Examen de Ingenios.

THE EXAMINATION of mens Wits.

In which, by discouering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what profession each one is apt, and how far he shall profit therein.

By John Huarte.

Translated out of the Spanish tongue by *M. Camillo Camilli.*

Englished out of his Italian, by *R. C. Esquire.*

LONDON,
Printed by Adam Islip.
1596.

16;06

LONDON.

1796.

TO THE RIGHT VVORSHIPFVL SIR *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN* KNIGHT, ONE OF THE DEPVTIE LIEVTENANTS OF CORNWAILE.

GOod Sir, your Booke returneth vnto you clad in a Corniſh gabardine, which if it become him not wel, the fault is not in the ſtuffe, but in the botching Tailor, who neuer bound Prentice to the occupation, and working only for his paſſe-time, could hardly obſerue the preciſe rules of meaſure: but ſuch as it is, yours it is, and yours is the workeman, entirely addicted to reuerence you for your vertues, to loue you for your kindneſſe, and ſo more readie in deſire, than able in power to teſtifie the ſame, doe with my deweſt remembrance take leaue, reſting

At your diſpoſition,

R. C.

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probably Fra. Carew

TO THE MAIESTIE of *Don Philip*, our Soueraigne.

TO the end that Artificers may attaine the perfection requisit for the vse of the commonwealth, me thinketh (Catholike roiall Maiestie) a law should be enacted, that no carpenter should exercise himselfe in any worke which appertained to the occupation of an husbandman, nor a tailor to that of an architect, and that the Aduocat should not minister Phisicke, nor the Phisition play the Aduocat, but ech one exercise only that art to which he beareth a naturall inclination, and let passe the residue. For considering how base and narrowly bounded a mans wit is for one thing and no more, I haue alwaies held it for a matter certain, That no man can be perfectly seene in two arts, without failing in

in one of them: now to the end he may not erre in chusing that which fitteth best with his owne nature, there should be deputed in the common-wealth, men of great wisedome and knowledge, who might discouer each ones wit in his tender age, and cause him perforce to studie that science which is agreeable for him, not permitting him to make his own choice: whence this good would ensue to your states and signiories, that in them should reside the rarest artificers of the world, and their workes should be of the greatest perfection, for nought else than because they vnited art with nature. The like would I that the vniuersities of our kingdomes did put in practise, for seeing they allow not that a scholer should passe to another facultie, vnlesse he perfectly vnderstand the Latine tongue, they should haue also examiners, to trie whether he who purposeth to studie Logick, Philosophie, Diuinitie, or the Laws, haue such a wit as is requisit for euery of these sciences, for otherwise, besides the dammage that such a one shall worke afterwards to the Common-wealth, by vsing an art wherein he is not skilled, it is a greefe to see that a man should take paines, and beat his brains about a matter wherein he

cannot reape any aduantage. For that at this day such a diligence is not vsed, those who had not a wit fit for Diuinitie, haue destroied the Christian religion. So doe those who are vntoward for Phisicke, shorten many a mans daies: neither possesseth the Legall Science that perfection which it might receiue, because it is not made knowne, to what reasonable power the vse and interpretation of the laws appertaineth. All the antient Philosophers found by experience, that where nature doth not dispose a man to knowledge, it falleth out a superfluous labour to toile in the rules of art. But none hath cleerely and distinctly deliuered vvhat that nature is vvhich maketh a man able for one science, and vncapaple of another, nor how many differences of vvittes there are found in mankind, nor vvhat Arts or Sciences do answer each in particular, nor by what tokens this may be known, vvhich is the thing that most importeth.

These foure points (though they seem vnpossible) containe the matter vvhereof I am to entreat, besides many others appurtenant to the purpose of this doctrine, with intention that curious parents may haue an art & maner to discouer

ner the wit of their children, and may weet how to set each of them in hand with that science wherin he shall principally profit. And this is an aduise which *Galen* sayth was giuen his father, namely that he should set him to studie Phisicke, because for that science he had a singular wit. By which your maiestie shall vnderstand how much it importeth the common-wealth, that there be established in the same a choice, and examination of wits for the sciences, seeing fro the study which *Galen* bestowed in Phisick, there ensued so great good to the diseased of his time, and he left so many remedies in writing for the posteritie, Euen as *Baldus* (a notable man in profession of the lawes) when he studied and practised Phisick, if he had passed further therein, would haue prooued but an ordinarie Phisitian, as he was not better, for that he wanted the difference of wit requisit for this science, but the lawes should haue lost one of the greatest helps that might be found amongst men for expounding them.

When I therfore purposed to reduce this new manner of Philosophie to art, and to proue the same in some wits, I remembered my selfe of your Maiestie, as the best knowne, and one, at whom

the whole world wondereth, beholding a Prince of ſo great knowledge and wiſedome, of whome here we cannot conueniently entreat; the laſt chapter ſaue one is your conuenient place, where your Maieſtie ſhall ſee the purport of your owne wit, and the art and learning wherewith you would haue benefited our common-wealth if you had bene a priuat perſon, as by nature you are our king and ſouereigne.

The ſecond Proeme to the Reader.

WHen Plato *would teach any doctrine graue, ſubtile. and deuided from the vulgar opinion, he made choiſe amongſt his ſcholers of ſuch as he reputed beſt witted, and to thoſe onely he imparted his mind, knowing by experience, that to teach delicat matters to perſons of baſe vnderſtanding, was loſſe of time, loſſe of pains, and loſſe of learning. The ſecond thing which he did after this choiſe made, was to preuent them with certaine preſuppoſitions, cleare and true, which ſhould not be wide from his concluſion: for the ſpeeches and ſentences which vnlooked for are deliuered againſt that which the vulgar beleeueth, at the beginning ſerue for nought elſe, (ſuch preuention not being made) than to put in a confuſion him that liſteneth, and to breed ſuch a loathing in mens minds, as it cauſeth them to looſe their*

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good affection, and to abhorre and detest this doctrin. This manner of proceeding would I, that I might obserue with thee, (curious Reader) if meanes could be vsed, that I might first treate with thee, and discouer betweene thee and me the disposition of thy wit. For if it be such as is requisite for this doctrine, and estranged from the ordinarie capacities, I would in secret tell thee such new and speciall conceites, as thou wouldest neuer haue thought could fall within the compasse of a mans imagination. But inasmuch as this will not be, and this worke must issue in publicke for all sortes, I could not but set thy braines somewhat aworke: for if thy wit be of the common and Vulgar alloy, I know right well thou art alreadie persuaded, that the number of the sciences, and their perfection, hath been accomplished many daies agoe. And heereto thou art mooued by a vaine reason, that they hauing found out no more what to ad, it is a token, that now there is in nothing, any more nouelties. Now if by hap thou art possessed of such an opinion, go no further, nor read thou anie longer on, for thou wilt be much agreeued, to see how miserable a difference of wit possesseth thee. But if thou be discreet, well compounded, and sufferent, I will

deliuer

deliuer vnto thee 3 conclusions very true, albeit for their noueltie they are worthie of great maruell.

The first is, that of many differēces of wit, which are in mankind, one only with prehemiuence can fal to thy lot, if alreadie, nature, as verie mightie, at such time as she framed it for thee, did not bestow all her endeuour, in vniting two onely, or three, or (in that she could not effect the same) left thee a dolt, and depriued of them all.

The second, that to euery differēce of wit there answereth in prehemiuence, but one only science, and no more of that condition. So as if thou diuine not to chuse that which answereth thy naturall ability, thou shalt be very remisse in the rest, though thou ply them night and day.

The third, that after thou hast knowen which the science is, that most answereth thy wit, there resteth yet (that thou mayst not be deceiued) another greater difficultie, which is, whether thine abilitie be more appliable to the practick than the theorick, for these 2 parts (be it what science it wil) are so opposit betwixt themselues, & require wits so different, that they may be placed one against the other, as if they were contraries. Hard are these sciences, but yet they haue greater

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difficultie and hardnesse, viz. that we cannot appeale from them, nor pretend that we haue receiued wrong. For God being the author of nature, and seeing that she gaue not to each man more than one difference of wit, (as I haue said before) through the opposition or difficulti: which combreth vs in vnuring them, he applied himselfe to her, and of the Sciences which are distributed amongst men by grace, it is a miracle, if in an eminent degree, he giue more than one. But there are (sayth S. Paule) deuisions of graces, and the same spirit; there are deuisions of ministeries, and the same Lord; there are deuisions of operations, but the same God, who worketh all things in all persons. To euery one is giuen the manifestation of the spirit for profit. and to one is giuen by the spirit the word of wisedome, to another that of knowledge, after the same spirit, to another sayth, in the same spirit, and to another the grace of healing, in the same spirit, to another the working of vertues, to another propheciens, and the description of spirits, to others the Varietie of toungs, to another the interpretation of words. but one selfe spirit, which diuideth to euery one as him pleaseth, worketh all these things.

This bestowing of sciences (I doubt not) God vseth, hauing

hauing regard to the wit and naturall disposition of euery person. For the Talents which he distributed, in S. Matthew, *the same Euangelist sayth, that he gaue them vnto euery one according to his proper vertue.*

And to thinke that these supernaturall Sciences require not some dispositions in the subiect, before they be infused, is an errour very great: for when God formed Adam *and* Eue, *it is certaine that before he filled them with wisedome, he instrumentalized their braine in such sort, as they might receiue it with ease, and serue as a commodious instrument, therewith to be able to discourse, and to forme reasons. And therefore the diuine scripture sayth; God gaue them an heart to thinke, and filled them with the discipline of vnderstanding, and that according to the difference of which euery one partaketh, one science is infused, and not onother, or more or lesse of each of them, is a thing which may be vnderstood by this example of our first parents, for God filling them both with wisedome, it is a verifyed conclusion, that he infused the lesser portion into her, for which reasons the Diuines say, that the diuell tooke hardinesse to beguile her, and durst not tempt the man, as fearing his much wisedome:*

wisedome. The reason hereof (as hereafter we will proue) is, that the naturall composition which the woman hath in her braine, is not capable of much wit, nor much wisedome. In the Angelicall substances, we shall find also the like count and reason: for God, to giue an angell more degrees of glorie and higher gifts, first giueth him a more delicat nature; and if you enquire of the Diuines whereto this delicat nature serueth, they answer, that the Angell who hath the deepest vnderstanding, and the best nature, with most facilitie conuerteth himselfe vnto God, and vseth his gift with the more efficacie; and that the like betideth in men. Hence we cleerely inferre, that there being an election of wit for sciences supernaturall, and that, not whatsoeuer difference of abilitie, is their commodious instrument, humane learning (with more reason) requireth the same, because it is to be learned by men, with the force of their wit.

To be able then to distinguish and discerne these naturall differences of mans wit, and to applie to each by art, that science wherein he may profit, is the intention of this my worke. If I bring the same to end (as I haue purposed) we will yeeld the glorie to God, seeing from his hand proceedeth whatsoeuer is good and

and certaine: and if not, thou knowest well (discreet Reader) that it is impossible both to deuise an art, and to reduce the same to perfection. For so long and large are humane sciences, that mans life sufficeth not to find them out, and to giue them that perfection which is requisit.

The first inuenter performeth very much, if he discouer some notable principles, to the end that such as come after, may with this seed take an occasion to amplifie the art, and to bring it into that estimation and account which is due thereunto. Aristotle *alluding hereunto, sayth: that the errors of those who first began to handle matters of Philosophie, are to be held in great reuerence, for it prooues a matter so difficult, to deuise new things, and so easie to ad vnto that which hath bene alreadie spoken and treated of; the defects of the first deserue not (by this reason) to be much reprooued, neither he who addeth ought, meriteth any great commendation. I confesse that this my worke cannot be excused from some errors, seeing the matter is so delicat, and no way fore-opened to entreat thereof. But if the same be in a matter where the vnderstanding hath place to thinke, in this case I pray thee (wittie Reader) that before thou giue sen-*

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vence thou read ouer the whole worke, and assure thy
selfe what the difference of thine owne wit is, and if
in the worke thou find ought which in thine opinion is
not well sayd, consider well of the reasons which sway
the most against it, and if thou canst not resolue, then
turne to read the eleuenth chapter, for in that
shalt thou find the answer which
they may receiue.

The Examination or Triall of mens wits and dispositions.

CHAP. I.

He prooueth by an example, that if a Child haue not the disposition and abilitie, which is requisit for that science whereunto he wil addict himselfe, it is a superfluous labour to be instructed therein by good schoolemaisters, to haue store of bookes, and continually to study it.

THe opinion of *Cicero* was good, who, that his sonne *Marke* might proue such a one in that kind of learning, which himselfe had made choise of, as he desired; iudged, that it sufficed to send him to a place of studie, so renowmed and famous in the world, as that of *Athens*, and to giue him *Cratippus* for his schoolemaister, who was the greatest Philosopher of those daies, bringing him vp in a citie so populous, where, through the great concourse of people which thither assembled, he should of necessitie haue many examples and profitings of strangers, fit to teach him by experience those things which appertained to the knowledge that himselfe was to learne. But, notwithstanding all this diligence, and much more

beſides, which (as a good father) he vſed, prouiding him bookes, and writing ſome vnto him of his own head; the Hiſtorians report, that he prooued but a Cods-head, with little eloquence, and leſſe philoſophie, (a matter vſuall amongſt men, that the ſonne abies the much wiſedome of the father.) Verely *Cicero* greatly beguiled himſelfe, imagining that albeit his ſonne were not iſſued out of natures hands, with that wit and habilitie which is requiſit for eloquence and philoſophie, yet by means of the good induſtrie of ſuch a teacher, and the many books, and examples of *Athens*, togither with the yoong mans continuall endeuour, and proceſſe of time, the defects of his vnderſtanding would be amended: but we ſee, that finally he deceiued himſelfe, neither do I maruell thereat, for he had many examples to this purpoſe, which encouraged him to beleeue, that the ſame might alſo befall in the perſon of his ſonne.

For the ſame *Cicero* reports in his booke of *Deſtinie*, that *Zenocrates* had a wit very vntoward for the ſtudie of Naturall and Morall philoſophie, of whome *Plato* ſayd, That he had a ſcholer, who ſtood in need of a ſpurre; and yet notwithſtanding, through the good induſtrie of ſuch a maiſter, and the continuall trauell of *Zenocrates* himſelfe, he became a very great Philoſopher. And he writes the like alſo of *Cleantes*, who was ſo doltiſh and void of vnderſtanding, that no teacher would receiue him into his ſchoole; whereat the yoong man agreeued and aſhamed, endured ſo great toile in ſtudying, that he came afterwards to be called a ſecond *Hercules* for wiſedome. No leſſe vntoward for matters of eloquẽce, ſeemed the wit of *Demoſthenes*, of whome it is ſayd, that when he was now growne big, he could not yet ſpeake plaine, but labouring and applying the art, by hearing of good teachers, he proued

ued the best Oratour of the world: and specially (as *Cicero* recounts) he could not pronounce the letter, R, for that he did somwhat stamer, and yet by practise he grew to articulat it so well, as if he had neuer had that way any defect. Hence tooke that prouerbe his originall, which saith, That mans wit in matters of science, is like a plaier at dice, for if any one prooue vnluckie in throwing his chaunce, by artificiall practise he comes to amend his euill fortune. But none of these examples produced by *Cicero*, remains without a conuenient answer in my doctrine: for (as we will hereafter proue) there is in yongmen a certaine dulnes, which argues a greater wit in another age, than if the same had bene sharpe from their childhood: nay it is a iudgement that they will prooue lowtish men, when they begin very soone to discourse and be quicke of conceipt. Wherefore, if *Cicero* had known the true tokens by which wits are in the first age to be discouered, he would haue held it a good signe, that *Demosthenes* was rude and slow of speech, and that *Zenocrates* had need of a spurre whilest he learned. I take not from a good instructor art, and industrie, their vertue and force, to manure wits, as well rude as pliant: but that which I will say, is, that if a yoong man haue not of himselfe an vnderstanding capable of precepts and rules, which properly belong to the art he would learne, and to none other, that the diligence vsed by *Cicero* with his sonne, was as vaine as that which any other parent shall vse with his sonne, will be in the like. Those who haue read *Plato* shall easily know, that this doctrine is true, who reports that *Socrates* was the sonne (as he also reported himselfe) of a midwife, & that as his mother (albeit she were much praised in the art) could not make a woman to be deliuered, that before her comming to her was not with child; so he (performing the like of-

fice as his mother) could not make his scholers bring foorth any science, if of themselues they had not their vnderstanding conceiued therwith. He was of opinion, that sciences were (as it were) naturall to those men only, who had their wits appliable thereunto; and that in such it befell, as we see by experience in those who haue forgotten somewhat which they first knew, who if we put them in mind but of one word, gather from that all the residue.

Maisters (for ought that I can gather) haue none other office with their schollers, than to bring learning to their remembrance, for if they haue a fruitfull wit, they make them with this only to bring forth woonderful conceipts; otherwise they do but afflict themselues, and those whom they instruct, nor euer obtaine their desires. And (at least if I were a teacher) before I receiued any scholer into my schoole, I would grow to many trials and experiments with him, vntill I might discouer the qualitie of his wit, and if I found it by nature directed to that science whereof I made profession, I would willingly receiue him, for it breeds a great contentment in the teacher, to instruct one of good towardlinesse: and if not, I would counsaile him to studie that science, which were most agreeable with his wit. But if I saw, that he had no disposition or capacitie for any sort of learning, I would friendly and with gentle words tell him; Brother, you haue no means to proue a man of that profession which you haue vndertaken, take care not to loose your time and your labour, and prouide you some other trade of liuing, which requires not so great an habilitie as appertaineth to learning. Hereof is seene very plaine experience, for we behold a great number of scholers enter the course of whatsoeuer science, and (be the teacher very good or very bad) finally euery day some prooue of great skill, some of meane, and some in their

their whole course, haue done nought else than leese their time, spend their goods, and beat their brains without any maner of profit.

I wot nere whence this effect may spring, they all hearing one selfe teacher, and with equall diligence and care, and perhaps the dull take more paine than the wittie, and this difficultie growes the greater, by seeing that those who are vntoward for one science, are very apt to another, and the toward in one sort of learning, passing to another sort, can vnderstand nothing. But my selfe am at least a good witnesse in this truth; for there were three companions of vs, who entered together to studie the Latine toong, and one of vs learned the same with great facilitie, the rest could neuer make any commendable composition; but all passing on to Logicke, one of those who could not learne Grammar, proued in that art a principal Aegle, and the other two, in the whole, neuer learned one ready point; then all three comming to heare Astrologie, it was a matter woorthy of consideration, that he who could no skill of Latine or Logicke, in few daies knew more in Astrologie than his maister that taught them, and the rest could neuer learne it. I then maruelling hereat, began foorthwith to make discourses, and play the Philosopher hereon, and so I found that euery science required a speciall and particular wit, which reaued from that, was little worth in other sorts of learning. And if this be true (as verely it is, and we will so proue it hereafter) he that at this day should enter into the schooles of our times, making proofe and assay of the scholers wits, how many would he change from one science to another, & how many would he send into the fields for dolts and vnable to learne? and how many would he cal backe of those, who for want of ability are occupied in base exercises, and yet their wits

were by nature created only for learning? but sithens this cannot be brought about nor remedied, it behooues to stay no longer hereon, but to passe forward.

It cannot be denied, but that (as I haue sayd) there are wits found capable of one science, which are vntoward for another: and therefore it behooues, before the child be set to studie, to discouer the manner of his wit, and to see what science agreeth with his capacitie, and then to prouide that he may apply the same. But it is necessarie also to consider, that this which hath bene sayd, sufficeth not to make a man prooue sufficiently learned, but wee must haue regard of other conditions no lesse requisit than is this of towardlinesse. For *Hippocrates* sayth, that mans wit holds the like proportion with knowledge, as the earth doth with seed, which though of her selfe she be fruitfull and fat, yet it behooues to manure her, and vse aduisement to what sort of seed her naturall disposition enclineth; for euery sort of earth cannot without distinction, produce euery sort of seed. Some better brings foorth Wheat than Barley, and some Barley better than Wheat; and of Wheats some bring a plentifull increase of good Lammas Wheat, and cannot away with the Basest sort.

Neither doth the good husbandman content himselfe to make this only distinction, but after he hath manured the earth in due season, he lookes for conuenient time to sow it, for it cannot be done at all times of the yeare, and after that the graine is sprung vp, he clenseth and weedeth it, that it may encrease and grow, giuing the fruit which of the seed is expected. After this sort, it is necessarie that the science being knowne, which best fitteth with the person, he begin to studie from his first age, for this (sayth *Aristotle*) is the most pliant of all others to learning. Moreo-

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uer, mans life is very short, and the arts long and toilsome, for which it behooues that there be time sufficient to know them, and space to exercise them, and therewith to profit the common wealth. Childrens memorie (saith *Aristotle*) is a table without any picture, because it was but a little while since they were borne, and so they receiue any thing whatsoeuer with facilitie; and not as the memorie of old men, which full of those many things they haue seene in the long course of their life, is not capable of more: and therefore *Plato* sayth, that in the presence of youth, we should recount honest tales and actions, which may incite them to vertuous doings, for what they learne in that age, abides still in their minds, and not (as *Galen* sayth) that then it behooues to learne the arts, when our nature hath accrued al the forces that she can haue; which point is void of reason if you admit no distinction. He that is to learne the Latine tongue or any other language, ought to do it in his childhood, for if he tarrie till the bodie be hardened, and take the perfection that it ought to haue, he shall neuer reape auaileable profit. In his second age, namely boyes state, it is requisit that he trauaile in the art of Syllogismes, for then the vnderstanding begins to display his forces, which hath the same proportion with Logicke, as shackles haue with the feet of mules not yet trayned, who going some daies therewith, take afterward a certaine grace in their pace: so our vnderstanding thackled with the rules & precepts of Logicke, takes afterwards a graceful kind of discourling and arguing in sciences and disputations. Then followes youth, in which all the sciences appertaining to the vnderstanding may be learned, for that hath a ripened knowledge.

True it is, that *Aristotle* excepteth natural Philosophy, saying, a yoong man is not of fit disposition for this kind

of doctrine, wherein it seemeth he hath reason, for that it is a science of deeper consideration and wisdome than any other.

Now the age thus knowne, in which sciences are to be learned, it behooues to search out a commodious place for the same, where nothing else saue learning may be handled, and such are the Vniuersitie: but the youth must forgo his fathers house, for the dandling of the mother, brethren, kindred, and friends which are not of his profession, do greatly hinder his profiting. This is plainly seene in the scholers who are natiue of the cities and places where Vniuersities are seated, none of which (saue by great miracle) euer become learned. And this may easily be remedied; by changing of Vniuersities, and the natiue of one citie going to studie in another. This faring, that a man takes from his owne country to make himselfe of woorth and discretion, is of so great importaunce, that there is no maister in the world who can teach him more, and especially, when a man sees himselfe (sometimes) abandoned of the fauour and delights of his countrie. Depart out of thy land (sayd God to *Abraham*) and seuer thy selfe from amidst thy kindred and thy fathers house, and come to the place where I will shew thee, in which thou shalt make thy name great, & I will giue thee my blessing. The like sayes God to all men, who desire to prooue of value and wisdome: for albeit he can blesse them in their natiue countrie, yet he will, that men dispose themselues by this meane which he hath ordained, and that wisdome be not attained by them with idlenesse. All this is meant with a foregoing presuppositall, that a man haue a good wit and be apt, for otherwise, *He that goes a beast to Rome, returns a beast againe.* Little auailes it, that a dullard go to learne in the famous places of studie, where there is no chaire of vnder-

vnderſtanding, nor wiſdome, nor a man to teach it.

The third point of diligence is, to ſeeke out a maiſter who hath a direction and method in teaching, whoſe doctrine is ſound and firme, not ſophiſticall nor of vaine conſiderations: for all that the ſcholler doth, whileſt he is a learning, is to credite all that which his maiſter propounds vnto him, for he hath no ſound iudgement or diſcretion to diſcerne or ſeparat falſhood from truth, albeit this is a chauncefull caſe, and not placed in the choice of ſuch as learne, that the ſcholers come in due time to ſtudie, and that the Vniuerſities haue good or vnfit inſtructers; as it befell certaine Phiſitions, of whom *Galen* reports, that hauing conuinced them by many reaſons and experiments, and ſhewed them, that the practiſe which they vſed was falſe and preiudiciall to mens health; the tears fell from their eyes, and in his preſence they began to curſe their hard hap, in lighting on ſuch bad maiſters as bare ſway during the time that they were learners. True it is, that there are found ſome ſchollers of ſo ripe wit, as they ſtraightwaies looke into the condition of the teachers, and the learning which he teacheth, and if it be vitious, they know how to confute the ſame, and to giue allowance to ſuch as deliuer ſoundly; theſe at the years end teach their maiſter much more than their maiſter taught them; for doubting & demaunding wittily, they make him ro vnderſtand and anſwer things ſo exquiſit, as he himſelfe neuer knew nor ſhould haue knowne, if the ſcholler with the felicitie of his wit, had not brought them to his mind: but thoſe who can do this, are one or two at the moſt, and the dullards are infinit, through which, it would do well (ſeeing this choiſe and Examination of Wits for euery ſcience is not had) that the

Vniuer-

Vniuersities alwaies made prouision of good teachers, endued with sound learning, and a cleere discerning wit, to the end they may not instruct the ignorant in errours and false propositions.

The fourth diligence requisit to be vsed, is to studie euery science with order, beginning at his principles, and passing through the midst to the end, without hauing matter that may presuppose another thing before. For which cause, I haue alwaies held it an errour, to heare many lessons of diuers matters, and to carry them all home fardled vp together. By this means there is made a masse of things in the vnderstanding, which afterwards, when they come to practise, a man knowes not how to turne to vse the precepts of his art, nor to assigne them a place conuenient: and it is much better to bestow labour in euery matter by it selfe, and with that naturall order which it holds in his composition, for in the selfe manner as it is learned, so is it also preserued in the memorie. And more in particular, it is necessary that they do this, who of their owne nature haue a confused wit: and this may easily be remedied by hearing one matter by it selfe, and that being endtd, to enter into the next following, till the whole art be atchieued. *Galen* well vnderstanding of how great importance it was to studie matters with order and conceit, wrot a booke to teach the manner that was to be held in reading his works, to the end that the Phisition might not be tangled in confusion. Others adde herevnto, that the scholler, whilest he learneth, haue but one booke which may plainly containe the points of his learning, and that he attend to studie that only and no more, least he grow into a garboile and confusion, and herein they are warranted by great reason.

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The laſt thing which makes a man proue of rare learning, is to conſume much time at his booke, and to expect, that knowledge haue his due digeſtion, and take deepe root; for as the bodie is not maintained by the much which we eat and drinke in one day, but by that which the ſtomacke digeſteth and turneth: ſo our vnderſtanding is not filled by the much which we read in little time, but by that which by little and little it proceeds to conceiue and chew vpon. Our wit day by day diſpoſeth it ſelfe better and better, and comes (by proceſſe of time) to light on things which before it could neither vnderſtand nor conceiue. Vnderſtanding hath his beginning, his increaſe, his ſtanding, and his declining, as hath a man, and other creatures and plants; it begins in boies age, hath his increaſe in youth, his ſtanding in middle or mans age, and in old age it begins to decline. Who ſo therefore would know at what time his vnderſtanding enioieth all the forces which it may partake, let him weet, that it is from the age of thirty and three vntill fiftie, little more or leſſe, within which compaſſe we may beſt giue credit to graue authors, if in the diſcourſe of their life, they haue held contrarie opinions; and he that will write bookes, let him do it about this age, and not before nor after, if he meane not to vnſay againe, or change opinion.

But mans age hath not in all people a like meaſure and reaſon; for in ſome, childhood ends in twelue yeares, in ſome at fourteene, ſome haue ſixteene, and ſome eighteen, ſuch liues very long, becauſe their youth arriues to little leſſe than forty yeares, and their ripe or firme age to three-ſcore, and they haue afterward twentie yeares of old age, wherethrough their life amounts to foureſcore, and this is the terme of thoſe who are ve-

ry

ty ſtrong. The firſt ſort, who finiſh their childhood at twelue years, are very ſhort liued, and begin ſpeedily to diſcourſe, their beard ſoone ſprowteth out, and their wit laſteth but a ſmall time, theſe at thirtie fiue years begin to decline, and at forty and eight, finiſh their life.

Of all the conditions aboue ſpecified, there is not any one which is not very neceſſary, profitable, and helpfull in practiſe for a yoong man to receiue notice of, but to haue a good and anſwerable nature to the ſcience which he pretendeth to ſtudy, is the matter which moſt makes for the purpoſe: for with this, we haue ſeene, that diuers men haue begun to ſtudy, after their youth was expired, and were inſtructed by bad teachers, with euill order, and in their owne birth-places, and yet for all that haue prooued great clearks. But if the wit faile (ſayth *Hippocrates*) all other diligences are loſt. But there is no man who hath better verefied this, than the good *Marcus Cicero*, who through griefe of ſeeing his ſonne ſuch a doo-nought, with whom none of the means could preuaile, that he had procured to breed him wildome, ſayd in the end after this ſort: *What elſe is it, after the manner of the Giants, to fight with the gods, than to reſiſt againſt nature?* as if he ſhould haue ſayd: What thing is there, which better reſembles the battaile, which the giants vndertooke againſt the gods, than that a man who wanteth capacitie, ſhould ſet himſelfe to ſtudie? for as the giants neuer ouercame the gods, but were ſtill vanquiſhed by them: ſo whatſoeuer ſcholler will labour to ouercome his owne vntoward nature, ſhall reſt vanquiſhed by her. For which cauſe, the ſame *Cicero* counſelleth vs, that we ſhould not vſe force againſt our nature, nor endeuour to become Orators, if ſhe aſſent not, for we ſhall vndergo labour in vaine.

That

CHAP. II.

That Nature is that which makes a man of habilitie to learne.

IT is an opinion very common and ordinarie amongſt the antient Philoſophers, to ſay, That Nature is ſhe who makes a man of habilitie to learne, and that art with her precepts and rules giues a facilitie therevnto, but then vſe and experience, which he reapes of particular things, makes him mightie in working. Yet none of them euer ſhewed in particular, what thing this nature was, nor in what ranke of cauſes it ought to be placed: only they affirmed, that this, wanting in him who learned, art, experience, teachers, bookes, and trauaile are of none auaile. The ignoraunt vulgar ſeeing a man of great wit and readineſſe, ſtraightwaies aſſigne God to be the author thereof, and looke no further, but hold euery other imagination that goes beyond this, for vanitie: but naturall Philoſophers deſpiſe this manner of talking, for put caſe that the ſame be godly, and containe therein religion and truth, yet it groweth from not knowing the order and diſpoſition which God placed amongſt naturall things that day when they were created, and ſo couer their ignorance with a kind of warrantiſe, and in ſort, that none may reprehend or gainſay the ſame, they affirme that all befals as God will, and that nothing ſucceeds, which ſprings not from his diuine pleaſure. But though this be neuer ſo apparant a truth, yet are they worthie of re-

proofe,

proofe: becauſe, as not euerie kind of demaund (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) is to be made after one faſhion, ſo not euerie aunſwer (though true) is to be giuen.

Whileſt a naturall Philoſopher reaſoned with a Grammarian, there came to them an inquiſitiue Gardener, and asked what the cauſe might be, that he cheriſhing the earth ſo charilie, in deluing, turning, dunging, and watering it, yet the ſame neuer well brought foorth the herbage which he ſowed therein; whereas the hearbes which ſhe bred of her ſelfe, ſhe cauſed to encreaſe with great facilitie. The Grammarian aunſwered, This grew from the diuine prouidence, and was ſo ordained thorow the good gouernment of the world: at which anſwer, the naturall Philoſopher laughed, ſeeing he reduced this to God, becauſe he knew not the diſcourſe of naturall cauſes, nor in what ſort they proceeded to their effects. The Grammarian perceiuing the other laugh, asked whether he mocked him, or wherat elſe he laughed? The Philoſopher anſwered that he laughed not at him, but at the maiſter who taught him ſo ill, for the knowledge and ſolution of things which ſpring from the diuine prouidence (as are the workes ſupernaturall) appertaine to the Metaphificks (whom we now tearme Diuines:) but this queſtion propounded by the Gardener, is naturall, and appertaineth to the iuriſdiction of the naturall Philoſophers, becauſe there are certaine ordered and manifeſt cauſes, from which this effect may ſpring. And thus the naturall Philoſopher anſwered, ſaying, that the earth is conditioned like a ſtepmother, who very carefully brings vp her owne children which ſhe breeds her ſelfe, but takes away the ſuſtenance from thoſe which appertaine to her husband, and ſo we ſee that her owne children are fat and freſh, and her ſtep-

children

children weake and ill coloured. The hearbs which the earth brings foorth of her selfe, are borne of her proper bowels, and those which the Gardener makes to grow by force, are the daughters of another mother, wherethrough she takes from them the vertue and nourishment, by which they ought to increase, that she may giue it to the hearbs which are borne of her selfe.

Hippocrates likewise reports, that he going to visit the great Philosopher *Democritus*, he told him the follies which the vulgar speake of Phisicke, namely, that seeing themselues recouered from sickneſſe, they would say, it was God who healed them, and that if his wil were not, little had the good diligence of the Phisition auailed. This is so antient a manner of talke, and the naturall Philosophers haue so often refuted it, that the seeking to take the same away, were superfluous, neither is it conuenient: for the vulgar, who know not the particular causes of any effect, answereth better and with more truth, as touching the vniuersall cause, which is God, than to say some other vnfitting thing. But I haue often gone about to consider the reason & the cause whence it may grow, that the vulgar sort is so great a friend to impute all things to God, and to reaue them from nature, & do so abhor the naturall means: and I know not whether I haue bene able to find it out. The vulgar (at least) giues hereby to vnderstand, that forasmuch as they know not what effects they ought to attribute to God immediatly, and what to Nature, they speake after this maner. Besides that, men are for the most part impatient, and desirous to accomplish speedily what they couet. But because the natural means are of such prolixitie, and work with length of time, they possesse not the patience to stand marking thereof, and knowing that God is omnipo-

omnipotent, and in a moment of time performeth whatsoeuer him pleaseth (whereof they find many examples) they would that he should giue thē health, as he did to the sicke of the palsie; and wisedome, as to *Salomon*; riches, as to *Iob*; and that he should deliuer them from their enimie, as he did *Dauid*.

2 The second cause is, for that men are arrogant, and vaine conceited, many of whom, desire secretly in their hearts, that God would bestow vpon them some particular graces, which should not befall after the common vse (as is, that the sunne ariseth vpon the good and bad, and that the raine fals vpon all in generall) for benefits are so much the more highly prized, as they are the more rare. And for this cause we haue seene many men to feigne miracles in houses and places of deuotion, for straightwaies, the people flockes vnto them, and holds them in great reuerence, as persons of whome God makes a speciall account: and if they be poore, they fauour them with large almes, and so some sinne vpon interest.

3 The third reason is, that men haue a liking to be well at their ease, whereas naturall causes are disposed with such order and conceit, that to obtaine their effects, it behooues to bestow labour. Wherefore they would haue God demeane himselfe towards them, after his omnipotencie, and that (without sweating) they might come to the well-head of their desires. I leaue aside the malice of those, who require miracles at Gods hand, thereby to tempt his almightinesse, and to prooue whether he be able to do it: and othersome, who to be reuenged after their hearts desire, cal for fire from heauen, and such other cruell chastisements.

4 The last cause is, for that many of the vulgar are religiously

ligiously giuen, and hold deere, that God may be honored and magnified, which is much sooner brought about by way of miracles than by naturall effects, but the common sort of men know not, that workes aboue nature and woonderfull, are done by God, to shew those who know it not, that he is omnipotent, and that hee serues himselfe of them; as an argument to prooue his doctrine, and that this necessitie once ceasing, he neuer doth it more. This may well be perceiued, considering that God dooth no longer those vnwoonted things of the new testament: and the reason is, for that on his behalfe, he hath performed all necessarie diligence, that men might not pretend ignorance. And to thinke that he will begin anew to do the like miracles, and by them once againe to prooue his doctrine, in raising the dead, restoring sight to the blind, and healing the lame and sicke of the palsie, is an errour very great; for once God taught men what is behoofull, and prooued the same by miracles, but returnes not to do it any more. God speakes once (sayth *Iob*) and turnes not to a second repliall.

The token whereon I ground my iudgement, when I would discouer whether a man haue a wit appropriat to Naturall Philosophie, is, to see whether he bee addicted to reduce all matters to miracle, without distinction; and contrariwise, such as hold not themselues contented, vntill they know the particular cause of euerie effect, leaue no occasion to mistrust the goodnesse of their wit. These doe well know, that there are effects which must be reduced to God immediatly, (as miracles) and others to nature, (and such are those, which haue their ordinarie causes, frō whence they accustome to spring) but speaking both of the one manner and the

other, we alwaies place God for author: for when *Aristotle* said, that God and nature did nothing in vaine, hee meant not, that nature was an vniuersall cause, endowed with a iurisdiction seuered from God, but that shee was a name of the order and concent, which God hath bestowed in the frame of the world, to the end that the necessarie effects might follow, for the preseruation thereof. For in the same manner, it is vsually said that the King, and Ciuill Reason, doe no man wrong. In which kind of speech, no man conceiueth that this name Reason, signifieth a Prince which possesseth a seuerall iurisdiction from that of the king; but a terme, which by his signification, embraceth all the roial laws, and constitutions ordained by the same king, for the preseruation of his common wealth in peace. And as the king hath his speciall cases reserued to himselfe, which cannot bee decided by the law, for that they are vnusuall and waighrie: in like manner God left miraculous effects reserued for himself, neither gaue allowance vnto naturall causes, that they might produce them. But here we must note, that he who should know them for such, and difference them from naturall works, behooues to bee a great naturall Philosopher, and to vnderstand the ordinary causes that euery effect may hold, & yet all this sufficeth not, vnlesse the Catholike church ratifie them to bee such. And as the Doctors labour and studie in reading this ciuill Reason, preseruing the whole in their memorie, that they may know and vnderstand what the kings will was, in the determination of such a case: so wee naturall Philosophers (as doctors in this facultie) bestow all our studie in knowing the discourse and order, which God placed that day when he created the world, so to contemplat and vnderstand

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in what ſort, and vpon what cauſe, he would that things ſhould ſucceed. And as it were a matter worthy laughter, that a doctor ſhould alleage in his writings (though approoued) that the king commaunds a caſe ſhould bee thus determined, without ſhewing the Law and Reaſon, through which it was ſo decided: ſo natural Philoſophers laugh at ſuch as ſay, This is Gods doing; without aſſigning the order and diſcourſe of the particular cauſes whēce they may ſpring. And as the king wil giue them no eare, when they require him to breake ſome iuſt law, or to rule ſome caſe beſides the order of iuſtice, which hee hath commanded to bee obſerued: ſo God will not hearken when any man demaunds of him miracles and workes beſides naturall order, without cauſe why. For albeit the king euery day abrogates and eſtabliſheth new lawes, and changeth iudiciall order (as wel through the variation of times, as for that it is the iudgement of a fraile man, and cannot at one only time, attain to perfect right and iuſtice) notwithſtanding the naturall order of the vniuerſe, which we cal nature, from that day wherein God created the world, vnto this, hath had no need of adioining or reauing any one iot, becauſe he framed the ſame with ſuch prouidence and wiſedome, that to require this order might not bee obſerued, were to ſay, that his workes were vnperfect.

To returne then to that ſentence ſo often vſed by naturall Philoſophers, that *Nature makes able*; we muſt vnderſtand that there are Wits, and there are Abilities, which God beſtoweth vpon men beſides naturall order, as was the wiſedome of the Apoſtles, who being ſimple and of baſe account, were miraculouſly enlightened and repleniſhed with knowledge and learning. Of this ſort of abilitie & wiſdome, it cannot be verefied,

that nature makes able; for this is a worke, which is to be imputed immeadiatly vnto God, & not vnto nature: The like is to bee vnderstood of the wisedome of the Prophets, and of all those to whome God graunted some grace infused. Another sort of abilitie is found in men, which springs of their being begotten, with that order and consent of causes which are established by God to this end: and of this sort it may bee said with truth; *Nature makes able*. For (as we will prooue in the last chapter of this worke) there is to be found such an order and consent in naturall things, that if the fathers in time of procreation, haue regard to obserue the same, all their children shall prooue wise, and none otherwise. But the whilest, this significatiō of nature is very vniuersall and confused, and the vnderstanding contents not it selfe, nor staieth, vntill it conceiue the particular discourse, and the lateſt cause, and so it behooues to search out another signification of this name Nature, which may be more agreeable to our purpose.

Definition of Nature.

Aristotle and other naturall Philosophers, discend into more particularities, and call Nature, whatsoeuer substantiall forme, which giues the being to any thing, and is the originall of all the working thereof; in which signification, our reasonable soule may reasonably be tearmed nature, for from her we receiue our formall being, which we haue of being men, and the selfe same is the beginning of whatsoeuer we doe and worke. But all soules being of equall perfection (as well that of the wiser, as that of the foolish) it cannot be affirmed, that nature in this signification, is that which makes a man able, for if this were true, all men should haue a like measure of wit and wisedome: and therefore the same *Aristotle* found out another signification of nature, which is the

cause

cauſe, that a man is able or vnable; ſaying, that the temperature of the foure firſt qualities, (hot, cold, moiſt, and drie) is to be called nature, for from this iſſue al the habilities of man, all his vertues and vices, and this great varietie of wits which we behold. And this is clearely proued by conſidering the age of a man when he is wiſeſt, who in his childhood is no more then a bruit beaſt, and vſeth none other powers than thoſe of anger and concupiſcence; but comming to youth, there begins to ſhoot out in him a maruellous wit, and we ſee that it laſteth til a time certaine, and no longer, for old age growing on, he goes euery day looſing his wit, vntill it come to be quite decaied.

This varietie of wits, it is a matter certaine that it ſprings not from the reaſonable ſoule, for that is one ſelfe in all ages, without hauing receiued in his forces and ſubſtannce any alteration: but man hath in euery age a diuers temperature, and a contrarie diſpoſition, by meanes whereof, the ſoule doth other workes in childhood, other in youth, and other in old age. Whence we draw an euident argument, that one ſelfe ſoule, doing contrarie workes in one ſelfe bodie, for that it partakes in euery age a contrarie temperature, when of young men, the one is able, and the other vnapt, this growes for that the one of them enioies a diuers temperature from the other: And this (for that it is the beginning of all the workes of the reaſonable ſoule) was by the Phiſitions and the Philoſophers, termed Nature; of which ſignification, this ſentence is properly verefied, that *Nature makes able.*

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* writ a booke, wherein he prooueth, That the maners of the ſoule, follow the temperature of the bodie, in which it keepes reſidence,

ſidence, and that by reaſon of the heat, the coldneſſe, the moiſture, and the drouth, of the territorie where men inhabit, of the meats which they feed on, of the waters which they drinke, and of the aire which they breath: ſome are blockiſh, and ſome wiſe: ſome of woorth, and ſome baſe: ſome cruel, and ſome merciful: many ſtraight breſted, and many large: part liers, and part true ſpeakers: ſundrie traitors, and ſundrie faithfull: ſomewhere vnquiet, and ſomewhere ſtaied: there double, here ſingle: one pinching, another liberall: this man ſhamefaſt, that ſhameleſſe: ſuch hard, and ſuch light of beleefe. And to prooue this, hee cites many places of *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, who affirme, that the difference of nations, as well in compoſition of the bodie, as in conditions of the ſoule, ſpringeth from the varietie of this temperature: and experience it ſelfe euidently ſheweth this, how far are different *Greeks* from *Tartarians*: *Frenchmen* from *Spaniards*: *Indians* from *Dutch*, and *Æthiopians* from *Engliſh*. And this may bee ſeene, not only in countries ſo far diſtant, but if we conſider the prouinces that enuiron all *Spaine*, wee may depart the vertues and vices which wee haue recounted, amongſt the inhabitants, giuing ech one his particular vice and vertue; and if wee conſider the wit and manners of the *Catalonians*, *Valentians*, *Mercians*, *Granatines*, *Andaluzians*, *Eſtremenians*, *Portugals*, *Galleſians*, *Aſturians*, *Montagneſes*, *Biſcanes*, *Nauarriſts*, *Aragonois*, and of the kingdome of *Caſtile*, who ſees not and knowes not, how farre theſe are different amongſt themſelues, not only in ſhape of countenance, and in feature of body, but euen in the vertues and vices of the ſoule? Which all growes, for that euery of theſe prouinces hath his particular and different temperature. And this varietie of manners is knowne, not onely in coun-

countries ſo far off, but in places alſo that are not more than a little league in diſtance, it cannot be credited what ods there is found in the wits of the inhabitants. Finally, all that which *Galen* writeth in this his booke, is the groundplot of this my Treatiſe, albeit hee declares not in particular, the differences of the habilities which are in men, neither as touching the ſciences which euerie one requires in particular. Notwithſtanding, hee vnderſtood that it was neceſſarie to depart the ſciences amongſt yoong men, and to giue ech one that which to his naturall habilitie was requiſite, in as much as he ſaid, That well ordered common wealths, ought to haue men of great wiſedome and knowledge, who might in their tender age, diſcouer ech ones wit and naturall ſharpneſſe, to the end they might bee ſet to learne that art which was agreeable, and not leaue it to their owne election.

CHAP. III.

What part of the bodie ought to be well tempered, that a young man may haue habilitie.

MAns body hath ſo many varieties of parts and powers (applied ech to his end) that it ſhall not ſtray from our purpoſe, but rather growes a matter of neceſſitie, to know firſt, what member was ordained by nature for the principall inſtrument, to the end man might become wiſe and aduiſed. For it is a thing apparant, that we diſcourſe not with our foot, nor walke on our head,

nor see with our nostrils, nor heare with our eies, but that euery of these parts hath his vse and particular disposition, for the worke which it is to accomplish.

Before *Hippocrates* and *Plato* came into the world, it held for a generall conceit amongst the naturall Philosophers, that the heart was the principall part where the reasonable facultie made his residence, and the instrument wherewith the soule wrought the workes of wisedome, of diligence, of memorie, and of vnderstanding. For which cause, the diuine scripture (applying it selfe to the ordinarie speech of those times) in many places, cals the heart the soueraigne part of a man. But these two graue Philosophers comming into the world, gaue euidence that this opinion was false, and prooued by many reasons and experiments, that the braine is the principall seat of the reasonable soule, and so they all gaue hands to this opinion, saue only *Aristotle*, who (with a purpose of crossing *Plato* in all points) turned to reuiue the former opinion, and with topicall places to make it probable: with which of these opinions the truth swaieth, time serueth not now to discusse. For there is none of these Philosophers that doubteth, but that the braine is the instrument ordained by nature, to the end that man might become wise and skilfull, it sufficeth only to declare with what conditions this part ought to bee endued, so as wee may affirme, that it is dulie instrumentalized, and that a yong man in this behalfe may possesse a good wit and habilitie.

Foure conditions the braine ought to enioy, to the end the reasonable soule may therewith commodiously performe the workes which appertaine to vnderstanding and wisedome. The first, good composition; the second, that his parts bee well vnited; the third, that the heat

heat exceed not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie; the fourth, that his ſubſtance be made of parts ſubtile and very delicate.

In the good compoſition, are contained other foure things: the firſt is, good figure: the ſecond, quantitie ſufficient: the third, that in the braine the foure ventricles be diſtinct and ſeuered, each duly beſtowed in his ſeat and place: the fourth, that the capableneſſe of theſe be neither greater nor leſſe than is conuenient for their workings.

Galen collects the good figure of the braine, by an outward conſideration, namely the forme and diſpoſition of the head, which he ſaith, ought to be ſuch, as it ſhould be, if taking a perfect round ball of wax, and preſſing it together ſomewhat on the ſides, there will remaine (after that manner) the forehead and the nape with a little bunchineſſe. Hence it followes that the man who hath his forehead very plaine, and his nodocke flat, hath not his braine ſo figured, as is requiſit for wit and habilitie. The quantitie of the braine, which the ſoule needeth to diſcourſe & conſider, is a matter that breeds feare, for amongſt all the bruit beaſts, there is none found to haue ſo much braine as a man, in ſort, as if we ioine thoſe of two the greateſt oxen together, they will not equall that of one onely man, be he neuer ſo little. And that whereto behooues more conſideration, is, that amongſt bruit beaſts, thoſe who approch neereſt to mans wiſedome and diſcretion (as the ape, the fox, and the dog,) haue a greater quantitie of braine than the other, though bigger bodied than they. For which cauſe, *Galen* ſaid, that a little head in any man is euer faultie, becauſe that it wanteth braine; notwithſtanding, I auouch that if his hauing a great head, proceedeth from abundance

dance of matter, and ill tempered, at ſuch time as the ſame was ſhaped by nature, it is an euill token, for the ſame conſiſts all of bones and fleſh, and containes a ſmal quantitie of braine, as it befals in very big orenges, which opened, are found ſcarce of iuice, and hard of rinde. Nothing offends the reaſonable ſoule ſo much, as to make his abode in a body ſurcharged with bones, fat, and fleſh. For which cauſe *Plato* ſaid, that wiſe mens heads are ordinarily weake, and vpon any occaſion are eaſily annoied, and the reaſon is, for that nature made them of an emptie skull, with intention not to offend the wit, by compaſſing it with much matter. And this doctrine of *Plato* is ſo true, that albeit the ſtomacke abides ſo far diſtent from the braine, yet the ſame workes it offence, when it is repleniſhed with fat and fleſh. For confirmation hereof, *Galen* alleageth a prouerbe which ſaith, *A groſſe bellie makes a groſſe vnderſtanding*, and that this proceeds from nothing elſe, than that the brain and the ſtomacke are vnited and chained together with certaine ſinewes, by way of which they interchangeably communicat their dammages. And contrariwiſe, when the ſtomacke is drie and ſhrunke, it affoords great aid to the wit, as wee ſee in the hungerſtarued, and ſuch as are driuen to their ſhifts, on which doctrine (it may be) *Perſius* founded himſelf, when he ſaid, That the belly is that which quickens vp the wit. But the thing moſt pertinent to be noted for this purpoſe, is, that if the other parts of the body bee fat and fleſhie, and therethrough a man growes ouer groſſe, *Ariſtotle* ſayes, It makes him to leeſe his wit. For which cauſe, I am of opinion, that if a man haue a great head, albeit the ſame proceed for that he is endued with a very able nature, and that he is furniſhed with a quantitie of well tempered matter, yet hee ſhall not

not be owner of so good a wit, as if the same held a meaner size.

Aristotle is of a contrary opinion, whilest he enquires for what cause a man is the wisest of all liuing creatures; to which doubt he answers, That you shall find no creature which hath so little a head as man, respecting withall the greatnesse of his bodie: but herein hee swarued from reason, for if he had opened some mans head, and viewed the quantitte of his braine, hee should haue found, that two horses together had not so much braine as that one man. That which I haue gathered by experience is, that in little men it is best that the head incline somewhat to greatnesse; and in those who are big bodied, it prooues best that they bee little: and the reason is, for that after this sort, there is found a measurable quantity, with which the reasonable soule may well performe his working.

Besides this, there are needfull the foure ventricles in the brain, to the end the reasonable soule may discourse and Philosophize: one must be placed on the right side of the braine, the second on the left, the third in the middle of these, and the fourth in the part behind the braine. Whervnto these ventricles serue, and their large or narrow capableness for the reasonable soule, all shall bee told by vs a little hereafter, when we shall intreat of the diuersities of mens wits.

But it sufficeth not, that the braine possesse good figure, sufficient quantitie, and the number of ventricles, by vs forementioned, with their capableness, great or little, but it behooues also that his parts holds a certaine kind of continuednesse, and that they bee not diuided. For which cause, we haue seen in hurts of the head, that some men haue lost their memorie, some their vnder-

standing,

ſtanding, and others their imagination: and put caſe, that after they haue recouered their health, the braine re-vnited it ſelfe againe, yet this notwithſtanding, the naturall vnion was not made, which the braine before poſſeſſed.

The third condition of the fourth principall, was, that the braine ſhould bee tempered with meaſurable heat, and without exceſſe of the other qualities, which diſpoſition, wee ſaid heretofore that it is called *good nature*; for it is that which principally makes a man able, and the contrarie vnable.

But the fourth, (namely that the braine haue his ſubſtance or compoſition of ſubtill and delicate parts) *Galen* ſayth, is the moſt important of all the reſt. For when he would giue a token of the good diſpoſition of the brain, he affirmeth, that a ſubtile wit, ſheweth that the braine is framed of ſubtile and very delicat parts, and if the vnderſtanding be dull, it giues euidence of a groſſe ſubſtance, but he makes no mention of the temperature. Theſe conditions the braine ought to bee endued withall, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may therethrough ſhape his reaſons and ſillogiſmes. But here encounters vs a difficultie very great, and this is, that if we open the head of any beaſt, we ſhall find his braine compoſed with the ſame forme and manner, as a mans, without that anie of the fore-reported conditions will bee failing. Whence we gather that the bruit beaſts haue alſo the vſe of Prudence and reaſon, by means of the compoſition of their braine, or elſe that our reaſonable ſoule ſerues not it ſelfe of this member, for the vſe of his operations; which may not be auouched. To this doubt, *Galen* anſwereth in this manner: Amongſt the kinds of beaſts, it is doubted, whether that which is termed vnreaſonable, be altogether

gether void of reason, or not, For albeit the same want that which consists in voice (which is named speech) yet that which is conceiued in the soule, and termed discourse, of this it may be, that al sortes of beasts are partakers, albeit the same is bestowed more sparingly vpon some, and more largely on other some. But verely, how far man in the way of reason outgoeth all the rest, there is none who maketh question. By these words, *Galen* giues vs to vnderstand (albeit with some fearfulnesse) that bruit beasts, doe partake reason, one more, and another lesse, and in their mind doe frame some sillogismes and discourses, though they cannot vtter them by way of speech. And then the difference betweene them and man consisteth in being more reasonable, and in vsing Prudence with greater perfection.

The same *Galen* prooues also by manie reasons and experiments, that Asses (being of all bruit beasts the blunteſt) doe ariue with their wit to the most curious and nice points, which were deuised by *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and thereon he collects saying: I am therefore so far from praising the ancient Philosophers, in that they haue found out some ample matter and of rare inuention, (as when they say, We must hold that there is selfe, and diuers: one, and not one: not only in number, but also in kind:) as I dare boldly affirme, that euen the very Asses (who notwithstanding seeme most blockish of all beasts) haue this from nature.)

This selfe same meant *Aristotle*, when he enquired the cause, Why man amongst all liuing creatures is wiſeſt: and in another place he turnes to doubt, For what cause man is the most vniust of all liuing creatures: in which hee giues vs to vnderstand the selfe same which *Galen* said, That the difference which is found betweene man

man and bruit beaſt, is the ſelfe ſame which is found betweene a foole and a wiſe man; which is nought elſe than in reſpect of the more and the leſſe. This (truly) is not to be doubted, that bruit beaſts enioy memorie and imagination, and another power which reſembles vnderſtanding, as the Ape is verie like a man, and that his ſoule takes vſe of the compoſition of the braine, it is a matter apparant: which being good, and ſuch as is behooffull, performes his works very well, and with much prudence, and if the braine be ill inſtrumentalized, it executes the ſame vntowardly. For which cauſe wee ſee that there bee aſſes, which in their knowledge are properly ſuch: and others againe are found ſo quicke conceipted and malicious, that they paſſe the propertie of their kind, And amongſt horſes are found many iadiſhneſſes, and good qualities, and ſome there are more traianable than the reſt: all which growes from hauing their braine well or ill inſtrumentalized. The reaſon and ſolution of this doubt, ſhall be placed in the chapter which followeth, for there we returne to reaſon anew of this matter.

There are in the body ſome other parts, from whoſe temperature, as well the wit as the braine depend; of which wee will reaſon in the laſt chapter of this worke. But beſides theſe and the braine, there is found in the bodie another ſubſtance, whoſe ſeruice the reaſonable ſoule vſeth in his operations, and ſo requireth the three laſt qualities which we haue aſſigned to the braine, that is, quantitie ſufficient, delicat ſubſtance, and good temperature. Theſe are the vitall ſpirits, and arteriall blood, which goe wandring through the whole body, and remaine euermore vnited to the imagination, following his contemplation. The office of this ſpirituall ſubſtance

is,

is, to stir vp the powers of man, and to giue them force and vigour that they may bee able to worke. This shall euidently be knowne to be their manner, if we take consideration of the motions, of the imaginations, and of that which after succeeds in working. For if a man begin to imagine vpon any iniurie that hath beene proferred him, the blood of the arteries runs sodainly to the heart, and stirs vp the wrathfull part, and giues the same heat and forces for reuenge.

If a man stand contemplating any faire woman, or stay in giuing & receiuing by that imaginatiõ touching the venerious act, these vitall spirits run foorthwith to the genitall members, and raise them to the performance. The like befals when we remember any delicat and sauourie meat, which once called to mind, they straigt abandon the rest of the body, and flie to the stomacke and repleniſh the mouth with water. And this their motion is so swift, that if a woman with child long for any meat whatsoeuer, and still retaine the same in her imagination, we see by experience, that she looseth her burthen if speedily it be not yeelded vnto her. The naturall reason of this, is, because these vitall spirits, before the woman conceiued this longing, made abode in the bellie, helping her there to retaine the creature, and through this new imagination of eating, they hie to the stomacke to raise the appetite, and in this space, if the belly haue no strong retentiue, it cannot sustaine the same, and so by this means she leeseth her burthen.

Galen vnderstanding this condition of the vitall spirits, counsaileth Phisitions that they giue not sicke folke to eat, when their humors are raw and vpon digestion, for when they first feele the meat in the stomacke, they straightwaies abandon the worke about which before they

they were occupied, and come thervnto to helpe it. The like benefite and aid, the braine receiues of theſe vitall ſpirits, when the reaſonable ſoule is about to contemplate, vnderſtand, imagine, or performe actions of memorie, without which it cannot worke. And like as the groſſe ſubſtance of the braine, and his euill temperature brings the wit to confuſion: ſo the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall blood (not being delicat and of good temperature) hinder in a man his diſcourſe and vſe of reaſon. Wherefore *Plato* ſaid, That the ſuppleneſſe and good temperature of the heart, makes the wit ſharpe and quicke ſighted. Hauing prooued before that the braine and not the heart, is the principall ſeat of the reaſonable ſoule. And the reaſon is, becauſe theſe vitall ſpirits are engendred in the heart, and partake of that ſubſtance and that temperature, which reſted in that which formed them. Of this arteriall blood, *Ariſtotle* meant when hee ſaid, That thoſe men are well compounded who haue their blood hote, delicate, and pure; for they are alſo of good bodily forces, and of a wit well diſpoſed. Theſe vitall ſpirits are by the Phiſitions termed Nature, for they are the principall inſtrument with which the reaſonable ſoule performeth his works, and of theſe alſo may that ſentence be verefied, *Nature makes able.*

CHAP. IIII.

It is prooued that the ſoule vegetatiue, ſenſitiue, and reaſonable, haue knowledge without that any thing be taught them, if ſo be that they poſſeſſe that conuenient temperature, which is requiſite for their operation.

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THe temperature of the four first qualities) which we heretofore termed Nature) hath so great force, to cause that (of plants, brute beasts, and man) each one set himselfe to performe those workes which are proper to his kind, that they arriue to that vtmost bound of perfection which may bee attained, so dainly & without any others teaching them; the plants know how to forme roots vnder ground, and by way of them to draw nourishment to retaine it, to digest it, and to driue foorth the excrements: and the brute beasts likewise so soone as they are borne, know that which is agreeable to their nature, and flie the things which are naughtie and noisome. And that which makes them most to maruell who are not seene in naturall Philosophie, is, that a man hauing his braine well tempered, and of that disposition which is requisit for this or that science, sodainly and without hauing euer learned it of any, hee speaketh and vttereth such exquisit matters, as could hardly win credit. Vulgar Philosophers, seeing the maruellous works which brute beasts performe, affirme it holds no cause of maruell, because they do it by naturall instinct, in as much as nature sheweth and teacheth each in his kind what hee is to doe. And in this they say very well, for wee haue alreadie alleaged and prooued, that nature is nothing else than this temperature of the foure first qualities, and that this is the schoolemaister who teacheth the soules in what sort they are to worke: but they tearme instinct of nature a certaine masse of things, which rise from the noddocke vpward, neither could they euer expound or giue vs to vnderstand, what

it is. The graue Philosophers (as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Aristotle*) attribute all these maruellous workes to heat, cold, moisture, and drouth, and this they affirme of the first principle, and passe no farther. And if you aske who hath taught the brute beasts to doe these works, (which breed vs such maruell) and men to discourse with reason; *Hippocrates* answereth, It is the natures of them all without any teacher: as if he should say, The faculties or the temperature of which they consist, are al giuen them without being taught by any other. Which is cleerely discerned, if they passe on to consider the works of the foule vegetatiue, and of all the rest which gouerne man, who if it haue a quantitie of mans seed, wel digested and seasoned with good temperature, makes a body so seemly and duly instrumentalized, that all the caruers in the world cannot shape the like.

For which cause *Galen* woondring to see a frame so maruellous, the number of his seuerall parts, the seating, the figure, and the vse of each one by it selfe, grew to conclude, it was not possible that the vegetatiue soule, nor the temperature, could fashion a workmanship so singular, but that the author thereof was God, or some other most wise vnderstanding. But this maner of speech is alreadie by vs heretofore refuted: for it beseemes not naturall Philosophers to reduce the effects immediatly to God, and so to slip ouer the assigning of the second reasons, and especially in this case, where we see by experience, that if mans seed consist of an euill substance, and enioy not a temperature conuenient, the vegetatiue soule runs into a thousand disorders: for if the same be cold and moist more than is requisit, *Hippocrates* sayth, that the men proove Eunuches, or Hermofrodites; and if it be very hote and drie, *Aristotle* saith, that

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it makes them curle-pated, crooke-legged, and flat nosed as are the *Æthiopians*, and if it be moist, the same *Galen* saith, that they grow long and lithie: and if it be drie, low of stature. All this is a great defect in mankind, and for such works we find little cause to giue nature any commendation, or to hold her for aduised; and if God were the author hereof, none of these qualities could di. uert him, Only the first men which the world possessed, *Plato* affirms were made by God, but the rest were born answerable to the discourse of the second causes, which if they be well ordered, the vegetatiue soule dooth well performe his operations: and if they concur not in sort conuenient, it produceth a thousand dammageable effects.

What the good order of nature for this effect must be, is, that the vegetatiue soule haue an endowment of a good temperature, or else, let *Galen* and all the Philosophers in the world answer me, what the cause is that the vegetatiue soule possesseth such skill and power in the first age of man to shape his body, and to increase and nourish the same, and when old age groweth on, can yeeld the same no longer. For if an old man leese but a tooth, he is past remedie of recouering another, but if a child cast them all, we see that nature returns to renew them againe. Is it then possible that a soule which hath done nought else in all the course of life, than to receiue food, retaine the same, digest it, and expell the excrements, new begetting the parts which faile, should towards the end of life forget this, and want abilitie to do the same any longer? *Galen* (for certaine) will answer, that this skill and habilitie of the vegetatiue soule in youth, springs from his possessing much naturall heat and moisture, and that in age the same wants skill and

power to performe it, by meanes of the coldneſſe and drineſſe, to which a bodie of thoſe yeares is ſubiect. The knowledge of the ſenſitiue ſoule, takes his dependance alſo from the temperature of the braine, for if the ſame be ſuch as his operations require that it ſhould be, it can perform with due perfection; otherwiſe, the ſame muſt alſo erre no leſſe than the ſoule vegetatiue. The manner which *Galen* held to behold and diſcerne by eiſight the wiſedome of the ſenſitiue ſoule, was to take a yoong kid, but newly kidded, which ſet on the ground, begins to goe (as if it had bene told and taught that his legs were made to that purpoſe) and after that, he ſhakes from his backe the ſuperfluous moiſture which he brought with him from his mothers belly, and lifting vp the one foot, ſcrapes behind his eare; and ſetting before him ſundrie platters with wine, water, vineger, oile, and milke, after hee hath ſmelt them all, hee fed only on that of milke. Which being beheld by diuers Philoſophers there preſent, they all with one voice cried out, That *Hippocrates* had great reaſon to ſay, that ſoules were skilfull without the inſtruction of any teacher. But *Galen* held not himſelfe contented with this one proofe, for two months after hee cauſed the ſame kid, being very hungrie, to bee brought into the field, where ſmelling at many hearbs, hee did eat onely thoſe, whereon goats accuſtomably feed.

But if *Galen*, as hee ſet himſelfe to contemplat the demeanure of this kid, had done the like with three or foure together, hee ſhould haue ſeene ſome gone better than other ſome, ſhrug themſelues better, ſcratch better, and performe better al the other actions which we haue recounted. And if *Galen* had reared two colts, bred of one horſe and mare, hee ſhould haue ſeene the one to

pace

pace with more grace than the other, and to gallop and ſtop better, and ſhew more fidelitie. And if he had taken an ayrie of Faulcons, and manned them, he ſhould haue found the firſt good of wing, the ſecond good of prey, and the third rauening and ill conditioned. The like ſhall we find in hounds, who being whelpes of the ſame litter, the one for perfection of hunting, will ſeeme to want but ſpeech, and the other haue no more inclination therevnto, than if hee had bene engendered by a heardmans bandog.

All this cannot be reduced to thoſe vaine inſtincts of nature; which the Philoſophers faine. For if you aske for what cauſe one dog hath more inſtinct than another, both comming of one kind, and whelpes of one ſire, I cannot coniecture what they may anſwer, ſaue to flie backe to their old leaning poſt, ſaying, That God hath taught the one better than the other, and giuen him a more naturall inſtinct. And if wee demaund the reaſon, why this good hound, being yet but a whelpe, is a perfect hunter, and growing in age, hath no ſuch ſufficiencie: and contrariwiſe, another being yoong cannot hunt at all, and waxing old, is wilie and readie; I know not what they can yeeld in replie. My ſelf at leaſt would ſay, that the towardly hunting of one dog more than another, growes from the better temperature of his brain: and againe, that his well hunting whileſt hee is yoong, and his decay in age, is occaſioned by means that in one age he partakes the temperature which is requiſit to the qualities of hunting, and in the other not. Whence wee infer, that ſithens the temperature of the foure firſt qualities is the reaſon and cauſe, for which one brute beaſt better performs the works of his kind than another, that this temperature is the ſchoolemaiſter which teacheth

the sensitiue soule what it is to do.

And if *Galen* had considered the demeanure and voiages of the Ant, and noted his prudence, his mercie, his iustice, and his gouernment, he would haue taken astonishment to see a beast so little, endewed with so great sageneſſe, without the helpe of any maister or teacher to instruct him. But the temperature which the Ant hath in his braine, being knowne, and how aptly it is appropriated to wisdome, (as hereafter shall be showne) this woonderment will cease, and we shall conceiue, that brute beasts with the temperature of their braine, and the fantasmes which enter thereinto by the fiue sences, make such discourses, and partake those abilities, which we do so note in them. And amongst beasts of one kind, he which is most schooleable and skilfull, is such, because he hath his braine better tempered, and if through any occasion or infirmitie, the temperature of his brain incur alteration, he will sodainly leese his skill and ability, as men also do.

But now we are to treat of a difficulty touching the reasonable soule, which is, in what sort he hath this naturall instinct for the operations of his kind, (namely Sapience, and Prudence) and how on the sodaine, by means of his good temperature, a man can be skilled in the sciences, without the instruction of any other: seeing experience telleth vs, that if they be not gotten by learning, no man is at his birth endewed with them.

Betweene *Plato* and *Aristotle*, there is a waighty question, as touching the verefieng the reason or cause from whence the wisdome of man may spring. One saith, That the reasonable soule is more ancient than the bodie, for that before such time as Nature endowed the same with these instruments, it made abode in heauen,

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in the company of God, whence it issued full of science and sapience: but when it entered to forme this matter, through the euill temperature which it found therein, it forewent the whole, vntill by processe of time, this ill temperature grew to amendment, and there succeeded another in steed thereof, with which (as more appliable to the sciences it had lost) it grew by little and little to call that to remembrance which before it had forgotten. This opinion is false, and I much maruel that *Plato* being so great a Philosopher, could not render the reason of mans wisdome, considering that brute beasts haue their prudences and naturall habilities, without that their soule departs from their bodie, or stirs vp to heauen to learne them. In which regard he cannot go blameleſſe, especially hauing red in Genesis (whereto he gaue so great credit) that God instrumentalized the body of *Adam*, before he created his soule. The selfe-same befals also now, saue that it is nature who begets the body, and in the last disposing thereof, God createth the soule in the same body, without that it be sundred therefrom any time or moment.

Plato tooke vse of the holy scripture the best sentences which are to be found in his works, in respect whereof, he was called Diuine.

Aristotle tooke another course, affirming that euery doctrine, and euery discipline, comes from a foregoing knowledge, as if he would say, all that which men know and learne, springs from that they haue heard the same, seene it, smelt it, tasted it, or felt it. For there can grow no notice in the vnderstanding, which hath not first taken passage by some of the fiue sences. For which cause he sayd, that these powers issue out of the hands of nature, as a plain table in which is no maner of painting, which opinion is also false as well as that of *Plato*. But that we may the better proove and make the same apparant, it behooues first to agree with the vulgar Philosophers,

that in mans body there rests but one soule, and that the same is reasonable, which is the originall of whatsoeuer we doe or effect: albeit there are opinions, and there want not, who against this defend, that in companie of the reasonable soule, there are associated some two or three more.

Plato attributes three soules vnto man.

This then standing thus in the workes which the reasonable soule performes, as it is vegetatiue, wee haue alreadie proued that the same knowes how to shape man, and to giue him the figure which hee is to keepe, and knowes likewise how to receiue nourishment, to retaine it, to digest it, and to expell the excrements, and if any part of the bodie doe faile, she knowes how to supplie the same anew, and yeeld it that composition agreeable to the vse which it is to hold. And in the works of the sensitiue and motiue, the child so soone as it is borne, knowes to suck, and fashion his lips to draw foorth the milke, and this so redily, as not the wisest man can doe the like. And herewithall, it assures the qualities which are incident to the preseruation of his nature, shuns that which is noisome and dammageable therevnto, knowes to weepe and laugh, without being taught by any. And if this be not so, let the vulgar Philosophers tell me awhile, who hath taught the children to do these things, or by what sence they haue learned it. Well I know they will answer, That God hath giuen them this naturall instinct as to the brute beasts, wherein they say not ill, if the naturall instinct bee the selfe same with the temperature.

The proper operations of the reasonable soule, namely, to vnderstand, to imagine and to performe actions of memorie, a man cannot do them forthwith so soone as he is borne, for the temperature of infancie serueth very vn-

vnfitly therefore, and is meerely appropriat to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue, as that of old age is appropriat to the reaſonable ſoule, and contrary to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue. And if as the temperature which ſerues for prudence, is gotten in the brain by little and little, ſo the ſame could all bee ioined together at one inſtant, man ſhould on the ſodaine haue better skill to diſcourſe and play the Philoſopher, than if he had attained the ſame in the ſchooles.

But becauſe nature cannot performe this ſaue by proceſſe of time, a man growes to gather wiſedome by little and little, and that this is the reaſon and cauſe thereof, is manifeſtly prooued, if wee conſider, that a man after he hath bene very wiſe, growes by little and little into folly, for that he daily goes (till his decrepit age) accrewing a contrarie temperature. I for mine owne part am of opinion, that if nature, as ſhe hath made man of ſeed hot and moiſt (and this is the temperature which directs the vegetatiue, and the ſenſitiue, what they are to effectuat) ſo ſhe had made him of ſeed cold and drie, euen after his birth, hee ſhould ſtraight-waies haue bene able to diſcourſe and reaſon, and not haue attended to ſucke, in as much as this is the temperature agreeable to theſe operations. But for that wee find by experience, that if the braine haue the temperature requiſite for naturall ſciences, he hath no need of a maiſter to teach him, it fals out neceſſarie that wee marke one thing, which is, that if a man fall into any diſeaſe, by which his braine vpon a ſodaine changeth his temperature (as are madneſſe, melancholy, and frenzie) it happens, that at one inſtant hee leeſeth, if hee were wiſe, all his knowledge, and vtters a thouſand follies; and if he were a foole, he accrues more wit and abilitie than he had before.

The ſeed and menſtrual blood which are two materiall principles of which we be formed, are hot & moiſt, through which temperature children are ſo vnskilled.

I can ſpeake of a rude countrie fellow, who becomming frantike, made a very eloquent diſcourſe in my preſence, recommending his well dooing to the by-ſtanders, and that they ſhould take care of his wife and children (if it pleaſed God to call him away in that ſickneſſe) with ſo many flowers of Rhethorike, and ſuch apt choice of words, as if *Cicero* had ſpoken in the preſence of the Senate: whereat the beholders maruelling, asked me whence ſo great eloquence and wiſedome might grow, in a man who in his health time could ſcantly ſpeake? and I remember I made anſwer, That the art of Oratorie was a ſcience, which ſprings from a certaine point or degree of heat, and that this country fellow, before found, had by meanes of this infirmitie attained thereunto.

I can alſo ſpeake of another frantike perſon, who for the ſpace of more than eight daies, neuer vttered word which I found not to carrie his iuſt quantitie, and moſtly be made couplements of verſes very well compoſed, whereat the by-ſtanders wondring to here a man ſpeake in verſe, who in his health had neuer ſo much skill, I ſayd, It ſildome fell out, that he who was a poet in his health time, ſhould be ſo alſo in his ſickneſſe. For the temperature of the braine, by which when a man is whole, he becommeth a poet, in ſickneſſe altereth and brings foorth contrary operations. I remember that the wife of this frantike fellow, and a ſiſter of his, named *Margaret*, reprooued him, becauſe he ſpake ill of the ſaints, whereat the patient growing impatient ſayd to his wife theſe words: I renounce God for the loue of you; and S. *Marie* for the loue of *Margaret*; and S. *Peter* for the loue of *Iohn* of *Olmedo*; and ſo he ran thorow a beadroll of many ſaints, whoſe names had conſonance with

with the other by-ſtanders there preſent.

But this is nothing, and a matter of ſmall importance in reſpect of the notable ſpeeches, vttered by a Page of one of the great ones of this realme, whilſt he was mad, who in his health was reputed a youth of ſlender capacitie, but falling into this infirmitie, he deliuered ſuch rare conceits, reſemblances, and anſwers, to ſuch as aſked him, and deuiſed ſo excellent maners of gouerning a kingdome (of which he imagined himſelfe to be ſoueraigne) that for great wonder people flocked to ſee him and heare him, and his very maiſter ſcarcely euer departed from his beds head, prayng God that he might neuer be cured. Which afterwards plainly appeared, for being recouered, his Phiſion (who had healed him) came to take leaue of his lord, with a mind to receiue ſome good reward, if of nothing elſe, yet at leaſt in good words; but he encountred this greeting: I promiſe you maiſter doctor, that I was neuer more aggreeued at any ill ſucceſſe, than to ſee this my page recouered, for it was not behooffull that he ſhould change ſo wiſe folly, for an vndetſtanding ſo ſimple as is this, which in his health he inioieth. Me-thinks that of one, who to fore was wiſe and well aduiſed, you haue made him a foole againe, which is the greateſt miſerie that may light vpon any man. The poore Phiſition ſeeing how little thankfully his cure was accepted, went to take leaue of the page, who amongſt many other words that paſſed betweene them, told him this: Maiſter doctor, I kiſſe your hands for ſo great a benefit beſtowed on me, in reſtoring mine vnderſtanding, but I aſſure you on my faith, that in ſome ſort, it diſpleaſeth me to haue bene cured. For whileſt I reſted in my folly, I led my life in the deepeſt diſcourſes of the world, and imagined my ſelfe ſo great a lord, as there

This page was not yet perfectly cured.

there raigned no king on the earth, who was not my vaſſall, and were this a ieaſt or a lie, what imported that, whileſt I conceiued thereof ſo great a contentment, as if it had bene true? I reſt now in far woorſe caſe, finding my ſelfe in troth to be but a poore page, and to morrow I muſt begin againe to ſerue one, who whileſt I was in mine infirmitie, I would haue diſdained for my foot-man.

It skils not much, whether the Philoſophers admit all this, and beleeue that it may bee ſo or not; but what if I ſhould prooue by verie true ſtories, that ignorant men ſtrooken with this infirmitie, haue ſpoken Latine, which they neuer learned in their health; and that a franticke woman told all perſons who came to viſit her, their vertues and vices, and ſometimes reported matters with that aſſurance, which they vſe to giue who ſpeake by coniectures and tokens: and for this cauſe, none almoſt durſt come in to viſite her, fearing to heare of thoſe true tales which ſhe would deliuer? and (which is more to bee maruelled at) when a barber came to let her blood, Friend (quoth ſhee) haue regard what you doe, for you haue but few daies to liue, and your wife ſhall marrie ſuch a man: and this, though ſpoken by chance, fell out ſo true, as it tooke effect before halfe a yeare came to an end.

Me thinks I heare them who flie natural Philoſophy, to ſay that this is a foule leaſing, & that (put caſe it were true) the diuell as hee is wiſe and craftie by Gods ſufferance, entred into this womans bodie, and into the reſt of thoſe frantike perſons, whom I haue mentioned, and cauſed them to vtter thoſe ſtrange matters, and yet euen to confeſſe this, they are very loath; for the diuell foreknoweth not what is to come, becauſe hee hath no pro-

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phetical spirit. They hold it a very sufficient argument to auouch, This is false, becaus I cannot conceiue how it may be so: as if difficult & quaint matters were subiect to blunt wits, and came within the reach of their capacities. I pretend not hereby to take those to taske who haue defect of vnderstanding, for that were a bootlesse labour, but to make *Aristotle* himselfe confesse, that men endowed with the temperature requisit for such operations, may conceiue many things without hauing receiued thereof any particular perseuerance, or learned the same at the hands of any other. Sundry also, because this heat is a neighbour to the seat of the mind, are wrapped in the infirmitie of sottishnesse, or are heated by some furious instinct, whence grew the *Sibils* and *Bacchants*, and all those, who men thinke are egged on by some diuine inspiration, whereas this takes his originall, not from any disease, but from a naturall distemperature. *Marcus* a citizen of *Siracusa*, was excellentest poet after hee lost his vnderstanding, and those in whom this abated heat approcheth least to mediocritie, are (verely) altogether melancholike, but thereby much the wiser. In these words *Aristotle* cleerely confesseth, that when the braine is excessiuely heated, many thereby attaine the knowledge of things to come, (as were the *Sibils*) which *Aristotle* saith, growes not by reason of any disease, but thorow the inequalitie of the naturall heat, and that this is the very reason and cause thereof, he prooues apparantly by an example; alleading that *Mark* a citizen of *Siracuse*, was a Poet in most excellencie at such time as through excessiue heat of the braine hee fell besides himselfe, and when he returned to a more moderat temperature, hee lost his versifying, but yet remained more wise and aduised. In so much that *Aristotle* not only admits.

mits the temperature of the braine, for the principall occaſion of theſe extrauagant ſucceſſes, but alſo reprooues them who hold the ſame for a diuine reuelation, and no naturall cauſe.

When the diſeaſed diuine thus it is a ſign that the reaſonable ſoule is now awearie of the bodie, and ſo none ſuch recouer.

The firſt who tearmed theſe maruellous matters by the name of diuineſſe, was *Hippocrates*, and that if anie ſuch point of diuineſſe bee found in the diſeaſe, that it manifeſteth alſo a prouidence. Vpon which ſentence, he chargeth Phiſitions that if the diſeaſed vtter any ſuch diuine matters, they may thereby know in what caſe ſhe reſts, and prognoſticate what will become of him. But that which in this behalfe driues me to moſt woonder, is, that demaunding of *Plato* how it may come to paſſe, that of two ſonnes begotten by one father, one hath the skill of verſifying, without any other teaching, and the other, toiling in the att of poetrie, can neuer beget ſo much as one verſe: hee anſwereth, That he who was borne a Poet, is poſſeſſed, and the other not. In which behalfe, *Ariſtotle* had good cauſe to find fault with him, for that he might haue reduced this to the temperature, as elſe where he did.

The frantike perſons ſpeaking of Latine, without that he euer learned the ſame in his health time, ſhewes the conſonance which the Latin toong holds with the reaſonable ſoule, and (as we will prooue hereafter) there is to be found a particular wit, appliable to the inuention of languages, and Latine words, & the phraſes of ſpeech in that toong are ſo fitting with the eare, that the reaſonable ſoule poſſeſſing the neceſſarie temperature for the inuention of ſome delicat language, ſodainly encounters with this. And that two deuiſers of languages may ſhape the like words (hauing the like wit and habilitie) it is very manifeſt, preſuppoſing that when God created

Adam

Adam, and ſet all things before him, to the end he might beſtow on each his ſeuerall name, whereby it ſhould be called; he had likewiſe at that inſtant molded another man with the ſame perfection and ſupernaturall grace; now I demaund, if God had placed the ſame things before this other man, that he might alſo ſet them names whereby they ſhould be called, of what manner thoſe names ſhould haue bene? for mine owne part, I make no doubt, but he would haue giuen theſe things, thoſe very names which *Adam* did: and the reaſon is very apparant, for both carried one ſelfe eie to the nature of each thing, which of it ſelfe was no more but one. After this manner might the frantike perſon light vpon the Latine toong, and ſpeake the ſame without euer hauing learned it in his health, for the naturall temperature of his braine, conceiuing alteration, through the infirmitie it might (for a ſpace) become like his, who firſt inuented the Latine toong, and faine the like words, but yet not with that concert and continued fineneſſe, for this would giue tokē that the diuel moued that toong, as the church teacheth hir exorciſts. This ſelfe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) befel ſome children, who at their birth-time ſpake ſome words very plainly; and afterward kept ſilence, and he finds fault with the vulgar Philoſophers of his time, who for that they knew not the naturall cauſe of this effect, imputed it to the diuell.

The cauſe why children ſpeake ſo ſoone as they are borne, and after foorthwith turne to hold their peace, *Ariſtotle* could neuer find out though he went much about it, but yet it could neuer ſinke into his braine, that it was a deuiſe of the Diuels, nor an effect aboue nature, as the vulgar Philoſophers held opinion; who ſeeing themſelues hedged in with the curious and nice points

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of naturall Philosophie, make them beleeue who know little, that God or the diuell are authors of the prodigious and strange effects, of whose naturall cause they haue no knowledge and vnderstanding.

Children which are engendred of seed cold and drie, (as are those begotten in old age) some few daies and moneths after their birth, begin to discourse and philosophise; for the temperature cold and drie, (as we will hereafter prooue) is most appropriat to the operations of the reasonable soule, and that which processe of time, and manie daies and months should bring about, is supplied by the present temperature of the brain, which for many causes anticipateth what it was to effect. Other children there are (saith *Aristotle*) who as soone as they are borne, begin to speake, and afterwards hold their peace vntill they attaine the ordinarie and conuenient age of speaking: which effect floweth from the same originall and cause that we recounted of the page, and of those furious and frantike persons, and of him who spake Latine on a sudden without hauing learned it in his health. And that children whilst they make abode in their mothers bellie, and so soone as they are borne, may vndergoe these infirmities, is a matter past deniall. But whence that diuining of the frantike woman proceeded, I can better make *Cicero* to conceiue, than these naturall Philosophers, for he describing the nature of man, said in this manner: The creature foresightfull, searchfull, apt for many matters, sharpe conceited, mindfull, repleniſhed with reason and counsell, whome we call by the name of Man. And in particular he affirmeth that there is found a certain nature in some men, which in foreknowing things to come, exceedeth other mens, and his words are these: For there is found a certaine force

force and nature, which foretels things to come, the force and nature of which, is not by reason to be vnfolded. The error of the naturall Philosophers consisteth, in not considering (as *Plato* did) that man was made to the likenesse of God, and that he is a partaker of his diuine prouidence, and that the power of discerning all the three differences of time, (memorie for the passed, conceiuing for the present, and imagination and vnderstanding for those that are to come.) And as there are men superior to others in remembring things past, and others in knowing the present, so there are also many, who partake a more naturall habilitie for imagining of what shall come to passe. One of the greatest arguments which forced *Cicero* to thinke, that the reasonable soule is vncorruptible, was to see the certaintie with which the diseased tell things to come, and especially when they are neere their end. But the difference which rests betweene a propheticall spirit and this naturall wit, is, that that which God speaks by the mouth of his Prophets, is infallible, for it is the expresse word of God: but that which man prognosticateth by the power of his imagination holds no such certaintie.

Those who say, that the discouering of their vertues and vices by the frantike woman, to the persons who came to visit her, was a tricke of the diuels playing, let them know, that God bestowes on men a certaine supernaturall grace, to attaine and conceiue which are the workes of God, and which of the diuell: the which saint *Paule* placeth amongst the diuine gifts, and cals it, The imparting of spirits. Whereby we may discerne, whether it be the diuell or some good angell that intermedleth with vs. For many times the diuell sets to beguile vs vnder the cloke of a good angell, and we haue

need of this grace and supernaturall gift, to know him, and difference him from the good. From this gift they are farthest sundered, who haue not a wit capable of naturall Philosophie: for this science, and that supernaturall infused by God, fall vnder one selfe ability, to weet, the vnderstanding at least; if it be true, that God in bestowing his graces, doe applie himselfe to the naturall good of euery one, as I haue afore rehearsed.

Iacob lying at the point of death, (at which time the reasonable soule is most at libertie, to see what is to come) all his twelue children entred to visit him, and he to each of them in particular, recited their vertues and vices, and propheſied what should befall, as touching them and their posteritie. Certaine it is, that he did all this inspired by God, but if the deuine scripture, and our faith, had not ascertained vs hereof, how would these naturall Philosophers haue known this to be the worke of God: and that the vertues and vices which the frantike woman told to such as came to visit her, were discouered by the power of the diuell; whilst this case in part resembles that of *Iacob?*

They reckon that the nature of the reasonable soule, is far different from that of the diuell, and that the powers thereof (vnderstanding, imagination, and memory,) are of another very diuers kind, and herein they be deceiued. For if a reasonable soule informe a well instrumentalized body (as was that of *Adam*) his knowledge comes little behind that of the subtilleſt diuel, and without the body he partakes as perfect qualities as the other. And if the diuels foresee things to come, coniecturing and discoursing by certaine tokens, the same also may a reasonable man do when he is about to be freed from his body, or when he is endowed with that difference

rence of temperature, which makes a man capable of this prouidence. For it is a matter as difficult for the vnderſtanding to conceiue how the diuell can know theſe hidden things, as to impute the ſame to the reaſonable ſoule. It will not fall in theſe mens heads, that in natural things there may be found out certaine ſigns, by means of which they may attaine to the knowledge of matters to come. And I affirme, there are certaine tokens to be found, which bring vs to the notiſe of things paſſed and preſent, and to forecaſt what is to follow, yea & to coniecture ſome ſecrets of the heauen, Therfore we ſee that his things inuiſible are vnderſtood by the creatures of the world, by means of the things which haue bene created. Whoſoeuer ſhall haue power to accompliſh this, ſhall attaine therevnto, and the orher ſhall be ſuch as *Homer* ſpake of, The ignorant vnderſtandeth the things paſſed, but not the things to come. But the wiſe & diſcreet is the Ape of God, for he immitates him in many matters, and albeit he cannot accompliſh them with ſo great perfection, yet he carries ſome reſemblance vnto him, by following him.

CHAP. V.

It is prooued that from the three qualities, hot, moiſt, and drie, proceed all the differences of mens wits.

THe reaſonable ſoule making abode in the body, it is impoſſible that the ſame can performe contrary and different operations, if for each of them it vſe not a particular inſtrument. This is plainly ſeen in the power of the ſoule, which performeth diuers operations in the

outward ſences, for euery one hath his particular compoſition: the eyes haue one, the eares another, the ſmelling another, and the feeling another; and if it were not ſo, there ſhould be no more but one ſort of operations, and that ſhould all be ſeeing, taſting, or feeling, for the inſtrument determines & rules the power for one action, and for no more.

By this ſo plaine and manifeſt a matter, which paſſeth through the outward ſences, we may gather what that is in the inward. With this ſelfe power of the ſoule, we vnderſtand, imagine, and remember. But if it be true, that euery worke requires a particular inſtrument, it behoueth of neceſſity, that within the braine there be one inſtrument for the vnderſtanding, one for the imagination, and another different from them for the memorie: for if all the brain were inſtrumentalized after one ſelfe manner, either the whole ſhould be memorie, or the whole vnderſtanding, or the whole imagination. But we ſee that theſe are very different operations, and therfore it is of force that there be alſo a varietie in the inſtruments. But if we open by skill, and make an anotomy of the braine, we ſhall find the whole compounded after one maner, of one kind of ſubſtance, and alike, without parts of other kinds, or a different ſort; onely there appeare foure little hollowneſſes, who (if we well marke them) haue all one ſelfe compoſition and figure, without any thing comming betweene which may breed a difference.

What the vſe and profit of theſe may be, and whereto they ſerue in the head, is not eaſily decideable: for *Galen* and the Anotomiſts, as well new as ancient, haue laboured to find out the truth, but none of them hath preciſely nor in particular, expreſſed whereto the right ventricle

ventricle serueth, nor the left, nor that which is placed in the middest of these two, nor the fourth, whose seat in the braine keepes the hinder part of the head. They affirme, only (though with some doubt) that these foure concauities, are the shops where the vitall spirits are digested, and conuerted into animals, so to giue sence and motion to all the parts of the body. In which operation, *Galen* sayd once, that the middle ventricle was the principall, and in another place he vnsayes it againe, affirming that the hindermost is of greatest efficacie and valure.

But this doctrine is not true, nor founded on good naturall Philosophie, for in all mans body, there are not two so contrary operations, nor that so much hinder one another, as are discoursing, and digestion of nourishment: and the reason is, because contemplation requireth quiet, rest, and a cleerenesse in the animall spirits; and digestion is performed with great stirring and trauaile, & from this action rise vp many vapours, which trouble and darken the animall spirits, so as by means of them, the reasonable soule cannot discerne the figures. And nature was not so vnaduised, as in one selfe place to conioine two actions which are performed with so great repugnancy. But *Plato* highly commends the wisdome and knowledge of him who shaped vs, for that he seuered the liuer from the braine by so great a distance, to the end, that by the rumbling there made, whilst the nourishments are mingled, and by the obscureneſſe and darkeneſſe occasioned through the vapours in the animall spirits, the reasonable soule might not be troubled in his discourses and considerations. But though *Plato* had not touched this point of Philosophie, we see hourly by experience, that because the liuer and the stomack

are ſo far from the brain, preſently vpon meat, and ſome ſpace thereafter, there is no man that can giue himſelfe to ſtudie.

The truth of this matter is, that the fourth ventricle hath the office of digeſting and altering the vitall ſpirits, and to conuert them into animal, for that end which we haue before remembred. And therefore nature hath ſeuered the ſame by ſo great a diſtance from the other three, and made that braine ſundred apart, and ſo far off (as appeareth) to the end, that by his operation, he hinder not the contemplation of the reſt. The three ventricles placed in the forepart, I doubt not, but that nature made them to none other end than to diſcourſe and philoſophiſe. Which is apparantly prooued, for that in great ſtudyings and contemplations, alwaies that part of the head finds it ſelf agreeued, which anſwereth theſe three concauities. The force of this argument is to be knowne, by conſideration, that when the other powers are wearie of performing their workes, the inſtruments are alwaies agreeued, whoſe ſeruice they vſed; as in our much looking, the eies are pained; and with much going, the ſoules of the feet wax ſore.

Now the difficultie conſiſts, to know in which of theſe ventricles the vnderſtanding is placed, in which the memory, and in which the imagination, for they are ſo vnited and nere neighboured, that neither by the laſt argument, nor by anie other notice, they can be diſtinguiſhed or diſcerned. Then conſidering that the vnderſtanding cannot worke without the memorie be preſent, repreſenting vnto the ſame the figures and fantaſies agreeable thereunto, it behooueth that the vnderſtanding part buſie it ſelfe in beholding the fantaſmes, and that the memorie cannot do it, if the imagination do

not

not accompany the ſame (as we haue already heretofore declared) we ſhall eaſily vnderſtand, that all the powers are vnited in euery ſeuerall ventricle, and that the vnderſtanding is not ſolely in the one, nor the memory ſolely in the other, nor the imagination in the third, as the vulgar Philoſophers haue imagined, but that this vnion of powers is accuſtomably made in mans body, in as much as the one cannot worke without the aid of the other, as appeareth in the foure naturall abilities, digeſtiue, retentiue, attractiue, and expulſiue, where, becauſe each one ſtands in need of all the reſidue, nature diſpoſed to vnite them in one ſelfe place, and made them not diuided or ſundered.

But if this be true, then to what end made nature thoſe three ventricles, and ioyned together the three reaſonable powers in euery of them, ſeeing that one alone ſufficed to vnderſtand and to performe the actions of memorie? To this may be anſwered, that there riſeth a like difficultie, in skanning whence it commeth that nature made two eyes, and two eares, ſithens in each of them is placed the whole power of ſight and hearing, and we can ſee, hauing but one eye? Whereto may be ſaid, that the powers ordained for the perfection of a creature, how much the greater number they carrie, ſo much the better aſſured is that their perfection, for vpon ſome occaſion, one or two may faile, and therefore it ſerues well to the purpoſe, that there remaine ſome others of the ſame kind, which may be applied to vſe.

In an infirmitie which the Phiſitions tearme Reſolution, or Palſie of the middle ſide, the operation is ordinarily loſt of that ventricle which is ſtrooken on that ſide, & if the other two remained not found, & without endammageance, a man ſhould thereby become witles,

and void of reason. And yet for all this, by wanting that onely ventricle, there is a great abatement discerned in his operations, as well in those of the vnderstanding, as of the imaginatiue, and memory, as they shal also find in the losse of one sight, who were woont to behold with two; whereby we cleerely comprize, that in euery ventricle are all the three powers, sithens by the annoiance of any one, al the three are weakened. Seeing then al the three ventricles are of one selfe composition, and that there rests not amongst them any varietie of parts, we may not leaue to take the first qualities for an instrument, and to make so many generall differences of wits, as they are in number. For to thinke that the reasonable soule being in the body, can worke without some bodily instrument to assist her, is against all naturall Philosophy. But of the foure qualities, heat, cold, moisture, and drouth: all Phisitions leaue out cold, as vnprofitable to any operation of the reasonable soule, wherethrough it is seene by experience in the other habilities, that if the same mount aboue heat, all the powers of man do badly performe their operations, neither can the stomacke digest his meat, nor the cods yeeld fruitfull seed, nor the muscles mooue the body, nor the braine discourse For which cause, *Galen* said, Coldnesse is apparantly noisome to all the offices of the soule; as if he should say, Cold is the ruine of all the operations of the soule, only it serues in the body to temper the naturall heat, and to procure that it burne not ouermuch: and yet *Aristotle* is of a contrary opinion, where he affirmeth, it is a matter certaine, that that blood carrieth most forcible efficacie, which is thickest and hottest, but the coldest & thinnest hath a more accomplished force to perceiue and vnderstand; as if he would say, the thicke and hot blood

makes

makes great bodily forces, but the pure and cold is cause that man possesseth great vnderstanding. Whereby we plainly see, that from coldnesse springeth the greatest difference of wit that is in any man, namely in the vnderstanding.

Aristotle moreouer mooues a doubt, and that is, why men who inhabite very hot countries (as *Ægypt*) are more wittie and aduised than those who are borne in cold regions. Which doubt he resolues in this manner: That the excessiue heat of the country fretteth and consumeth the naturall heat of the braine, and so leaues it cold, wherby man growes to be full of reasonablenesse. And that contrariwise, the much cold of the aire, fortifieth the much naturall heat of the braine, and yeelds it not place to resolue. For which cause (sayth he) such as are very hot brained, cannot discourse nor philosophise, but are giddie headed, and not setled in any one opinion. To which opinion it seemes that *Galen* leaneth, saying that the cause why a man is vnstable, and changeth opinion at euery moment, is, for that he hath a hote braine: and contrariwise, his being stable and firme, springs from the coldnesse of his brain. But the truth is, that from this heat there groweth not any difference of wit, neither did *Aristotle* mean that the cold blood, by his predominance, did better the vnderstanding, but that which is lesse hote. True it is, that mans variablenesse springs from his partaking of much heat, which lifts vp the figures that are in the brain, and makes them to boile, by which operation, there are represented to the soule many images of things, which inuite him to their contemplation, and the soule to possesse them all, leaues one and takes another. Contrariwise it befals in coldnesse, which for that it imprints inwardly these figures

gures, and ſuffers them not to riſe, makes a man firme in one opinion, and it prooues ſo, becauſe none other preſents it ſelfe to call the ſame away. Coldneſſe hath this qualitie, that it not only hindereth the motions of bodily things, but alſo makes that the figures and ſhapes which the Philoſophers call ſpirituall, be vnmooueable in the braine. And this firmneſſe ſeemeth rather a negligence, than a difference of habilitie. Alike true it is, that there is found another diuerſity of firmneſſe, which proceeds from poſſeſſing an vnderſtanding well compacted together, & not from the coldneſſe of the brain. So there remaine drouth, moiſture, and heat for the ſeruice of the reaſonable facultie. But no Philoſopher as yet wiſt to giue to euery difference of wit determinatly that which was his. *Heraclitus* ſayd, *A drie brightneſſe makes a moſt wiſe mind*: by which ſentence he giues vs to vnderſtand, that drineſſe is the cauſe why a man becoms very wiſe, but he declares not in what kinde of knowledge.

The ſelfe ſame meant *Plato*, when he ſayd, that the ſoule deſcended into the body endowed with great wiſdome, and through the much moiſture which it there found, grew to become dull & vntoward. But this wearing away in the courſe of age, and purchaſing drineſſe, the ſoule grew to diſcouer the knowledge which he tofore enioyed. Amongſt brute beaſts, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, thoſe are wiſeſt whoſe temperature is moſt enclined to cold and drie, as are the ants and bees, who for wiſedome, concurre with thoſe men that partake moſt of reaſon. Moreouer, no brute beaſt is found of more moiſture, or leſſe wit than a hog, wherethrough the Poet *Pindare*, to gibe at the people of *Beotia*, and to handle them as fooles, ſayd thus:

Th'vn-

Th'vntoward ſolke which now is nam'd
Beotia, were once cald Hogs.

Moreouer, blood through his much moiſture, ſayth *Galen*, makes men ſimple. And for ſuch, the ſame *Galen* recounts that the Commicks ieaſted at *Hippocrates* children, ſaying of them, That they had much naturall heat, which is a ſubſtance moiſt and very vaporous. This is ordinarily incident to the children of wiſe men, & hereafter I will make report of the cauſe whence it groweth. Amongſt the foure humours which we enioy, there is none ſo cold and drie as that of melancholy, and whatſoeuer notable men for learning, haue liued in the world (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) they were all melancholike. Finally, all agree in this point, that drineſſe makes a man very wiſe, but they expreſſe not to which of the reaſonable powers it affoordeth greateſt helpe; only *Eſay* the Prophet cals it by his right name, where he ſayth, *That trauaile giues vnderſtanding*: for ſadneſſe and affliction not only diminiſheth & cõſumeth the moiſture of the brain, but alſo drieth vp the bones, with which qualitie, the vnderſtanding groweth more ſharpe & ſightfull. Wherof we may gather an example very manifeſt by taking into conſideration many men, who caſt into pouertie and affliction, haue therethrough vttered and written ſentences woorth the maruelling at, and afterwards riſing to better fortune, to eat and drinke well, would neuer once open their mouths. For a delicious life, contentment, and good ſucceſſe, and to ſee that all things fall out after our liking, looſeneth and maketh the brain moiſt. And this is it which *Hippocrates* ſayd, *Mirth looſeneth the heart*, as if he would haue ſaid, That the ſame enlargeth and giueth it heat and groſeneſſe.

And the ſame may eaſily be prooued another way, for

for if sadnesse and affliction drie vp and consume the flesh, and for that reason, man gaineth more vnderstanding, it fals out a matter certain, that his contrary, namely mirth, will make the braine moist, and diminish the vnderstanding. Such as haue purchased this manner of wit, are suddenly enclined to pastimes, to musicke, and to pleasant conuersations, and flie the contrarie, which at other times gaue them a relish and contentment. Now by this, the vulgar sort may conceiue whence it growes, that a wise and vertuous man attaining to some great dignity (whereas at first he was but poore & base) sodainly changeth his manners, and his fashion of speech: and the reason is, because he hath gotten a new temperature, moist and full of vapours, whence it follows that the figures are cancelled which tofore he had in his braine, and his vnderstanding dulled.

From moisture it is hard to know what difference of wit may spring, sithens it is so far contrary to the reasonable facultie. At least (after *Galens* opinion) all the humours of our body, which hold ouer-much moisture, make a man blockish and foolish, for which cause he sayd, The readinesse of mind and wisdome growes from the humour of choler: the humour of melancholy is author of firmnesse and constancie; blood, of simplicitie and dulnesse; the flegmaticke complexion auaileth nothing to the polishing of mannes. In so much that blood with his moistures, and the flegme, cause an impairing of the reasonable facultie.

But this is vnderstood of the faculties or reasonable wits, which are discoursiue and actiue, and not of the passiue, as is the memory, which depends as well on the moist, as the vnderstanding doth on the drie. And we call memory a reasonable power, because without it, the vnder-

vnderſtanding and the imaginatiue are of no valure. It miniſtreth matter and figures to them all, wherevpon they may ſyllogiſe conformably to that which *Ariſtotle* ſayth, It behooues that the vnderſtander go beholding the fantaſmes; and the office of the memorie is, to preſerue theſe fantaſmes, to the end that the vnderſtanding may contemplat them, and if this be loſt, it is impoſſible that the powers can worke; and that the office of memorie is none other, than to preſerue the figures of things, without that it appertains therto to deuiſe them. *Galen* expreſſeth in theſe words, Memorie (verely) laies vp and preſerueth in it ſelfe, the things knowne by the ſence, and by the mind, & is therin as it were their ſtorehouſe and receiuing place, and not their inuenter. And if this be the vſe thereof, it fals out apparant, that the ſame dependeth on moiſture; for this makes the braine pliant, and the figure is imprinted by way of ſtrayning. To prooue this, we haue an euident argument in boyes age, in which any one ſhall better conne by hart, than in any other time of life, and then doth the braine partake greateſt moiſture. Whence *Ariſtotle* moueth this doubt, Why in old age we haue better wit, and in yoong age we learne more readily? as if he ſhould ſay, What is the cauſe, that when we are old we haue much vnderſtanding, and when we are yoong we learne with more towardlineſſe? Whereto he anſwereth, That the memory of old men is full of ſo many figures of things which they haue ſeene and heard in the long courſe of their life, that when they would beſtow more therin, it is not capable thereof, for it hath no void place where to receiue it. But the memory of yoong folke, when they are newly borne, is full of plaits, and for this cauſe they receiue readily whatſoeuer is told or taught them. And he

Wherethrough Cicero defining the nature of wit, placeth memory in his definition: Docility & Memorie, which as it were by one name are tearmed wit.

makes

makes this playner, by comparing the memorie of the morning with that of the euening, saying, That in the morning we learne best, because at that time our memorie is emptie, and at the euening illy, because then it is full of those thinges which we encountred during the day. To this Probleme *Aristotle* wist not how to answer, and the reason is very plaine, for if the spices and figures which are in the memorie, had a body and quantitie to occupie the place: it would seeme that this were a fitting answer, but being vndeuided and spiritual, they cannot fill nor emptie any place where they abide; yea we see by experience, that by how much more the memorie is exercised euery day receiuing new figures, so much the more capable it becommeth. The answere of this Probleme is very euident after my doctrine, and the same importeth, that old men partake much vnderstanding, because they haue great drinesse, and faile of memorie, for that they haue little moisture, and by this means the substance of the braine hardneth, and so cannot receiue the impression of the figures, as hard wax with difficultie admitteth the figure of the seale, and the soft with easinesse. The contrary befals in children, who through the much moisture wherewith the braine is endowed, faile in vnderstanding, and through the great suppleneſse of their braine, abound in memory: wherein, by reason of the moisture, the shapes and figures that come from without, make a great easie, deepe, and well formed impression.

That the memorie is better the morning than the euening, cannot be denied, but this springeth not from the occasion alleaged by *Aristotle*, but the sleepe of the night passed hath made the braine moist, and fortifyed the same, and by the waking of the whole day, it is dried

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and hardened. For which cauſe, *Hippocrates* affirmeth thoſe who haue great thirſt at night, ſhall doe well to drinke, for ſleepe makes the fleſh moiſt, and fortifieth all the powers which gouern man. And that ſleepe ſo doth, *Ariſtotle* himſelfe confeſſeth.

By this doctine is perfectly ſeene that the vnderſtanding and memorie, are powers oppoſit and contrary, in ſort, that the man who hath a great memorie, ſhall find a defect in his vnderſtanding, and he who hath a great vnderſtanding cannot enioy a good memorie; for it is impoſſible that the brain ſhould of his owne nature, be at one ſelfe time drie and moiſt. On this maxime, *Ariſtotle* grounded himſelfe, to prooue, that memorie is a power different from remembrance, and he frames his argument in this manner: Thoſe who haue much remembrance, are men of great vnderſtanding, and thoſe who poſſeſſe a great memorie, find want of vnderſtanding; ſo then memorie and remembrance are contrary powers. The former propoſition, after my doctrine is falſe; for thoſe who haue much remembrance, are of little vnderſtanding, and haue great imaginations, as ſoone hereafter I will prooue: but the ſecond propoſition is verie true, albeit *Ariſtotle* knew not the cauſe, whereon was founded the enmitie which the vnderſtanding hath with the memory.

From heat, which is the third qualitie, groweth the imaginatiue, for there is no other reaſonable power in the braine, nor any other qualitie to which it may be aſſigned beſides that, the ſciences which appertaine to the imaginatiue, are thoſe, which ſuch vtter as dote in their ſickneſſe, and not of thoſe which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, or to the memorie. And frenzie, peeuiſhneſſe, and melancholy, being hot paſſions of the braine,

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it yeelds a great argument, to prooue that imagination consists in heat. One thing breeds me a difficulty herein, and that is, that the imagination carrieth a contrarietie to the vnderstanding, as also to the memorie, and the reason hereof is not to be gotten by experience, for in the braine may very wel be vnited much heat and much drinesse; and so likewise, much heat and much moisture, to a large quantity: and for this cause, a man may haue a great vnderstanding and a great imagination, & much memorie with much imagination: and verely, it is a miracle to find a man of great imagination, who hath a good vnderstanding, and a sound memorie. And the cause thereof behooues to be, for that the vnderstanding requires that the braine be made of parts very subtile and delicat, as we haue prooued heretofore out of *Galen*, and much heat frets and consumes what is delicat, and leaues behind the parts grosse and earthly. For the like reason, a good imagination cannot be vnited with much memorie; for excessiue heat resolueth the moisture of the braine, and leaueth it hard and drie, by means whereof it cannot easily receiue the figures. In sort that in man there are no more but three generall differences of wits for there are no more but three qualities whence they may grow. But vnder these three vniuersall differences, there are contained many other particulars, by means of degrees of accesse which heat, moisture and drinesse may haue.

Any distemperature whatsoeuer, cannot any long time endure alone.

Notwithstanding there springs a difference in wits from euery degree of these three qualities, for the dry, the hot, and the moist, may exceed in so high a degree, that it may altogether disturbe the animall power, conformable to that sentence of *Galen*, Euery excessiue distemperature resolues the forces; and so it is. For albeit

drinesse

drineſſe giue helpe to the vnderſtanding, yet it may be that the ſame ſhal conſume his operations. Which *Galen* and the ancient Philoſophers would not admit, but affirm, that if old mens brains grew not cold, they ſhould neuer decay, though they became drie in the fourth degree. But they haue no reaſon for this, as we will prooue in the imaginatiue: for albeit his operations be performed with heat, yet if it paſſe the third degree, forthwith the ſame begins to reſolue, and the like doth the memorie through ouer-much moiſture.

How many differences of wits grow by means of the ſuperabounding of each of theſe three qualities, cannot for this preſent be particularly recited, except tofore we recount all the operations and actions of the vnderſtanding, the imagination, and the memory. But the whileſt we are to know that the principall works of the vnderſtanding are three: the firſt, to diſcourſe; the ſecond, to diſtinguiſh; and the third, to chuſe. Hence comes it that they place alſo three differences in the vnderſtanding: into three other is the memorie deuided: one receiues with eaſe, and ſuddenly forgetteth; another is ſlow to receiue, but a long time retaineth; and the laſt receiueth with eaſe, and is very ſlow to forget.

The imagination containeth many more differences, for he hath three, no leſſe than the vnderſtanding and memorie, and from each degree ariſeth three other. Of theſe we will more diſtinctly diſcourſe hereafter, when we ſhall aſſigne to each, the ſcience which anſwereth it in particular.

But he that will conſider three other differences of wit, ſhall find that there are habilities in thoſe who ſtudie, ſome which haue a diſpoſition for the cleare and eaſie contemplations of the art which they learne, but if

you ſet them about matters obſcure and very difficult, it will prooue a loſt labour for the teacher to ſhape them a figure therof by fit examples, or that they frame themſelues the like by their owne imagination, for they want the capacitie.

In this degree are all the bad ſcholers of whatſoeuer facultie, who being demaunded touching the eaſie points of their art, anſwer to the purpoſe, but comming to matters of more curiouſneſſe, they will tel you a hundred follies. Other wits aduaunce themſelues one degree higher, for they are pliant and eaſie in learning things, and they can imprint in themſelues all the rules and conſiderations of art, plaine, obſcure, eaſie, and difficult; but as for doctrine, argument, doubting, anſwering, and diſtinguiſhing, they are all matters, wherewith they may in no wiſe be combred. Theſe need to learne ſciences at the hands of good teachers, well skilled in knowledge, and to haue plenty of bookes, and to ſtudie them hard, for ſo much the leſſe ſhall their knowledge be, as they forbeare to reade and take paines. Of theſe may be verefied that ſo famous ſentence of *Ariſtotle*, Our vnderſtanding is like a plaine table, wherin nothing is pourtraied. For whatſoeuer they are to know and attaine, it behooues that firſt they heare the ſame of ſome other, and are barren of all inuention themſelues. In the third degree, nature maketh ſome wits ſo perfect, that they ſtand not in need of teachers to inſtruct them, nor to direct in what ſort they are to philoſophiſe, for out of one conſideration, endicted to them by their ſchoolmaiſter, they will gather a hundred, and without that ought be beſtowed vnto them, they fill their wit with ſcience and knowledge. Theſe wits beguiled *Plato*, and made him to ſay, That our knowledge is a certaine ſpice

of

of remembrance, when he heard them ſpeake and ſay that which neuer fell into conſideration with other men.

To ſuch, it is allowable that they write bookes, and to others not: for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that ſciences may dayly receiue increaſe and greater perfection, is to ioine the new inuention of our ſelues, who liue now, with that which the auntients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, ſhall adde an increaſe to the arts, and men who are yet vnborne, ſhal enioy the inuention and trauaile of ſuch as liued before. As for ſuch who want inuention, the common wealth ſhould not conſent that they make bookes, nor ſuffer them to be printed, becauſe they do nought elſe ſaue heape vp matters alreadie deliuered, and ſentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the ſelfe things, ſtealing one from hence, and taking another from thence; and there is no man but after ſuch a faſhion may make a booke.

Wits full of inuention, are by the *Tuſcanes* called goatiſh, for the likeneſſe which they haue with a goat, in their demeanure and proceeding. Theſe neuer take pleaſure in the plains, but euer delight to walke alone thorow dangerous and high places, and to approch neere ſteepe down-fals, for they will not follow any beaten path, nor go in company. A propertie like this, is found in the reaſonable ſoule when it poſſeſſeth a braine well inſtrumentalized and tempered, for it neuer reſteth ſetled in any contemplation, but fareth forthwith vnquiet, ſeeking to know and vnderſtand new matters. Of ſuch a ſoule is verefied the ſaying of *Hippocrates*, The going of the ſoule is the thought of men. For there are ſome, who neuer paſſe out of one contemplation, and thinke

not that the whole world can discouer another such. These haue the propertie of a beast, who neuer forsakes the beaten path, nor careth to walke through desert and vnhaunted places, but only in the high market way, and with a guide before him. Both these diuersities of wits, are ordinarie amongst professors of learning. Some others there are of high searching capacities, and estranged from the common course of opinions, they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion, they are franke in deliuering their opinion, and tie not themselues to that of any other. Some sorts are close, moist, and very quiet, distrusting themselues, and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow, whose sayings and sentences, they repute as sciences and demonstrations, and al things contrarying the same they reckon vanitie and leasings.

These two differences of wits are very profitable if they be vnited; for as amongst a great droue of cattell, the heardsmen accustome to mingle some dozen of goats to lead them and make them trot apace, to enioy new pastures, that they may not suffer scarcitie; so also it behoueth, that in humane learning, there be some goat-like wits, who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstanding, thorow secrets of nature, and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of, wherein they may exercise themselues, for after this manner, arts take increase, and men daily know more and more.

CHAP. VI.

Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last chapter, and their answer.

One

One of the cauſes for which the wiſdome of *Socrates* hath bene ſo famous till this day, is, for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of *Apollo*, to be the wiſeſt man of the world, he ſayd thus: *I know this onely, that I know nothing at all:* which ſentence, al thoſe that haue ſeene and read, paſſed it ouer as ſpoken by *Socrates*, for that he was a man of great humbleneſſe, a deſpiſer of worldly things, and one to whome, in reſpect of diuine matters, all elſe ſeemed of no valure. But they verely are beguiled, for none of the antient Philoſophers poſſeſſed the vertue of humilitie, nor knew what thing it was, vntill God came into the world and taught the ſame.

The meaning of *Socrates* was, to giue to vnderſtand how little certaintie is contained in humane ſciences, and how vnſetled and fearfull the vnderſtanding of a Philoſopher is in that which he knoweth, ſeeing by experience, that all is full of doubts and arguments, and that we can yeeld aſſent to nothing, without fearing that it may be contrary. For it was ſaid, The thoughts of men are doubtfull, and our foreſeeings vncertaine. And he who will attaine the true knowledge of things, it behooues that he reſt ſetled and quiet without feare or doubt of being deceiued, and the Philoſopher who is not thus wiſe grounded, may with much truth affirme that he knoweth nothing.

This ſame conſideration had *Galen*, when he ſayd, Science is a conuenient and firme notice, which neuer departeth from reaſon: therfore thou ſhalt not find it amongſt the Philoſophers, eſpecialy when they conſi-

der the nature of things: but verely much leſſe in matters of Phiſicke, nay rather (to ſpeake all in one word) it neuer makes his full arriuall where men are.

Hereby it ſeemeth that the true notice of things fails to come this way, and to man arriueth only a certaine opinion, which makes him to walke vncertaine, and with fear whether the matter which he affirmeth be ſo or no. But that which *Galen* noteth more particularly, touching this, is, that Philoſophie and Phiſicke, are the moſt vncertaine of all thoſe wherewith men are to deale. And if this be true, what ſhall we ſay touching the Philoſophie wherof we now intreat, where with the vnderſtanding, we make an anotomie of a matter ſo obſcure and difficult, as are the powers and faculties of the reaſonable ſoule? In which point are offered ſo many doubts and arguments, that there remains no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relie.

One of which, and the principall, is, that we haue made the Vnderſtanding an inſtrumentall power, as the Imagination, and the Memory: and haue giuen drineſſe to the braine, as an inſtrument with which it may worke; a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of *Ariſtotle* and all his followers, who placing the vnderſtanding ſeuered from the bodily inſtrument, prooue eaſily the immortality of the reaſonable ſoule, and that the ſame iſſuing out of the body, endureth for euer. Now the contrary opinion being diſputable, the way hereby is ſtopped vp, ſo that this cannot be prooued. Moreouer, the reaſons on which *Ariſtotle* groundeth himſelfe, to proue that the vnderſtanding is not an inſtrumentall power, carrie ſuch efficacie, as other than that cannot be concluded. For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderſtanding the nature and being of whatſoeuer materiall

terial things in the world, and if the same should be conioined with any bodily thing, that selfe would hinder the knowledge of the residue: as we see in the outward sences, that if the tast be bitter, all the things which the tongue toucheth, pertake the same sauour: and if the christalline humour be greene or yellow, al that the eye seeth, it iudgeth to be of the same colour. The reason of this is, for that the thing within breeds an impediment to that without.

Aristotle sayth moreouer, That if the vnderstanding were mingled with any bodily instrument, it would retaine some qualitie, for whatsoeuer vniteth it selfe with heat or cold, it is of force that it partake of the same quality. But to say that the vnderstanding is hot, cold, moist, or drie, is to vtter a matter abhominable to the ears of all naturall Philosophers.

The second principall doubt is, that *Aristotle* and all the *Peripateticks*, bring in two other powers besides the Vnderstanding, the Imaginatiō, & the Memory: namely, Remembrance, and Common sence, grounding vpon that rule, That the powers are knowne by way of the actions. They sayd, That besides the operations of the Vnderstanding, the Imagination, & the Memory, there are also two other different. So then the wit of man taketh his originall from fiue powers, and not from three only, as we did proue.

We sayd also in the last chapter, after the opinion of *Galen*, that the memorie doth none other worke in the braine, saue only to preserue the shapes and figures of things, in such sort as a chest preserueth and keepeth apparell and what so else is put thereinto. And if by such a comparison, we are to vnderstand the office of this power, it is requisit also to proone another reasonable fa-

 culties,

cultie, which may fetch out the figures from the memorie, and represent them to the vnderstanding, euen as it is necessarie that there be one to open the cheſt, and to take out what hath bene laid vp therein.

Besides this, we sayd that the vnderstanding and the memorie are contrarie powers, and that the one chaceth away the other, for the one loueth great drineſſe, and the other much moisture, and a ſuppleneſſe of the braine. And if this be true, wherefore sayd *Aristotle* and *Plato*, That men who haue their fleſh tender, enioy great vnderstanding, seeing this supplenes is an effect of moisture.

We sayd also, that for effecting that a memorie may be good, it was neceſſary the braine ſhould be endowed with moisture, for the figures ought to be printed therein by way of compreſſion, and the ſame being hard, they cannot ſo eaſily make a ſigne therein. True it is, that to receiue figures with readineſſe, it requireth that the braine be pliant, but to preſerue the ſhapes ſome long time, all affirme that it is neceſſarie the ſame be hard and drie, as it appeareth in outward things, where the figure printed in a pliant ſubſtance, is eaſily cancelled, but in the drie and hard, it neuer periſheth. Wherethrough we ſee many men who con by heart with great readineſſe, but forget againe very ſpeedily. Of which *Galen* rendering a reaſon, ſayth that ſuch through much moisture, haue the ſubſtance of their braine tender and not ſetled, for the figure is ſoone cancelled, as if it were ſealed in water. And contrariwiſe, other learne by heart with difficultie, but what they haue once learned, they neuer forget againe. Wherethrough it ſeemeth a matter impoſſible, that there ſhould be that difference of memorie which we ſpeake of, which ſhould learne with eaſe,

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and preſerue a long time.

It is alſo hard to vnderſtand how it is poſſible that ſo many figures being ſealed together in the braine, the one ſhould not cancell the other, for if in a peece of ſoftned wax, there be printed many ſeales of diuers figures, it fals out certaine, that ſome cancell other ſome, by the intermingling of theſe figures.

And that which breedeth no leſſe difficultie, is, to know whence it proceedeth, that the memorie by exerciſing it ſelfe, becommeth the more eaſie to receiue figures, it being certaine, that not only bodily exerciſe, but ſpirituall much more, drieth and ſoketh the fleſh.

It is alſo hard to conceiue, in what ſort the imagination is contrary to the vnderſtanding, if there be none other more vrgent cauſe, than to ſay, That exceſſiue heat reſolueth the ſubtile parts of the braine, leauing an earthly and groſſe remnant, ſeeing that Melancholy, is one of the groſſeſt and earthlieſt humours of our body. And *Ariſtotle* ſayth, That the vnderſtanding vſeth the ſeruice of none ſo much, as of that. And this difficulty is encreaſed, conſidering that melancholy is a groſſe humor, cold and drie; and choler is of a delicat ſubſtance, and of temperature hot and drie, and yet for all this, melancholy is more appropriat to the vnderſtanding than choler. Which ſeemeth repugnant to reaſon, for this humour aideth the vnderſtanding with two qualities, and gainſetteth it ſelfe only with one, which is heat. But melancholie aydeth it with his drineſſe, and with none other, and oppoſeth it ſelfe by his cold, and by his groſſe ſubſtance, which is a thing that the vnderſtanding moſt abhorreth. For which cauſe, *Galen* aſſigneth more wit and prudence to choler, than to melãcholy, ſaying thus; Readineſſe and Prudence, ſpring from the humour of choler,

choler, and the melancholicke humour is author of integritie and constancie.

Lastly, the cause may be demaunded, whence it may grow, that toiling, and continuall contemplation of studie maketh many wise, in whome at the beginning, the good nature of these qualities, which we speake of, was wanting: and so by giuing and receiuing with the imagination, they come to make themselues capable of many verities, which tofore they knew not, nor had the temperature which thereto was requisit. For if they had possessed the same, so much labour should not haue ben needfull.

Al these difficulties, and many other besides, are contrarie to the doctrine of the last chapter. For natural Philosophie hath not so certaine principles as the Mathematicall sciences, wherein, the Phisition and the Philosopher (if he be also a Mathematician) may alwaies make demonstration: but comming afterwards to the cure which is conformable to the art of Phisicke, he shall commit therein many errours, and yet not alwaies thorow his own fault (sithens in the Mathematicks he alwaies followed a certaintie) but through the little assurance of the art, for which cause, *Aristotle* said, The Phisition though he alwaies cure not, is not therefore a bad one, prouided that he foreslow not to performe any of those points which appertain to the art. But if he should commit any errour in the Mathematicks, he would be void of excuse. For performing in this science all the diligences which it requireth, it is impossible that the truth should not appeare. In sort, that albeit we yeeld not a manifest demonstration of this doctrine, yet the whole fault is not to be layd on our want of capacitie, neither may it straightwaies be recounted as false that

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we deliuer.

To the first principal doubt, we answer, that if the vnderstanding were seuered from the body, & had nought to do with heat, cold, moist, and drie, nor with the other bodily qualities, it would follow that al men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But we see by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another, then this groweth, for that the vnderstãding is an instrumentall power, and better disposed in one than in another, and not from any other occasion. For all reasonable soules and their vnderstandings (sundered from the body) are of equall perfection and knowledge. Those who follow *Aristotles* doctrine, seeing by experience, that some discourse better than othersome, haue found an excuse in apparence, saying; That the discoursing of one better than another, is not caused, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, & that the braine is better disposed in some than in othersome: but for that the vnderstanding (whilst the reasonable soule remaineth in the body) standeth in need of the fantasmes and figures which are in the imagination, and in the memorie. Through default whereof, the vnderstanding fals to discourse illy, and not through his own fault, nor for that it is ioyned with a matter badly instrumentalized But this answer is contrary to the doctrine of *Aristotle* himselfe, who proueth, that by how much the memorie is the woorse, by so much the vnderstanding is the better; and by how much the memorie is bettered, by so much the vnderstanding is impaired; and the same we haue heretofore prooued as touching the imagination, in confirmation of that which *Aristotle* demaundeth, What the cause is, that we waxing old, haue

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so bad a memorie, and so good an vnderstanding: and when we are yoong, it fals out contrary, that we possesse a great memorie and small vnderstanding. Hereof, in one thing we see the experience, and *Galen* noteth it, that when in a disease, the temperature and good disposition of the braine is impaired, many times the operations of the vnderstanding are thereby lost, and yet those of the memorie and the imagination remaine sound, which could not come to passe, if the vnderstanding enioyed not a particular instrument for it selfe besides this which the other powers do partake.

To this I know not what may be yeelded in answer, vnlesse it be by some metaphysicall relation, compounded of action and power, which neither themselues know what it meaneth, nor is there any other man that vnderstands it. Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the sciences: and what belongs to the Metaphysicks, to entreat thereof in naturall Philosophie; and matters of naturall Philosophie in the Metaphysicks.

The reasons wherevpon *Aristotle* grounded himselfe are of small moment, for the consequence followeth not, to say that the vnderstanding, because it must know materiall things, should not therefore enioy a bodily instrument: for the bodily qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, make no alteration of the power; nor from them do the fantasmes arise, euen as the sensible, placed aboue the sence, causeth not the selfe sence. This is plainly seene in touching, for notwithstanding that the same is compounded of four materiall qualities: and that the same hath in it quantitie, and hardnesse or softnesse; for all this, the hand discerneth whether a thing be hot or cold, hard or soft, great

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or little. And if you ask in what sort the naturall heat which is in the hand, hindereth not the touching that it may discerne the heat which is in the stone; we answer, that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, do not alter the instrument it selfe, neither from them do there issue any shapes whereby to know them. Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things, and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie, and of the humours and skins which go to his composition, some haue colours, and some are *diaphane* and transparant, all which hindereth not, but that we with our sight may discerne the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs: and the reason is, for that the humours, the skins, the figure, and the quantity, serue for the composition of the eye, and such thinges cannot alter the sightfull power, and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures. The like we affirme of the vnderstanding, that his proper instrument (though the same be materiall and ioyned with it) cannot enlarge it, for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes, which haue force to alter it: and the reason is, For that the vnderstandable placed aboue the vnderstanding, causeth not the vnderstanding; & so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall thinges, without that it encounter ought to hinder the same. The second reason wherin *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, is of lesse importance than the former, for neither the vnderstanding, nor any other accident, can be qualiti-like, for of themselues, they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie. For which cause, it litle skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument together with the temperature of the 4. first qualities, that

therefore

therfore it may be called qualitie-like, in as much as the braine and not the vnderſtanding, is the ſubiect of the heat, the cold, the moyſt, and the drie.

To the third difficulty which the *Peripateticks* alleage, ſaying, That by making the vnderſtanding an inſtrumẽtall power, we reaue one of thoſe principles, which ſerue to prooue the immortality of the reaſonable ſoule: we anſwere, That there are other argumentes of more ſoundneſſe, whereby to prooue the ſame, whereof we will treat in the chapter following.

To the ſecond argument, we anſwere that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuerſitie of powers: for (as we will prooue hereafter) the imaginatiue performeth matter ſo ſtrange, that if this *maxime* were true in ſort as the vulgar Philoſophers had it, or admitting the interpretation which they giue it, there ſhould be in the braine, ten or twelue powers more. But becauſe all theſe operations, are to be marſhalled vnder one generall reaſon, they argue no more than one imaginatiue, which is afterwardes deuided into many particular differences, by the means of the ſundry operations which it performeth: the compoſing of the ſhapes, in the preſence or the abſence of the obiects, not onely argueth not a diuerſitie of the generall powers (as are the common ſenſe, and the imaginatiue) but euen not of the very particulars.

To the third argument we anſwere, that the memory is nothing els but a tenderneſſe of the braine, diſpoſed with a certaine kinde of moiſture, to receiue and preſerue that, which the imaginatiue apprehendeth: with the like proportion, that white or blew paper holdes with him who writeth: for as the writer, writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget, and

after

after he hath written them, returnes to read them; euen so we ought to conceiue, that the imagination writeth in the memorie, the figures of the things knowne by the fiue sentes, and by the vnderstanding, as also some others of his own framing: and when it will remember ought (saith *Arist.*) it returneth to behold & contemplat them. With this maner of comparison *Plato* serued himselfe, when he said that fearing the weake memorie of old age, he hastened to make another of paper (namely bookes) to the end his trauailes ought not to be lost, but that hee might haue that which might represent them vnto him, when he list to read them. This selfe doth the imaginatiue, of writing in the memorie, and returning to read it when it would remember the same. The first who vttered this point was *Aristotle*, and the second *Galen* who sayd thus, Forasmuch as that part of the soule, which imagineth, whatsoeuer the same be, seemeth to be the selfe that also remembreth. And so verely it seemeth to be, for the things which we imagine with long thinking, are well fixed in the memorie, and that which we handle with light consideration, also soone we forget the same againe. And as the writer, when he writeth faire, the better assureth it to be read: so it befalles to the imaginatiue, that if it seale with force, the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine: otherwise it can skarsly be discerned. The like also chanceth in old deedes, which being found in part, and in part perished by time, cannot well be read, vnlesse we gather much by reason and coniecture. So doth the imaginatiue, when in the memorie, some figures remaine, and some are perished, where *Aristotles* errour had his originall, who for this cause conceiued that remembrance was a different power from the memorie. Moreouer, he affirmed, that

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those who haue great remembrance, are likewise of great vnderstanding, which is also false: for the imaginatiue, which is that that makes the remembrance, is contrarie to the vnderstanding; in sort, that to gather memory of things, and to remember them after they are knowne, is a worke of the imagination: as to write and returne to read it, is a worke of the Scriuener, and not of the paper. Whereby it falleth out that the memorie remayneth a power passiue, and not actiue: euen as the blew and the white of the paper, is none other than a commoditie whereby to write.

To the fourth doubt may be answered, That it maketh little to the purpose, as touching the wit, whether the flesh be hard or tender, if the braine partake not also the same qualitie, the which we see many times hath a distinct temperature from al the other parts of the body. But when they concur in one selfe tendernesse, it is an euill token for the vnderstanding, and no lesse for the imagination. And if we consider the flesh of women and children, we shall find that in tendernesse it exceedeth that of men, and this notwithstanding, commonly men haue a better wit than women: and the naturall reason hereof is, For that the humours, which make the flesh tender, are fleagme and blood, because they are both moist (as we haue aboue specified) and of them *Galen* said, That they make men simple & dullards: and contrariwise, the humours which harden the flesh, are choler and melancholy: and hence grow the prudence and sapience which are found in man. In sort, that it is rather an ill token, to haue the flesh tender, than drie and hard. And so in men who haue an equall temperature throughout their whole bodie, it is an easie matter to gather the qualitie of their wit by the tendernesse or hard-

hardnes of their fleſh: For if it be hard & rough, it giueth token either of a good vnderſtanding or a good imagination; and if ſmooth and ſupple, of the contrary, namely of good memory, and ſmall vnderſtanding, and leſſe imagination: and to vnderſtand whether the brain haue correſpondence, it behoooueth to conſider the haire, which being big, blacke, rough, and thicke, yeeldeth token of a good imagination, or a good vnderſtanding: and if ſoft and ſmooth, they are a ſigne of much memorie and nothing els. But who ſo will diſtinguiſh and know, whether the ſame be vnderſtanding, or imagination (when the haire is of this ſort) it muſt be conſidered of what forme the child is in the act of laughter: for this paſſion diſcouereth much, of what qualitie he is in the imagination.

What the reaſon and cauſe of laughter ſhould be, many Philoſophers haue laboured to conceiue, and none of them hath deliuered ought that may well be vnderſtood, but all agree that the bloud is an humour, which prouoketh a man to laugh, albeit none expreſſe with what qualitie this humour is indewed more than the reſt, why it ſhould make a man addicted to laughter. The follies which are committed with laughing, are leſſe dangerous: but thoſe which are done with labour are more perilous: as if he ſhould ſay, When the diſeaſed become giddie and doting do laugh, they reſt in more ſafetie, than if they were in toyle and anguiſh: for the former commeth of blood, which is a moſt mild humour, and the ſecond of melancholie: but we grounding vpon the doctrine, whereof we intreat, ſhall eaſily vnderſtand all that, which in this caſe may be deſired to be known. The cauſe of laughter (in my iudgement) is nought els, but an approouing, which is made by the

imagination, seeing or hearing somewhat done or said, which accordeth very well: and this power remaineth in the braine, when any of these things giue it contentment, sodainly it mooueth the same, and after it all the muscles of the body, and so, many times we do allow of wittie sayings, by bowing downe of the head. When then the imagination is verie good, it contents not it selfe with euery speech, but onely with those which please very well: and if they haue some little correspondence, and nothing els, the same receiueth thereby rather paine than gladnesse. Hence it groweth that men of great imagination, laugh verie seldome, and the point most worthie of noting, is, that iesters, and naturall counterfeiters neuer laugh at their own meriments, nor at that which they heare others to vtter: for they haue an imagination so delicat, that not euen their own pleasanteries, can yeeld that correspondence which they require.

Heereto may be added, that merimentes (besides that they must haue a good proportion, and be vttered to the purpose) must be new, and not tofore heard or seene. And this is the propertie not onely of the imagination, but also of all the other powers which gouerne man: for which cause we see, that the stomacke when it hath twise fed vpon one kinde of meate, straightwaies loatheth the same: so doth the sight one selfe shape and colour; the hearing one concordance, how good soeuer; and the vnderstanding one selfe contemplation. Hence also it proceedeth, that the pleasant conceiued man, laugheth not at the iestes which himselfe vttereth: for before he send them forth from his lips, he knew what he would speake: Whence I conclude, that those who laugh much, are all defectiue in their imagi-

nation,

nation, wherethrough what ſoeuer merriment & pleaſanterie, (how cold ſoeuer) with them carrieth a verie good correſpondencie: And becauſe the bloud partaketh much moiſture (wherof we ſaid before, that it breedeth dammage to the imagination:) thoſe who are very ſanguine, are alſo great laughers. Moiſture holdeth this propertie, that becauſe the ſame is tender and gentle, it abateth the force of heate, and makes that it burne not ouermuch. For which cauſe, it partakes better agreement with drineſſe, becauſe it ſharpneth his operations. Beſides this, where there is much moiſture, it is a ſigne that the heat is remiſſe, ſeeing it cannot reſolue nor conſume the ſame: and the imagination cannot performe his operations with a heat ſo weake. Hence we gather alſo, that men of great vnderſtanding, are much giuen to laughter, for that they haue defect of imagination, as we read of the great Philoſopher *Democritus*, and many others whom my ſelfe haue ſeene and noted. Then by meanes of this laughter we ſhall know, if that which men or boyes haue of fleſh hard and tough, and of haire blacke, thicke, hard, and rough, betoken either the imagination, or the vnderſtanding. In ſort, that *Ariſtotle* in this doctrine, was ſomwhat out of the way.

To the fifth argument we anſwer, that there are two kindes of moiſture in the brain, one which groweth of the aire (when this element predominateth in the mixture) and another of the water, with which the other elements are amaſſed. If the braine be tender by the firſt moiſture, the memory ſhall be verie good: eaſie to receiue, and mightie to reteine the figures for a long time. For the moiſture of the aire is verie ſupple and full of fatneſſe, on which the ſhapes are tacked with ſure holdfaſt, as we ſee in pictures, which are lymned in oyle,

who being set against the sunne and the water, receiue thereby no dammage at all: and if we cast oyle vpon any writing, it will neuer be wiped out, but marreth the same: and that which cannot be read, with oyle is made legible, by yeelding thereto a brightnesse and transparence. But if the difference of the braine, spring from the second kind of moisture, the argument frameth verie well: For if it receiue with facilitie, with the same readinesse, it turneth again to cancell the figure, because the moisture of the water, hath no fatnesse, wherein the figures may fasten themselues. These two moistures are knowne by the haire. For that which springs from the aire maketh them to prooue vnctious and ful of oyle and fat: and the water maketh them moyst and verie supple.

To the sixth argument may be answered, that the figures of things are not printed in the braine, as the figure of the seale is in waxe, but they pearce thereinto to remaine there affixed, in sort as the sparrowes are atrached to birdlime, or the flies sticke in honnie: For these figures are bodilesse, and cannot be mingled nor corrupt one the other.

To the seuenth difficultie we answer, that the figures amasse and mollifie the substance of the braine, in such sort, as wax groweth soft by plying the same betweene our fingers: besides that the vitall spirits haue vertue to make tender and supple the hard and drie members, as the outward heat doth the yron. And that the vitall spirites ascend to the braine, when any thing is learned by heart, we haue prooued heretofore, And euery bodily and spirituall exercise, doth not drie: yea the Phisitions affirme, that the moderat fatteneth.

To the eigth argument we answer, that there are

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two ſpices of melancholy: one naturall, which is the droſſe of the blood, whoſe temperature is cold and drie, accompanied with a ſubſtance very groſſe, this ſerues not of any value for the wit, but maketh men blockiſh, ſluggards, and grynnars, becauſe they want imagination. There is another ſort which is called *choler ad uſt*, or *atra bile*, of which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That it made men exceeding wiſe: whoſe temperature is diuers, as that of vinegre. Sometimes it performeth the effects of heat, lightning the earth; and ſometimes it cooleth, but alwaies it is drie and of a very delicat ſubſtance. *Cicero* confeſſeth that he was ſlow witted, becauſe he was not melancholike aduſt, and he ſayd true, for if he had bene ſuch, he ſhould not haue poſſeſſed ſo rare a gift of eloquence. For the melancholicke aduſt want memorie, to which appertaineth the ſpeaking with great preparation. It hath another qualitie which much aideth the vnderſtanding, namely, that it is cleere like the Agat ſtone, with which cleereneſſe it giueth light within to the braine, and maketh the ſame to diſcerne well the figures. And of this opinion was *Heraclitus* when he ſayd, *A drie cleereneſſe maketh a moſt wiſe mind*, with which cleereneſſe, naturall melancholy is not endowed, but his blacke is deadly: and that the reaſonable ſoule there within the braine, ſtandeth in need of light to diſcern the figures & the ſhapes, we will prooue hereafter.

To the ninth argument we anſwer, that the prudence and readineſſe of the mind which *Galen* ſpeaketh of, appertaineth to the imagination, whereby we know that which is to come, whence *Cicero* ſayd, Memorie is of things paſſed, and Prudence of thoſe to come. The readineſſe of the mind is that, which commonly they call a ſharpeneſſe in imagining, and by other names, craftines,

ſubtiltie, cauelling, wilineſſe: wherefore *Cicero* ſayth, Prudence is a ſubtiltie which with a certaine reaſon, can make choiſe of good things and of euill. This ſort of Prudence and readineſſe, men of good vnderſtanding do want, becauſe they lack imagination. For which reaſon we ſee by experience in great ſcholers in this ſort of learning, which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, that taking them from their bookes, they are not woorth a ruſh to yeeld or receiue in trafficke of worldly affaires. This ſpice of Prudence, *Galen* ſayd very wel, that it came of choler, for *Hippocrates* recounting to *Damagetus* his friend, in what caſe he found *Democritus*, when he went to viſit him for curing him, writeth that he lay in the field, vnder a plane tree, bare legged, and without breeches, leaning againſt a ſtone with a booke in his hand, and compaſſed about with brute beaſts, dead and diſmembred. Whereat *Hippocrates* maruailing, asked him whereto thoſe beaſts of that faſhion ſerued, and he then anſwered, that he was about to ſearch what humour it was, which made a man to be headlong, craftie, readie, double, and cauillous, & had found (by making an anotomie of thoſe wild beaſts) that choler was the cauſe of ſo diſcommendable a propertie: and that to reuenge himſelfe of craftie perſons, he would handle them as he had done the fox, the ſerpent and the ape. This manner of Prudence is not only odious to men, but alſo S. *Paule* ſayth of it, The wiſedome of the fleſh is enemie to God. The cauſe is aſſigned by *Plato*, who affirmeth that knowledge which is remooued from iuſtice, ought rather to be tearmed ſubtiltie than prudence, as if he ſhould haue ſayd: It is no reaſon that a knowledge which is ſeuered from iuſtice, ſhould be called wiſdome, but rather craft, or malicioufneſſe. Of this, the diuell euermore ſerueth himſelfe

himselfe to do men dammage, and S. *Iames* said, that this wisdome came not from heauen, but is earthly, beastly, and diuelish.

There is found another spice of wisdome, conioyned with reason and simplicitie, and by this, men know the good and shun the euill: the which, *Galen* affirmeth doth appertaine to the vnderstanding, for this power is not capable of maliciousnesse, doublenesse, and subtilty, nor hath the skill how to do naught, but is wholly vpright, iust, gentle, and plaine. A man endowed with this sort of wit, is called vpright and simple, wherethrough when *Demosthenes* went about to creepe into the good liking of the iudges in an oration which he made against *Eschines*, he tearmed them vpright and simple, in respect of the simplicitie of their dutie: concerning which, *Cicero* sayth, Dutie is simple, and the only cause of all good things. For this sort of wisdome, the cold and drie of melancholy is a seruing instrument, but it behoooueth that the same be composed of parts very subtile and delicat.

To the last doubt may be answered, that when a man setteth himselfe to contemplat some truth, which he would faine know, and cannot by and by find it out, the same groweth for that the braine wanteth his conuenient temperature; but when a man standeth rauished in a contemplation, the naturall heat that is in the vitall spirits, and the arteriall blood, run foorthwith to the head, and the temperature of the braine enhaunceth it selfe, vntill the same arriue to the tearme behooffull. True it is, that much musing, to some dooth good, and to some harme: for if the brain want but a little to arriue to that point of conuenient heat, it is requisit that he make but small stay in the contemplation, and if it passe that point

straightwaies the vnderstanding is driuen into a garboile, by the ouer plentifull presence of the vitall spirits, and so he cannot attaine to the notice of the trueth. For which cause, we see many men, who vpon the sodaine speake verie well: but with aduisement are nothing worth. Others haue their vnderstanding so base, either through too much coldnes, or too much drouth, that it is requisite the naturall heate abide a long time in the head, to the end the temperature may lift it selfe vp to the degrees which are wanting, where through they speake better vpon deliberation then on the sodaine.

CHAP. VII.

It is shewed, that though the reasonable soule haue need of the temperature of the foure first qualities, aswell for his abiding in the bodie, as also to discourse and syllogize, Yet for all this, it followeth not, that the same is corruptible and mortall.

IT was held by *Plato* for a matter very certaine, that the reasonable soule is a substance bodilesse, and spiritual: not subiect to corruption or mortalitie, as that of brute beasts: the which departing from the bodie, possesseth another better and more quiet life. But this is to be vnderstood (saith *Plato*) if a man haue led his life conformable to reason, for otherwise, it were better that the soule had remained still in the body, there to suffer the tormentes, with which God chastiseth the wicked. This conclusion is so notable and catholicke, that if he attained

ned the knowledge thereof by the happineſſe of his wit, with a iuſt title he came to be called the diuine *Plato*. But albeit the ſame is ſuch as we ſee, yet for all this, *Galen* could neuer bring within his conceit, that it was true, but held it alwaies doubtfull, ſeeing a wiſe man through the heat of his braine, to dote, and by applying cold medicines vnto him, he commeth to his wits againe. In reſpect whereof, he ſayd he could wiſh that *Plato* were now liuing, to the end he might ask him how it was poſſible that the reaſonable ſoule ſhould be immortall, ſeeing it altered ſo eaſily with heat, with cold, with moiſture, & with drouth: & principally, cõſidering that the ſame departs from the body through ouermuch heat, or when a man giueth ouer himſelfe exceſſiuely to laſciuiouſneſſe, or is forced to drinke poiſon, and ſuch other bodily alterations, which accuſtomably bereaue the life. For if it were bodileſſe and ſpirituall (as *Plato* affirmeth) heat, being a materiall qualitie, could not make the ſame to leeſe his powers, nor let his operations in a garboile.

Theſe reaſons, brought *Galen* into a confuſion, and made him wiſh that ſome *Platoniſt* would reſolue him theſe doubts, and I beleeue, that in his life time he met not with any, but after his death experience ſhewed him that which his vnderſtanding could not conceiue. For it is a thing certaine, that the infallible certayntie of our immortall ſoule, is not gathered from humane reaſons, or from arguments which prooue that it is corruptible, for to the one and the other, an anſwer may eaſily be ſhaped, it is only our fayth which maketh vs certaine and aſſured, that the ſame endureth for euer. But *Galen* had ſmall reaſon, to intricate himſelfe in arguments of ſo ſlight conſequence.

Galen dying, went to hell, an ſaw by experiẽce that materiall fire burned the ſoules, and could not cõſume the this Phyſition had knowledge of that Euangelicall doctrine, and could not receiue it.

conſequence, for the workes which ſeeme to be performed by meanes of ſome inſtrument, it cannot well be gathered in naturall Philoſophie, that it proceedeth from a defect in the principal agent, if they take not perfection. That painter who portraieth well when he hath a penſill requiſit for his art, falleth not in blame, if with a bad penſill he draw ill fauoured ſhapes, and of bad delineation: and it is no good argument to ſay, that the writer had an imperfection in his hand, when through default of a well made penne, he is forced to write with a ſticke. *Galen* conſidering the maruellous works which are in the vniuerſe, and the wiſedome and prouidence by which they were made and ordained, concluded thereof, that in the world there was a God, though we behold him not with our corporall eyes, of whom he vttered theſe words; God was not made at any time, in as much as he is euerlaſtingly vnbegotten. And in another place he ſayth, That the frame and compoſition of mans body was not made by the reaſonable ſoule, nor by the naturall heat, but by God, or by ſome very wiſe vnderſtanding.

Out of which there may be framed an argument againſt *Galen*, and his falſe conſequence be ouerthrowne, and it is thus: Thou haſt ſuſpected that the reaſonable ſoule is corruptible, becauſe if the braine be well tempered, it fitteth well to diſcourſe and philoſophiſe, and if the ſame grow hot or cold beyond due, it doteth, and vttereth a thouſand follies; the ſame may be inferred, conſidering the workes which thou ſpeakeſt of, as touching God: for if he make a man in places temperat (where the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie) he produceth him very wittie and diſcreet, and if the country be vntemperat, he breedeth thé all fooles

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and doltish. For the same *Galen* affirmeth that it is a miracle to find a wise man in *Scythia*, and in *Athens* they are all borne Philosophers. To suspect then that God is corruptible, because with one qualitie he performeth these workes well, and with the contrary they proue ill, *Galen* himselfe would not confesse, for as much as he sayd before, that God was euerlasting.

Plato held another way of more certainty, saying, That albeit God be euerlasting, almightie, and of infinit wisdome: yet he proceedeth in his workes as a naturall agent, & makes himselfe subiect to the disposition of the foure first qualities: in sort, that to beget a man verie wise, and like to himselfe, it behoueth that he prouide a place the most temperate of the whole world, where the heate of the aire may not exceed the cold, nor the moyst the drie, and therefore he said, But God as desirous of warre, and of wisedome, hauing chosen a place which should produce men like vnto himselfe, would that the same should be first inhabited: And though God would shape a man of great wisedome in *Scythia*, or in any other temperate countrey, and did not herein imploy his omnipotencie, he should of necessitie yet proove a foole, through the contrarietie of the first qualities. But *Plato* would not haue inferred (as *Galen* did) that God was alterable and corruptible: for that the heate and coldnesse would haue brought an impediment to his worke. The same may be collected, when a reasonable soule, for that it is seated in a braine inflamed, cannot vse his discretion and wisdome, and not to thinke that in respect thereof, the same is subiect to mortalitie and corruption. The departure out of the body, and the not being able to support the great heate, nor the other alterations which are woont to kill men, shew-

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eth plainly that the same is an act and substantiall form of mans bodie, and that to abide therein, it requireth certain materiall dispositions, fitted to the being, which it hath of the soule, and that the instruments with which it must worke, be wel composed, and well vnited, and of that temperature, which is requisite for his operations, all which failing, it behoueth of force, that it erre in them, and depart from the body.

The error of *Galen* consisted, in that he would verifie by the principles of naturall Philosophie, whether the reasonable soule, issuing out of the bodie, do forthwith die or not: this being a question, which appertaineth to another superiour science; and of more certaine principles, in which we will prooue, that it is no good argument nor concludeth well, that the soule of man is corruptible, because the same dwelleth quietly in a bodie endowed with these qualities, and departeth when they do fayle. Neither is this difficult to be prooued: for other spirituall substances, of greater perfection than the reasonable soule do make choice of place, altered with materiall qualities, in which it seemeth, they take abode with their content: and if there succed any contrarie dispositions, forthwith they depart, because they cannot endure it: for it is a thing certaine, that there are to be found some dispositions in a mans bodie, which the diuell coueteth with so great egernesse, as to enioy thē, he entereth into the man where they rested, wherethrough he becommeth possessed: but the same being corrupted and chaunged by contrarie medicines, and an alteration being wrought in these blacke, filthy, and stincking humours, he naturally comes to depart. This is plainly discerned by experience: for if there be in a house, great, darke, foule, putrified, melancholicke, and void

void of dwellers to make abode therin, the diuels soone take it vp for their lodging: but if the same be clensed, the windowes opened, and the sunne-beames admitted to enter, by and by they get them packing, and specially if it be inhabited by much companie, and that there be meetings and pastimes, and playing on musicall instrumentes: how greatly harmony and good proportion offendeth the diuell, is apparantly seene by the authoritie of the deuine scripture, where we find recounted, that *Dauid* taking a Harpe, and playing thereupon, straightwaies made the diuels runne away, and depart out of *Saul* his body, And albeit this matter haue his spirituall vnderstanding: yet I conceiue thereby, that musicke naturally molesteth the diuell, where-through he cannot in any sort endure it. The people of *Israel* knew before by experience, that the diuell was enemie to musicke: and because they had notice heereof, *Saules* seruants spake these wordes: Behold, the euill spirit of the Lord tormenteth thee: let my Lord the king therefore command, that thy seruants, who wait in thy presence, search out a man who can play on the citherne, to the end, that when the euill spirite of the Lord taketh thee, he may play with his hand, and thou thereby mayst receiue ease. In the selfe manner, as there are found out wordes and coniurations, which make the diuell to tremble; and not to heare them: he abandoneth the place which he chose for his habitation. So *Ioseph* recounteth that *Salomon* left in writing, certaine maners of coniuration, by which he not onely chased away the diuell for the present, but he neuer had the hardinesse to returne againe to that body, from whence he was once so expelled. The same *Salomon* shewed also a roote of so abhominable sauour in the diuels nose,

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that if it were applied to the nosthrils of the possessed, he would forthwith shake his eares and runne away. The diuell is so slouinly, so melancholike, and so much an enemie to things neat, cheerefull, and cleere, that when *Christ* entered into the region of *Genezaret*, *S. Mathew* recounteth, how certaine diuels met him in dead carcases, which they had caught out of their graues crying and saing, *Iesu* thou sonne of *Dauid* what hast thou to do with vs, that thou art come before hand to torment vs? we pray thee that if thou be to driue vs out of this place where we are, thou wilt yet let vs enter into that Heard of swine which is yonder For which reason, the holy Scripture tearmeth them vncleane spirites: Whence we plainly discerne, that not onely the reasonable soule, requireth such dispositions in the body, that they may informe it, and be the beginning of all his operations, but also hath need to soiourne therein, as in a place befitting his nature.

The diuels then (being a substance of more perfection) abhorre some bodily qualities, and in the contrarie take pleasure and contentment. In sort, that this of *Galen* is no good argument, The reasonable soule through excesse of heate departs from the body, *ergo* it is corruptible, inasmuch as the diuel doth the like (as we haue said) and yet for all this is not mortall.

But that which to this purpose deserueth most note, is, that the diuell not onely coueteth places alterable with bodily qualities, to soiourne there at his pleasure: but also when he will worke any thing, which much importeth him, he serues himselfe with such bodily qualities, as are aidable to that effect. For if I should demand now, wherein the diuell grounded himselfe, when minding to beguile *Eue*, he entered rather into a venemous serpent,

ſerpent, than into a horſe, a beare, a woolfe, or any other beaſt, which were not of ſo ghaſtly ſhape? I wot not what might be giuen in anſwere: well I know that *Galen* admitteth not the ſentences of *Moſes*, nor of Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe (ſaith he) they both ſpeake without making demonſtration: but I haue alwaies deſired to learne from ſome Catholike, the ſolution of this doubt, and none hath yet ſatisfied me.

This is certaine (as alreadie we haue prooued) that burnt and inflamed choler, is an humour which teacheth the reaſonable ſoule in what ſort to practiſe treaſons and trecheries; and amongſt brute beaſts, there is none which ſo much partaketh of this humour as the ſerpent, wherethrough more than all the reſt (ſayth the ſcripture) he is crafty and guileful. The reaſonable ſoule although it be the meaneſt of all the intelligences, partakes yet the ſame nature with the diuell and the angels. And in like manner: as there it takes the ſeruice of venemous choler, to make a man wily and ſuttle: ſo the diuell (being entered into the body of this cruell beaſt) made himſelfe the more cunning and deceitfull. This manner of Philoſophiſing will not ſticke much in the naturall Philoſophers ſtomacks, becauſe the ſame carrieth ſome apparance that it may be ſo: but that which will breed them more aſtoniſhment, is, that when God would draw the world out of errour, and eaſily teach them the truth (a worke contrary to that which the diuell went about) he came in the ſhape of a doue, and not of an eagle, nor a peacocke, nor of any other birds of fairer figure: and the cauſe knowne, is this, that the doue partaketh much of the humour which enclineth to vprightneſſe, to plainneſſe, to truth, and to ſimplicitie, and wanteth choler, the inſtrument of guile & maliciouſnes.

None

None of these things are admitted by *Galen*, nor by the naturall Philosophers: for they cannot conceiue, how the reasonable soule, and the diuel (being spirituall substances) can be altered by materiall qualities, as are heat, coldnesse, moisture, and drouth. For if fire bring in heat to the wood, it is because they both possesse a body, & a quantity, wherof they are the subiect: the which faileth in spirituall substances, and admit (as a thing yet impossible) that bodily qualities, might alter a spirituall substance, what eies hath the diuell, or the reasonable soule, wherwith to see the colours and shapes of things? or what smelling, to receiue sauours, or what hearing for musicke? or what feeling, to rest offended with much heat, seeing that for all these, bodily instruments are behooffull. And if the reasonable soule, being seuered from the bodie, remaine agreeued, and receiue anguish and sadnesse, it is not possible that his nature should rest free from alteration, or not come to corruption. These difficulties and argumentes, perplexed *Galen* and the other Philosophers of our times, but with me they conclude nothing. For when *Aristotle* affirmed, that the chiefest propertie which substance had, was to be subiect to accidents: he restrained the same, neither to bodily nor to spirituall: for the propertie of the generall is equally partaked by the special, and so he said, that the accidents of the body passe to the substance of the reasonable soule, and those of the soule, to the body: on which principle he grounded himselfe, to write all that which he vttered as touching *Phisnomy*, especially, that the accidents by which the powers receiue alteration, are all spirituall, without body, and without quantity, or matter: and so they grow to multiplie in a moment, through their mean, and passe through a glasse window with-

without breaking the ſame, And two contrarie accidents, may be extended in one ſelfe ſubiect, almuch as poſſibly they can be. In reſpect of which ſelfe qualitie, *Galen* tearmeth them vndiuidable, and the vulgar Philoſophers intentionall: and the matter being in this ſort, they may be very well proportioned with the ſpirituall ſubſtance.

I cannot forgoe to thinke that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the body, as alſo the diuell, hath a power ſightfull, ſmelling, hearing, and feeling. The which (me ſeemeth) is eaſie to be prooued: For if it be true, that their powers be knowne by means of their actions, it is a thing certain, that the deuill had a ſmelling power, when he ſmelled that root, which *Salomon* commaunded, ſhould be applied to the noſthrils of the poſſeſſed. And likewiſe that he had a hearing power, ſeeing he heard the muſicke which *Dauid* made to *Saule*. To ſay then, that the diuell receiued theſe qualities by his vnderſtanding, it is a matter not auouchable, in the doctrine of the vulgar Philoſophers: For this power is ſpiritual, and the obiects of the fiue ſences are material: and ſo it behoueth, to ſeeke out ſome other powers in the reaſonable ſoule, and in the diuell, to which they may carrie proportion. And if not, put caſe that the ſoule of the rich *Glutton*, had obtained at the hands of *Abraham*, that the ſoule of *Lazarus* ſhould returne to the world, to preach to his brethren, and perſuade them that they ſhould become honeſt men, to the end they might not paſſe to that place of torments, where himſelfe abode. I demaund now, in what maner the ſoule of *Lazarus* ſhould haue knowen to go to the citie, and to thoſe mens houſes, and if the ſame had met them by the way, in company with others, whether it could haue

known them by ſight, and been able to diuerſifie them, from thoſe who came with them? and if thoſe brethren of the rich glutton, had inquired of the ſame who it was, and who had ſent it: whether the ſame did partake anie power to hear their words? The ſame may be demãded of the diuel when he folowed after *Chriſt* our redeemer, hearing him to preach, & ſeeing the myracles which he did, and in that diſputation which they had togither in the wilderneſſe, with what eares the diuell receiued the words, and the anſweres which *Chriſt* gaue vnto him.

Verily, it betokens a want of vnderſtanding, to think that the diuell, or the reaſonabſe ſoule (ſundered from the bodie) cannot know the obiects of the fiue ſenſes, albeit they want the bodily inſtruments. For by the ſame reaſon, I will prooue vnto them, that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the bodie, cannot vnderſtand, imagine, nor performe the actions of memorie. For if whileſt the ſame abideth in the body, it cannot ſee being depriued of eies: neither can it diſcourſe or remember, if the braine be inflamed. To ſay then, that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the body, cannot diſcourſe, becauſe it hath no braine, is a follie very great, the which is proued by the ſelfe hiſtory of *Abraham*. Son remember, that thou haſt enioyed good things in thy life time, and *Lazarus* likewiſe euill, but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented. And beſides all this, there is placed betwixt you and vs, a great *Chaos*, in ſort that thoſe who would paſſe from hence to you, cannot, nor from you to vs. And he ſaid, I pray thee then O father, that thou wilt ſend to my fathers houſe, for I haue fiue brothers, that he may yeeld teſtimony vnto them, ſo as they come not alſo to this place of tormentes.

Whence

Whence I conclude, that as these two soules discourſed betweene themselues, and the rich glutton remembred, that he had fiue brothers in his fathers house, and *Abraham* brought to his remembrance, the delicious life which he had liued in the world, together with *Lazarus* penance, and this without vse of the braine: so also the soules can see without bodily eyes, heare without eares, taste without a tongue, smell without nosthrils, and touch without sinews and without flesh, and that much better beyond comparison. The like may be vnderstoode of the diuell, for he partaketh the same nature with the reasonable soule.

All these doubts, the soule of the rich glutton will very well resolue: of whom *S. Luke* recounteth, that being in hell, he lifted vp his eies, and beheld *Lazarus*, who was in *Abrahams* bosome, and with a loud voice sayd: Father *Abraham*, haue mercie on me, send *Lazarus*, that he may dip the point of his finger in water, and coole my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. Out of the passed doctrine, and out of that which is there red, we gather, that the fire of hell burneth the soules, and is materiall as this of ours, and that the same annoied the rich glutton and the other soules (by Gods ordinance) with his heat, and that if *Lazarus* had carried to him a pitcher of fresh water, he should haue taken great refreshment thereof: and the reason is verie plaine, for if that soule could not endure to abide in the bodie, through excessiue heate of the Feuer, and when the same dranke fresh water, the soule felt refreshment, why may not we conceiue the like, when the soule is vnited with the flames of the fire infernall? The rich Gluttons lifting vp of his eies, his thirstie tongue, & *Lazarus* finger, are all names of the powers of the soule, that so the scriptures might

expreſſe them. Thoſe who walke not in this path, and ground not themſelues on naturall philoſophie, vtter a thouſand follies: but yet hence it cannot be concluded, that if the reaſonable ſoule partake griefe and ſorrow (for that his nature is altered by contrarie qualities) therefore the ſame is corruptible or mortall: For aſhes, though they be compounded of the foure elementes, and of action and power: yet there is no naturall agent in the world, which can corrupt thē, or take from them, the qualities that are agreeable to their nature. The naturall temperature of aſhes, we all know to be cold and drie, but though we caſt them neuer ſo much into the fire, they will not leeſe their radicall coldneſſe which they enioy: and albeit they remaine 100000. yeares in the water, it is impoſſible that (being taken thence) they hold any naturall moiſture of their owne: and yet for all this, we cannot but grant that by fire they receiue heat, and by water moiſture. But theſe two qualities are ſuperficial in the aſhes, and endure a ſmall time in the ſubiect; for taken from the fire, forthwith they become cold, and from the water, they abide not moyſt an houre.

But there is offered a doubt, in this diſcourſe and reaſoning of the rich Glutton with *Abraham*, and that is, How the ſoule of *Abraham* was indowed with better reaſon, than that of the rich man: it being alleaged before, that all reaſonable ſoules (iſſued out of the body) are of equall perfection and knowledge? whereto we may anſwere in one of theſe two manners. The firſt is, that the Science and knowledge, which the ſoule purchaſeth, whileſt it remaineth in the bodie, is not loſt when a man dieth, but rather groweth more perfect, for he is freed from ſome errors. The ſoule of *Abraham*, departed out of this life, repleniſhed with wiſedome, and

with

with many reuelations, and ſecrets which God communicated vnto him, as his very freind: but that of the rich glutton, it behooued that of neceſſitie it ſhould depart away ignorant: firſt, by reaſon of his ſinne, which createth ignorance in a man: and next, for that riches heerein worke a contrarie effect vnto pouertie: this giueth a man wit, as hereafter we may well prooue, and proſperitie reaueth it away. There may alſo another anſwere be giuen after our doctrine, and it is this, that the matter of which theſe two ſoules diſputed, was ſchoole diuinitie: For to know whether abiding in hell, there were place for mercie, and whether *Lazarus* might paſſe vnto hell, and whether it were conuenient to ſend a deceaſed perſon to the world, who ſhould giue notice to the liuing, of the torments which the damned there indured; are all ſchoole-points, whoſe deciſion appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, as heereafter I will make proofe, and amongſt the firſt qualities, there is none which ſo much garboileth this power, as exceſſiue heat, with which the rich Glutton was ſo tormented: But the ſoule of *Abraham*, made his abode in a place moſt temperate, where it inioyed great delight and refreſhment: and therefore it bred no great woonder, that the ſame was better able to diſpute. I concluding then that the reaſonable ſoule, and the diuell, in their operations, vſe the ſeruice of materiall qualities, and that by ſome they reſt agreeued, and by other ſome they receiue contentment. And for this reaſon, they couet to make abode in ſome places, and flie from ſome other, and yet notwithſtanding are not corruptible.

CHAP. VIII.

How there may be assigned to euerie difference of wit, his Science, which shalbe correspondent to him in particular: and that which is repugnant, and contrarie, be abandoned.

ALl artes (saith *Cicero*) are placed vnder certaine vniuersall principles, which being learned with studie and trauaile, finally we so grow to attaine vnto them: but the art of poesie is in this so speciall, as if God or nature make not a man a Poet: little auailes it, to deliuer him the precepts and rules of versifieng. For which cause he said thus, The studying and learning of other matters consisteth in precepts and in artes: but a Poet taketh the course of nature it selfe, and is stirred vp by the forces of the minde, and as it were enflamed by a certaine diuine spirit. But heerein *Cicero* swarued from reason: for verily there is no Science or Art, deuised in the commonwealth, which if a man wanting capacitie for himselfe to apply, he shall reape anie profit thereof; albeit he toyle all the daies of his life in the precepts and rules of the same: But if he applie himselfe to that which is agreeable with his naturall abilitie, we see that he will learne in two daies. The like we say of Poesie without any difference, that if hee who hath anie answerable nature, giue himselfe to make verses, he performeth the same with great perfection, and if otherwise, he shall neuer be good Poet.

This being so, it seemeth now high time, to learne by way

way of Art what difference of Science, is answerable in particular, to what difference of wit: to the end, that euerie one may vnderstand with distinction (after he is acquainted with his owne nature) to what Art he hath a naturall disposition. The Arts and Sciences which are gotten by the memorie, are these following, *Latine, Grammar*, or of whatsoeuer other language, the *Theoricke* of the lawes, Diuinitie positiue, *Cosmography*, and *Arithmeticke*.

Those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are Schoole diuinitie, the *Theoricke of Phisicke, logicke, naturall and morall Philosophy*; and the practicke of the lawes, which we tearme pleading. From a good imagination, spring all the Arts and Sciences, which consist in figure, correspondencie, harmonie, and proportion: such are Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill of preaching: the practise of Phisicke, the Mathematicals, Astrologie, and the gouerning of a Common-wealth, the art of Warfare, Paynting, drawing, writing, reading, to be a man gratious, pleasant, neat, wittie in managing, & all the engins and deuises which artificers make: besides a certain speciall gift, whereat the vulgar maruelleth, and that is, to endite diuers matters, vnto foure, who write togither, and yet all to be penned in good sort. Of all this, we cannot make euident demonstration, nor proue euerie point by it selfe: For it were an infinite peece of worke, notwithstanding by making proofe thereof in three or foure Sciences, the same reason will afterwards preuaile for the rest.

In the catalogue of Sciences, which we said appertained to the memorie, we placed the *latine tongue*, and such other, as all the nations in the world do speake: the which no wise man wil denie: for tongues were deuised

by men, that they might communicate amongst themselues, and expresse one to another their conceits, without that in them there lie hid any other mistery or naturall principles: for that the first deuisers agreed togither, and after their best liking, (as *Aristotle* saith) framed the words, and gaue to euerie ech his signification. From hence arose so great a number of wordes, and so manie maners of speech so farre besides rule and reason, that if a man had not a good memorie, it were impossible to learne them with any other power. How little the vnderstanding and the imagination make for the purpose, to learne languages and manners of speech, is easily prooued by childhood, which being the age wherein man most wanteth these two powers, yet (saith *Aristotle*) children learne any language more readily than elder men, though these are endowed with a better discourse of reason. And without farther speech, experience plainly prooueth this, for so much as we see, that if a Biscane of 30. or 40. yeeres age, come to dwell in *Castilia*, he will neuer learn this language: but if he be but a boy, within two or three yeares you would thinke him born in *Toledo*. The same befalles in the *latine* tongue, and in those of all the rest of the world: for all languages hold one selfe consideration. Then if in the age when memorie chiefly raigneth, and the vnderstanding and the imagination least, languages are better learned, than when there growes defect of memorie, & an encrease of vnderstanding, it falles out apparent that they are purchased by the memorie, and by none other power. Languages (saith *Aristotle*) cannot be gathered out by reason, nor consist in discourse or disputations, for which cause, it is necessarie to heare the word from another, and the signification which it beareth, and to keepe the

ſame in mind, and ſo he prooueth that if a man be borne deaffe, it followes of neceſſity that he be alſo dumbe, for he cannot heare from another, the alteration of the names, nor the ſignification which was giuen them by the firſt deuiſer.

That languages are at pleaſure, and a conceit of mens brains, and nought elſe, is plainly prooued; for in them all, may the ſciences be taught, and in each is to be ſayd and expreſſed that which by the other is inferred. Therfore none of the graue authors attended the learning of ſtrange tongues, thereby to deliuer their conceits: but the Greekes wrot in Greeke, the Romans in Latine, the Hebrues in the Hebrue language, and the Moores in Arabique, and ſo do I in my Spaniſh, becauſe I know this better than any other. The Romans as lords of the wold, finding it was neceſſarie to haue one common language, by which all nations might haue commerce together, & themſelues be able to heare and vnderſtand ſuch as come to demaund iuſtice, and things appertayning to their gouernment, commanded that in all places of their empire there ſhould ſchooles be kept, where the Latine tongue might be taught, and ſo this vſage hath endured euen to our time.

Schoole-diuinitie, it is a matter certaine that it appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, preſuppoſing that the operations of this power, are to diſtinguiſh, conclude, diſcourſe, iudge, & make choiſe; for nothing is done in this faculty, which is not to doubt for inconueniences, to anſwer with diſtinction, and againſt the anſwer to conclude that, which is gathered in good conſequence, and to returne to replication, vntill the vnderſtanding find where to ſettle. But the greateſt proofe which in this caſe may be made, is to giue to vnderſtand with

how great difficultie the latine tongue is ioyned with *Schoole diuinitie*, and how ordinarily it falleth not out, that one ſeltman is a good *latiniſt*, and a profound ſcholer: at which effect ſome curious heads, who haue lighted hereon, much maruelling procured to ſearch out the cauſe from whence the ſame might ſpring, and by their conceit, found that *Schoole diuinitie*, being written in an eaſie and common language, and the great *latiniſts*, hauing accuſtomed their eare, to the well ſounding and fine ſtile of *Cicero*: they cannot apply themſelues to this other. But well ſhould it fall out for the *latiniſts*, if this were the cauſe: For, forcing their hearing by vſe, they ſhould meet with a remedie for this infirmitie: but to ſpeake trueth, it is rather an head-ach than an eare-ſore. Such as are skilfull in the *latine* tongue, it is neceſſarie that they haue a great memorie: for otherwiſe, they can neuer become ſo perfect in a tõgue which is not theirs: and becauſe a great and happie memorie is as it were cõtrarie to a great and high raiſed vnderſtanding, in one ſubiect, where the one is placed, the other is chaſed away.

Hence remaineth it, that he who hath not ſo deepe, and loftie an vnderſtanding (a power whereto appertaineth, to diſtinguiſh, conclude, diſcourſe, iudge, and chooſe) cannot ſoone attaine the skil of *Schoole diuinitie*, Let him that will not allow this reaſon for currant payment, read *S. Thomas*, *Scot*, *Durand*, and *Caietane*, who are the principall in this facultie, and in them he ſhall finde manie excellent points, endited and written, in a ſtile very eaſie and common. And this proceeded from none other cauſe, than that theſe graue authours, had from their childhood a feeble memorie, for profiting in the *latine* tongue. But comming to *logicke*, *metaphiſicke*, and

Schoole

Schoole diuinitie, they reaped that great fruite, which we see, because they had great vnderstanding.

I can speake of a *schoole diuine* (and manie other can verifie the same, that knew and conuersed with him) who being a principall man in this facultie: not onely spake not finely, nor with well shaped sentences, in imitation of *Cicero*, but whilest he red in a chaire, his scholers noted in him, that he had lesse than a meane knowledge in the *latine* tongue: Therefore they councelled him (as men ignorant of this doctrine) that he should secretly, steale some houre of the day from *Schoole diuinitie*, and employ the same in reading of *Cicero*. Who knowing this counsell to proceed from his good friends, not onely procured to remedie it priuilie, but also publickly, after he had red the matter of the trinitie, & how the diuine word might take flesh, he meant to heare a lecture of the latine tongue, and it fell out a matter worthy consideration, that in the long time while he did so, he not onely learned nothing of new, but grew welneere, to leese that little latine which he had before, and so at last was driuen to read in the vulgar. *Pius* the fourth, enquiring what diuines were of most speciall note at the councell of *Trent*, he was told of a most singular *Spanish* diuine, whose solutions, answeres, argumentes, and distinctions, were worthy of admiration: the Pope therefore, desirous to see and know so rare a man, sent word vnto him, that he should come to *Rome* & render him accompt of what was done in the Councell. He came, and the Pope did him many fauours, amongst the rest, commaunded him to be couered, and taking him by the hand, led him walking to *Castle S. Angelo*, and speaking verie good latine, shewed him his deuise, touching certain fortifications, which he was then

about

about to make the Castle stronger, asking his opinion in some particulars: but he answered the Pope so intricately, for that he could not speake latine, that the *Spanish* Embassadour, who at that time was *Don Lewes de Requesens*, great Commander of *Castilia*, was faine to step forth to grace him with his latine, and to turne the Popes discourse into another matter. Finally, the Pope said to his Chamberlains, it was not possible that this man had so much skill in diuinitie, as they made report, seeing he had so little knowledge in the latine tongue. But if as he proued him in this toung, which is a work of memorie, and in platforming, and building, which belong to the imagination, so he had tried him in a matter appertaining to the vnderstanding, he would haue vttered diuine considerations. In the Catalogue of Sciences, which appertaine to the imagination, we placed poetry amongst the first, and that not by chance nor for want of consideration, but thereby to giue notice, how farre off, those who haue a speciall gift in poetry, are from vnderstanding. For we shall finde that the selfe difficultie, which the latine tongue holdeth in vniting with *Schoole diuinitie*, is also found (yea and beyond comparison farre greater) betweene this facultie, and the art of versifiyng: and the same is so contrary to the vnderstanding, that by the self reason, for which man is likely to proue singular therein, he may take his leaue of all the other sciences which appertayne to this power, and also to the latine tongue through the contrarietie, which a good imagination beareth to great memorie.

For the first of these two, *Aristotle* found not the reason, but yet confirmed mine opinion by experience, saying: *Marke*, a Citizen of *Siracusa*, was best Poet, when he lost his vnderstanding, and the cause is, for that

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the difference of the imagination, to which Poetrie belongeth, is that which requireth three degrees of heat, and this qualitie so extended (as we haue before expressed) breedes an vtter losse of the vnderstanding, the which was obserued by the same *Aristotle*. For he affirmeth, that this *Marke* the *Siracusane*, growing to more temperature, enioyed a better vnderstanding, but yet he attained not to versifie so well, through default of heat, with which, this difference of the imagination worketh. And this, *Cicero* wanted when going about to describe in verse, the heroicall actions of his consulship, and the happy birth of Rome, in that she was gouerned by him: he said thus, *O fortunatam natam me consule Romam*. For which cause, *Iuuenall* not conceiuing, that to a man endowed with so rare a wit, as *Cicero*, poetrie was a matter repugnant, did Satirically nip him, saying, If thou hadst rehearsed the *Philippicks* against *Marck Antony*, answerable to the tune of so bad a verse, it should not haue cost thy life.

But worse did *Plato* vnderstand the same, when he said, that Poetrie was no humane Science, but a diuine reuelation. For if the Poets were not rauished besides themselues, or full of God, they could not make nor vtter any thing worthy regard. And he prooueth it by a reason, auouching, that whilest a man abideth in his sound iudgement, he cannot versifie. But *Aristotle* reprooueth him, for affirming that the art of Poetry is not an abilitie of man, but a reuelation of God: And he admitteth, that a wise man, and who is free possessed of his iudgement, cannot be a poet: and the reason is, because where there resteth much vnderstanding, it behoueth of force, that there befall want of the imagination, whereto appertaineth the Art of versifieng: which may

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the more apparently be prooued, knowing that *Socrates* after he had learned the art of Poetrie, for all his precepts and rules, could not make so much as one verse: and yet notwithstanding, he was by the oracle of *Apollo* adiudged the wisest man of the world.

I hold it then for certaine, that the boy who will prooue of a notable vaine for versifieng, and to whom, vpon euerie sleight consideration, consonances offer themselues, shall ordinarily incurre hazard not to learn well the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philosophie, Phisicke, Schoole-diuinitie, and the other artes and sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie. For which cause, we see by experience, that if we charge such a boy, to forme a *nominatiue* without booke, he will not learne it in two or three daies: but if there be a leafe of paper written in verse, to be recited in any comedie, in two turnes, he fixeth them in his memorie. These loose themselues by reading bookes of chiualrie: *Orlando*, *Boccace*, *Diana of Monte maggior*, and such other deuises: for all these are workes of the imagination. What shall we say then of the harmony of the Organs, and of the singing men of the Chappell, whose wits are most vnprofitable for the latine tongue, and for all other Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding and to the memorie? the like reason serueth in playing on instruments, and all sorts of musicke. By these three examples, which we haue yeelded, of the Latine, of Schoole-diuinity, and of Poetrie, we shall vnderstand this doctrine to be true, and that we haue duely made this partition, albeit we make not the like mention in the other arts.

Writing also, discouerth the imagination, and so we see, that few men of good vnderstanding, doe write a faire

faire hand, and to this purpose I haue noted many examples: and specially I haue knowen a most learned Shoole diuine, who shaming at himselfe to see how bad a hand he wrote, durst not write a letter to any man, nor to answere those which were sent to him: so as he determined with himselfe, to get a Scriuener secretly to his house, who should teach him to frame a reasonable letter that might passe, and hauing for many daies taken pains heerein, it prooued lost labour, and he reaped no profit thereby. Wherefore, as tyred out, he forsooke the practise: & the teacher, who had taken him in hand, grew astonished, to see a man so learned in his profession, to be so vntoward for writing. But my selfe, who rest well assured that writing is a worke of the imagination, held the same for a naturall effect. And if anie man be desirous to see and note it, let him consider the Schollers, who get their liuings in the Vniuersities, by copying out of writings in good forme, and he shall find, that they can little skill of Grammer, Logicke, and Philosophy, and if they study Phisick or Diuinitie, they fish nothing neere the bottome. The boy then, who with his pen can tricke a horse to the life, and a man in good shape, and can make a good paire of it serues little to employ him in any sort of learning, but will do best, to set him to some painter, who by art may bring forward his nature.

To read well and with readinesse, discouereth also a certaine spice of the imagination, and if the same be very effectuall, it booteth little to spend much time at his booke, but shall do better, to set him to get his liuing by reading of processes. Heere a thing note-worthy, offereth it selfe, and that is, that the difference of the imagination, which maketh men eloquent and pleasant, is

contrary

contrarie to that, which is behooffull for a man to read with facilitie, where-through none, who is prompt-witted, can learne to read without ſtumbling, and putting too ſomewhat of his own head.

To play well at *Primero*, and to face and vie, and to hold and giue ouer when time ſerueth, and by conie-ctures to know his aduerſaries game, and the skill of diſcarding, are all workes of the imagination. The like we ſay of playing at *Cent*, and at Triumph, though not ſo farfoorth as the *Primero* of *Almaigne*, and the ſame, not only maketh proofe & demonſtration of the difference of the wit, but alſo diſcouereth al the vertues and vices in a man. For at euery moment, there are offered occaſions in this play, by which a man ſhall diſcouer, what he would do in matters of great importance, if oportunity ſerued.

Cheſſe-play, is one of the things, which beſt diſcouereth the imagination: for he that makes ten or twelue faire draughts one after another on the Cheſſe-boord, giues an euill token of profiting in the Sciences which belong to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie, vnleſſe it fall out, that he make an vnion of two or three powers, as we haue alreadie noted. And if a very learned Shoole-diuine (of mine acquaintance) had been skilled in this doctrine, he ſhould haue got notice of a matter, which made him very doubtfull. He vſed to play often with a ſeruant of his, and lighting moſtly on the looſe, told him, much mooued: Sirha, how comes it to paſſe, that thou who canſt skill neither of Latine, nor Logicke, nor Diuinitie, though thou haſt ſtudied it, yet beateſt me that am full of *Scot* and S. *Thomas*? Is it poſſible that thou ſhouldſt haue a better wit than I? verily I cannot beleeue it, except the diuell reueale vnto thee what

draughts

draughts thou shouldst make: and the misterie was, that he had great vnderstanding, with which he attained the delicacies of *Scot* and *Thomas*, but wanted that difference of imagination, which serueth for Chesse-play, whereas his seruant, had an ill vnderstanding, and a bad memorie, but a good imagination. The Schollers, who haue their bookes well righted, and their chamber well dressed, and cleane kept, euery thing in his due place & order, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrary to the vnderstanding, and to the memory.

Such a like wit, haue men who goe neat, and handsomly apparelled, who looke all about their cape for a mote, & take dislike at any one wry plait of their garmẽt, this (assuredly) springeth from their imagination. For if a man, that had no skill in versifieng, nor towardlinesse thereunto, chance to fall in loue, sodainly (saith *Plato*) he becomes a Poet, and verie trim and handsome: for loue heateth and drieth his braine, and these are qualities which quicken the imagination: the like (as *Iuuenal* noteth) anger doth effect, which passion heateth also the braine:

Anger makes verse, if nature but denie.

Gracious talkers, and imitaters, and such as can hold at bay, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrary to the vnderstanding, and to the memory. For which cause they neuer prooue learned in Grammer, Logicke, Schoole-diuinitie, Phisicke, or the lawes. If then they be wittie in managing, toward for euery matter they take in hand, ready in speech, and answering to the purpose: these are fit to serue in Courts of iustice, for sollicitors, atturnies, merchants, and factors to buy and sell, but not for learning. Heerein the vulgar is much deceiued seeing them so readie at all handes, and them

ſeemeth, that if ſuch gaue themſelues to learning, they would prooue notable fellowes: but in ſubſtance there is no wit more repugnant to matters of learning, than theſe. Children that are ſlow of ſpeech, haue a moiſtnes in their tongue and alſo in their braine, but that wearing away, in proceſſe of time they become verie eloquent, and great talkers, through the great memory which they get when that moiſture is tempered.

This we know by the things tofore rehearſed, befell that famous Orator *Demoſthenes*, of whome we ſaid, that *Cicero* maruelled how being ſo blunt of ſpeech when he was a boy, growing greater he became ſo eloquēt. Children alſo, who haue a good voice, and warble in the throat, are moſt vntoward for all Sciences, and the reaſon is, for that they are cold and moiſt. The which two qualities, being vnited, we ſaid before, that they breed a dammage in the reaſonable part. Schollers, who learn their leſſon in ſuch maner as their maiſter deliuereth it, and ſo recite the ſame, it ſhewes a token of a good memorie, but the vnderſtanding ſhall abie the bargaine. There are offered in this doctrine, ſome problemes and doubts: the anſwere whereunto, will perhaps yeeld more light, to conceiue, that what we haue propounded, doth carrie trueth. The firſt is, whence it groweth that great Latiniſts are more arrogant and preſumptuous on their knowledge, than men very well skilled in that kind of learning which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding? in ſort, that the prouerbe, to let vs know what manner of fellow a Grammarion is, ſayth; That a Grammarian is arrogancie it ſelfe. The ſecond is, whence it commeth that the Latine tongue, is ſo repugnant to the Spaniſh capacities, and ſo naturall to the French, Italian, Dutch, Engliſh, and other northernly nations, as we ſee in their

workes, which by their good Latine phraſe, ſtraightwaies proue the authour to haue been a ſtranger, and by the barbarouſneſſe and ill compoſition, we know the ſame for a *Spaniards*. The third is, for what reaſon the things that are ſpoken and writen in the Latine tongue, ſound better, carrie a more loftineſſe, and haue greater delicacie, than any other language how good ſoeuer: we hauing auouched before, that all languages, are nought els, but a conceit at pleaſure, of thoſe who firſt deuiſed them, without holding any foundation in nature. The fourth doubt is, ſeeing all Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, are written in Latine, how it can frame, that ſuch as want memorie, may read and ſtudy them in thoſe books, whileſt the Latine is (by this reaſon) ſo repugnant vnto them.

To the firſt probleme we anſwere, that to know whether a man haue defect of vnderſtanding, there fals out no token more certaine, than to ſee him loftie, big looked, preſumptuous, deſirous of honour, ſtanding on termes, and full of ceremonies: And the reaſon is, for that all theſe be workes, of a difference of the imagination, which requireth no more but one degree of heat, wherwith the much moiſture (which is requiſite for the memorie) accordeth very fitly: for it wanteth force to reſolue the ſame. Contrariwiſe it is an infallible token, that if a man be naturally lowly, deſpiſer of himſelfe, and his own matters, and that not only he vanteth not, nor praiſeth himſelf, but feels diſpleaſure at the commēdations giuen him by others, and takes ſhame of places and ceremonies pertaining to honour, ſuch a one may well be pointed at for a man of great vnderſtanding, but of ſmall imagination and memory. I ſaid naturall lowly: for if he be ſo by cunning, this is no certain

ſigne. Hence it commeth, that as the Grammarians are men of great memorie, and make an vnion with this difference of the imagination: ſo it is of force, that they faile in vnderſtanding, and be ſuch as the prouerb paints them forth.

To the ſecond probleme may be anſwered, that *Galen* enquiring out the wits of men by way of the temperature of the region where they inhabit, ſayth, that thoſe who made abode vnder the North, haue all of thē want of vnderſtanding: but thoſe who are ſeated between the North and the burned Zone, are of great wiſedome; Which ſituation, anſwereth directly to our region. And verily ſo it is: for *Spaine* is not ſo cold as the places ſubiected to the Pole, nor ſo hot as the burned Zone. The ſame ſentence doth *Ariſtotle* produce, demanding, for what cauſe, ſuch as inhabit very cold regions partake leſſe vnderſtanding than thoſe who are born in the hotter, and in the anſwere he verie homely handles the *Flemmiſh*, *Dutch*, *Engliſh*, and *French*, ſaying that their wits are like thoſe of drunkards: for which cauſe they cannot ſearch out, nor vnderſtand the nature of things, & this is occaſioned by the much moiſture, wherwith their brain is repleniſhed, and the other parts of the bodie: the which is knowen by the whiteneſſe of the face, and the golden colour of the haire, and by that it is a miracle, to find a *Dutchman* bald: and aboue this they are generally great, and of tall ſtature, through the much moiſture, which breedeth encreaſe of fleſh. But in the *Spaniards*, we diſcerne the quite contrarie: they are ſomwhat browne, they haue blacke haire, of meane ſtature, and for the moſt part, we ſee them bald, Which diſpoſition (ſaith *Galen*) groweth, for that the braine is hot and drie. And if this be true, it behoueth of force, that they

be

be endowed with a bad memorie, and a good vnderſtanding, but the *Dutchmen* poſſeſſe a great memorie, & ſmall vnderſtanding. For which cauſe, the one can no skill of Latine, and the other eaſily learne the ſame. The reaſon which *Ariſtotle* alleaged, to proue the ſlender vnderſtanding of thoſe who dwell vnder the North, is, that the much cold of the country calleth backe the naturall heate inward, by counterpoſition, and ſuffereth not the ſame to ſpread abroad: for which cauſe, it partaketh much moyſture, and much heate, and theſe vnite a great memorie for the languages, and a good imagination; with which they make clocks, bring the water to Toledo, deuiſe engins, and workes of rare skill, which the *Spaniards* through defect of imagination cannot frame themſelues vnto: But ſet them to Logicke, to Philoſophie, to Schoole-diuinitie, to Phiſicke, or to the Lawes, and beyond compariſon a *Spaniſh* wit, with his barbarous termes, will deliuer more rare points than a ſtranger. For if you take from them this fineneſſe and quaint phraſe of writing, there is nothing in them of rare inuention or exquiſite choice.

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* ſaid that in *Scithia*, one onely man became a Philoſopher: but in *Athens* there were many ſuch: as if he ſhould ſay, that in *Scithia*, which is a Prouince vnder the North, it grew a myracle to ſee a Philoſopher, but in *Athens* they were all borne wiſe and skilfull. But albeit Philoſophie and the other Sciences rehearſed by vs, be repugnant to the Northren people; yet they profit well in the Mathematicals, and in Aſtrologie, becauſe they haue a good imagination.

The anſwere of the third probleme dependeth vpon a queſtion, much hammered betweene *Plato* & *Ariſtotle*:

the one saith that there are propernames, which by their nature carry signification of things, and that much wit is requisite to deuise them. And this opinion is fauoured by the diuine scripture, which affirmeth that *Adam* gaue euery of those things which God set before him, the proper name that best was fitting for them. But *Aristotle* wil not grant, that in any toung there can be found any name, or maner of speech, which can signifie ought of it own nature, for that all names are deuised and shaped after the conceit of men. Whence we see by experience, that wine hath aboue 60. names, and bread as many, in euery language his, & of none we can auouch that the same is naturall and agreeable thereunto, for then all in the world would vse but that. But for all this, the sentence of *Plato* is truer: for put case that the first deuisers fained the words at their pleasure and will, yet was the same by a reasonable instinct, communicated with the eare, with the nature of the thing, & with the good grace and well sounding of the pronunciation, not making the wordes ouer short or long, not enforcing an vnseemly framing of the mouth in time of vtterance, setling the accent in his conuenient place, and obseruing the other conditions, which a tongue should possesse, to be fine, and not barbarous.

Of this selfe opinion with *Plato*, was a *Spanish* gentleman; who made it his pastime to write books of chiualry, because he had a certain kind of imagination, which entiseth men to fayning and leasings. Of him it is reported, that being to bring into his works a furious Gyant, he went many daies deuising a name, which might in al points be answerable to his fierceneſſe: neither could he light vpon any, vntill playing one day at cardes in his friends house, he heard the owner of the house say, Ho

sirha,

firha, boy, *traquitantos*, the Gentleman so soone as he heard this name *Traquitantos*, sodainly he took the same for a word of ful sound in the eare, and without any longer looking arose, saying, gentleman I wil play no more, for many daies are past sithence I haue gone seeking out a name, which might fit well with a furious Gyant, whom I bring into those volumes which I now am making, and I could not find the same, vntill I came to this house, where euer I receiue all courtesie. The curiositie of this gentleman in calling the Gyant *Traquitantos*, had also those first men, who deuised the Latine tongue, in that they found out a language of so good sound to the eare. Therefore we need not maruell that the things which are spoken and written in Latine, doe sound so well, and in other tongues so ill: for their first inuenters were barbarous.

The last doubt I haue been forced to alleage, for satisfieng of diuers who haue stũbled theron, though the solution be very easie: for those who haue great vnderstanding are not vtterly depriued of memorie, in asmuch as if they wanted the same, it would fall out impossible that the vnderstanding could discourse or frame reasons; for this power is that which keepeth in hand the matter and the fantasies, whereon it behooueth to vse speculation. But for that the same is weake of three degrees of perfection, whereto men may attaine in the Latine tongue (namely, to vnderstand, to write, and to speake the same perfitly) it can hardly passe the first without fault and stumbling.

CHAP. IX.

How it may be prooued that the eloquence and fineneſſe of ſpeech cannot find place in men of great vnderſtanding.

ONe of the graces by which the vulgar is beſt perſuaded, and thinketh that a man hath much knowledge and wiſdome, is, to heare him ſpeake with great eloquence, to haue a ſmooth tongue, plentie of ſweet and pleaſant words, and to alleage many examples fit for the purpoſe that is in hand: but this (verily) ſpringeth from an vnion, which the memorie maketh with the imagination, in a degree and meaſure of heat, that cannot reſolue the moiſture of the brain, and ſerueth to lift vp the figures, and cauſe them to boile, where-through are diſcouered many conceits and points to be vttered. In this vnion it is impoſſible that diſcourſe may be found; for we haue already ſaid and prooued heretofore, that this power greatly abhorreth heat, and moiſture cannot ſupport it. Which doctrine, if the *Athenians* had knowen, they would not ſo much haue maruelled to ſee ſo wiſe a man as *Socrates* not to haue the gift of vtterance; of whom, thoſe who vnderſtood how great his knowledge was, ſaid, that his words & his ſentences, were like a wodden cheſt knobby and nothing trimmed on the outſide, but that in opening the ſame, within it held liniamentes and portraitures of rare admiration. In the ſame ignorance reſt they, who attempting to render a reaſon of *Ariſtotles* bad ſtile and obſcurenes, ſayd:

That

That of set purpose, & because he would that his works should carry authoritie, he wrot vnder riddles, & with so slender ornament of words, and simple manner of deliuerance. And if we consider also the so harsh proceeding of *Plato*, and the breefnesse with which he writeth, the obscuritie of his reasons, and the ill placing of the parts of his tale, we shall find that nought else saue this, occasioned the same. For such also we find the works of *Hippocrates*, the thefts which he committeth of Nowns and Verbs, the ill disposition of his sentences, and the weake foundation of his reasons, to stuffe out the empty places of his doctrine. What will you more? vnlesse, that when he would yeeld a very particular reckoning to his friend *Damagetus*, how *Artaxerxses* king of *Persia*, had sent for him, promising him as much gold and siluer as he list himselfe, and to make him one of the great ones of his kingdome: hauing plenty of answers to so many demaunds, he writ only thus; The king of *Persia* hath sent for me, not knowing that with me the respect of wisdome is greater than that of gold, Farewell. Which matter if it had passed through the hands of any other man of good imagination and memorie, a whole leafe of paper would not haue sufficed to set it forth.

Put who would haue bene so hardie to alleage for the purpose of this doctrine, the example of *S. Paule*, and to affirme, that he was a man of great vnderstanding and little memory, and that with these his forces, he could not skill of toungs, nor deliuer his mind in them polishedly and with gracefulnesse, if himselfe had not so sayd; I reckon not my selfe to haue done lesse than the greatest Apostles, for though I be ignoraunt of speech, yet am I not so in vnderstanding: as if he should say; I confesse that I haue not the gift of vtterance, but for science

ence and knowledge, none of the greateſt Apoſtles goeth beyond me. Which difference of wit was ſo appropriat to the preaching of the Goſpell, that choice could not be made of a better, for, that a preacher ſhould be eloquent, and haue great furniture of queint tearms, is not a matter conuenient: for the force of the Orators of thoſe daies, appeared in making the hearers repute things falſe for true; and what the vulgar held for good and behooffull, they, vſing the precepts of their art, perſuaded the coutrary, and maintained that it was better to be poore than rich, ſicke then whole, ſond than wiſe, and other points manifeſtly repugnant to the opinion of the vulgar. For which cauſe the Hebrues tearmed them *Geragnin*, that is to ſay, Decciuers. Of the ſame opinion was *Cato* the more, and held the abode of theſe in Rome for very dangerous, in as much as the forces of the Romane empire, were grounded on arms: & they began then to perſuade that the Romane youth ſhould abandon thoſe, and giue themſelues to this kind of wiſdome; therfore (in breefe) he procured them to be baniſhed out of Rome, forbidding them euer to returne againe. If God then had ſought out an eloquent preacher, who ſhould haue vſed ornament of ſpeech, & that he had entered into Athens or Rome, auouching that in Hieruſalem the Iewes had crucified a man, who was very God, and that he died of his owne accord to redeeme ſinners, and roſe againe the third day, and aſcended into heauen, where he now ſitteth; what would the hearers haue thought, ſaue that theſe things were ſome of thoſe follies and vanities which the Orators were woont to perſuade by the force of their art? For which cauſe, S. *Paul* ſaid: For Chriſt ſent me not to baptiſe, but to preach the goſpel, and that not in wiſdome of words,

leaſt

leaſt the croſſe of Chriſt might prooue in vaine. The wit of S. *Paule* was appropriat to this ſeruice, for he had a large diſcourſe to proue in the ſynagogues and amongſt the Gentils, That Ieſus Chriſt was the Meſſias promiſed in the law, and that it was bootleſſe to looke for any other: and herewithall he was of ſlender memorie, and therefore he could not skil to ſpeake with ornament and ſweet and well reliſhed tearms, and this was that which was behooffull for preaching of the goſpell. I will not maintaine (for all this) that S. *Paule* had not the gift of toungs, but that he could ſpeake all languages as he did his owne, neither am I of opinion, that to defend the name of Chriſt, the forces of his great vnderſtanding ſufficed, if there had not bene ioyned therewithall the meanc of grace, and a ſpeciall ayd which God to that purpoſe beſtowed vpon him: it ſufficeth me only to ſay That ſupernaturall gifts worke better, when they light vpon an apt diſpoſition, than if a man were of himſelfe vntoward and blockiſh. Hereto alludeth that doctrine of S. *Hierome*, which is found in his proem vpon *Eſay* and *Hieremie*; where asking what the cauſe is, that it being one ſelfe holy ghoſt which ſpake by the mouth of *Hieremie* and of *Eſay*, one of them propounded the matters which he wrot with ſo great elegancie, and *Hieremie* ſcarſely wiſt how to ſpeake: to which doubt he anſwereth, that the holy ghoſt applieth it ſelfe to the naturall manner of proceeding of each Prophet, without that his grace varrieth their nature, or teacheth thē the language wherein they are to publiſh their propheſie. Therefore we muſt vnderſtand, that *Eſay* was a noble gentleman brought vp in court, and in the cittie of *Hieruſalem*, and for this cauſe, had ornament & poliſhedneſſe of ſpeech; But *Ieremie* was borne and reared in a village of *Hieruſalem*,

lem, called *Anathochites*, blunt and rude in behauiour, as a country person, and of such a stile the holy ghost vsed the seruice in the prophecie which he commanded vnto him. The same may be said of S. *Pauls* Epistles, that the holy Ghost dwelled in him, when he wrote them, to the end he might not erre, but the language and maner of speech was S. *Pauls* natural, applied to the doctrin which he wrote; for the truth of Schooldiuinity abhorreth many words. But the practise of languages, and the ornament and polishment of speech may very well be ioyned with positiue diuinitie: for this faculty appertayneth to the memorie, and is nought els saue a masse of words and catholicke sentences, taken out of the holy doctors, and the diuine Scripture, and preserued in this power, as the *Grammarian* doth with the flowers of the Poets, *Virgill*, *Horace*, *Terence*, and other Latine authours whom he readeth: who meeting occasion to rehearse them, he comes out straightwaies with a shred of *Cicero*, or *Quintilian*, whereby he makes his hearers know what he is able to do.

Those that are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and of the memorie, and trauaile in gathering the fruit of whatsoeuer hath been said or written in their profession, and serue themselues therewith in conuenient occasions, with great ornament of words & gratious fashions of speech, for that so many things are already found out in all the Sciences, it seemeth to them who know not this doctrin, that they are of great profoundnesse, whereas in truth they hold much of the Asse: for if you grow to try them in the foūdations of that which they alleage and affirme, they then discouer their wants. And the reason is, because so great a flowing of speech cannot be vnited with the vnderstanding, whereto appertaineth

pertaineth to ſearch out the bottome of the trueth. Of theſe the diuine ſcripture ſaid, Where there is plentie of words, there raigneth great ſcarſity: as if he had ſaid, that a man of many words ordinarily wanteth vnderſtanding and wiſdome.

Thoſe who are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and memorie, enter with great courage to interpret the diuine ſcripture, it ſeeming to them, that becauſe they vnderſtand well the Hebrue, Greeke and Latine tongues, they haue the way made ſmooth to gather out the very ſpirit of the letter: but verily they ruinate themſelues; firſt, becauſe the words of the diuine text and his maners of ſpeech, haue many other ſignifications, beſides thoſe which *Cicero* vnderſtood in Latine. And then becauſe their vnderſtāding is defectiue, which power verifieth whether a ſenſe be Catholicke or depraued: and this is it which may make choice by the grace ſupernatural, of two or three ſenſes, that are gathered out of the letter, which is moſt true and catholicke.

Beguilings (ſaith *Plato*) neuer befall in things vnlike and very different, but when many thinges meet which carrie neere reſemblance, For if we ſet before a ſharpe ſight, a litle ſalt, ſugar, meale, and lyme, all well pounded and beaten to powder; and ech one ſeuerally by it ſelfe: what ſhould he doe who wanted taſt, if with his eyes he ſhould be ſet to diſcern euery of theſe powders from other without erring? ſaying; this is ſalt, this ſugar, this meale, and this lyme. For my part I beleeue he would be deceiued through the great reſemblance, which theſe things haue betweene themſelues. But if there were a heape of ſalt, one of ſugar, one of corne, one of earth, and one of ſtones, it is certaine he would not be deceiued in giuing ech of theſe heapes his name, though his

ſight

ſight were dimme, for ech is of a diuers figure. The ſame we ſee befalleth euery day in the ſences and ſpirits, which the diuines giue to the holie ſcripture, of which two or three being looked on, at firſt ſight they all carry a ſhew to bee Catholicke, and to agree wel with the letter, but yet in trueth are not ſo, neither the holy Ghoſt ſo meant. To chuſe the beſt of theſe ſenſes, and to refuſe the bad, it is a thing aſſured that the diuine emploieth not his memory nor his imagination, but his vnderſtanding. Wherefore I auouch that the poſitiue diuine ought to conferre with the Schoole-man, and to enquire at his hands, that of theſe ſenſes he may chuſe that which ſhal appeare to be ſoundeſt, vnleſſe he will be ſent to the holy houſe. For this cauſe doe heretickes ſo much abhorre Schoole diuinitie, and learne to baniſh it out of the world: for by diſtinguiſhing, inferring, framing of reaſons, and iudging, we attaine to vnderſtand the trueth, and to diſcouer falſhood.

CHAP. X.

How it is prooued that the Theoricke of Diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, and preaching (which is his practiſe) to the imagination.

IT is a probleme often demanded, not onely by folke learned & wiſe, but alſo the vulgar will put in their oare, and euery day bring in queſtion, For what cauſe a diuine being a great man in the Schooles, ſharp in diſputing, ready in anſwering, and in writing and lecturing of rare learning; yet getting

getting vp into the pulpit, cannot skil of preaching: and contrariwise if one prooue a gallant preacher, eloquent, gratious, and that drawes the people after him; it seemes a myracle if he be deeply seene in Schoole-diuinitie. Wherefore they admit not for a sound consequence: such a one is a great Schoole-diuine; therefore he will prooue a good preacher: and contrariwise they will not grant; he is a good preacher, therefore he hath skill in Schoole-diuinitie. For to reuerse the one and other of these consequences, there may be alleaged for ech, more instances than are haires on our head.

No man hitherto hath been able to answer this demand, saue after the ordinary guise, *vz.* to attribute the whole to God, and to the distribution of his graces: and to my liking they doe very well, in asmuch as they know not any more particular occasion thereof. The answere of this doubt (in some sort) is giuen by vs in the foregoing chapter, but not so particularly as is requisite; and it was, that School-diuinity appertaineth to the vnderstãding: but now we affirme and will prooue that preaching, and his practise, is a worke of the imagination. And as it falles out a difficult matter, to ioyne in one self brain a good vnderstanding and much imagination: so likewise it will hardly fall that one selfe man, be a great Schoole-diuine, & a famous preacher: and that School-diuinitie is a worke of the vnderstanding, hath tofore been prooued when we proued the repugnancie which it carried to the Latine tongue. For which cause it shall not now be necessary to prooue the same anew, onely it shall suffice to giue to vnderstand, that the grace and delightfulnesse which good preachers haue, whereby they draw their audience vnto them, and hold them well pleased, is altogether a worke of the imagination,

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and part thereof of a good memorie, and to the end I may better expound my selfe, and cause it as it were to be felt with the hand, it behoooeth first to presuppose that man is a liuing creature, capable of reason, of cõpanie, and of ciuilitie, and to the end that his nature might be the more abled by art, the ancient Philosophers deuised Logicke to teach him how he might frame his reasons with those precepts and rules, how he should define the nature of things, distinguish, deuide, conclude, argue, iudge, and choose, without which works it grows impossible, that the Artist can go forward: and that he might be companiable and ciuill; it behooued him to speake, & to giue other men to weet the conceits which he framed in his mind. And for that he should not deliuer them without disposition and without order: they deuised another art which they termed Rhethoricke, which by his preceptes and rules might beautifie the speech with polished words, with fine phrases, and with stirring affections and gratious colours. But as Logicke teacheth not a man to discourse and to argue in one science alone; but without difference in all alike: so also Rhethoricke instructeth how to speake, in Diuintie, in Phisicke, in skill of the Lawes and in all other Sciences and conuersations, which men entermedled withall. In sort, that if we will faine a perfect Logician, or an accomplished Oratour, he cannot fall into due consideration vnlesse he be seene in all the Sciences, for they all appertaine to his iurisdiction, and in which soeuer of them, he may exercise his rules without distinction: not as Phisicke which hath his matter limited whereof it must intreat: and so likewise naturall Philosophie, and morall, Metaphisick, Astrologie, and the rest: and therefore *Cicero* said, The Oratour whersoeuer he abideth,

dwelleth

dwelleth in his own. And in another place he affirmeth, in a perfect Oratour is found all the knowledge of the Philosophers, and therefore the same *Cicero* auouched, that there is no art more difficult than that of a perfect Oratour: and with more reason he might so haue said, if he had known with how great hardnesse al the Sciences are vnited in one particular subiect.

Anciently the doctors of the law were adorned with the name of Oratour, for the perfection of pleading required the notice & furniture of all the arts in the world, for the lawes do iudge them all. Now to know the defence reserued for euery art by it selfe, it was necessary to haue a particular knowledge of them all; for which cause *Cicero* said, No man ought to be reputed in the number of oratours, who is not well seen in all the arts. But seeing it was impossible to learne all Sciences: first, through the shortnesse of life, and then because mans wit is so bounded, they let them passe, and of necessitie held themselues contented to giue credit to the skilful in that art whereof they made profession, and no farther.

After this manner of defending causes, straightwaies succeeded the euangelicall doctrine, which might haue been persuaded by the art of oratorie, better than all the Sciences of the world besides, for that the same is the most certaine and trueſt: but Christ our redeemer, charged S. *Paul*, that he should not preach it with wisdome of words, to the end the Gentiles should not think it was a well couched leasing, as are those which the oratours vse to persuade by the force of their art. But when the faith had been receiued, many yeares after it was allowed to preach with places of Rhetoricke, and to vse the seruice of eloquent speech; for that then the incon-

uenience fell not in consideration, which was extant when S. *Paul* preached. Yea we see that the preacher reapeth more fruit, who hath the conditions of a perfect orator, and is more haunted than he that wanteth them: and the reason is very plaine. For if the ancient oratours gaue the people to vnderstand things false for true (vsing those their preceptes and rules) more easily shall the christian auditory be drawen, when by art they are persuaded to that which already they vnderstand and beleeue. Besides that the holy Scripture (after a sort) is all things; and to yeeld the same a true interpretation, it behoouerh to haue all the Sciences conformable to that so oft said saw, He sent his damsels to call to the Castle. This fitteth not to be remembred to the preachers of our time, nor to aduise them that now they may do it: for their particular study (besides the fruit which they pretend to bring with their doctrine) is to seeke out a good text, to whose purpose they may apply many fine sentences taken out of the diuine Scripture, the holy doctors, poets, historians, phisitians and lawyers, without forbearing any Science, and speaking copiously with quietnesse and pleasant words; and with al these things they goe amplifying and stuffing their matter, an houre or two if need be, Of this saith *Cicero* the oratours of his time made profession: The force of an oratour (saith he) and the selfe art of well speaking, seemeth that it vndertaketh and promiseth to speake with copiousnesse and ornament, of whatsoeuer matter that shall be propounded. Then if we shall proue that the graces and conditions which a perfect oratour ought to haue, do all appertaine to the imagination and to the memorie; we shall also know that the diuine, who is indowed with them will be an excellent preacher: but being set to

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the doctrin of S. *Thomas* and *Scotus* can litle skill thereof, for that the same is a science belonging to the vnderstanding, in which power, of necessitie it holdeth litle force.

What the things be which appertaine to the imagination, and by what signs they are to be knowne, we haue heretofore made mention: now we will return to a replication of them, that they may the better be refreshed to the memory. All that which may be tearmed good figure, good purpose and prouision, comes from the grace of the imagination, as are merrie ieasts, resemblances, quips, and comparisons.

The first thing which a perfect Orator is to go about (hauing matter vnder hand) is to seeke out arguments and conuenient sentences, whereby he may dilate and proue, and that not with all sorts of words, but with such as giue a good consonance to the eare: and therefore *Cicero* sayd: I take him for an Orator, who can vse in his discourses, words well tuning with the eare, and sentences conuenient for proofe. And this (for certain) appertaineth to the imagination, sithens therin is a consonance of well pleasing words, and a good direction in the sentences.

The second grace which may not be wanting in a perfect Orator, is to possesse much inuention, or much reading, for if he rest bound to dilate and confirme any matter whatsoeuer, with many speeches and sentences applied to the purpose, it behoueth that he haue a verie swift imagination, and that the same supply (as it were) the place of a braach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand, and when he wants what to say, to deuise somewhat as if it were materiall. For this cause we sayd before, that heat was an instrument with which the ima-

gination worketh, for this qualitie lifteth vp the figures and maketh them to boile. Here is discouered all that which in them may be seene, and if there fel our nought else to be considered, this imagination hath force not onely to compound a figure possible with another, but doth ioyne also (after the order of nature) those which are vnpossible, and of them growes to shape mountains of gold, and calues that flie. In lieu of their owne inuention, oratours may supply the same with much reading, forasmuch as their imagination faileth them: but in cõcluſion whatsoeuer bookes teach, is bounded and limited; and the proper inuention is a good fountain which alwaies yeeldeth foorth new and fresh water. For retaining the things which haue been read, it is requisite to possesse much memorie, and to recite them in the presence of the audience with readinesse, cannot be done without the same power. For which cause *Cicero* said, he shall (in mine opinion) be an oratour worthy of so important a name, who with wisdome, with copiousnesse, and with ornament, can readily deliuer euerie matter that is worth the hearing. Heeretofore we haue said and prooued that wisdome appertaineth to the imagination, copiousnesse of words and sentences to the memorie, ornament and polishment to the imagination: to recite so many things without faltring or stopping, for certain is atchieued by the goodnesse of the memorie. To this purpose, *Cicero* auouched that the good oratour ought to rehearse by heart, and not by booke. It falleth not besides the matter to let you vnderstand that M. *Antony* of Lebrissa, through old age grew to such a decay of memorie, that he read his Rhetoricke lecture to his schollers out of a paper, and for that he was so excellent in his profession, and with good proofes confirmed

med his points propounded, it passed for currant; but that which might be no way tollerated, was, that where he died sodainly of an apoplexie, the Vniuersity of *Alcala* recommended the making of his funerall oration to a famous preacher, who inuented and disposed what he had to say the best he could: but time so pressed him, as it grew impossible for him to con the same without booke: Wherefore getting vp into the pulpit with his paper in his hand, he began to speake in this sort. That which this notable man vsed to do whilst he read to his schollers, I am now also resolued to do in his imitation; for his death was so sodaine, and the commandement to me of making his funerall sermon so late, as I had neither place nor time to studie what I might say, nor to con it by heart. Whatsoeuer I haue been able to gather with the trauell of this night, I bring heere written in this paper, and beseech your maisterships that you will heare the same with patience, and pardon my slender memorie.

This fashion of rehearsing with paper in the hand so highly displeased the audience, as they did nought els than smile and murmure: Therefore very well said *Cicero*, that it behooued to rehearse by heart and not by booke. This preacher verily was not endowed with any inuention of his own, but was driuen to fetch the same out of his books; and to performe this, great studie and much memorie were requisite. But those who borrow their conceits out of their owne brain, stand not in need of studie, time, or memorie: for they find all ready at their finger ends. Such will preach to one selfe audience all their life long without reapeating any point touched in twentie yeares before; whereas those that want inuention, in two Lents cull the flowers out of all

the books in a whole world, and ransacke to the bottom all the writings that can be gotten; and at the third Lent must go and get themselues a new auditory, except they will heare cast in their teeth, This is the same which you preached vnto vs in the yeare before.

The third property that a good orator ought to haue, is that he know how to dispose his matter, placing euerie word and sentence in his fit roome, in sort that the whole may carrie an answerable proportion, and one thing bring in another: And to this purpose *Cicero* said, Disposition is an order & distribution of things which sheweth what ought in what places to be bestowed; which grace when it is not naturall, accustomably breedeth much cumber to the preachers, For after they haue found in their books many things to deliuer, all of them cannot skill to apply this prouision readily to euerie point. This property of ordering and distributing, is for certaine a worke of the imagination, since (in effect) it is nought els, but figure and correspondence.

The fourth propertie wherewith good oratours should be endowed, and the most important of all, is action, wherwith they giue a being and life to the things which they speake, and with the same do moue the hearers, and supple them to beleeue how that is true which they go about to persuade. For which cause *Cicero* said, Action is that which ought to be gouerned by the motion of the body, by the gesture, by the countenance, & by the confirmation and varietie of the voice. As if he should say: action ought to be directed in making the motions and gestures, which are requisite for the things that are spoken, lifting vp and falling with the voice, growing passionate, and sodainly turning to appeasement; one while speaking fast, another-while leisurely,

reproouing

reproouing, and cherishing, moouing the body, sometimes to the one side, somtimes to the other, plucking in the armes, and stretching them out, laughing and weeping: and vpon some occasions beating the hands togither. This grace is so important in preachers, that by the same alone (wanting both inuention and disposition) of matters of small value and ordinary, they make a sermon which filleth the audience with astonishment, for that they haue this action, which otherwise is termed spirit or pronunciation. Heerein falleth a thing worth the marking, whereby is discouered how much this grace can preuaile; and it is, that the sermons which through the much action and much spirite doe please much, when they be set downe in writing are nothing worth, nor will any wel-neer vouchsafe their reading: and this groweth because with the pen it is impossible to pourtray those motions and those gestures, which in the pulpit so far wan mens likings. Other sermons shew very well in paper; but at their preaching no man listeth to giue eare because that action is not giuen thē, which is requisite at euery close. And therefore *Plato* said, that the stile wherewith we speake, is far different from that which we write well, where-through we see many men who can speake very well, do yet endite but meanly, and others contrariwise, endite very well, and discourse but harshly: all which is to be reduced to action, and action (for certaine) is a worke of the imagination, for all that which we haue vttered thereof, maketh figure, correspondence, and good consonance.

The fift grace, is to know how to assemble & alleage good examples and comparisons, which better contenteth the hearers humour than any thing els: For by a fit example they easily vnderstand the doctrine, and with-

out the same it soone slippeth out of their mind: whereon *Aristotle* propoundeth this question, Whence it riseth that men (in making speeches) are better pleased with examples and fables than with conceits, as if he should say, For what occasion do such as come to heare oratours, make more reckoning of the examples and fables which they alleage, to prooue the things that they striue to persuade, than of the arguments and reasons which they frame? and to those he answereth, That by examples & fables men learne best, because it is a proofe which appertaineth to the sense, but arguments and reasons hold not the like reason, for that they are a worke whereto is requisite much vnderstanding. And for this cause Christ our redeemer in his sermons vsed so many parables and comparisons, because by them he gaue to vnderstand many diuine secrets. This point of deuising fables and comparisons, it is a thing certaine that the same is performed by the imagination, for it is figure, and denoteth good correspondence and similitude.

The sixth propertie of a good oratour, is, to haue a readie tongue of his owne, and not affected, choice words, and many gratious sorts of vtterance: of which graces we haue entreated oftentimes heretofore, prooving that the one part of them appertaineth to the imagination, and the other to a good memory.

The seuenth propertie of a good oratour, is that which *Cicero* speaketh of: furnished with voice, with action, and with comelinesse, the voice full and ringing, pleasing to the hearers, not harsh, not hoarse, nor sharp: and although it be true that this springeth from the temperature of the breast and the throat, and not from the imagination: yet sure it is that from the same temperature from which a good imagination groweth, namely heat,

heat, a good voice also fetcheth his originall, & to know this, importeth much for our purpose: For the Schoole-diuines in that they are of a cold and drie complexion, cannot haue their voice a good instrument: and this is a great defect in a pulpit.

This same *Aristotle* also prooueth, alleaging the example of old men, by reason of their coldnesse add drynesse. To haue a full and cleare voice, much heat is requisit to enlarge the passages, and measurable moisture which may supple and soften them. And also *Aristotle* demaundeth why al who by nature are hote, are also big voiced? For which cause we see the contrary in women and Eunuches, who through the much coldnes of their complexion (saith *Galen*) haue their throat and voice very delicat, in sort, that when we heare a good voice, we can straightwaies say, it comes of much heat and moisture in the brest: which two qualities, if they passe so far as the braine, make the vnderstanding to decay, and the memory and imagination to increase, which are the two powers wherof the good preacher serueth himselfe to content his auditory.

The eigth propertie of a good oratour (sayth *Cicero*) is to haue toung at will, ready, and well exercised, which grace cannot befall men of great vnderstanding, for that it may be ready, it behooueth the same to partake much heat, and much drouth. And this cannot light in the melancholicke, either naturall, or by adustion. *Aristotle* prooueth it, by asking this question, Whence commeth it, that such as haue an impediment in their speech, are reputed to be of complexion melancholicke? To which probleme he answereth very vntowardly, saying, That the melancholicke haue a great imagination, and that the toung cannot hast to vtter so fast as the imagination

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conceiueth, wherethrough they ſtammer and ſtumble: which yet proceedeth from nought elſe, ſaue that the melancholicke haue euer their mouth full of froath and ſpittle, through which diſpoſition their toung is moiſt and ſlipper, which thing may euidently be diſcerned, conſidering the often ſpitting of ſuch. This ſelfe reaſon did *Ariſtotle* render, when he demaunded, Whence it groweth that ſome are ſo ſlow tounged? and he anſwereth, That ſuch haue their toung very cold and moiſt, which two qualities breed an impediment therein, and make it ſubiect to the palſie; and ſo you ſee his conceit of the imagination cannot follow: for this he yeeldeth a profitable remedie, *vz.* to drinke a little wine, or at firſt to hallow ſomewhat lowd, before they ſpeake in the preſence of their audience, for thereby the toung getteth heat, and drieth.

But *Ariſtotle* ſayth further, that not to ſpeake plaine, may grow from hauing the toung very hot, and very dry, and voucheth the example of cholericke perſons, who growing in choler, cannot ſpeake, and when they are void of paſſion and choler, they are very eloquent: the contrary betideth to the flegmaticke, who being quiet, cannot talke, and when they are angred vtter ſpeeches of great eloquence. The reaſon of this is very manifeſt, for although it is true, that heat aideth the imagination, and the toung alſo, yet the ſame may alſo breed them dammage: firſt, for that they want ſupply of replies and wittie ſentences, as alſo becauſe the toung cannot pronounce plainly, through ouer-much drineſſe; wherethrough we ſee, that after a man hath drunke a little water, he ſpeaketh better.

The cholericke (being quiet) deliuer very well, for they then retaine that point of heat which is requiſit for

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the toung; and the good imagination; but in anger, the heat groweth beyond due, and turneth the imagination topsie turuie: The flegmaticke vnincenſed, haue their brain very cold and moiſt, and therfore are ſet a ground what to ſay, and their toung is ouer ſlipper through too much moiſture; but when they are ſet on fire and in choler, the heat foorthwith getteth vp, and ſo lifteth vp the imagination; by which means there comes to their mind much what to deliuer, and the toung giueth no hinderance for that it is heated: theſe haue no great vaine in verſifieng, for that they are cold of braine, who yet (once angred) do then make verſes beſt, and with moſt facilitie, againſt ſuch as haue ſtirred them, and to this purpoſe *Iuuenal* ſayd:

Anger makes verſe, if nature but denie.

Through the defect of toung, men of great vnderſtanding cannot be good orators or preachers, and ſpecially for that action requireth a ſpeech ſometimes high, and ſometimes low, and thoſe who are ſlow tounged, cannot pronounce but with loud voice, and in a maner crying out, and this is one of the things which ſooneſt cloieth the hearers: whereon *Ariſtotle* mooueth this doubt, Whence it ſpringeth, that men of ſlow toung cannot ſpeake ſoft. To which probleme he anſwereth very wel, ſaying, that the toung which is faſtened to the roofe of the mouth, by reaſon of much moiſture, is better looſened with a force, than if you put therto but little might, as if one would lift vp a launce, taking the ſame by the point, he ſhal ſooner raiſe it at one puſh and with a force, then taking it vp by little and little.

Me ſeemeth, I haue ſufficiently proued that the good naturall qualities which a perfect Orator ought to haue, ſpring for the moſt part from a good imagination, and

ſome

ſome from the memorie. And if it be true that the good preachers of our time content their audience, becauſe they haue theſe gifts; it followeth very well, that whoſoeuer is a great preacher can ſmall skill of Schoole-diuinitie, and a great ſcholler will hardly away with preaching, through the contrarietie, which the vnderſtanding carrieth to the imagination and to the memorie. Well knew *Ariſtotle* by experience, that although the oratour learned Naturall and Morall Philoſophy, Phiſicke, Metaphiſicke, the Lawes, the Mathematicals, Aſtrology, and al the arts and ſciences; notwithſtanding he was ſeen of all theſe, but in the flowers and choice ſentences, without pearcing to the roote of the reaſon & occaſion of any of them: But he thought that this not knowing the Diuinitie, nor the cauſe of things which is termed *Propter quid*, grew, for that they bent not themſelues therevnto, and therfore propounded this demand. Why do we imagine that a Philoſopher is different from an oratour? To which probleme he anſwereth, that the Philoſopher placeth all his ſtudie in knowing the reaſon and cauſe of euery effect, and the oratour in knowing the effect and no farther. And verily it proceedeth from nought els, than for that naturall Philoſophy appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, which power the oratours do want; and therefore in Philoſophy they can pearce no farther than into the vpper skin of things. This ſelfe difference there is between the Schoole-diuine and the poſitiue, that the one knoweth the cauſe of whatſoeuer importeth his faculty; & the other the propoſitions which are verefied, & no more. The caſe then ſtanding thus, it falleth out a dangerous matter that the preacher enioyeth an office and authority to inſtruct Chriſtian people in the trueth, and that their auditory is bound

bound to beleeue them, and yet they want that power, through which the trueth is digged vp from the roote, we may say of them (without lying) those wordes of Christ our redeemer, Let them go, they are blinde, and do guide the blinde; and if the blind guide the blinde, both fall into the ditch. It is a thing intollerable to behold with how great audacity such set themselues to preach, who cannot one iote of Schoole-diuinitie, nor haue any naturall abilitie to learne the same.

Of such S. *Paul* greatly cõplaineth; saying, But the end of the commandement is charitie from a pure heart and good conscience, & faith vnfained, from which (verily) some straying, haue turned aside to vain babling: who would be doctors in the Law and yet vnderstand not the things which they speake, nor which they auouch.

Besides this we haue prooued tofore, that those who haue much imagination, are cholericke, subtle, malignant, and cauillers, and alwaies enclined to euill, which they can compasse with much readinesse & craft. Touching the oratours of his time, *Aristotle* propoundeth this demand, why we vse to call an oratour craftie, and giue not this name to a musitian, nor to a comecal poet? And more would this difficulty haue growen, if *Aristotle* had vnderstood that muscke and the stage appertain to the imaginatiõ. To which probleme he answereth, That Musitions and stage-plaiers shoot at none other Butte, than to delight the hearers, but the oratour goes about to purchase somewhat for himselfe, and therfore it behoueth him to vse rules and readinesse, to the end the hearers may not smell out his fetch and bent.

Such properties as these behad those false preachers, of whom S. *Paul* spake, writing to the Corinthians, But I feare that as the serpent beguiled *Eue* with his subtletie;

so

ſo their ſences are led aſtray: for theſe falſe Apoſtles are guilefull workmen, who transforme themſelues into the Apoſtles of Chriſt: and this is no wonder, for Sathan transformed himſelfe into an Angell of light, and therefore it is no great matter for his miniſters to transforme themſelues as miniſters of iuſtice, whoſe end ſhall be their worke: as if he ſhould ſay, I haue great feare (my brethren) that as the ſerpent beguiled *Eue* with his ſubtletie and malice, ſo they alſo intricate their iudgement and perſeuerance: for theſe falſe Apoſtles are like pottage made of a foxe. Preachers who ſpeake vnder wiles, repreſent very perfectly a kinde of holineſſe, ſeeme the Apoſtles of Ieſus Chriſt, and yet are diſciples of the diuell, who can skill ſo well to repreſent an Angell of light, that there needeth not a ſupernaturall gift to diſcouer what he is: and ſince the maiſter can play his part ſo well, it is not ſtrange that they alſo who haue learned his doctrine practiſe the ſemblable, whoſe end ſhall be none other than their works. All theſe properties are well knowen to appertaine to the imagination, and that *Ariſtotle* ſaid very wel, that oratours are ſubtle and readie, becauſe they are euer in hand to get ſomewhat for themſelues.

Such as poſſeſſe a forcible imagination we ſaid before, that they are of complexion very hote, and from this quality ſpring three principall vices in a man; Pride, Gluttonie, and Lecherie: for which cauſe the Apoſtle ſaid, Such ſerued not our Lord Ieſus Chriſt, but their bellie.

And that theſe three euill inclinations ſpring from heat, and the contrary vertues from cold: *Ariſtotle* prooueth, ſaying thus: and therfore it holdeth the ſame force to ſhape conditions, for heat and cold (more than any thing

thing els which is in the body) do seaſon maners, and therefore printeth and worketh in vs the qualities of maners: as if he ſhould ſay, from heat and cold ſpring all the conditions of man: for theſe two qualities do more alter our nature than any other: For which cauſe men of great imagination are ordinarily bad and vitious: for they abandon themſelues to be guided by their naturall inclination, and haue wit and ability to do lewdly. For which cauſe the ſame *Ariſtotle* asketh, Whence it groweth, that a man being ſo much inſtructed, is yet the moſt vniuſt of all liuing creatures? to which probleme he maketh anſwere that man hath much wit, and a great imagination, and for this he findeth many waies to do ill, and (as by his nature he coueteth delights, and to be ſuperiour to al and of great happineſſe) it is of force that he offend: for theſe things cannot be atchieued, but by doing wrong to many: but *Ariſtotle* wiſt not how to frame this probleme, nor to yeeld a fitting anſwere.

Better might he haue enquired for what cauſe the worſt people are commonly of greateſt wit, & amongſt thoſe, ſuch as are beſt furniſhed with abilitie, commit the lewdeſt prancks: whereas of dew, a good wit and ſufficiencie ſhould rather encline a man to vertue and godlineſſe than to vices and miſdoing. The anſwere heereto is, for that thoſe who partake much heate, are men of great imagination, and the ſame qualitie which maketh them wittie, traineth them to be naughtie & vicious. But when the vnderſtanding ouerruleth, it ordinarily inclineth a man to vertue, becauſe this power is founded on cold and dry: From which two qualities, bud many vertues, as are Continencie, Humilitie, Temperance, and from heat the contrarie. And if *Ariſtotle* had knowen this point of Philoſophy, he ſhould haue

been

been able to answer this probleme which saith, Whence may it proceed that that sort of men who we call craftsmen of *Bacchus* or stage plaiers, are for the most part ill conditioned? as if he should say: for what cause are such as gaine their liuing on the stage, In-keepers and Butchers, and those whose seruice is vsed about feastes and banquets to order the cates, ordinarily naught and vitious? To which probleme he answereth, saying; that such by being occupied in these belly-cheere offices, leaue themselues no leisure to studie, and therefore passe ouer their life in incontinencie. And heereto is pouerty also aiding, which accustomably bringeth with it many euils: hut (verily) this is not the reason; but playing on the stage and ordering of feasts springeth from the difference of the imagination, which inuiteth a man to this maner of life. And because this difference of imagination consisteth in heate, all of them haue very good stomackes and great appetite to eat and drinke. These although they gaue themselues to learning, should therby reape little fruit; and had they been neuer so wealthie, yet would they (howsoeuer) haue cast their affection to these seruices, were they euen baser than they are: for the wit and ability draweth euery one to that art, which answereth it in proportion.

For this cause *Aristotle* demanded what the reason was, why there are men who more willingly addict thēselues to the professiō of which they haue made choice, (though somwhiles vnworthy) than to the more honorable? As for example, to be rather a iugler, a stage-plaier, or a trumpeter, than an Astrologer or an Orator? To which probleme he answereth very well, saying; that a man soon discerneth to what art he is disposed, and inclined of his owne nature, because he hath somewhat within

within that teacheth him, and nature can doe so much with her pricks, that albeit the art and office be vnseemly for the calling of the learner, yet he cleaueth vnto that and not to others of great imagination. But sithence we haue put by this manner of wits from the function of preaching, and that we are bound to giue and bestow vpon euery difference of abilitie that sort of learning, which is answerable thereto in particular: we must likewise determin what sort of wit he ought to be endowed withall, vnto whose charge the function of preaching is to be committed, which is the thing that most importeth the christian commonwealth: For we must conceiue that albeit we haue prooued heretofore, that it is a matter repugnant in nature to find a great wit accompanied with much imagination and memorie. Notwithstanding this rule holdeth not so vniuersally in all arts, but that it admitteth his exceptions and somtimes commeth short.

In the last chapter of this worke saue one, we will proue at full, that if nature be possessed of her due force, and haue no impediment cast athwart to stop her, she maketh so perfect a difference of wit, as the same vniteth in one selfe subiect a great vnderstanding, with much imagination and memory, as if they were not contrary, nor held any naturall opposition.

This should be a fitting ability, and conuenient for the function of preaching, if there could be found many subiects to be endowed therewith; but (as we will shew in the place alleaged) they are so few, that of 100000. whom I haue measured, I can meet but with one of the size. Therefore it behoueth to seeke out another more familiar difference of wit, though not so far stept in perfection as the former. We must then weet, that between

the Phiſitians and Philoſophers riſeth a great diuerſity in opinions, for reſoluing the temperature and the qualitie of vineger, of choler aduſt, and of aſhes; inaſmuch as theſe things ſometimes worke the effect of heat, and ſomtimes of cold; and thereon they deuided themſelues into diuers ſects: but the trueth is, that all theſe things which ſuffer aduſtion, and are conſumed and burned by the fire, haue a variable temperature. The greater part of the ſubiect is cold and drie, but there are alſo other parts entermingled, ſo ſubtle and delicate, and of ſuch feruency and heat, that albeit they contain litle in quantity, yet they carie more efficacie in working than al the reſt of the ſubiect.

So we ſee that vineger and melancholie through aduſtion open & leauen the earth by meanes of the heat, and cloſe it not though the more part of theſe humours be cold. Hence is gathered that the melancholicke by aduſtion, accompany great vnderſtanding with much imagination; but they are all weake of memorie, for the much aduſtion much alſo drieth & hardneth the braine. Theſe are good preachers, or (at leaſt) the beſt that may be found, ſauing thoſe perfect ones of whom we ſpake: for although memorie faile them, they enioy of themſelues ſuch inuention that the very imagination ſerueth them in ſtead of memorie and remembrance; and miniſtreth vnto them figures and ſentences to deliuer, without that they ſtand in need of ought beſides. Which theſe cannot bring about who haue conned boſome ſermons, and ſwarued from that bias are ſtraight ſet a ground, without hauing the furniture of any ſecond meanes, to bring themſelues aflote again. And that melancholy by aduſtion hath this varietie of temperature, namely; cold and dry, for the vnderſtanding, and heate

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for the imagination, *Aristotle* declareth in these wordes, Melancholike men are variable and vnequall: for the force of choler aduſt is variable and vnequall, as if the ſame might be greatly both hot and cold, & as if he had ſaid, Melancholike men by aduſtion are variable & vnequall in their complexion: for that choler aduſt is very vnequall, inaſmuch as ſomtimes it is exceeding hot, and ſomtimes cold beyond meaſure.

The ſigns by which men of this temperature may be knowne, are very manifeſt: they haue the colour of their countenaunce a darke greene, or ſallow, their eies very fierie; of whom it was ſayd, he is a man that hath blood in his eyes, their haire blacke and bald, their fleſh leane, rough and hairie, their veins big, they are of very good conuerſation, and affable, but letcherous, proud, ſtately, blaſphemers, wily, double, iniurious, friends of ill dooing; and deſirous of reuenge: this is to be vnderſtood when melancholy is kindled, but if it be cooled, foorthwith there grow in them the contrary vertues, chaſtitie, humilitie, feare and reuerence of God, charitie, mercie, and great acknowledgement of their ſins, with ſighings and tears, for which cauſe they liue in continuall warre and ſtrife, without euer enioying eaſe or reſt. Somtimes vice preuaileth in them, ſometimes vertue, but with all theſe defects, they are wittieſt, and moſt able for the function of preaching, & for all matters of wiſdome which befall in the world; for they haue an vnderſtanding to know the truth, and a great imagination to be able to perſuade the ſame.

Wherethrough, we ſee that which God did when he would faſhion a man in his mothers wombe, to the end that he might be able to diſcouer to the world, the comming of his ſon, and haue the way to prooue and per-

ſuade, That Chriſt was the Meſſias and promiſed in the law. For making him of great vnderſtanding, & of much imagination, it fell out of neceſſity (keeping the naturall order) that he ſhould alſo make him cholericke and aduſt: And that this is true, may eaſily be vnderſtood by him, who conſidereth the great fire & furie, with which he perſecuted the church; the greefe conceiued by the ſynagogues, when they ſaw him conuerted, as they who had forgone a man of high importance, and of whom the contrarie partie had made a gainfull purchace. It is alſo knowen by the tokens of the reaſonable choler, with which he ſpake and anſwered the deputy, Conſuls, and the Iudges who had arreſted him: defending his owne perſon and the name of Chriſt, with ſo great art and readineſſe, as he conuinced them all: yet he had an imperfection in his tongue, and was not very prompt of ſpeech, which *Ariſtotle* affirmeth to be a property of the melancholicke by aduſtion. The vices wherto he confeſſed himſelfe to be ſubiect before his conuerſion, ſhew him to haue been of this temperature: he was a blaſphemer, a wrong doer, and a perſecutor: all which ſpringeth from abundance of heat. But the moſt euident ſigne which ſhewed that he was cholericke aduſt, is gathered from that battaile which himſelfe confeſſeth he had within himſelfe, betwixt his part ſuperiour & inferiour, ſaying; I ſee another law in my members ſtriuing againſt the law of my minde, which leadeth me into the bondage of ſinne. And this ſelfe contention haue we prooued (by the mind of *Ariſtotle*) to be in the melancholicke by aduſtion.

Paule.

True it is that ſome expound (very well) that this battaile groweth from the diſorder which originall ſinne made betweene the ſpirit and the fleſh; albeit being ſuch

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and so great, I beleue also that it springs from the choler aduſt, which he had in his naturall conſtitution: for the roiall prophet *Dauid* participated equally of original ſin, and yet complained not ſo much as did *S. Paul*, but ſaith, that he found the inferiour portion accorded with his reaſon, when he would reioice with God: My hear (ſaith he) and my fleſh ioyed in the liuing God, and (as we will touch in the laſt chapter ſaue one) *Dauid* poſſeſſed the beſt temperature that nature could frame: and heereof we will make proofe by the opinion of all the Philoſophers, that the ſame ordinarily enclineth a man to be vertuous without any great gainſtriuing of the fleſh. The wits then which are to be ſorted out for preachers, are firſt theſe who vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination and memorie, whoſe ſignes ſhalbe expreſſed in the laſt chapter ſaue one. Where ſuch want, there ſucceede in their roome the melancholicke by aduſtion. Thoſe vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination, but ſuffer defect of memorie; wherthrough, they are not ſtored with copie of words, nor can preach with full ſtore in preſence of the people.

In the third rancke ſucceed men of great vnderſtanding, but defectiue in their imagination and memorie. Theſe ſhall haue but a bad grace in preaching; yet will preach ſound doctrine. The laſt whom I would not charge with preaching at all, are ſuch as vnite much memorie with much imaginaton, and haue defect of vnderſtanding. Theſe draw the auditory after them, and hold them in ſuſpenſe and well pleaſed: but when they leaſt miſdoubt it, they fetch a turne to the holy houſe: for by way of their ſweet diſcourſes and bleſſings, they beguile the innocent.

CHAP. XI.

That the Theoricke of the lawes appertaineth to the memorie, and pleading and iudging (which are their practise) to the vnderstanding, and the gouerning of a common-wealth to the imagination.

IN the Spanish toung, it is not void of a mysterie, that this word (Lettered) being a common tearme for all men of letters or learning, as well Diuines, as Lawyers, Phisitions, Logicians, Philosophers, Orators, Mathematicians, and Astrologers, yet in saying that such a one is learned, we all vnderstand it by common sence, that he maketh profession of the lawes, as if this were their proper aud peculiar title, and not of the residue.

The aunswer of this doubt, though it be easie, yet to yeeld the same such as is requisit, it behoooueth first to be acquainted what law is, and wherevnto they are bound, who set themselues to studie that profession, that afterwards they may employ the same to vse, when they are iudges or pleaders. The law (who so well considereth thereof) is nought else, but a reasonable will of the law maker, by which he declareth, in what sort he will that the cases which happen dayly in the common wealth, be decided, for preseruing the subiects in peace, and directing them in what sort they are to liue, & what things they are to refraine.

I sayd, a reasonable will, because it sufficeth not, that the king or emperour (who are the efficient cause of the lawes) declaring his will in what sort soeuer, doth thereby

by make it a law, for if the same be not iust, and grounded vpon reason, it cannot be called a law, neither is it: euen as he cannot be tearmed a man who wanteth a reasonable soule. Therefore it is a matter established by common accord, that kings enact their lawes with assent of men very wise and of sound iudgement, to the end they may be right, iust, and good, and that the subiects may receiue them with good will, and be the more bound to obserue and obey them. The materiall cause of the law is, that it consist of such cases as accustomably befall in the common wealth, according to the order of nature, and not of things impossible or such as betide very sildome. The finall cause is, to order the life of man and to direct him what he is to do, and what to forbear, to the end that being conformed to reason, the common wealth may be preserued in peace. For this cause we see that the lawes are written in plaine words, not doubtfull, nor obscure, nor of double vnderstanding, without ciphers, and without abbreuiations, and so easie and manifest, that whosoeuer shall read them, may readily vnderstand and retaine them in memorie. And because no man should pretend ignorance, they are publikely proclaymed, that whosoeuer afterward breaketh them, may be chastised.

In respect therefore of the care and diligence which the good law makers vse, that their lawes may be iust and plaine, they haue giuen in charge to the iudges and pleaders, that in actions or iudgements, none of them follow his owne sence, but suffer himselfe to be guided by the authority of the lawes, as if they should say, We commaund that no iudge or aduocat, imploy his conceit, nor intermeddle in deciding, whether the law be iust or vniust, nor yeeld it any other sence than that that

is contained in the text of the letter. So it followeth that the lawyers are to construe the text of the law, and to take that sense which is gathered out of the construction thereof, and none other.

This doctrine thus presupposed, it falleth out a matter very manifest, for what reason the lawyers are termed lettered, and other men of learning not so, for this name is deriued from the word letter, which is to say, a man who is not licenced to follow the capacity of his owne vnderstanding, but is enforced to ensue the sense of the very letter. And for that the well practised in this profession haue so construed it, they dare not denie or affirme any thing which appertaineth to the determination of any case whatsoeuer, vnles they haue lying before them some law which in expresse tearms decideth the same. And if sometimes they speake of their owne head, interlacing their conceit and reason, without grounding vpon some law, they dō it with feare and bashfulnesse, for which cause is a much worne prouerbe, We blush when we speake without law. Diuines cannot call themselues lettered in this signification, for in the holy scripture the letter killeth, and the spirit giueth life; it is full of mysteries, repleniſhed with figures and cyphers, obscure, and not vnderstood by all readers, the vowels and phrases of speech hold a very different significatiō from that which the vulgar and three-tounged men do know. Therefore whosoeuer shall set himselfe to construe the letter, and take the sence which riseth of that Grammaticall construction, shall fall into many errours.

The Phisitions also haue no letter whereto to submit themselues, for if *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, and the other graue authors of this faculty, say and affirme one thing, and that experience and reason approue the contrarie,

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they are not bound to follow them: for in Phiſicke, experience beareth more ſway than reaſon, and reaſon more than authority: but in the lawes it betideth quite contrary, for their authoritie and that which they determine, is of more force and vigour than all the reaſons that may be alleaged to the contrary. Which being ſo, we haue the way layd open before vs, to aſſigne what wit is requiſit for the lawes. For if a Lawyer haue his vnderſtanding and imagination tied to follow that which the law auouched, without adding or diminiſhing, it falleth out apparent, that this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, and that the thing wherein they muſt labour, is to know the number of the lawes, and of the rules which are in the text, and to call to remembrance ech of them in particular, & to rehearſe at large his ſentence and determination, to the end that when occaſion is miniſtred, we may know there is a law which giueth deciſion, and in what forme and maner. Therefore to my ſeeming it is a better difference of wit for a lawyer to haue much memory and litle vnderſtanding, than much vnderſtanding and litle memorie. For if there fall out no occaſion of employing his wit and abilitie, and that he muſt haue at his fingers ends ſo great a number of lawes as are extant, and ſo far different from the other; with ſo many exceptions, limitations, & enlargements, it ſerues better to know by heart what hath been determined in the lawes for euery point which ſhall come in queſtion, than to diſcourſe with the vnderſtanding in what ſort the ſame might haue been determined: for the one of theſe is neceſſary, & the other impertinent, ſince none other opinion than the very determination of the law muſt beare the ſtroke.

So it falles out for certaine, that the Theorick of the law

law appertaineth to the memory and not to the vnderſtanding, nor to the imagination: for which reaſon, and for that the lawes are ſo poſitiue, and that becauſe the lawyers haue their vnderſtanding ſo tied to the will of the law-maker, and cannot entermingle their own reſolution, ſaue in caſe where they reſt vncertaine of the determination of the law, when any client ſeeketh their iudgement, they haue authority and licence to ſay, I wil looke for the caſe in my booke: which if the Phiſition ſhould anſwer when he is asked a remedy for ſome diſeaſe, or the Diuine in caſes of conſcience; we would repute them for men, but ſimply ſeen in the faculty wherof they make profeſſion. And the reaſon hereof is, that thoſe ſciences haue certain vniuerſall principles and definitions, vnder which the particular caſes are contained; but in the law faculty euery law containeth a ſeuerall particular caſe, without hauing anie affinitie with the next, though they both be placed vnder one title. In reſpect wherof, it is neceſſarie to haue a notice of all the lawes, and to ſtudie ech one in particuler, and diſtinctly to lay them vp in memorie. But heere againſt *Plato* noteth a thing worthy of great conſideration; and that is, how in his time a learned man was held in ſuſpition that he knew many lawes by heart, ſeeing by experience that ſuch were not ſo skilfull iudges & pleaders, as this their vaunt ſeemed to pretend. Of which effect it appeareth he could not find out the cauſe, ſeeing in a place ſo conuenient he did not report the ſame; onely he ſaw by experience that Lawyers endowed with good memorie, being ſet to defend a cauſe, or to giue a ſentence, applied not their reaſons ſo well as was conuenient.

The reaſon of this effect may eaſily be rendered in my doctrine, preſuppoſing that memorie is contrarie to

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the vnderſtanding, & that the true interpretation of the lawes, to amplifie, reſtraine, and compound them, with their cõtraries and compoſitions, is done by diſtinguiſhing, concluding, arguing, iudging, and chuſing: which workes we haue often ſaid heeretofore belong to diſcourſe, and the learned man poſſeſſing much memorie cannot by poſſibilitie enioy them.

We haue alſo noted heeretofore that memorie ſupplieth none other office in the head than faithfully to preſerue the figures and fantaſies of things: but the vnderſtanding and the imagination, are thoſe which work therewithall.

And if a learned man haue the whole art of memory, and yet want vnderſtanding and imagination, he hath no more ſufficiencie to iudge or plead, than the verie *Code* or *Digeſt*, which cõpaſſing within them all the laws and rules of reaſon, for all that cannot write one letter. Moreouer, albeit it be true that the law ought to be ſuch as we haue mentioned in his definition; yet it falleth out a miracle to finde thinges with all the perfections, which the vnderſtanding attributeth vnto them: that the law be iuſt and reaſonable, and that it proceed fully to all that which may happen, that it be written in plain termes, void of doubt & oppoſitions, and that it receiue not diuerſe conſtructions, we ſee not alwaies accompliſhed: for in concluſion, it was eſtabliſhed by mans counſell, and that is not of force ſufficient to giue order for all that may betide: and this is daily ſeen by experience, for after a law hath bin enacted with great aduiſement and counſell, the ſame (in ſhort ſpace) is abrogated againe; for when it is once publiſhed and put in practiſe, a thouſand inconueniences diſcouer themſelues: whereof (when it was perſuaded) no man took regard: and therfore

fore kings and emperours are aduiſed by the ſame laws, that they ſhame not to amend and correct their lawes: for, in a word, men they are, and maruell there is none if they commit an error, ſo much the rather, for that no law can comprehend in wordes and ſentences all the circumſtances of the caſe which it decideth: for the craft of bad people is more wily to finde holes than that of good men to foreſee how they are to be gouerned; and therefore it was ſaid, Neither the lawes nor the reſolutions of the Senate can be ſet down in writing in ſuch ſort, that all the caſes which ſeuerally chance may be compriſed therein; but it ſufficeth to comprehend the things which fall out oftenest: and if other caſes ſucceed afterward, for which no law is enacted, it decideth them in proper termes.

The law facultie is not ſo bare of rules and principles, but that if the iudge or pleader haue a good diſcourſe, to know how to apply them; they may find their true determination and defence, and whence to gather the ſame. In ſort that if the caſes be more in number than the lawes, it behoueth that in the iudge and in the pleader there be much diſcourſe to make new laws, and that not at all aduentures: but ſuch as reaſon (by his conſonance) may receiue them without contradiction. This the lawyers of much memorie cannot doe: for if the caſes which the law thruſteth into their mouth, be not ſquared and chewed to their hands, they are to ſeek what to doe. We are woont to reſemble a lawyer, who can rehearſe many lawes by heart, to a regrater or hoſier that hath many paires of hoſen ready made in his ſhop, who, to deliuer you one that may fit you, muſt make you to aſſay them all: and if none agree with the buiers meaſure, he muſt ſend him away hoſeleſſe. But a learned

learned man of good vnderſtanding, is like a good tailer, who hath his ſheeres in his hand, and his peece a cloth on the table, and taking meaſure, cutteth his hoſen after his ſtature that demandeth them.

The ſheeres of a good pleader is his ſharp vnderſtanding, with which he taketh meaſure of the caſe, and apparelleth the ſame with that law which may decide it: and if he finde not a whole one that may determine it in expreſſe termes, he maketh one of many peeces, and therewith vſeth the beſt defence that he may. The lawyers who are endowed with ſuch a wit and ability, are not to be termed lettered: for they conſtrue not the letter, neither bind themſelues to the formall words of the law; but it ſeemeth they are law-makers, or counſellors at law: of whom the lawes themſelues enquire and demand how they ſhall determine: for if they haue power & authority to interpret them, to reaue, to adde, and to gather out of them exceptions, and fallecies, and that they may correct and amend them, it was not vnfitly ſaid, That they ſeem to be law-makers.

Of this ſort of knowledge it was ſpoken: by the knowledge of the lawes it is not meant to con their wordes by rote; but to take notice of their force and power, as if he ſhould ſay, Let no man thinke that to know the lawes is to beare in minde the formall words with which they are written; but to vnderſtand how far their forces extend, and what the point is which they may decide: for their reaſon is ſubiect to many varieties, by meanes of the circumſtances as well of time as of perſon, of place, of maner, of matter, of cauſe, and of the thing it ſelfe. Al which breedeth an alteration in the deciſion of the law, and if the iudge or pleader be not endowed with diſcourſe, to gather out of the law, or to

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take away or adioine that which the law ſelfe doth not expreſſe in words, he ſhall commit many errors in following the letter: for it hath been ſaid that the words of the law are not to be taken after the Iewiſh manner, that is, to conſture onely the letter, and ſo take the ſenſe thereof.

On the things alreadie alleaged, we conclude that pleading is a worke of diſcourſe, and that if the learned in the lawes poſſeſſe much memorie, he ſhalbe vntoward to iudge or plead through the repugnancie of theſe two powers. And this is the cauſe for which the learned of ſo ripe memorie (whom *Plato* mentioneth) could not defend well their clients cauſes, nor apply the lawes. But in this doctrin there preſents it ſelfe a doubt, and that (in mine opinion) not of the lighteſt: for if the diſcourſe be that which putteth the caſe in the law, and which determineth the ſame by diſtinguiſhing, limiting, amplifieng, inferring, and anſwering the arguments of the contrarie party, how is it poſſible that the diſcourſe may compaſſe all this, if the memorie ſet not downe all the lawes before it? for (as we haue aboue remembred) it is commanded that no man in actions or iudgements ſhall vſe his owne ſenſe, but leaue himſelfe to be guided by the authority of the lawes. Conformable hereunto, it behoooueth firſt to know all the lawes and rules of the law faculty, ere we can take hold of that which maketh to the purpoſe of our caſe. For albeit we haue ſaid that the pleader (of good vnderſtãding) is lord of the lawes: yet it is requiſit that all his reaſons and arguments be grounded on the principles of this faculty, without which they are of none effect or valure. And to be able to do this it behooueth to haue much memorie that may preſerue and retaine ſo great a number of laws which

which are written in the books.

This argument prooueth it to be neceſſarie, to the end a pleader may be accompliſhed, that there be vnited in him a great diſcourſe and much memory. All which I confeſſe, but that which I would ſay is, that ſince we cannot finde great diſcourſe vnited with much memorie, through the repugnancie which they carrie ech to other, it is requiſit that the pleader haue much diſcourſe, and litle memory, rather than much memory & litle diſcourſe: for to the default of memory are found many remedies; as books, tables, alphabets, & other things deuiſed by men: but if diſcourſe faile, there can nothing be found to remedy the ſame.

Beſides this, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that men of great diſcourſe though they haue a feeble memory, yet they haue much remembrance, by which they retaine a certaine diffuſe notice of things, they haue ſeen, heard, and read: wherupon diſcourſing, they cal them to memory. And albeit they had not ſo many remedies to preſent vnto the vnderſtanding the whole bodie of the ciuill law: yet the lawes are grounded on ſo great reaſon, as *Plato* reporteth, that the ancients termed the law, Wiſdom & Reaſon. Therefore the iudge or pleader, of great diſcourſe, though iudging or counſelling he haue not the law before him; yet ſeldome ſhall he commit an error: for he hath with him the inſtrument, with which the Emperors made the lawes. Whence oftentimes it falleth out that a Iudge of good wit, giueth a ſentence without knowing the deciſion of the law; and afterwards findeth the ſame ſo ruled in his books: and the like we ſee ſomtimes betideth the pleaders when they giue their iudgement in a caſe without ſtudying. The lawes and rules of reaſon, whoſoeuer well marketh them, are the fountaine

taine and originall, whence the pleaders gather their arguments and reasons to proove what they vndertake. And this worke (for certaine) is performed by the discourse: which power if the pleader want, he shall neuer skill to shape an argument though he haue the whole ciuill law at his fingers ends. This we see plainly to befall in such as studie the art of oratorie, when the aptnesse thereunto is failing: for though they learne by art the Topicks of *Cicero*, being the spring from which flow the arguments that may be inuented to proove euery probleme, both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part: yet they cannot thereout shape a reason. Againe, there come others of great wit and towardnes, who without looking in booke or studying the Topicks, make 1000 arguments seruing for the purpose, as occasion requireth.

This selfe falleth out in the lawyers of good memorie, who will recite you a whole text very perfectly, and yet of so great a multitude of lawes, as are compriſed therein, cannot collect so much as one argument to proove their inuention. And contrariwise, others who haue studied simply without books, and without allowance, worke miracles in pleading of causes. Hence we know how much it importeth the common-wealth, that there may be such an election and examination of wits for the sciences; inasmuch as some without art know and vnderstand what they are to effect: and others loden with precepts and rules, for that they want a conuenient towardlinesse for practise, commit a thousand absurdities, which very ill beseeme them. So then, if to iudge & plead, be effected by distinguishing, inferring, arguing, & chusing, it standeth with reason that whosoeuer setteth himselfe to studie the lawes, enioy a good vnder-

vnderſtanding, ſeeing that ſuch actions appertain to this power, and not to the memorie or to the imagination. How we may finde whether a child be endowed with this difference of wit or no, it would do well to vnderſtand: but firſt it behoooueth to lay downe what are the qualities of diſcourſe, & how many differences it compriſeth in it ſelfe, to the end we may likewiſe know with diſtinction, to which of theſe the lawes appertaine: for the firſt, we muſt weet, that albeit the vnderſtanding be the moſt noble power, and of greateſt dignitie in man: yet there is none which is more eaſily led into errour (as touching the trueth) than the vnderſtanding. This *Ariſtotle* attempted to prooue when he ſaid, That the ſenſe is euer true, but the vnderſtanding (for the moſt part) diſcourſeth badly; the which is plainly ſeen by experience: for if it were not ſo amongſt the Diuines, the Phiſitions, the Philoſophers, and the Lawyers, there would not fall out ſo manie waightie diſſentions, ſo diuers opinions, and ſo many iudgements and conceits vpon euery point, ſeeing the trueth is neuer more than one. Whence it groweth, that the ſenſes hold ſo great a certaintie in their obiects, and the vnderſtanding is ſo eaſily beguiled in his, may well be conceiued if we conſider that the obiects of the fiue ſenſes, and the ſpices by which they are known, haue their being, reall, firme, and ſtable by nature before they are knowen. But that truth which is to be contemplated by the vnderſtanding, if it ſelfe do not frame and faſhion the ſame, it hath no formall being of his owne; but is wholly ſcattered and loſe in his materials, as a houſe conuerted into ſtones, earth, timber & tiles, with which ſo many errors may be committed in building, as there ſhall men ſet themſelues to build with ill imagination.

The like befalleth in the building which the vnderstanding raiseth when it frameth a trueth: for if the wit be not good, all the residue wil worke a thousand follies with the selfe same principles. Hence springs it that amongst men there are so sundrie opinions touching one selfe matter: for euery one maketh the composition and figure such as is his vnderstanding.

From these errours and opinions are the fiue senses free: for neither the eies make the colour, nor the taste the sauours, nor the feeling the palpable qualities; but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiect. Men because they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderstanding, take hardinesse to deliuer confidently their owne opinion, without knowing (in certaintie) of what sort their wit is, and whither it can fashion a truth well or ill. And if we be not resolued heerein, let vs ask some of these learned mē, who after they haue set down in writing, and confirmed their opinions with many arguments and reasons, and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit, when or how they can assure themselues, that (now at last) they haue hit the nail on the head: themselues will not denie, but that they erred the first time, seeing they vnsay what they said tofore.

Secondly, I auouch that they ought to haue the lesse confidence in their vnderstanding, because the power which once ill compoundeth the trueth, whilest his patrone placed so much assurance in his argumentes and reasons, should therefore the sooner take suspect, that he may once again slide into error whilest he worketh with the selfe same instrument of reason; and so much the rather for that it hath been seen by experiences, that the

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first opinion hath borne most trueth, and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worse, and of lesse probabilitie. They hold it for a sufficient token, that the vnderstanding compoundeth well a trueth, when they see it enamored of such a figure; and that there are arguments & reasons which moue it to conclude in that sort: and verily they misse their cushion, for the same vnderstanding carrieth the same proportion to his false opinions, that the inferiour powers haue ech with the differences of their obiect: for if we demand of the Phisitions, what meat is best and most sauoury of al that men accustomably feed vpon; I beleeue they will answere, that for men who are distempered and of weake stomacke, there is none absolutely good or euil, but such as the stomacke is that shall receiue it: for there are stomacks (saith *Galen*) which better brooke beefe than hennes or cracknels, and othersome abhorre egges and milke: and others againe haue a longing after them: and in the maner of vsing meates, some like rost, and some boild: and in rost, some loue to haue the bloud run in the dish, and some to haue it browne and burned. And (which is more worthie of consideration) that meat which this day is sauourly eaten, and with good appetite, to morrow will be lothed, and a farre worse longed for in his roome. All this is vnderstood when the stomacke is good and sound: but if it fall into a certain infirmitie, which the Phisitions call Pica, or Malacia, then arise longings after things, which mans nature abhorreth: so as they eate earth, coles, and lime, with greater appetite than hennes or trouts. If we passe on to the faculty generatiue, we shall find as many appetites & varieties: for some men loue a foule woman, and abhorre a faire: others cast better liking to a foole than her that is wise: a fat wench is fulsome, and a leane

haue their liking, silks & braue attire offend some mens fancies, who leese themselues after one that totters in her ragges. This is vnderstood when the genitall partes are in their soundnesse: but if they fall into their infirmitie of stomacke, which is termed Malacia, they couet detestable beastlinesse. The same befalleth in the faculties sensitiue: for of the palbable qualities hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, moist and drie, there is none of them which can content euery ones feeling: for there are men who take better rest on a hard bed than a soft, & other som better on a soft than a hard. All this varietie of strange tasts & appetites, is found in the compositions, framed by the vnderstanding: for if we assemble 100 men of learning and propound a particular question, ech of them deliuereth a seuerall iudgement, and discourseth thereof in different maner. One selfe argument to one seemeth a sophisticall reason, to another probable, and some you shall meet with, to whose capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonstration. And this is not onely true in diuerse vnderstandings, but we see also by experience that one selfe reason concludeth to one selfe vnderstanding, at one time thus wise, and at another time otherwise: so much that euerie day men varie in opinion, some by processe of time purging their vnderstanding, know the default of reason, which first swaied them, and others leesing the good temperature of their braine, abhorre the trueth, and giue allowance to a leasing. But if the braine fall into the infirmitie, which is termed *Malacia*, then we shal see strange iudgements and compositions, arguments false and weake to proue more forcibly than such as carrie strength and trueth; to good argum nts, an answere shaped, and to bad a condescēding: from the premisses, whence a right

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concluſion may be collected, they gather a wrong, and by ſtrange arguments, and fond reaſons, they prooue their bad imaginations. This, graue and learned men duely aduiſing, labour to deliuer their opinion, concealing the reaſons whereon they ground: for men perſuade themſelues, that ſo farre mans authoritie auaileth, as the reaſon is of force on which he buildeth, and the arguments reſting ſo indifferent for cõcluding through the diuerſitie of vnderſtandings, euerie man giueth a iudgement of the reaſon conformably to the wit which he poſſeſſeth: for which cauſe it is reputed greater grauitie to ſay, This is mine opinion, for certaine reaſons which moue me ſo to thinke; than to diſplay the arguments whereon he relieth. But if they be enforced to render a reaſon of their opinion, they ouerſlip not anie argument, how ſlight ſocuer: for that which they leaſt valued, with ſome concludeth and worketh more effect, than the moſt vrgent. Wherein the great miſerie of our vnderſtanding is diſcouered, which compoundeth, and diuideth, argueth, and reaſoneth, and at laſt (when it is growen to a concluſion) is void of proofe or light, which may make it diſcern whether his opinion be true or no.

This ſelfe vncertaintie haue the diuines in matters which appertaine not to the faith: for after they haue argued at full, they cannot then aſſure themſelues of anie infalliable proofe or euident ſucceſſe that may diſcouer, which reaſons carried greateſt waight; and ſo euerie diuine caſteth how he may beſt ground himſelf, and anſwer with moſt apparence to the aduerſe parties arguments, his owne reputation ſaued, and this is all whereabouts he muſt beſtow his endeuour. But the charge of a Phiſition, and a Generall in the field, after he hath well

discourſed and refuted the grounds of the contrary partie, is to marke the ſucceſſe, which if it be good, he ſhal be held for diſcreet; if bad, all men will know that he relied vpon guileſull reaſons.

In matters of faith propounded by the Church, there can befall none error: for God, beſt weeting how vncertaine mens reaſons are, and with how great facilitie they runne headlong to be deceiued, conſenteth not that matters ſo high and of ſo waightie importance, ſhould reſt vpon our onely determination: but when two or three are gathered togither in his name, with the ſolemnitie of the Church, he forthwith entreth into the midſt of them, as preſident of the action, and ſo giueth allowance to that which they ſay well, and reaueth their errours, and of himſelfe reuealeth that, to whoſe notice by humane forces we cannot attaine. The proofe then which the reaſons formed in matters of faith muſt receiue, is to aduiſe well whether they prooue or inferre the ſame, which the Catholicke church ſaith and declareth: for if they collect ought to the contrarie, then (without doubt) they are faultie: but in other queſtions where the vnderſtanding hath libertie of diſcourſe, there hath not yet any maner bin aduiſed to know what reaſons conclude, nor when the vnderſtanding doth well compound a trueth: onely we relie vpon the good conſonance which they make, and that is an argument which may erre: for manie falſe points carrie better apparence and likelier proofe of truth, than the true themſelues.

Phiſitions, and ſuch as commaund in martiall affairs, haue ſucceſſe and experience for proofe of their reaſons. For if ten captains proue by many reaſons, that it is beſt to ioine battaile, and ſo many (on the other ſide) defend the

the contrarie, that which ſucceedeth, will confirme the one opinion, and conuince the other. And if two Phiſitions diſpute whether the patient ſhall die or liue, after he is cured or deceaſſed, it will appeare whoſe reaſon was beſt. But for all this, the ſucceſſe is yet no ſufficient proofe, for whereas an effect hath many cauſes, it may very well betide happily for one cauſe, and yet the reaſons (perhaps) were grounded on a contrary. *Ariſtotle* moreouer affirmeth, that to know what reaſons conclude, it is good to enſue the common opinion; for if many wiſemen ſay and affirme one ſelfe thing, and all conclude with the ſame reaſons, it is a ſigne (though topical) that they are concluſiue, and that they compound well the truth. But who ſo taketh this into due conſideration, ſhall find it a proofe ſubiect alſo vnto beguiling, for in the forces of the vnderſtanding, waight is of more preheminence than number: for it fareth not in this, as in bodily forces, that when many ioine together to lift vp a waight, they preuaile much, and when few, but little: but to attaine to the notice of a truth deepely hidden, one high vnderſtanding is of more value, than 100000 which are not comparable thereunto; and the reaſon is, becauſe the vnderſtandings helpe not each other, neither of many make one, as it fals out in bodily powers. Therefore well ſayd the wiſe man, Haue many peace-makers, but take one of a thouſand to be thy coũſellor; as if he ſhould ſay, Keepe for thy ſelfe many friends who may defend thee when thou ſhalt be driuen to come to hand-ſtrokes, but to aske councell, chuſe onely one amongſt a thouſand. Which ſentence was alſo expreſſed by *Heraclitus*, who ſayd, One with me is worth a thouſand. In contentions and cauſes, euery learned man bethinketh how he may beſt ground himſelfe

on reaſon, but after he hath well reuolued euery thing, there is no art which can make him know with aſſurance whether his vnderſtanding haue made that compoſition which in iuſtice is requiſit: for if one pleader proue with law in hand, that reaſon ſtandeth on the demandants ſide, and another by way alſo of the law, prooueth the like for the defendant, what remedie ſhall we deuiſe, to know which of the two pleaders hath formed his reaſons beſt? The ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration of true iuſtice, neither can the ſame be tearmed a ſucceſſe, for his ſentence (alſo) is but an opinion, & he doth none other than cleaue to one of the two pleaders: and to increaſe the number of learned men in one ſelfe opinion, is no argument to perſuade that what they reſolue vpon is therefore true, for we haue alreadie affirmed and prooued, that many weake capacities (though they ioine in one to diſcouer ſome darke conceiued truth) ſhall neuer ariue to the power and force of ſome one alone, if the ſame be an vnderſtāding of high reach. And that the ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration, is plainly ſeene, in that at another higher ſeat of iuſtice they reuerſe the ſame and giue a diuerſe iudgement, and (which is woorſt) it may ſo fall, that the inferiour iudge, was of an abler capacitie than the ſuperiour, and his opinion more conformable vnto reaſon. And that the ſentence of the ſuperiour iudge, is not a ſufficient proofe of iuſtice neither, it is a matter very manifeſt, for in the ſame actions, and from the ſame iudges, without adding or reauing any one iot, we ſee daily contrarie ſentences to iſſue. And he that once is deceiued by placing confidence in his owne reaſons, falleth duly into ſuſpect, that he may be deceiued of new. Wherethrough we ſhould the leſſe relie vpon his opinion, For he

he that is once naught (ſayth the wiſeman) chace him from thee. Pleaders, ſeeing the great varietie of vnderſtandings which poſſeſſe the iudges, and that each of them is affectionat to the reaſon which beſt ſquareth with his wit, and that ſometime they take ſatisfaction at one argument, & ſometimes aſſent to the contrary, they thereupon boldly thruſt themſelues foorth to defend euery cauſe in controuerſie, both on the part affirmatiue and the negatiue; and this ſo much the rather, becauſe they ſee by experience, that in the one maner and the other, they haue a ſentence in their fauour, and ſo that comes very rightly to be verefied, which wiſdome ſayd, The thoughts of mortal men are timorous, and their foreſights vncertaine. The remedie then which we haue againſt this, ſeeing the reaſons of the lawyer faile in proofe and experience, ſhall be, to make choiſe of men of great vnderſtanding, who may be iudges and pleaders; For the reaſons and arguments of ſuch (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) are no leſſe certaine and firme, than experience it ſelfe. And by making this choice, it ſeemeth that the cõmon wealth reſteth aſſured that her officers ſhall adminiſter iuſtice. But if they giue them all ſcope, to enter without making trial of their wit, as the vſe is at this day, the inconueniences (which we haue noted) will euermore befall.

By what ſignes it may be knowne, that he who ſhall ſtudie the lawes, hath the difference of wit requiſit to this facultie, heretofore (after a ſort) we haue expreſſed, but yet, to renew it to the memorie, and to prooue the ſame more at large, we muſt know, that the child who being ſet to read, ſoone learneth to know his letters, and can pronounce euery one with facilitie, according as they be placed in the A B C, giueth token that he ſhall be endowed

endowed with much memorie, for ſuch a worke as this (for certaine) is not performed by the vnderſtanding, nor by the imagination, but it appertaineth vnto the office of the memorie, to preſerue the figures of things, and to report the natures of each, when occaſion ſo requireth, and where much memorie dwelleth, we haue prooued before, that default of vnderſtanding alſo raigneth.

To write alſo with ſpeed, and a faire hand, we ſayd that it bewraid an imagination, wherethrough the child who in few daies will frame his hand, and write his lines right, and his letters euen and with good forme and figure, yeeldeth ſigne of meane vnderſtanding, for this worke is performed by the imagination, and theſe two powers encounter in that contrarietie which we haue alreadie ſpoken of and noted.

And if being ſet to Grammer he learne the ſame with little labour, and in ſhort time make good Latines, and write fine epiſtles, with the well ruled cloſes of *Cicero*, he ſhall neuer be good iudge nor pleader, for it is a ſigne that he hath much memorie, and (ſaue by great miracle) he will be of ſlender diſcourſe. But if ſuch a one wax obſtinat in plodding at the lawes, and ſpend much time in the ſchooles, he will prooue a famous reader, and ſhall haue a ſtint of many hearers, for the latine tongue is very gratious in chaires, and to read with great ſhow, there are requiſit many allegations, and to fardell vp in euery law, whatſoeuer hath bene writen touching the ſame, and to this purpoſe, memorie is of more neceſſitie than diſcourſe. And albeit it is true, that in the chaire he be to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge and chuſe, to gather the true ſenſe of the law; yet in the end he putteth the caſe as beſt liketh himſelfe, he mooues doubts, maketh obiections,

obiections, and giueth ſentence after his own will, without that any gainſaie him: for which a meane diſcourſe is ſufficient. But when one pleader ſpeaketh for the plaintife, and another for the defendant, and a third lawyer ſupplieth the iudges place; this is a true controuerſie, & men cannot ſpeake ſo at randon, as when they skirmiſh without an aduerſarie. And if the childe profit ſlenderly in Grammer, we may thereby gather, that he hath a good diſcourſe, I ſay we may ſo coniecture, becauſe it followeth not of neceſſitie, that whoſoeuer cannot learne Latine, hath therefore ſtraightwaies a good diſcourſe, ſeeing we haue prooued tofore, that children of good imagination neuer greatly profit in the Latine tongue; but that which may beſt diſcouer this, is Logicke: for this ſcience carieth the ſame proportion with the vnderſtanding, as the touchſtone with gold. Where-through it falleth out certaine, that if he who taketh leſſon in the arts, begin not within a month or two to diſcourſe and to caſt doubts; and if there come not in his head arguments and anſwers in the matter which is treated of, he is void of diſcourſe: but if he proue towardly in his ſcience; it is an infallible argument that he is endued with a good vnderſtanding for the lawes, and ſo he may forthwith addict himſelf to ſtudie them without longer tarying. Albeit I would hold it better done, firſt to run through the arts, becauſe Logicke, in reſpect of the vnderſtanding, is nought els than thoſe ſhackles which we clap on the legs of an vntrained Mule, which going with them many daies, taketh a ſteddy and ſeemly pace. Such a march doth the vnderſtanding make in his diſputations, when it firſt bindeth the ſame with the rules and precepts of Logicke: but if this child, whom we go thus-wiſe examining, reape no profit in the La-

tine

tine tongue, neither can come away with Logicke as were requisite, it behooueth to trie whether he poſſeſſe a good imagination, ere we take him from the laws; for herein is lapped vp a very great ſecret, and it is good that the common wealth be done to ware thereof, and it is, that there are ſome lawyers, who getting vp into the chaire, work miracles in interpreting the texts, & others in pleading: but if you put the ſtaffe of iuſtice into their hands, they haue no more abilitie to gouerne, than as if the lawes had neuer been enacted to any ſuch end. And contrariwiſe, ſome other there are who with three miſvnderſtood lawes, which they haue learned at all aduentures; being placed in any gouernment, there cannot more be deſired at any mans handes than they will performe. At which effect, ſome curious wits take wonder, becauſe they ſinck not into the depth of the cauſe, from whence it may grow. And the reaſon is, that gouernment appertaineth to the imagination, and not to the vnderſtanding nor the memorie. And that this is ſo, the matter may verie manifeſtly be prooued, conſidering that the common-wealth is to be compounded with order & concert, with euery thing in his due place, which all put togither maketh good figure & correſpondence. And this (ſundrie times heeretofore) we haue prooued to be a worke of the imagination: and it ſhall prooue nought els to place a great lawyer to be a gouernour, than to make a deafe man a Iudge in muſicke; but this is ordinarily to be vnderſtood, & not as an vniuerſall rule: for we haue alreadie prooued it is poſſible that nature can vnite great vnderſtanding with much imagination: ſo ſhall there follow no repugnancie to be a good pleader and a famous gouernour: and we heeretofore diſcouered, that nature being endowed with all the forces which

which she may possesse, and with matter well seasoned, will make a man of great memorie, and of great vnderstanding, and of much imagination; who studying the lawes, will proue a famous reader, a great pleader, and no lesse gouernor, but nature makes so few such, as this cannot passe for a generall rule.

CHAP. XII.

How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phisicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderstanding, and the practicke to the imagination.

What time the *Arabian* Phisicke florished, there was a Phisition very famous, aswell in reading, as in writing, arguing, distinguishing, answering, and concluding; who, men would thinke in respect of his profound knowledge, were able to reuiue the dead, and to heale any disease whatsoeuer, and yet the contrary came to passe: for he neuer tooke anie patient in cure, who miscarried not vnder his hands. Wherat greatly shaming, and quite out of countenance, he went and made himselfe a flier, complaining on his euill fortune, and not able to conceiue the cause how he came so to misse. And because the freshest examples affoord surest proof, and do most sway the vnderstanding, it was held by many graue Phisitions, that *Iohn Argentier*, a phisition of our time, farre surpassed *Galen* in reducing the art of phisicke to a better method: and yet for all this it is reported of him, that he was so infortunat in practise, as no patient of his countrey durst take phisicke

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at his hands, fearing some dismall successe. Hereat it seemeth the vulgar haue good reason to maruell, seeing by experience (not onely in those rehearsed by vs: but also in many others with whom men haue dayly to deale) that if the Phisition be a great clearke: for the same reason he is vnfit to minister.

Of this effect *Aristotle* procured to render a reason, but could not find it out. He thought that the cause why the reasonable Phisitions of his time failed in curing, grew for that such men had only a generall notice, and knew not euerie particular complexion, contrarie to the Empiricks, whose principal study bent it self to know the properties of euery seuerall person, and let passe the generall; but he was void of reason, for both the one and the other exercised themselues about particular cures, & endeuoured (so much as in them lay) to know ech ones nature singly by it selfe. The difficultie then consisteth in nothing els than to know, for what cause so well learned phisitions, though they exercise themselues all their life long in curing; yet neuer grow skilfull in practise, and yet other simple soules with three or foure rules, learned very soone: and the schollers can more skill of ministring than they.

The true answere of this doubt holdeth no little difficultie, seeing that *Aristotle* could not finde it out, nor render (at least in some sort) any part therof. But grounding on the prinicples of our doctrine, we will deliuer the same: for we must know that the perfection of a phisition consisteth in two things, no lesse necessarie to attaine the end of his art, than two legges are to go without halting. The first is, to weet by way of method, the precepts and rules of curing men in generall, without descending to particulars. The second, to be long time

exercised

exercised in practise, and to haue visited many patients: for men are not so different ech from other, but that in diuers things they agree; neither so conioyned, but that there rest in them particularities of such condition, as they can neuer be deliuered by speech, nor written, nor taught, nor so collected, as that they may be reduced into art: but to know them, is onely granted to him, who hath often seen and had them in handling. Which may easily be conceiued, considering that mans face, being composed of so small a number of parts, as are two eies, a nose, two ckeeks, a mouth, & a forehead, nature shapeth yet therein so manie compositions and combinations, as if you assemble togither 100000 men, ech one hath a countenance so different from other, and proper to himselfe, that it falleth out a miracle, to find two who do altogither resemble. The like betideth in the foure elements, & in the 4 first qualities, hot, cold, moist, and drie, by the harmonie of which, the life and health of man is compounded: and of so slender a number of parts, nature maketh so many proportions, that if a 100000 men be begotten, ech of them comes to the world with a health so peculier and proper to himselfe, that if God should on the sodaine miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities, they would all become sicke, except some two or three, that by great dispositiō had the like consonance and proportion. Whence two conclusions are necessarily inferred. The first is, that euerie man who falleth sicke, ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportiō; in sort, that if the phisition restore him not to his first consonance of humours, he cannot recouer. The second that to performe this as it ought, is requisite the phisition haue first seen & dealt with the patient sundry times in his health,

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by feeling his pulſe, peruſing his ſtate, and what maner countenance and complexion he is of, to the end that when he ſhall fall ſicke, he may iudge how farre he is from his health, and in miniſtring vnto him, may know to what point he is to reſtore him. For the firſt, (namely to weet and vnderſtand the Theorick and compoſition of the art) ſaith *Galen*, it is neceſſary to be endowed with great diſcourſe and much memorie: for the one part of phiſick conſiſteth in reaſon, and the other in experience and hiſtorie To the firſt is vnderſtanding requiſite, and to the other memorie, and it reſting a matter of ſo great difficultie, to vnite theſe two powers in a large degree; it followeth of force that the phiſition become vnapt for the Theorick. Where through we behold many Phiſitions, learned in the Greeke & Latine tongue, and great Anotomiſts and Simpliciſts (all workes of the memory) who brought to arguing or diſputation, or to finde out the cauſe of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, can ſmall skill thereof.

The contrarie befalleth in others, who ſhew great wit and ſufficiencie in the Logicke and Philoſophie of this art, but being ſet to the Latine and Greeke tongue, touching ſimples and anotomies, can do little, becauſe memory in them is wanting: for this cauſe *Galen* ſaid verie well, That it is no maruell, if among ſo great a multitude of men, who practiſe the exerciſe and ſtudie of the art of Phiſicke and Philoſophie, ſo few are found to profit therein, and yeelding the reaſon, he ſaith, It requires a great toile to find out a wit requiſite for this Science; or a maiſter who can teach the ſame with perfection, or can ſtudie it with diligence and attention. But with all theſe reaſons *Galen* goeth groping, for he could not hit the cauſe whence it comes to paſſe, that few perſons profit

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in Phiſick. Yet in ſaying it was a great labour to find out a wit requiſit for this ſcience, he ſpake truth; albeit he did not ſo far forth ſpecifie the ſame, as we will; namely, for that it is ſo difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderſtanding with much memorie, no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall phiſick. And for that there is found a repugnancie between the vnderſtanding and the imagination (whereunto we will now prooue, that practiſe and the skill to cure with certaintie appertaineth) it is a miracle to find out a Phiſition, who is both a great *Theoriſt*, and withall a great practitioner, or contrariwiſe a great practitioner, and very well ſeen in Theorick. And that the imagination, and not the vnderſtanding is the power, wherof the phiſition is to ſerue himſelf, in knowing and curing the diſeaſes of particular perſons, may eaſily be prooued.

Firſt of all preſuppoſing the doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, who affirmeth, That the vnderſtanding cannot know particulars; neither diſtinguiſh the one from the other, nor diſcerne the time and place, & other particularities which make men different ech from other: and that euery one is to be cured after a diuers maner; and the reaſon is (as the vulgar Philoſophers auouch) for that the vnderſtanding is a ſpirituall power, and cannot be altered by the particulars which are repleniſhed with matter. And for this cauſe *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That the ſence is of particulars, and the vnderſtanding of vniuerſals.

If then medicines are to worke in particulars, and not in vniuerſals (which are vnbegotten, and vncorruptible) the vnderſtanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing. Now the difficultie conſiſteth in diſcerning why men of great vnderſtanding, cānot poſſeſſe good outward ſenſes for the particulars, they be-

ing powers ſo repugnant; And the reaſon is very plain, and this is it, that the outward ſenſes cannot well performe their operations, vnleſſe they be aſſiſted with a good imagination, and this we are to prooue by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*, who going about to expreſſe what the imagination was, ſaith it is a motion cauſed by the outward ſenſe, in ſort as the colour, which multiplieth by the thing coloured, doth alter the eie. And ſo it fareth that this ſelfe colour, which is in the chriſtallin humour, paſſeth farther into the imagination, and maketh therin the ſame figure which was in the eie. And if you demād of which of theſe two kinds the notice of the particular is made, all philoſophers auouch (and that verie truely) that the ſecond figure is it which altereth the imagination, and by them both is the notice cauſed, conformable to that ſo commō ſpeech, From the obiect, and from the power the notice ſpringeth. But from the firſt which is in the chriſtallin humour, & from the ſightfull power, groweth no notice, if the imagination be not attentiue thereunto, which the phiſitions do plainly prooue, ſaying, That if they lance or ſear the fleſh of a diſeaſed perſon, who for al that feeleth no pain, it ſhews a token that his imagination is diſtracted into ſome profound contemplation: whence we ſee alſo by experience in the ſound, that if they be raught into ſome imagination, they ſee not the things before them, nor heare though they be called, nor taſt meat ſauory or vnſauory, though they haue it in their mouth. Wherefore it is a thing certaine, that not the vnderſtanding or outward ſenſes, but the imagination, is that which maketh the iudgement, and taketh notice of particular things.

It followeth then, that the phiſition, who is well ſeen in Theoricke, for that he is indowed with great vnderſtanding

ſtanding, or great memorie, muſt of force prooue a bad practitioner, as hauing defect in his imagination. And contrariwiſe, he that prooueth a good practitioner, muſt of force be a bad Theoriſt: for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderſtanding and much memorie. And this is the cauſe for which ſo few are thoroughly ſeen in phiſicke, or commit but ſmall errors in curing: for, not to halt in the worke, it behooueth to know the art, and to poſſeſſe a good imagination, for putting the ſame in practiſe, and we haue prooued that theſe cannot ſtick togither.

The Phiſition neuer goeth to know and cure a diſeaſe, but that ſecretly to himſelfe he frameth a *Syllogiſme in Darij*, though he be neuer ſo well experienced, and the proofe of his firſt proportion belongeth to the vnderſtanding, and of the ſecond to the imagination: for which cauſe, the great Theoriſts doe ordinarily erre in the *minor*, and the great practitioners in the *maior*: as if we ſhould ſpeake after this maner, Euerie feuer which ſpringeth from cold and moiſt humours, ought to be cured wih medicins hot and drie. (Taking the tokening of the cauſe) this feuer which the man endureth, dependeth on humors cold and moiſt: therefore the ſame is to be cured with medicines hot and drie. The vnderſtanding will ſufficiently prooue the truth of the *maior*, becauſe it is an vniuerſall, ſaying; That cold & moiſt require for their temperature hot and drie: for euerie qualitie is abated by his contrarie. But comming to prooue the *minor*, there the vnderſtanding is of no value: for that the ſame is particular and of another iuriſdiction whoſe notice appertaineth to the imagination, borowing the proper and particular tokens of the diſeaſe, from the fiue outward ſenſes.

And if the tokening is to be taken from the feuer, or from his cauſe, the vnderſtanding cannot reach therunto: onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which ſheweth greateſt perill; but which of thoſe tokenings is greateſt, is only known to the imagination, by counting the damages which the feuer produceth, with thoſe of the *Syntones* of the euill, and the cauſe and the ſmall or much force of the power. To attain this notice, the imagination poſſeſſeth certain vnutterable properties, with which the ſame cleereth matters that cannot be expreſſed nor conceiued, neither is there found any art to teach them. Where-through, we ſee a phiſition enter to viſit a patient, and by meanes of his ſight, his hearing, his ſmelling, and his feeling, he knoweth things which ſeem impoſſible. In ſort that if we demand of the ſame phiſition, how he could come by ſo readie a knowledge, himſelfe cannot tell the reaſon: for it is a grace which ſpringeth from the fruitfulneſſe of the imagination, which by another name is termed a readineſſe of capacitie, which by common ſignes, and by vncertain coniectures, and of ſmall importance, in the twinckling of an eie knoweth 1000 differēces of things, wherein the force of curing and prognoſticating with certaintie conſiſteth.

This ſpice of promptneſſe, men of great vnderſtanding do want, for that it is a part of the imagination: for which cauſe, hauing the tokens before their eies (which giue them notice how the diſeaſe fareth) it worketh no maner alteration in their ſenſes, for that they want imagination. A phiſition once asked me in great ſecreſie, what the cauſe was, that he hauing ſtudied with much curioſitie all the rules and conſiderations of the art prognoſticatiue; & being therin throughly inſtructed,

yet

yet could neuer hit the truth in any prognoſtication which he made. To whom (I remember) I yeelded this anſwer that the art of Phiſick is learned with one power, and put in execution with another. This man had a verie good vnderſtanding, but wanted imagination: but in this doctrine there ariſeth a difficulty very great, and that is, how phiſitions of great imagination, can learn the art of phiſicke, ſeeing they want that of vnderſtanding: and if it be true that ſuch were better than thoſe who were well learned, to what end ſerueth it to ſpend time in the ſchooles? to this may be anſwered, that firſt to know the art of phiſicke is a matter verie important: for in two or three yeares, a man may learn al that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thouſand. And if a man ſhould herein aſcertain himſelfe by experience, it were requiſit that he liued ſome thouſands of yeeres, and in experimenting of medicines, he ſhould kill an infinit number of perſons before he could attain to the knowledge of their qualities: from whence we are freed, by reading the books of reaſonable experienced phiſitions, who giue aduertiſment of that in writing, which they found out in the whole courſe of their liues; to the end that the phiſitions of theſe daies may miniſter ſome receits with aſſurance, and take heed of other-ſome as venomous.

Beſides this, we are to weet that the common & vulgar points of al arts are very plain and eaſie to learn, and yet the moſt important of the whole worke. And contrariwiſe, the moſt curious and ſubtile, are the moſt obſcure, and of leaſt neceſſitie for curing. And men of great imagination, are not altogither depriued of vnderſtanding, nor of memorie. Wher-through, by hauing theſe two powers in ſome meaſure they are able to learn the

moſt neceſſarie points of Phiſicke : for that they are plaineſt, and with the good imagination which they haue, can better looke into the diſeaſe and the cauſe thereof, than the cunningeſt doctors. Beſides that the imagination is it which findeth out the occaſion of the remedie that ought to be applied, in which grace the greateſt part of practiſe conſiſteth : for which cauſe *Galen* ſaid, that the proper name of a phiſition, was The finder out of occaſion.

Now to be able to know the place, the time, and the occaſion, for certain, is a worke of the imagination, ſince it toucheth figure and correſpondence; but the difficultie conſiſteth in knowing (amongſt ſo many differences as there are of the imagination) to which of them the practiſe of Phiſicke appertaineth, for it is certaine, that they all agree not in one ſelfe particular reaſon, which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of ſpirit than all the reſidue : and yet for all that, I cannot as yet yeeld the ſame a fitting name, vnleſſe it ſpring from a leſſe degree of heat which partaketh that difference of imagination, wherewith verſes and ſongs are endited. Nether do I relie altogether on this, for the reaſon whereon I ground my ſelfe, is, that ſuch as I haue marked to be good practitioners, do all piddle ſomwhat in the art of verſifieng, and raiſe not vp their contemplation very high, and their verſes are not of any rare excellencie, which may alſo betide, for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requiſit for poetrie : and if it ſo come to paſſe for this reaſon, the heat ought to hold ſuch qualitie, as it ſomewhat drie the ſubſtance of the braine, and yet much reſolue not the natural heat, albeit (if the ſame paſſe further) it breedeth no euill difference of the wit for Phiſicke, for it vniteth the vnderſtanding

derſtanding to the imagination by aduſtion. But the imagination is not ſo good for curing, as this which I ſeeke, which inuiteth a man to be a witch, ſuperſtitious, a magician, a deceiuer, a palmiſter, a fortune teller, and a calker: for the diſeaſes of men are ſo hidden, and deliuer their motions with ſo great ſecrecie, that it behoooueth alwaies to go calking what the matter is.

This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine, for tofore we haue prooued that the inhabitants of this reg ion want memory and imagination, and haue good diſcourſe: neither yet the imaginatiõ of ſuch as dwell towards the North, is of auaile in Phiſicke, for it is very ſlow and ſlacke, only the ſame is towardly to make clocks, pictures, poppets, & other ribaldries which are impertinent for mans ſeruice.

Ægypt alone is the region which ingendereth in his inhabitants this differẽce of imagination, wherthrough the Hiſtoriens neuer make an end of telling, how great enchaunters the Aegyptians are, and how ready for obtaining things, and finding remedies to their neceſſities. *Ioſeph* to exaggerat the wiſedome of *Salomon*, ſayd in this manner, So great was the knowledge and wiſedome which *Salomon* receiued of God, that he outpaſſed al the ancients, and euen the very Egyptians, who were reputed the wiſeſt of all others. And *Plato* alſo ſayd, that the Aegyptians exceeded all the men of the world in skill how to get their liuing; which abilitie appertaineth to the imagination. And that this is true, may plainly appeare, for that all the ſciences belonging to the imagination, were firſt deuiſed in Ægypt, as the Mathematicks, Aſtrologie, Arithmeticke, Perſpectiue, Iudiciarie, and the reſt. But the argument which moſt ouer-ruleth me in this behalfe, is, that whẽ *Francis* of *Valois* king of France,

was moleſted by a long infirmitie, and ſaw that the Phiſitions of his houſhold and court, could yeeld him no remedy, he would ſay euery time when his feuer increaſed, It was not poſſible that any Chriſtiã Phiſition could cure him, neither at their hands did he euer hope for recouerie: wherethrough one time agreeued to ſee himſelfe thus vexed with this feuer, he diſpatched a poſt into Spaine, praying the emperour *Charles* the fifth, that he would ſend him a Iew Phiſition, the beſt of his court, touching whom he had vnderſtood, that he was able to yeeld him remedie for his ſickneſſe, if by art it might be effected. At this requeſt the Spaniards made much game, and all of them concluded it was an humorous conceit of a man, whoſe brains were turmoiled with the feuer. But for all this, the Emperour gaue commandement that ſuch a Phiſition ſhould be ſought out, if anie there were, though to find him they ſhould be driuen to ſend out of his dominions; and whē none could be met withall, he ſent a Phiſition newly made a Chriſtian, ſuppoſing that he might ſerue to ſatisfie the kings humour. But the Phiſition being arriued in France, and brought to the kings preſence; there paſſed between them a gratious diſcourſe, in which it appeared that the Phiſition was a Chriſtian: and therefore the king would receiue no phiſicke at his hands. The king with opinion which he had conceiued of the phiſition, that he was an Hebrue, by way of paſſing the time, asked him whether he were not as yet weary in looking for the Meſſias promiſed in the law? The phiſition anſwered; Sir I expect not any Meſſias promiſed in the Iews law. You are verie wiſe in that (replied the king): for the tokens which were deliuered in the diuine ſcripture, whereby to know his comming, are all fulfilled many daies ago.

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This number of daies (reioyned the phiſition) we Chriſtians do well reckon: for there are now finiſhed 1542 yeares, that he came and conuerſed in the world 33 yeares; in the end of which he died on the croſſe, and the third day roſe again, and afterwards aſcended into heauen, where he now remaineth. Why then quoth the king you are a Chriſtian? yea Sir, by the grace of God, I am a Chriſtian (quoth the phiſition) then (anſwered the king) return you home to your own dwelling in good time: for in mine owne houſe and court I haue Chriſtian phiſitions very excellent, and I held you for a Iew; who (in mine opinion) are thoſe that haue beſt naturall abilitie to cure my diſeaſe. After this maner he licenced him without once ſuffering him to feele his pulſe, or ſee his ſtate, or telling him one word of his griefe. And forthwith he ſent to Conſtantinople for a Iew, who healed him with the onely milke of a ſhe Aſſe.

This imagination of king *Francis* (as I think) was very true, and I haue ſo conceiued it to be, for that in the great hot diſtemperatures of the brain, I haue prooued tofore, how the imagination findeth out that, which (the partie being ſound) could neuer haue done. And becauſe it ſhall not ſeem that I haue ſpoken in ieſt, and without relying herein vpon a materiall ground, you ſhall vnderſtand that the varieties of men, aſwell in the compoſitions of the body, as of the wit and conditions of the ſoule, ſpring from their inhabiting countries of different temperature, from drinking diuers waters, and from not vſing all of them one kind of food. Wherein *Plato* ſaid, Some through variable windes and heats, are amongſt themſelues diuers in maner and kinds: others through the waters and food which ſpring of the earth,

who

who not only in their bodies, but in their minds alſo can skill to do things better and woorſe, as if he ſhould ſay, ſome men are different from others, either by reaſon of the contrarie aire, or through drinking ſeuerall waters, or for that they feed not all vpon one kind of meat, and this difference is diſcerned not only in the countenaunce and demeanure of the body, but alſo in the wit of the ſoule.

If I then ſhall now prooue, that the people of Iſraell dwelt many yeares in Ægypt, and that departing from thence, they did eat & drinke waters & meats, which are appropriat to make this difference of imagination, I ſhall then yeeld a demonſtration for the opinion of the king of France, and by conſequence we ſhall vnderſtand what wits of men are in Spaine to be made choice of, for ſtudying the art of Phiſicke. As touching the firſt, we muſt know, that *Abraham* asking tokens whereby to be aſſured that he or his deſcendents ſhould poſſeſſe the land of promiſe, the text ſayth, that whileſt he ſlept, God made him anſwer ſaying, Know that thy ſeed ſhall bee a ſtranger in a country not his owne, and they ſhall make them vnderlings in bondage, and afflict them for 400 yeares, notwithſtanding I will iudge that nation whom they ſerue, and after this, they ſhall depart from thence with great ſubſtance; which Propheſie was accompliſhed: albeit God for certaine reſpects, added thereunto 30 yeares more, for which cauſe the ſcripture ſayth, But the aboad of the children of Iſraell in Ægypt was 430 yeares, which being finiſhed, that very day the whole armie of the Lord departed out of the land of Aegypt. But although this text ſay manifeſtly, that the people of Iſraell abode in Aegypt 400 yeares, a gloſſe declareth, that theſe yeares were the whole time which Iſraell went on pilgri-

pilgrimage, vntill he possessed his own countrie. In as much as he remained in Aegypt but 210 yeares, which declaration agreeth not well with that which S. *Stephen* the Prothomartyr made, in his discourse to the Iewes, namely that the people of Israell was 430 yeares in the bondage of Aegypt.

And albeit the abode of 210 yeares suffised, that the qualities of Aegypt might take hold in the people of Israell, yet the time whiles they liued abroad, was no lost season, in respect of that which appertaineth to the wit, for those who liue in bondage, in miserie, in affliction, and in strange countries, engender much choler adust, because they want libertie of speech, and of reuenging their iniuries: and this humour, when the same is grown drie, becommeth the instrument of subtiltie, of craft, and of malice: whence we see by experience, that if a man rake hell for bad maners and conditions, he cannot find woorse than in a slaue, whose imagination alwaies occupieth it selfe in deuising how to procure dammage to his maister, and freedome to himselfe. Moreouer the land which the people of Israell walked through, was not much estranged nor different from the qualities of Aegypt: for in respect of the miserie thereof, God promised *Abraham* to giue him another, much more aboundant and fruitfull. And this is a matter greatly verefied, as well in good naturall Philosophie, as in experience, that barraine and beggerly regions, not fat, nor plentiful of fruit, engender men of very sharpe wit. And contrariwise abundant and fertile soils, bring foorth persons big limmed, couragious, and of great bodily forces, but very slow of wit.

Touching Greece, the Historiens neuer make an end to recount, how appropriat that region is to breed men of

of great habilitie, and particularly *Galen* auoucheth, that it is held a miracle for a man to find a foole in Athens. And we must note that this was a citie the most miserable, and most barren of all the rest in Greece. Whence we collect, that through the qualities of Egipt, and of the Prouinces where the Hebrue people liued, they grew very quick of capacitie. But it behooueth likewise to vnderstand for what cause the temperature of Ægypt produceth this difference of imagination. And this wil fall out a plain matter when you are done to ware, that in this region, the sunne yeeldeth a feruent heat: and therfore the inhabitants haue their brain dried, and choler aduſt, the instrument of wilinesse and aptnesse: In which sense, *Aristotle* demandeth why the men of Aethiopia & Ægypt, haue their feet crooked, & are commonly curlpated and flat nosed? to which probleme he answereth, that the much heat of the country rosteth the substance of these members, and wrieth them, as it draweth togither a peece of leather set by the fire; and for the same cause, their haire curleth, and themselues also are wily. And that such as inhabit hot countries, are wiser than those who are born in cold regions, we haue alreadie prooued by the opinion of *Aristotle*: who demandeth whence it grows, that men are wiser in hot climats than in cold? But he wilt not to answer this probleme, nor make distinction of wisdome: for we haue prooued heretofore, that in man there rest two sorts of wisdome; one whereof *Plato* said, Knowledge which is seuered from Iustice, ought rather to be termed craft than wisdome: another there is found accompanied with iustice and simplicity, without doublenesse, and without wiles; and this is properly called Wisdome: for it goeth alwaies guided by iustice and dutie. They who inhabit very

very hot countries, are wise in the first kind of wisdome, and such as are those of Ægypt.

Now let vs see when the people of Israell was departed out of Ægypt, and come into the desart, what meat they did eat, what water they dranke, and of what temperature the aire was where they trauelled? that we may know whether vpon this occasion, the wit with which they issued out of bondage, took exchange; or whether the same were more confirmed in them? Fortie yeares (saith the text) God maintaind this people with Manna, a meat so delicat and sauoury, as any might be, that euer men tasted in the world. In sort that *Moses* seeing the delicacie and goodnesse therof, commanded his brother *Aaron* to fill a vessell, and place the same in the Arke of confederacie, to the end the descendents of this people, when they were setled in the land of promise, might see the bread with which God had fed their fathers, whiles they liued in the wildernesse, and how bad paiment they yeelded him in exchange of such cherishments. And to the end that we who haue not seen this meat, may know of what maner the same was: it will do well that we describe the Manna which nature maketh; and so adioining therunto the conceit of a great delicacie, we may wholly imagine his goodnesse. The materiall cause of which Manna is engendred, is a very delicat vapour, which the sunne, with the force of his heat, draweth vp from the earth; the which taking stay aloft, is concocted and made perfect: and then the cold of the night cõming on, it congealeth, and through his waightinesse, turneth to fall vpon the trees and stones, where men gather the same, and preserue it in vessels to serue for food. It is called Deawy, and Airy honny, through the resemblance which it beareth to the deaw, and for

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that it is made in the aire. His colour is white, his ſauour ſweet as honny: his figure like that of Coriander, which ſignes the holy Scripture placeth alſo in the Manna, which the people of Iſrael did eat: and therfore I carry an imagination, that both were ſemblable in nature. But if that which God created were of more delicat ſubſtance, ſo much the better ſhall we confirme our opinion. But I am euer of opinion that God applied himſelf to naturall means, when with them he could performe what he meant; and where nature wanted, his omnipotencie ſupplied. This I ſay, becauſe to giue them Manna to eat in the deſart (beſides that which heerby he would ſignifie) me ſeemeth was founded in the ſelfe diſpoſition of the earth, which (euen at this day) produceth the beſt Manna in the world: through which *Galen* affirmeth, that on Mount Libanus (which is not far diſtant frō this place) there is great and very choice abundance: in ſort, that the countrie people are woont to ſing in their paſtimes, That *Iupiter* raineth honny in that region. And though it be true, that God miraculouſly created that Manna in ſuch quantitie, at ſuch time, and on ſpeciall daies: yet it may be that it partaked the ſame nature with ours, as had alſo the water which *Moſes* drew forth of the rocke; and the fire which *Elias* with his word cauſed to rain from heauen; all of them naturall things, though miraculouſly brought to paſſe.

The Manna deſcribed by the holy Scripture, it ſaith was as deaw, & as the ſeed of Coriander, white, & in taſt like honny, which conditions are alſo in the Manna produced by nature. The temperature of this meat, the Phiſitions ſay, is hot, and conſiſting of ſubtile and verie delicat parts, which compoſition the Manna eaten by the Iews, ſhould alſo ſeeme to haue: whereon (complaining

ning of his tenderneſſe) they ſaid in this maner, Our ſoule hath a fulſomneſſe at this ſlight meat; as if they ſhould ſay, that they could no longer endure nor brook ſo light a meat in their ſtomacke: and the Philoſophie of this was, that their ſtomacks had been made ſtrong by onions, chibals, and leeks; and comming to eat a meat of ſo ſmall reſiſtance, it wholly with them turned into choler. And for this cauſe, *Galen* gaue the charge that men endowed with much naturall heat, ſhould forbeare to eat honny or other light meats: for they would turne to corruption, and in ſteed of digeſtion, would partch vp like ſoot.

The like heereof befell to the Hebrues, as touching Manna, which with them wholly turned into choler aduſt, and therefore they were altogither dry and thin: for this meat had no corpulencie to fatten them. Our ſoule (ſaid they) is drie, and our eies ſee nothing but Manna. The water which they dranke after this meat, was ſuch as they would deſire; and if they could not find any ſuch, God ſhewed to *Moſes* a wood of ſo diuine vertue, that dipping the ſame in groſſe and ſalt waters, it made them to become delicat and of good ſauor: and when they had no ſort of water at all, *Moſes* took the rod, with which he had parted the red Sea, and ſtriking therewith the rocks, there iſſued ſprings of waters ſo delicat and ſauoury, as their taſt could deſire. In ſort, that S. *Paul* ſaith, The rocke followed them, as if he ſhould ſay, The water of the rocke ſeconded their taſt, iſſuing delicat, ſweet, and ſauourie. And they had accuſtomed their ſtomacks before, to drinke waters thicke and briniſh: for in Aegypt (ſaith *Galen*) they boiled them ere they could ſerue for drinke, for that they were naughty and corrupt, ſo as afterwards drinking waters ſo delicat,

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it could not fall out otherwiſe, but that they ſhould turn into choler, for that they found ſmall reſiſtance. Water requireth the ſame qualities, to digeſt well in our ſtomacke (ſaith *Galen*) & not to corrupt, that the meat hath wheron we accuſtomably feed. If the ſtomack be ſtrong, it behoueth to giue the ſame ſtrong meat, which may anſwer in proportion: if the ſame be weake and delicat, ſuch alſo the meat ought to be. The like regard is to be held as touching the water: where-through we ſee by experience, that if a man vſe to drinke groſſe water; he neuer quencheth his thirſt with the purer: neither feeleth it in his ſtomacke. Rather the ſame encreaſeth his thirſt: for the exceſſiue heat of the ſtomacke burneth and reſolueth it ſo ſoon as it is receiued, becauſe therein is no reſiſtance.

The aire which they enioyed in the deſert, we may alſo ſay, that it was ſubtile and delicat: for iourneing ouer mountains, and through vninhabited places, they had the ſame alwaies freſh, clenſed, and without anie corruption: for they neuer made long ſtay in any one place. So did it alwaies carrie a temperature: for by day a cloud was ſet before the ſun, which ſuffered him not to ſcorch ouer vehemently; and by night, a piller of fire which moderated the ſame. And to enioy an aire of this maner (*Ariſtotle* affirmeth) doth much quicken the wit. We may conſider then that the men of this folke muſt needs haue a feed very delicat and aduſt, eating ſuch meat as Manna was, and drinking the waters aboue ſpecified, and breathing and enioying an aire ſo clenſed and pleaſant, as alſo that the Hebrue women bred flowers very ſubtile and delicat.

Againe, let vs call to mind, that which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that the flowres being ſubtile and delicat, the child who

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is bred of them, ſhalbe a man of great capacitie. How much it importeth, that for begetting children of great ſufficiencie, the fathers do feed on delicat meats, we will prooue at large in the laſt chapter of this worke. And becauſe all the Hebrues did eat of one ſelfe ſo ſpirituall and delicat meat, and dranke of one ſelfe water, all their children and poſteritie prooued ſharp and great of wit in matters appertaining to this world.

Now then, when the people of Iſraell came into the land of promiſe, with ſo great a wit as we haue expreſſed, there befell vnto them afterwards ſo many trauails, dearths, ſiedges of enimies, ſubiections, bondages, and ill intreatings: that though they had not brought from Ægypt and the wilderneſſe, that temperature, hot, drie, and aduſt before ſpecified: they would yet haue made it ſo by this diſmall life: for continuall ſadneſſe and toil, vniteth the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall blood, in the brain, in the liuer, and in the heart: and there ſtaying one aboue another, they grow to drineſſe and aduſtion. Where through, oft times they procure the feuer, and their ordinary is to make melancholie by aduſtiõ, wherof they (in maner) do all partake euen to this day, in reſpect of that (which *Hppocrates* ſaith) Feare and ſadneſſe continuing a long time, ſignifieth melancholie. This choler aduſt (we ſaid before) to be the inſtrument of promptneſſe, craftineſſe, ſharpneſſe, ſubtiltie, and maliciouſneſſe. And this is applied to the coniectures of Phiſicke, and by the ſame a man getteth notice of the diſeaſes, their cauſes and remedies. Wherfore king *Francis* vnderſtood this maruellous well, and it was no lightneſſe of the brain, or inuention of the diuell, which he vttered. But through his great feuer, laſting ſo manie daies, and with the ſadneſſe to find himſelfe ſicke and

without remedy, his brain grew dry, and his imagination rose to such a point, of which we made proofe tofore, that if it haue the temperature behooffull, a man will on a sodain deliuer that which he neuer learned. But there presents it selfe a difficultie very great against all these things rehearsed by vs, and that is, that if the children or nephews of those who were in Ægypt, and enioyed the Manna, the waters, and the subtle aire of the wildernesse, had been made choice of for phisitions, it might seeme, that king *Francis* opinion were in some part probable, for the reasons by vs reported. But that their posteritie should preserue till our daies those dispositions of the Manna, the water, the aire, the afflictions, and the trauails, which their ancestors endured in the prison of Babilon, it is a matter hard to be conceiued: for if in 430 yeares, during which the people of Israel liued in Ægypt, and 40 in the desart, their seed could purchase those dispositions of abilitie, better, and with more facilitie could they leese it again in 2000 yeares, whilest they haue been absent. And specially sithence their comming into Spain, a region so contrarie to Ægypt, and where they haue fed vpon different meats, and druncke waters of nothing so good temperature and substance as those other.

This is agreeable to the nature of man, and whatsoother liuing creature and plant, which forthwith partaketh the conditions of the earth where they liue, and leese those which they brought with thē from elswhere. And whatsoeuer instance they can alleage, the like will betide it within few daies beyond all gainsaying.

Hippocrates recounteth of a certain sort of men, who to be different from the vulgar, chose for a token of their nobilitie, to haue their head like a sugar-loafe. And to

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ſhape this figure by art, when the child was born, the mid-wiues tooke care to bind their heads with ſweaths, and bands vntill they were faſhioned to the forme. And this artificialneſſe grew to ſuch force, as it was conuerted into nature: for in proceſſe of time, all the children that were born of nobilitie, had their head ſharp from their mothers womb. So from thenceforth, the art and diligence of the mid-wiues heerin, became ſuperfluous. But ſo ſoone as they left nature to her liberty, and her owne ordering, without oppreſſing her any longer with art, ſhe turned by little and little to recouer again the figure which ſhe had before.

In like ſort might it befall the children of Iſrael, who notwithſtanding the region of Ægypt, the Manna, the delicat waters, and their ſorrowfulneſſe, wrought thoſe diſpoſitions of wit in that ſeed: yet thoſe reaſons and reſpects ſurceaſing, and other contrary growing on, it is certain that by little and little the qualities of the Manna would haue worn away, and other far different therefrom haue grown on, conformable to the countrey where they inhabited, to the meats which they fed vpon, to the waters which they dranke, & to the aire which they breathed. This doubt in naturall philoſophy holdeth little difficultie: for there are ſome accidents to be found, which are brought in at a moment, & afterwards endure for euer in the ſubiect, without poſſibility of corrupting. Others there are, which waſt aſmuch time in vndoing, as they occupied in engrafting, & ſome more, ſome leſſe, according to the action of the agent, and the diſpoſition of the patient. For example of the firſt, we muſt know, That a certain man through a great feare wher-into he was driuen, reſted ſo transformed and changed in colour, that he ſeemed dead; and the ſame

lasted not only during all the time of this owne life, but also the children which he begat had the same colour: without that he could find any remedie to take it away. Conformable heerunto, it may be, that in 430 yeares, whilest the people of Israel led their liues in Aegypt, 40 in the wildernesse, and 60 in the bondage of Babilon there needed more than 3000 yeares, that this seed of *Abraham* should take a full losse of their disposition of wit, occasioned by this Manna, seeing to reforme the bad colour, setled vpon a sodain through feare, more than 100 yeares were requisit. But because the truth of this doctrin may be vnderstood from the root, it behoueth to resolue two doubts which serue to the purpose, and as yet I haue not cleered. The first is, whence it commeth, that meats, by how much the more delicat and sauoury they are, as hennes, and partridge; so much the sooner the stomacke doth abhorre and lothe them? and contrariwise, we see that a man eateth beefe all the yeare long without receiuing any annoiance thereby, and if he eat hennes flesh but three or foure daies togither, the fifth he cannot abide the sauour thereof; but that it will turne his stomacke vpside-downe. The second is, whence it commeth, that bread of wheat, and flesh of mutton, not being of substance so good and sauoury, as hen and partridge; yet the stomacke neuer loatheth them, though we feed theron all our liues long? But wanting bread we cannot eat other meats, neither do they content vs.

He that can shape an answer to these two doubts, shal easily vnderstand for what cause the descendents of the people of Israell, haue not yet lost the dispositions & accidents which Manna brought into that seed: neither will the promptnesse of wit, and subtletie wherof they

then

then poſſeſſed themſelues, ſo ſoon take an end. Two certain and very true principles there are in naturall philoſophy, on which the anſwer and reſolution of theſe doubts dependeth. The firſt is, That al powers, (whatſoeuer) which gouern man, are naked and depriued of the conditions and qualities which reſt in their obiect, to the end that they may know and giue iudgement of all the differences. The eies partake this property, who being to receiue into themſelues all figures and colours, it was of neceſſitie, vtterly to depriue them of figures and colours. For if they were pale, as in thoſe who are ouercome with the yellow iandize, all things wheron they looked would appeare to them of the ſame colour. So the tongue, which is the inſtrument of taſt, ought to be void of all ſauours: and if the ſame be ſweet or bitter, we know by experience, that whatſoeuer we eat or drinke hath the like taſt. And the ſame may be auouched of hearing, of ſmelling, and of feeling: The ſecond principle is, that all things created, naturally couet their preſeruation, and labour to endure for euer, and that the being which God and nature haue giuen them, may neuer take end: notwithſtanding that afterward they are to poſſeſſe a better nature. By this principle, all naturall things endowed with knowledge and ſenſe, abhorre and flie from that which altereth and corrupteth their naturall compoſition.

The ſtomacke is naked and depriued of the ſubſtance and qualities of all meats in the world, as the eye is of colours and figures, and when we eat ought, though the ſtomacke ouercome it, yet the meat turneth againſt the ſtomacke, for that the ſame is of a contrary principle, and altereth and corrupteth his temperature and ſubſtance, for no agent is of ſuch force, but that in doing, it

alſo ſuffereth. Meats that are very delicat and pleaſing doe much alter the ſtomacke; firſt, becauſe it digeſteth and embraceth them with great appetit and liking, and then, through their being ſo ſuttle and void of excrements, they pierce into the ſubſtance of the ſtomacke, from whence they cannot depart againe: the ſtomacke then feeling that this meat altereth his nature, and taketh away the proportion which he carrieth to other meats, groweth to abhor the ſame, and if he muſt needs feed thereon, it behoooueth to vſe many ſallets and ſeaſonings, thereby to beguile him.

All this, Manna had euen from the beginning, for though the ſame were a meat of ſuch delicaſie and pleaſing reliſh, yet in the end, the people of Iſraell found it fulſome, and therefore ſayd, Our ſoule loatheth this ouer light meat. A complaint far vnworthie of a people ſo ſpecially fauoured by God, who had pretended a remedie in that behalfe, which was, that Manna had thoſe reliſhes and taſts which well agreed with them, to the end they might eat thereof. Thou ſenteſt them bread from heauen, which had in it all pleaſingneſſe; for which cauſe many amongſt them fed theron with good appetite, for they had their bones, their ſinewes, and their fleſh, ſo imbewed with Manna and his qualities, that by means of the reſemblance from each to other, they longed after nothing elſe. The like befalleth in bread of wheat, and weathers fleſh, whereon we accuſtomably feed.

Groſſe meats and of good ſubſtance, as beefe, haue much excrements, and the ſtomacke receiueth them not with ſuch deſire, as thoſe that are delicat and of good reliſh, and therefore is longer ere the ſame take alteration by them. Hence commeth it, that to corrupt the alteration

on which Manna made in one day, it behoueth to feed a whole moneth vpon contrarie meats. And (after this reckoning) to deface the qualities that Manna brought into the ſeed in the ſpace of 40 yeares, there need 4000 and vpward. And if any man will not herewith reſt ſatiſfied, let vs ſay, that as God brought out of Aegypt the 12 tribes of Iſraell, ſo he had taken then 12 male, and 12 female Moores of *Aethiopia*, and had placed them in our countrie, in how many yeares thinke we, would theſe Moores and this poſteritie, linger to leaue their natiue colour, not mixing themſelues the while with white perſons? to me it ſeemeth a long ſpace of yeares would be requiſit. For though 200 yeares haue paſſed ouer our heads, ſithens the firſt Aegyptians came out of Aegypt into Spaine, yet their poſteritie haue not forlorne that their delicacy of wit and promptneſſe, nor yet that roſted colour which their auncestors brought with them from Aegypt. Such is the force of mans ſeed when it receiueth thereinto any well rooted qualitie. And as in Spaine the Moores communicat the colour of their elders, by means of their ſeed, though they be out of Aethiopia, ſo alſo the people of Iſrael comming frō thence, may communicat to their deſcendents their ſharpeneſſe of wit, without remaining in Aegypt, or eating Manna: for to be ignorant or wiſe, is as well an accident in man, as to be blacke or white. True it is, that they are not now ſo quicke and prompt, as they were a thouſand yeares ſince: for from the time that they left to eat Manna, their poſterity haue euer leſſened hitherto, becauſe they vſed contrarie meats, and inhabited countries different from Aegypt: neither dranke waters of ſuch delicacie as in the wilderneſſe. As alſo by mingling with thoſe who deſcended from the Gentils, who wanted this difference

of wit: but that which cannot be denied them, is, that as yet they haue not loſt it altogither.

CHAP. XIII.

By what meanes it may be ſhewed, to what difference of abilitie the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what ſignes the man may be knowen, who is endowed with this maner of wit.

WHat is the cauſe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) that ſeeing Fortitude is not the greateſt of all vertues, but Iuſtice and Prudence are greater than it: yet the commonwealth, and in a maner all men with a common conſent do make greater accompt, and within themſelues, do more honour a valiant man than either the iuſt or wiſe; though placed in neuer ſo high callings or offices. To this probleme *Ariſtotle* anſwereth, ſaying; there is no king in the world who doth not either make war, or maintain war againſt ſome other: and for ſomuch as the valiant procure them glorie and empire, take reuenge on their enemies, and preſerue their eſtate, they yeeld chiefeſt honour, nor to the principall vertue, which is Iuſtice, but to that by which they reap moſt profit and aduantage. For if they did not in this wiſe intreat the valiant, how were it poſſible, that kings ſhould find captains and ſouldiours, who would willingly ieopard their liues to defend their goods and eſtates?

Of the Aſiaticans it is recounted, that there was a people inhabiting a part thereof, who bare themſelues verie couragiouſly; and being asked why they had neither king nor law: they made anſwer, that laws made men

men cowards, and seeing it was necessarie to vndergoe the hazard of the wars, for depriuing another of his estate, they made choice to fight for their own behoose, and themselues to reap the benefit of the victorie. But this was an answer rather of barbarous men than reasonable people, who well know, that without a king, without a common-wealth, and without lawes, it is impossible to preserue men in peace. That which *Aristotle* said, serueth very well to the purpose, though there be a better answer to be framed, namely, That when Rome honoured her captains with those triumphs and solemnities, she did not only reward the courage of the triumpher, but also the iustice with which he maintained his armie in peace and concord, the wisdome with which he performed his enterprises, and their temperancy vsed in abstaining from wine, women, and meat, which trouble the iudgement, and turne counsels into error. Yea wisdome is more highly to be regarded and rewarded in a generall, than courage and manlinesse: for as *Vegetius* well said, Few ouer-couragious captains bring their enterprises to luckie passe. Which groweth for that wisdome is more necessarie in warre, than courage in bickering: but *Vegetius* could neuer attain to the notice what maner of wisdom this is: neither could plot down, with what difference of wit he ought to be endowed, who taketh charge in war. Neither do I ought maruell thereat: for the maner of philosophie whereon this dependeth, was not then deuised. True it is, that to verefie this point, answereth not our first intent, which purporteth to make choice of apt wits for learning. But martiall affaires are so dangerous, and of so deep counsell: and it falleth out a matter so important for a king to know well vnto whom he credit his power and state, that we

shall

ſhall perform no leſſe thanks-worthie a part of ſeruice to the common wealth, to teach this difference of wit and his ſigns, than in the other which we haue already deſcribed. For which cauſe we muſt note, that *Malitia* and *Militia*, viz. martial matters, and malice, haue as it were one ſelfe name, and likewiſe one ſelfe definition. For changing *a* into *i*, of *malitia* you make *militia*, and of *militia*, *malitia*, with great facilitie. What the nature and propertie of malice is, *Cicero* teacheth, ſaieng, Malice is a way of hurting, craftie, and full of guile. In warre (likewiſe) nothing falleth ſo much into cõſideration, as how to offend the enimie, and defend our ſelues from his entrappings. Therefore the beſt property whereof a Generall can be poſſeſſed, is to be malicious with his enemie, and neuer to conſtrue any his demeanures to a good ſenſe, but to the worſt that may be, and to ſtand on his guard.

Beleeue not (ſayth *Eccleſiaſticus*) thine enemie, with his lips he ſweetneth, and in his heart he betraieth thee, to make thee fall into the dike: he weepeth with his eies, and if he light vpon a fit occaſion, he will not be ſatiſfied with thy blood. Hereof we find a manifeſt example of the holy ſcripture: for the people of Iſrael being beſieged in Bethulia, and ſtraightned with hunger and thirſt, that famous lady *Iudith*, iſſued out with a reſolution to kill *Holofernes*, and going towards the armie of the Aſſirians, ſhe was taken by the ſentinels and guards, and being asked whether ſhe was bound, made anſwere with a two-fold mind; I am a daughter of the Hebrues, whom you hold beſieged, and flie vnto you, for I haue learned that they ſhall fall into your hands, and that you ſhall euill intreat them, becauſe they would not yeeld themſelues to your mercy: therefore I determined to flie vn-

to

to *Holofernes*, and to diſcouer vnto him the ſecrets of this obſtinat people, ſhewing him how he may enter without the loſſe of any one ſouldier.

So *Iudith* being brought to *Holofernes* preſence, threw her ſelfe downe to the ground, and with cloſed hands began to worſhip him and vtter words full of deceit, the moſt craftily that might be, in ſort that *Holofernes* and all his counſell, verely beleeued ſhe ſayd nothing but truth: but ſhe not forgetfull what in heart ſhe had purpoſed, found a conuenient occaſion, and chopped off his head.

Contrary hereunto are the conditions of a friend, and therefore it behoueth euer to yeeld him credit, wherethrough *Holoferves* ſhould haue done better to beleeue *Achior*, ſeeing he was his friend, and on zeale that he ſhould not leaue the ſiege with diſhonour, ſayd vnto him, Sir, firſt informe your ſelfe whether this people haue ſinned againſt God, for if it be ſo, himſelfe will deliuer them into your hands, without that you ſhall need to conquer them; but if he hold them in grace, know for certaine, that he will defend them, and we ſhall not be able to vanquiſh them. *Holofernes* conceiued diſpleaſure at this aduertiſement, as a man confident, laſciuious and a wine-bibber, which three things turne topſie turuie that counſell which is requiſit for the art of war. For which cauſe *Plato* ſayd, he liked very well of a law which the Carthagineans had, by which they commaunded, that the Generall whilſt he had charge of the armie, ſhould drinke no wine, for this licour (as *Ariſtotle* affirmeth) maketh a man of wit be quite burned vp with choler (as *Holofernes* ſhewed in thoſe ſo furious words which he ſpake to *Achior*.)

Now that wit which is requiſit for ambuſhes and ſtratagems,

tagems, aſwell to prepare them as to perceiue them; and to find out ſuch remedie as appertaineth, *Cicero* deſcribeth, drawing his deſcēt from this nown *verſutia*, which he ſaith is deriued from this verb *verſor*: for thoſe who are winding, craftie, double, and cauillers, vpon a ſodain contriue their wiles, and employ their conceit with facilitie: and ſo the ſame *Cicero* exemplified it, ſaying; *Chriſippus* a man doubtleſſe winding and craftie. I call thoſe winding whoſe mind is ſodainly winded about. This propertie to attain ſodainly the means is *ſolertia* (quickneſſe) and appertaineth to the imagination: for the powers which conſiſt in heat performe ſpeedily their worke. And for this cauſe men of great vnderſtanding are little worth for the war, for this power is very ſlow in his operation and a friend of vprightneſſe, of plainneſſe, of ſimplicitie and mercie: all which is woont to breed much dammage in war. Theſe are good to treat with friends, with whom the wiſdome of the imagination is not needfull; but only the rightfulneſſe and ſingleneſſe of the vnderſtanding, which admitteth no doubleneſſe, nor doth any wrong: therefore with the enemy it booteth nothing; for he alwaies ſtudieth to offend with wiles, and ſuch wit is requiſit wherwith to counter-gard our ſelues. And ſo Chriſt our redeemer aduiſed his diſciples, ſaying; Behold I ſend you as ſheepe amongſt woolfes: be you therefore wiſe as ſerpents, and ſimple as dooues. With our enimies we muſt practiſe wiſdome, and with our friends plainneſſe and ſimplicitie.

Now if the captain be not to giue credit to his enimy, but is alwaies to miſdoubt that he will go beyond him, it is neceſſarie that he hold a difference of imagination, forecaſtfull, warie, and which can skill to diſcern the

wiles

wiles which come vailed with anie couerture : for the ſelfe power which finds them out can only deuiſe the remedies which are behooffull in that behalfe : that ſeemeth to be another difference of the imagination which deuiſeth the engins and war-like inſtruments, whereby vnuincible fortreſſes are won, which pitcheth the camp and marſhalleth euery ſquadron in his due place, and which knoweth the occaſions of ioyning and retiring; which plotteth treaties, conſortments and capitulations with the enemie : for all which the vnderſtanding is impertinent as are the eares to ſee withall. And therefore I nothing doubt, but that the art of war appertaineth to the imagination, for all whatſoeuer a good captain is to performe importeth conſonance, figure and correſpondence.

Now the difficulty reſteth to ſet down with what difference of the imagination in particular, war is to be mannaged. And in this I cannot reſolue with certaintie, becauſe the knowing therof is very nice : yet I coniecture that it requireth a degree more of heat than the practiſe of phiſicke, and that it allay choler but not vtterlie quench it.

This is very manifeſt : for thoſe captains who are full of promptneſſe and ſubtletie, are not verie couragious, nor deſirous of bickering, neither couet to come to handyſtrokes; but by ſtratagems & fetches, without aduenturing a broken pate, do bring their purpoſes to paſſe. Which property, better pleaſed *Vegetius* than any other. Good captains (ſaith he) not by open war, in which the perill is common, but by ſecret practiſes, euer aſſay with the ſafetie of their owne ſouldeirs, to cut their enemies in peeces, or at leaſt to make them afraid. The fruit of this maner of wit, the Romain Senat very wiſely looked into :

into: for though they had manie famous captains, who atchieued ſundry warres, yet returning to Rome to receiue the triumph and glorie due to their enterpriſe, ſo great were the plaints which the parents made for their children, the children for the parents, the wiues for their husbands, and brothers for brethren, that through the ſorrow for them who periſhed in the warres, they could take little pleaſure in the ſports and paſtimes. Wherfore the Senat took a reſolution, not to ſeeke out ſo couragious captains, wholly deſirous to come to hand ſtrokes: but men ſomwhat timorous, & very ready, as *Q. Fabius*, of whom it is written, that it was a wonder to ſee him offer a pitched battaile in the open field, and ſpeciallie when he was far from Rome, wherby in ill ſucceſſes he could not readily be releeued, and he did nought els but giue way to the enemie, and deuiſe ſtratagems and wiles, with which he exploited great enterpriſes and obtained many victories, without the loſſe of any one ſouldiour. He was receiued into Rome with great ioy of all men: for if he carried forth 10000 ſouldiours, he returned with as many, vnleſſe ſome perhaps miſcarried by ſickneſſe. The ſhout which the people gaue at his returne was (as *Ennius* reporteth) of this tenour:

One man by lingring, only vs releeu'd.

As if they had ſaid, This man with giuing way to our enemies, hath made vs lords of the world, and brought backe our ſouldiours to their houſes in ſafetie. Some captains haue ſince that time endeuoured to imitate him: but becauſe they wanted his wit and readineſſe, they ſundry times let ſlip many fit occaſions of fighting, whence greater dammages and inconueniences aroſe, than if they had ſpeedily ioyned battaile. We may alſo take example of that famous Carthaginian captain, of whom

whom *Plutarch* writeth theſe words, *Anniball* after he had attained this ſo great a victorie, commanded that manie Italian priſoners ſhould freely be ſet at libertie without ranſom, to the end the fame of his courteſie and pardoning might be diſperſed among the people; albeit of diſpoſition he were very wide from this vertue: for of his owne nature he was fell and vnmercifull, and in ſuch ſort was trained vp from the tender yeares of his youth, that he neuer learned laws or ciuil conditions, but wars, ſlaughters, and betrayings of the enemy. Wher-through he grew to be a captain very cruell, and malicious in beguiling men, and alwaies deuiſing how he might entrap his enemie. And when he ſaw he could not preuaile by open war, he ſought to get the vpper hand by pollicies, as was plainly ſeen in this deed of arms by vs rehearſed, and by the battaile which he found againſt *Sempronius*, neer the riuer *Trebia*. The tokens to know a man that is poſſeſſed of this difference of wit, are very ſtrange and well worthy of contemplation. Wher-through *Plato* ſaith, that the man who is verie wiſe (in this ſort of abilitie which we trace out) cannot be couragious nor well conditioned: for *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That wiſdom conſiſteth in cold, and ſtomacke and manlineſſe in heat. Therfore theſe two qualities being repugnant and contrarie, it is impoſſible that a man be very full of hardineſſe, and alſo of wildome therewithall. For which cauſe it is neceſſarie that choler be burned, and become choler aduſt, to the end that a man may prooue wiſe: but where this ſpice of melancholie is found. inaſmuch as the ſame is cold, feare and cowardize are ſtraightwaies entertained. In ſort, that craft and readineſſe require heat, for that the ſame is a worke of the imagination, but not in ſuch degree as courage, where-through they repugne ech to other

ther in extenſion. But herein befalleth a matter worth the noting, that of the foure morall vertues, Iuſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance; the two firſt require a wit and good temperature, to the end that they may be put in practiſe: for if a Iudge be not endowed with vnderſtanding, to make himſelfe capable of the point of iuſtice, little auails it that he carrie a good will to render euery man his due. Since this his good meaning may wander out of the way, and wrong the true proprietarie. The like is to be vnderſtood of wiſdome: for if the only will ſufficed to ſet things in good order, then in no work good or euill, ſhould any error be committed. There is no theefe whatſoeuer, who ſeeketh not to rob in ſuch manner as he may not be eſpied, and there is no captain, who deſireth not to be owner of ſo much wiſdome, as may ſerue to vanquiſh his enemie. But a theefe that is not his craftſmaiſter in filching, ſoon falleth to be diſcouered; and the captain that wanteth imagination, ere long is ouercome. Fortitude, and Temperance are two vertues, which men carrie in their fiſt, though they want a naturall diſpoſition: for if a man be diſpoſed to ſet little of his life, and ſhow hardineſſe, he may well do it: but if he be couragious of his owne naturall diſpoſition, *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* affirme verie truely, it is not poſſible that he can be wiſe though he would. In ſort, that by this reaſon, there groweth no repugnancie to vnite the wiſdome of the minde with courage: for a wiſe and skilful man, hath the vnderſtanding to hazard his honour in reſpect of his ſoule, and his life in reſpect of his honour, and his goods in reſpect of his life, and ſo he doth. Hence it comes, that gentlemen for that they are ſo much honored, are ſo couragious; and there is none who will endure more hardneſſe in the wars, for

that

that they are brought vp in ſo many pleaſures, to the end they may not be termed ribalds. Heeron is that by-word grounded, God keepe me from a Gent. by day, and a theefe by night; for the one, becauſe he is ſeene, and the other that he may not be known, do fight with double reſolution: on this ſelfe reaſon, is the religion of *Malta* grounded, who knowing how much it importeth nobilitie, to be a man of valure, haue a firme law, that all thoſe of their order ſhalbe iſſued from gentilitie, both on the fathers ſide and the mothers: for ſo ech of them muſt in the combat ſhew himſelfe worth two of a baſer progenie. But if a gentleman had the charge giuen him, to encamp an army, and the order whereby he ſhould put the enemy in rout, if he had not a wit appropriat hereunto, he would commit and vtter a thouſand diſorders: for wiſdome lieth not in mens diſpoſition. But if there were recõmended vnto him the guard of a gate: they might ſoundly ſleep on his eies, although by nature he were a baggage. The ſentence of *Plato* is to be conſtrued, when a wiſe man followeth his owne natural inclination, and doth not correct the ſame by reaſon. And in that ſort it is true, that a verie wiſe man cannot of his naturall diſpoſition be couragious: for choler aduſt (which maketh him wiſe) maketh him alſo, ſaith *Hippocrates*, timorous and fearfull. The ſecond propertie, wherewith a man poſſeſſed of this difference of wit cannot be endowed, is to be pleaſant and of quaint behauiour: for with his imagination he frameth many plots, and weeteth that whatſoeuer error or negligẽce, are the way to caſt away an army, wherthrough he euer carrieth an eie to the maine chance. But people of little worth, call carefulneſſe a toil, chaſtiſment crueltie, and mercie ſoftneſſe, ſuffering and diſſembling of leud parts a good

diſpoſition. And this verily ſpringeth, becauſe men are ſots, who pierce not into the true value of things, nor in what ſort they ought to be managed: but the wiſe and skilfull cannot hold patience, nor beare to ſee matters ill handled, though they nothing appertain vnto themſelues, and therfore liue a ſmall while, and with much trouble of ſpirit. Whence *Salomon* ſaid, I gaue alſo my mind to vnderſtand wiſdom, doctrine, errors, and folly; and found that in theſe alſo, there is wearineſſe and affliction of ſpirit: for into much wiſdome entreth much diſpleaſure, and who ſo attaineth Science, getteth ſorrow. In which words it ſeemeth that *salomon* gaue vs to vnderſtand, that he liued better contented being ignorant, than after he had receiued wiſdome. And ſo verily it came to paſſe: for the ignorant liue moſt careleſſe, inaſmuch as nothing giueth them pain and vexation, and they little reck who haue a better capeaſe than themſelues. The vulgar accuſtometh to call ſuch the Angels of heauen: for they ſee how they take nothing at heart, neither find fault with any thing ill done, but let all paſſe: but if they conſidered the wiſdome and condition of the Angels, they ſhould ſee it were a word that carried euill conſonance, and a caſe for the inquiſition houſe: for from the day when we receiue the vſe of reaſon, vntill that of our death, they doe nought els ſaue reproouevs for all our euill doings, and aduiſe vs to that which we ought to do. And if as they ſpeake to vs in their ſpirituall language, by mouing our imagination, ſo they ſhould deliuer vs their opinion in materiall words, we would hold them importunate and vnmannerly brought vp. And he that beleeueth not this, let him marke that the Angel (of whom S. *Mathew* maketh mention) ſeemed ſuch a one to *Herod*, and to the wife of his brother

brother *Philip*, seeing (because they would not heare his fault-findings) they faire and wel chopped off his head. Better were it, that these men, who by the vulgar are fondly termed Angels of heauen, were called Asses of the earth: for amongst brute beasts (saith *Galen*) there is none more blunt, or of lesse wit than the Asse: although in memory he out-reach all the rest. He refuseth no burden, he goeth whither he is driuen without any gainstriuing, he winceth not, he biteth not, he is not fugitiue, not iadish conditioned; if he be laboured with a cudgell, he setteth not by it, he is wholly made to the wel-liking and seruice of him that is to vse him: these selfe properties do those men partake, whom the vulgar terme Angels of heauen; which sport-making, springeth in them, for that they are blockheads and void of imagination, and haue their wrathfull power verie remisse, which tokeneth a great defect in a man, and argueth that he is ill compounded.

There was neuer Angel nor man in the world, better conditioned than Christ our redeemer, and he entring one day into the temple, belabored welfauoredly those whom he found there selling of marchandize: and this he did because the irascible is the chastice geuer, and sword of reason, & the man who reproueth not things ill done, either sheweth himselfe but a foole, or is depriued of the wrathfull power. In sort, that it falles out a miracle to see a wise man of that gentlenesse or conditions, which are best liking to lewd mens fancies: wherethrough such as set down in writing the actions of *Iulius Cæsar*, maruelled to see how his souldiers could support a man so rough and seuere, and this grew in him, because he lighted vpon a wit requisit for the warres. The third property of those who are endowed with this difference

of wit is, to be reckleſſe touching the attiring of their perſon, and in a maner all of them are ſlouinly, homely, with their hoſen hanging about their heels, ful of wrinckles, their cap ſitting vpō the one ſide, with ſome threedbare gabberdine on their backe, & neuer long to change ſuits.

This propertie, *Lucius Florus* recounteth, had that famous captain *Viriatus*, by nation a Portuguiſe, of whom (exaggerating his great humility) he ſaith and affirmeth, that he deſpiſed ſo much all ornament of his perſon, as there was no priuate ſouldier in his army, that wēt worſe apparelled than himſelfe. And verily this was no vertue, neither did he the ſame artificially, but it is a natural effect of thoſe, who are poſſeſſed with that difference of imagination after which we enquire.

This rechleſneſſe in *Iulius Cæſar*, greatly deceiued *Cicero*: for being asked (after the battell) the cauſe which mooued him to follow the party of *Pompey*, he anſwered (as *Macrobius* recounteth) His girding deceiued me: as if he had ſaid, It was my beholding of *Iulius Cæſar* to be a man ſomwhat ſlouinly, and who neuer wore his girdle handſomly, whom his ſouldiers in ſcoffe called, Looſe-coat. But this ſhould haue mooued and made him to know, that he was endowed with a wit requiſit to the counſell of warre. Rightly did *Silla* hit the naile on the head, who (as *Suetonius Tranquillius* reporteth) ſeeing the rechleſneſſe of *Iulius Cæſar* in his apparrelling himſelfe when he was a boy, aduertiſed the Romains, ſaying; take heed of this ill girded yong fellow. The Hiſtorians buſie themſelues much, in recounting how careleſſie *Hannibal* bare him touching his apparell, and how little he reaked to go neat and handſome. To grow in great diſlike at motes on the cape, to take much care that his

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ſtockings ſit cleane, and his cloke handſome, without plaits, appertaineth to a difference of the imagination of very baſe alloy, and gainſaith the vnderſtanding, and that imagination which the war requireth. The fourth ſigne is to haue a bald head, and the reaſon heerof may ſoon be learned: for this difference of imagination, reſideth in the forepart of the head, as doe all the reſt, and exceſſiue heat burneth the skin of the head, and cloſeth the poares, through which the haire is to paſſe. Beſides that the matter wherof the haire is engendered (as the phiſitions auouch) are thoſe excremẽts which the brain expelleth in time of his nouriſhing, and by the great fire that there is, they are conſumed and burned vp, and ſo the matter faileth wherof they may breed. And if *Iulius Cæſar* had been ſeen in this point of Philoſophy, he wold not ſo much haue ſhamed at his baldhead, as that to couer the ſame, he cauſed the hinder part of his haire which ſhould hang down on his necke to be featly turned towards his forehead. And *Suetonius* maketh mention, that nothing ſo much contented him, as when the Senat enacted that he might weare a laurell garland on his head, and that on none other ground than becauſe thereby he might couer his baldneſſe. Another ſort of baldneſſe groweth from hauing the haire hard & earthly, and of a groſſe compoſition, but that betokeneth a man void of vnderſtanding, imagination and memory. The fifth ſigne, wherby thoſe are known who haue this difference of imagination is, that ſuch are ſpare in words and full of ſentences, and the reaſon importeth becauſe the brain being hard, it followeth of neceſſitie, that they ſuffer a defect in memorie, to which copie of words appertaineth. To find much what to ſay, ſpringeth from a coniunction, which the memorie maketh with the ima-

gination, in his firſt degree of heat. Such as haue this conioyning of both powers, are ordinarily great liers, and neuer want words and tales, though you ſtand harkening vnto them a whole day togither.

The ſixt propertie of thoſe who haue this difference of imagination, is, to be honeſt, and to take great diſlike at filthie and baudy talke: and therefore *Cicero* ſaith, that men very reaſonable, do imitate the honeſtie of nature, who hath hidden the vnſeemly and ſhamefull parts, which ſhe made to prouide for the neceſſity of mankind and not to adorne it, and ſhe conſenteth not to faſten the eyes on theſe, nor that the eares ſhould once heare them named. This we might wellattribut to the imagination, and ſay that the ſame reſteth offended at the euill repreſentation of theſe parts, but in the laſt chapter we rendered a reaſon of this effect, and reduced the ſame to the vnderſtanding, and we adiudged him defectiue in this power, who tooke not offenſe at ſuch diſhoneſtie. And becauſe to the difference of imagination appurtenant to the art miliaritie, there is ioyned this diſcourſe, therefore are good captains very honeſt. Wherthrough, in the hiſtorie of *Iulius Ceſar*, we find an action of the greateſt honeſtie that might be, and that is, whilſt they murthered him with daggers in the Senat-houſe, he (perceiuing it was impoſſible to eſcape death) gaue himſelfe to fall to the ground, and ſo fitted his imperiall robe about him, that after his death they found him couched with great honeſtie, with his legs and other parts couered, that might any way offend the ſight.

The ſeuenth propertie, and of greateſt importance, is that the Generall haue good fortune and be luckie, by which ſigne we ſhall perfectly find, that he is ſeized of the wit and habilitie behooffull for the art martial, for in

ſubſtance

ſubſtance and truth, there is nothing which ordinarily maketh men vnfortunat, and that their enterpriſes do not alwaies take ſucceſſe after their deſire, ſaue that they are depriued of wiſedome, and lay not hold on the conuenient means for achieuing their exploits. For that *Iulius Cæſar* ſhewed ſuch wiſedome in the affairs which he managed, he bare away the bell (in reſpect of fortunateneſſe) from all other captains of the world, ſo as in perils of importance, he encouraged his ſouldiors, ſaieng; Feare not, for you haue *Cæſars* good fortune to fight on your partie.

The Stoicks held opinion, that as there was a firſt cauſe, euerlaſting, almightie, and of infinit wiſedome, knowne by the order and concert of his maruellous works; ſo alſo there was another vnwiſe and vnconcerted, whoſe workes prooued without order, without reaſon, and void of diſcretion: for with an affection no way reaſonable, it giueth and reaueth from men riches, dignitie, and honour. This they tearmed Fortune, ſeeing hir a friend to men who performe their buſineſſe by hap hazard, without forecaſting, without wiſedome, and without ſubmitting themſelues to the gouernmẽt of reaſon. They pourtraied her (the better to make her manners and malice knowne) in fourme of a woman, a roiall ſcepter in her hand, her eyes vailed, her feet vpon a round ball, accompanied with perſons ſottiſh and void of all trade of liuing. By painting her like a woman, they noted her great lightneſſe and little diſcretion; by her roiall ſcepter, they acknowledged her ſoueraigntie ouer riches and honour; her veiled eyes, gaue to vnderſtand the ill faſhion which ſhe held in diſtributing her gifts; her feet ſtanding on the round ball, betokened the ſmall firmeneſſe in the fauours which ſhe imparted, for ſhe ſnatcheth

cheth them away with the like facilitie that ſhe reacheth them foorth, without keeping ſtedfaſtneſſe in ought whatſoeuer: but the worſt part they found in her, was that ſhe fauoureth the wicked, and perſecuteth the vertuous; loueth the fooliſh, and abhorreth the wiſe; abaſeth the noble, & aduanceth the baſe: what is foule pleaſeth her, and what is faire worketh her annoiance. Many men, placing confidēce in theſe properties, becauſe they know their owne good fortune, take hardineſſe to vndertake fond and headlong enterpriſes, which yet proſper with them very luckily, and yet other men, very wiſe and aduiſed, dare not aduenture to execute thoſe enterpriſes, which they haue begun with great diſcretion, finding by experience that ſuch find worſt ſucceſſe. How great a friend Fortune ſheweth her ſelfe to bad people, *Ariſtotle* maketh knowne by this probleme, Whence groweth it, that riches (for the moſt part) are poſſeſſed rather by the wicked than by men of worth? Whereto he ſhapeth anſwer, Perhaps becauſe Fortune being blind cannot know nor make choice of what is beſt. But this is an anſwer vnworthy of ſo great a philoſopher: for it is not Fortune that beſtoweth wealth on men, and though it were, yet he yeelde th no reaſon, why ſhe alwaies cheriſheth the bad, and abandoneth the good. The true ſolution of this demand is, that the lewd ſort are very witty, and haue a gallant imagination, to beguile in buying and ſelling, and can profit in bargaining, and employing their ſtocke where occaſion of gaine is offered. But honeſt men want this imagination: many of whom had endeuoured to imitate theſe bad fellowes, and by trafficquing & trucking, within few daies haue loſt their principall.

This, Chriſt our redeemer pointed at, conſidering the

the ſufficiencie of that ſteward, whom his maiſter called to accompt, who reſeruing a good portion of the goods to his owne behooſe, ſalued vp all his reckonings, and got his *quietus eſt*. Which wiſdome (though it were faultie) yet God commended, ſaying; The children of this world are more wiſe in their kinde, than the children of light: for theſe ordinarily enioy a good vnderſtanding, with which power they place their affection on their law, and haue want of imagination, whereto the knowledge how to liue in this world appertaineth; wherethrough many are morally good, becauſe they lacke the wit how to be naught. This maner of anſwering is more eaſie and apparent. The naturall philoſophers, becauſe they could not reach ſo farre, deuiſed ſo fond and ill iointed a cauſe, as lady Fortune, to whoſe power they might impute good and bad ſucceſſes, & not to the vnskilfulneſſe and little knowledge of men.

Foure ſorts of people there are in euerie commonwealth, if a man liſt to marke them, For ſome men are wiſe, and ſeeme not ſo; others ſeeme ſo, and are not; others, neither are, nor ſeem; and ſome both are, and ſeem ſo. Some men there are ſilent, ſlow in ſpeech, ſtaid in anſwering, not curious nor copious of words: yet they retain hidden within them, a naturall power appertaining to the imagination, whereby they know the fit time and occaſion to bring their purpoſe to paſſe, and how they are therein to demeane themſelues without communicating or imparting their minde to any other. Theſe by the vulgar are called happy and luckie, them ſeeming that with little knowledge, and leſſe wit, euery thing falleth into their lap.

Others, contrariwiſe are of much eloquence in words & diſcourſe, great conuerſers, men that take vpon them to

to gouerne the whole world, who go about hunting thow with ſmall expenſe they may reape great gains, and herein (after the vulgars conceit) no man in iudgement can ſtep an ace beyond them, and yet, comming to the effect, all falleth to the ground betweene their hands. Theſe crie out vpon fortune, and call her blind buzzard, and iade, for the matters which they diſſeigne & worke with much wiſdome, ſhe ſuffereth not to take good effect: but if there were a Fortune who might plead her own defence, ſhe would tell them, Your ſelues are the buzzards, the ſots, and the doo-noughts, whome you ſpeake of, that being vnskilful, hold your ſelues wiſe, and vſing vnfit means, would yet reape good ſucceſſes. This ſort of people haue a kind of imagnation which decketh vp and ſetteth foorth their words and reaſons, and maketh them ſeeme to be what in deed they are not. Wherein I conclude, that the Generall who is endowed with a wit requiſit for the art militarie, and doth duly foreeaſt what he is to exploit, ſhall be fortunate and happie, otherwiſe it is loſt labour to looke that he euer preuaile to victorie, vnleſſe God do fight for him, as he did for the armies of Iſraell, and yet withall, they choſe the wiſeſt and skilfulleſt amongſt them to be commanders, for we muſt not leaue all vpon Gods hands, neither yet may a man wholy affie on his own wit and ſufficiencie, but it will do beſt to ioine both together; for there is no other Fortune, ſaue God and a mans own good indeuour.

He who firſt deuiſed Cheſſe-play, made a modell of the art militarie, repreſenting therein all the occurrents and cõtemplations of war, without leauing any one behind: and as in this game Fortune beareth no ſtroke, neither can the plaier who beateth the aduerſe party be termed

med fortunat, nor he who is beaten vnfortunat. So the captain that ouercommeth ought to be called wise, and the vanquished, ignorant; and not the one happie, or the other vnhappie. The first thing which he ordained in this play was, that when the king is mated, the contrary partie is vanquisher, thereby to let vs vnderstand, that the cheefe force of an armie, consisteth in a good commaunder to gouern and direct the same: and for proofe hereof, he lotted as many cheefe men to the one side as to the other, to the end that whosoeuer lost, might be ascertained, it so fell out through default of his owne knowledge, and not of fortune. And this is more apparantly seene, if we consider, that a skilfull plaier will spare halfe his men to the other partie, and yet for all that get the game. And this was it which *Vegetius* noted, that often few souldiers and weake, vanquish many & valiant, if they be gouerned by a generall who can skill in ambushes and stratagems. He ordained also that the pawnes might not turne backe, thereby to aduise the commaunder that he duly forecast all chances, ere he send foorth his souldiers to the seruice, because if any mischaunce alight, it behooues rather that they be cut in peeces wher they were placed, than to turne their backs, for the souldier is not to know, when time serueth to flie or to fight saue by direction of his captaine, and therefore so long as his life lasteth, he is to keepe his place, vnder paine of becomming infamous. Hereunto he adioined another law, that the pawne which had made seuen draughts without being taken, should be made a queene, & might make any draught at pleasure, and be placed next the king, as one set at libertie; and endowed with nobility; whereby he gaue vs to vnderstand, how in the warre it importeth greatly for making the souldior valiant, to

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proclaime aduantages, free camps, and preferments, for ſuch as ſhall haue done any ſpecial peece of ſeruice. And principally, that the honour and profit paſſe to their poſteritie: for then they will exploit with greater courage, and gallantneſſe. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* affirmeth that a man maketh more reake to be chiefe of his linage, than of his owne proper life. This *Saul* well perceiued when he cauſed to be proclaimed in the army, Whoſoeuer ſhal ſtrike that man (meaning kill the Giant *Golias*) ſhall be made rich by the king, and ſhall haue his daughter to wife, and his houſe ſhalbe enfranchiſed in Iſrael from all maner tribute. Conformable vnto this proclamation, there was a court in Spain, which ordained, that whatſoeuer ſouldier, by his good vſage, deſerued to receiue for his pay 500 Soldi (this was the greateſt ſtipend allowed in the warres) ſhould himſelfe and his poſtertie, be diſcharged for euer from all taxes and ſeruices. The Moores (as they are great plaiers at cheſſe) haue in their plaies ſet ſeuen degrees in imitation of the 7 draughts, which the pawn muſt make to be a queene, and ſo they enlarge the play from one to the ſecond, and from the ſecond to the third, vntill they arriue to ſeuen, anſwerable to the proofe that the ſouldier ſhall giue of himſelfe: & if ſhe be ſo gallant as to enlarge his pay to the ſeuenth, they yeeld him the ſame: and for this cauſe they are termed Septerniers, or Seuenſtears. Theſe haue large liberties and exemptions, as in Spain thoſe gentlemen who are called *Hidalgos*. The reaſon hereof, in naturall philoſophy is verie plain: for there is no facultie of all thoſe that gouern man, which will willingly worke, vnleſſe there be ſome intereſt to moue the ſame: which *Ariſtotle* proueth in the generatiue power, and the ſelfe reaſon ſwaieth in the reſidue. The obiect of the wrathfull

full facultie (as we haue aboue ſpecified) is honour and aduantage: and if this ceaſe, ſtraightwaies courage and ſtomacke decay: by all this may be conceiued the great ſignification which it carrieth to make that pawne a queene, who hath made ſeuen draughts without taking: for whatſoeuer the greateſt nobilitie in the world, that hath been or ſhalbe, hath ſprung and ſhall ſpring from pawns, and priuat men, who by the valour of their perſon haue done ſuch exploits, as they deſerued for themſelues and their poſteritie, the title of gentlemen, knights, noblemen, earls, marqueſſes, dukes and kings. True it is, that ſome are ſo ignorant and void of conſideration as they will not grant, that their nobilitie had a beginning; but that the ſame is euerlaſting, and grown into their blood, not by the grace of ſome particular king, but by the ſupernaturall and diuine reaſon. To the bent of this purpoſe (though we ſhall thereby ſomwhat lengthen our matter) I cannot but recount a verie wittie diſcourſe, which paſſed between our Lord the Prince *Don Carlos*, and the doctor *Suares* of Toledo, who was iudge of the Court in Alcala of Heuares. Prince: Doctor what thinke you of this people? Doctor: Verie well (my Lord) for here is the beſt aire, and the beſt ſoile of any place in Spain. *P.* For ſuch the phiſitions made choice of to recouer my health: haue you ſeen the Vniuerſitie? *D.* No my *L.* *P.* See it then: for it is very ſpeciall; and where they tell me the Sciences are verie learnedly red. *D.* Verily, for a colledge and particular ſtudie, it carrieth great fame, and ſhould be ſuch in effect, as your highneſſe ſpeaketh of. *P.* Where did you ſtudie? *D.* In Salamanca, my lord. *P.* And did you proceed doctor in Salamanca? *D.* My lord, no. *P.* That me ſeemeth was euill done to ſtudie in one Vniuerſitie, and

take degree in another. *D.* May it please your highnesse, that the charges of taking degrees in Salamanca, are excessiue, and therefore we poore men flie the same, and get vs to some other Vniuersitie, knowing that we receiue our sufficiencie and learning, not from the degree, but from our studie and pains, albeit my parents were not so poore, but if them listed might haue borne the charge of my proceeding in Salamanca: but your highnesse well knoweth, that the doctors of this Vniuersitie haue the like franchises, as the gentleman of Spain, and to vs who are such by nature, this exemption doth harm, at least to our posteritie. *P.* Which of the kings mine ancestors gaue this nobility to your linage? *D.* None. And to this end your highnesse must vnderstand, there are two sorts of gentlemen in Spain, some of bloud, & some by priuiledge. Those in bloud (as my selfe) haue not receiued their nobility at the kings hand, but those by priuiledge haue. *P.* This matter is very hard for me to conceiue, and I would gladly that you expressed it in plainer termes: for if my bloud roiall, reckoning from my selfe to my father, and from him to my grandfather, and so by order from ech to other commeth to finish in *Pelagius*: to whom by the death of the king *Don Rodericke*, the kingdome was giuen, before which time he was not king, if we reckon vp after this sort your pedigree, shall we not come at last to end in one who was no gentleman? *D.* This discourse cannot be denied, for all things haue had a beginning. *P.* I aske you then, from whence that first man had his nobilitie, who gaue beginning to your nobilitie? he could not enfranchise himselfe, nor plucke out his own necke from the yoke of tributes and seruices, which before time he paied to the kings my predecessors: for this were a kind of theft, and a prefer-

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ring himselfe by force with the kings patrimony, and it foundeth not with reason, that gentlemen of blood should haue so bad an originall as this: therefore it falleth out plain, that the king gaue him freedom, and yeelded him the grace of that nobilitie. Now tell me from whom he had it. *D.* Your highnesse concludeth verie well, and it is true, that there is no true nobilitie saue of the kings grant: but we terme those noble of blood, of whose originall there is no memorie, neither is it specified by writing, when the same began, nor what king yeelded them this fauour. And this obscureneſſe is receiued in the common-wealth, for more honourable than distinctly to know the contrarie. The common-wealth also maketh gentlemen: for when a man groweth valorous, of great vertue, and rich: it dareth not to challenge such a one, as seeming thereby to doe him wrong, and that it is fit a man of that worth do liue in all franchize. This reputation passing to the children, & to the nephews, groweth to nobilitie, & so they get a pretence against the king. Thus are not therefore gentlemen, because they receiue 500 Soldi of pay; but when the contrarie can not be prooued, they passe for such. That Spaniard, who deuised this name of a gentleman, *Hijosdalgos*, gaue verie well to vnderstand this doctrine which we haue here discoursed by his opinion: men haue two kinds of birth: the one naturall, in which all are equall, the other spirituall. When a man performeth any heroicall enterprise, or any vertue or extraordinarie worke, then is he new borne, and procureth for himselfe other new parents, and leaueth that being which he had to fore. Yesterday he was called the son of *Peter*, and nephew of *Sanchia*, and now he is named the sonne of his owne actions. Hence had that Castilian prouerb

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his original which saith, Euery man is the son of his own works. And because the good and vertuous works, are in the holy scripture termed somwhat, & in the Spanish tongue it signifieth *algo*, and vices & sins nothing, which in the Spanish is termed *nada*. This Spaniard compounded this word *hijo dalgo* therof, which importeth nought els, but that such a one is descended of him, who performed some notorious and vertuous action: for which he deserued to be rewarded by the king or commonwealth, together with all his posteritie for euer. The law of the *Partitas* saith, that *hijo dalgo*, signifieth the sonne of goods: But if we vnderstand the same of temporall goods, the reason was not good; for there are infinit gentlemen poore, and infinit rich men, who are no gentlemen: but if he meane the sonne of goods, that is to say of good qualities, it carrieth the same sense which we before expressed.

Of the second birth which men ought to haue besides their naturall, there is affoorded vs a natural example in the scripture, where Christ our redeemer reprehendeth *Nicodemus*, because he (being a doctor of the law) wist not yet, it was necessarie that a man should be borne of new, thereby to obtain a better being, and more honourable parents than his naturall: for which cause, all the time that a man performeth no heroicall enterprise, in this sense he is called *hijo de nada*, to weet the sonne of nothing; although by his ancestors he beare the name of *hijo dalgo*, that is the sonne of somwhat, or a gentleman. To the purpose of this doctrine, I will recite vnto you a discourse which passed betweene a very honourable Captain, and a Caualiero, who stood much on the pantophles of his gentilitie. Whereby shall be discouered in what the honor of this second birth consisteth.

sisteth. This captaine then falling in companie with a knot of Caualieros, and discoursing of the largesse & liberty, which souldiers enioy in Italie, in a certaine demand, which one of them made him, he gaue him the *you*, because he was natiue of that place, and the sonne of meane parents, born in a village of some few houses: but the captain (aggreeued therat) answered saying; Signore your signory shall vnderstand, that souldierrs who haue enioyed the liberty of Italy, cannot content themselues to make abode in Spain, because of the many laws which are here enacted against such as set hand to their sword.

The other Caualieros, hearing him vse the terme of *Signoria*, could not forbeare laughter. The Caualiero blushing hereat, vsed these words, Your *Mercedi* may weet, that in Italy, to say *Signoria*, importeth so much as in Spain to say *mercede*, and this Signor Capitano, being accustomed to the vse and maner of that country, giueth the terme of *Signiora*, where he should doe that of *mercede*. Hereto the captain answered, saying; let not your Signory hold me to be a man so simple, but that I know when I am in Italy, to apply my selfe to the language of Italy, and in Spain, to that of Spain: but he that in Spain talking with me, may giue me the *you*, it behoooueth at least that he haue a Signory in Spain; & yet so I can scarse take it wel, the Caualiero somwhat affroted made reply, saying, why Signor Capitano are you not natiue in such a place, and sonne to such a man? And know you not again who I am, and what mine ancestors haue been? Signore (answered the captain) I know right well, that your Signory is a good Caualiero, and such haue been your elders: but I and my right arme (which now I acknowledge for my father) are better than you & all your

linage. This captain meant to allude to the second birth, when he said I and my right arme, which now I acknowledge to be my father; and that not vnduly: for with his right arme, and with his sword he had performed such actions, as the valour of his person was equall to the nobility of that Caualiero. For the most part, the laws and nature (saith *Plato*) are contrary: for a man sometimes issueth out of natures hands, with a minde verie wise, excellent, noble, franke, and with a wit apt to command a whole world: yet because his hap was to be borne in the house of *Amiclas*, a base peasant; by the laws he remaineth depriued of that honour and liberty, wherin nature placed him. And contrariwise we see others, whose wit & fashions were ordained to be slaues; and yet for that they were borne in noble houses, they come by force of the laws to be great Lords. But one thing hath been noted many daies ago, which is worthy of consideration, that those who are born in villages and thatched houses, prooue more sufficient men, and of greater towardnesse for the Sciences & arms, than such as haue greate Cities for their birth-place. Yet is the vulgar so subiect to ignorance, as they gather a consequence to the contrary, from birth in meane places: hereof the sacred scripture affoordeth as an example, where it is read, that the people of Israel much wondering at the great works of our sauiour Christ, said; is it possible, that out of Nazareth can come ought that is good? But to return to the wit of this captain, of whō we haue discoursed; he ought to be endowed with much vnderstanding, and with the difference of imagination, which is requisit for the art of war. Wher-through, in this treatise we deliuer much doctrine, whence we may gather wherin the valour of men consisteth, that they may reap

estimation

eſtimation in the common-wealth.

Six things (me ſeemeth) a man ought to haue, to the end he may be termed honourable, and which of them ſoeuer want, his being is thereby impaired: but yet all of them are not placed in one ſelfe degree, nor partake a like valew, or the ſelfe qualities.

The firſt and principall, is the valour of a mans owne perſon, as touching his wiſdome, iuſtice, mind, and courage. This maketh riches and birth right, from hence grow honourable titles; from this beginning all the nobilitie in the world fetcheth his originall. And if any be ſetled in a contrary opinion, let him go to the great houſes in Spain, and he ſhall find that they all deriue their originall from particular men, who by the valour of their perſons, attained to that, which now by their ſucceſſions is poſſeſſed.

The ſecond thing which honoureth a man, next to the valour of his perſon is ſubſtance, without which we find not, that any man carrieth eſtimation in the common-wealth.

The third is, the nobilitie and antiquitie of his anceſtors, to be well born, and of honourable blood, is a thing very precious: but yet retaineth in it ſelfe a great defect: for by it ſelfe alone, it yeeldeth a ſlender auaile, aſwell in regard of the gentleman himſelfe, as of others who ſtand in need therof: for a man can neither eat nor drinke the ſame, nor apparrell himſelfe therewithall, nor giue nor beſtow the ſame: but it maketh a man to liue as dying, by depriuing him of the remedies, which he might otherwiſe procure to ſupplie his neceſſities, but let him vnite the ſame with riches, and by no degree of honour it can be counteruailed. Some are wont to reſemble nobilitie, to a cipher in numbring, which of it

ſelfe beareth no value, but vnited with another number, multiplieth the ſame.

The fourth point which maketh a man to be of accompt, is to haue ſome dignitie or honourable office, and contrariwiſe nothing ſo much abaſeth a man, as to get his liuing by ſome handy craft.

The fift thing which honoureth a man, is to be called by a good ſurname, and a gratious-chriſtian name, which may deliuer a pleaſing conſonance to the eare, & not to be termed paſty, or peſtell, as ſome that I know. We read in the generall hiſtorie of Spaine, that there came two Embaſſadours out of France, vnto king *Alfonſe* the ninth, to demand one of his daughters in marriage for their ſoueraigne king *Philip*: one of which ladies was very faire, and named *Vrraca*, the other nothing ſo gratious, and called *Blanche*. They both comming in preſence of the Embaſſadours, all men held it as a matter reſolued, that the choice would light vpon *Vrraca*, as the elder, and fairer, and better adorned: but the Embaſſadours, enquiring ech of their names, tooke offence at the name of *Vrraca*, and made choice of the lady *Blanche*: ſaying, that her name would be better receiued in France than the other.

The ſixt thing which honoureth a man, is the ſeemly ornament of his perſon, & his going well apparelled, and attended with manie waiters. The good diſcent of the Spaniſh nobilitie, is of ſuch as through the valour of their perſon, and through their honourable enterpriſes atchieued, grew in the wars to the pay of 500 Soldi. The originall wherof our late writers cannot verifie: for if they find not their matter laid down in writing, and expreſſed to their hands by others, they are vnable to ſupplie the ſame, with any inuention of their own. The difference

ference which *Aristotle* placeth betwixt memory and remembrance is, that if the memorie haue lost anie of those things which at first it knew, it cānot call the same to mind, without new learning thereof: but remembrance enioieth this special grace, that if it forget ought, by stopping a while to discourse thereupon, it turneth to find out that which was before lost. Which may be the Court that speaketh in fauour of good souldiours, we find at this day recorded neither in books, nor in the memorie of men, but there are left as reliques these words, *hijo dalgo*, in those that receiue 500 Soldi of pay, after the Court of Spain, and their known wages. By making discourse, and arguing wheron, it will fall out an easie matter to find out their associats. *Antony* of Lebrissa giuing the signification of this verbe, *vendico, cas*: saith the same signifieth, to draw vnto it that which is due for pay, or by reason, as we say now a daies by a new phrase of speech, to take pay from the king. And it is a thing so vsed in Castilia the old, to say such a one hath well impaied his trauaile, when he is well paied, that amongst the ciuiller sort, there is no maner of speech more ordinarie.

From this signification, the word *vindicare* fetched his originall, namely, when anie one would stirre at the wrong offered him by another: for iniury metaphorically is termed debt. After this sort when we now say, such a one is *hijo dalgo, de vengar quincentos sueldos*, that is, a gentleman of the pay of 500 Soldi, we meane that he is descended from a souldier so valiant, as for his proweesse he deserued to receiue so large a pay, as is that of 500 Soldi. VVho by the court of Spain was (with all his posteritie) enfranchised from paying any tallages or seruices to the king. This known pay, is nought els saue the

entrance which such a souldiour made into the number of those, whose stipend was 500 Soldi: for then were registred in the kings booke, the name of the souldiour, the countrey where he was born, and who were his parents, and progenitors: for the more certaintie to him who receiued this benefit and stipend. Euen as at this day we read in the book of *Bezerro*, which is kept at Salamanca, where are foūd written, the beginning of welneere all the Spanish nobilitie. The semblable diligence vsed *Saul*, when *Dauid* slew *Golias*: for forthwith he sent *Abner* his captain, to take information of what stock the yong man was descended. Antiently they termed *Solaro*, the house of the villaine, aswell as of the gentleman.

But sithens we haue stepped aside into this digression, it behoooueth to make returne to our purpose from whence we parted, and to know whence it groweth, that in play at chesse, which we tearmed a counterfeit of war, a man shameth more to loose, than at any other game, albeit the same turne him to no dammage, neither is the play for monie: and whence it may spring that the lookers on see more draughts than the plaiers themselues, though they are lesse seene in the play? and that which most importeth is, that some gamsters play best fasting, and some better after meat. The first doubt boldeth like difficultie, for we haue auouched, that in warre and in chesse-play fortune hath nought to do, neither may we be allowed to say, Who would euer haue thought this? but all is ignorance and carelesnesse in him that leeseth, and wisedome and cunning in him that getteth. And when a man is ouercome in matters of wit & sufficienceie, and is cut off from all allegations of excuse or pretence, other than his own ignorance, it followeth

followeth a matter of neceſſitie that he wax aſhamed: for man is reaſonable, and a friend to his reputation, and cannot brooke that in the works of this power, any other ſhould ſtep a foot before him. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* demaundeth what the reaſon may be, why the antients conſented not that ſpeciall rewards ſhould be aſſigned to thoſe, who ſurpaſſed the reſt in the Sciences, & yet ordained ſome for the beſt leaper, runner, thrower of the barre, and wreſtler? To which he frameth anſwer, That in wreſtling and bodily contentions, it is tollerated that there be Iudges aſſigned, who ſhall cenſure how far one man exceedeth another, to the end they may iuſtly yeeld prize to the vanquiſher, it falling out a matter of no difficultie for the eye to diſcerne who leapeth moſt ground, or runneth with greateſt ſwiftneſſe: but in matters of ſcience it prooueth very hard to trie by the vnderſtanding, which exceedeth other, for that it is a thing appertaining to the ſpirit, and of much queintneſſe; and if the iudge liſt to giue the prize maliciouſly, all men cannot looke thereunto, for it is a iudgement much eſtranged from the ſenſe of the beholders. Beſides this anſwer, *Ariſtotle* giueth another which is better, ſaying, That men make no great recke to be ouercome in throwing, wraſtling, running, and leaping, for that they are graces wherein the verie brute beaſts outpaſſe vs. But that which we cannot endure with patience, is, to haue another adiudged more wiſe and aduiſed than our ſelues, wherethrough they grow in hatred with the iudges, and ſeeke to be reuenged of them, thinking that of malice they went about to ſhame thē. Therfore to ſhun theſe incōueniences, they would not yeeld conſent, that in works appertaining to the reaſonable part, men ſhould be allowed either iudges or rewards.

Whence is gathered, that the Vniuerſities do ill who aſſigne iudges and rewards of the firſt, ſecond, and third degree, in licencing thoſe that prooue beſt at the examinations.

For beſides that the inconueniences alleaged by *Ariſtotle* do betide, it is repugnant to the doctrine of the geſpell, that men grow into contention who ſhould be cheefe. And that this is true, we ſee manifeſtly, for that the diſciples of our ſauiour Chriſt, comming one day from a certain voiage, treated amongſt themſelues, who ſhould be the greateſt, and being now ariued at their lodging, their maiſter asked them whereof they had reaſoned vpon the way? but they (though ſomwhat blunt) well vnderſtood how this queſtion was not allowable, wherthrough the text ſaith, that they durſt not tell him, but becauſe from God nothing can be concealed, he ſpake vnto them in this manner, If any will be chiefe amongſt you, he ſhalbe the laſt of all, and ſeruant to the reſt. The Phariſies were abhorred by Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe they loued the higheſt ſeats at feaſts, and the principall chaires in the Sinagogues. The chiefe reaſon wheron they rely, who beſtow degrees after this maner, is, that when ſchollers know ech of them ſhalbe rewarded according to the triall which they ſhall giue of themſelues, they will skantly affoord themſelues time frō their ſtudie, to ſleep or eat. Which would ceaſe, were there not a reward for him that taketh pains, or chaſtiſment for him that addicteth himſelfe to looſeneſſe and loitering. But this is a ſlender reaſon, and ſo only in apparence, and preſuppoſeth a great falſhood, which is, that knowledge may be gotten by continuall plodding at the booke, and by hearing of good maiſters, and neuer leeſing a leſſon. And they marke not, that if a ſchol-

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ler want the wit and abilitie requisit for the learning which he applieth, it falleth out a lost labour, to beat his head day and night at his books. And the error is such, that if differences of wits, so far distant as these, do enter into competencie, the one through his quicke capacity, without studying or poaring in books, getteth learning in a trice, and the other, for that he is block headed and dull, after he hath toiled all his life long, can small skill in the matter.

Now the Iudges come, as men to giue the first price to him, who was enabled by nature, and tooke no trauell, and the last to him who was born void of capacitie, yet neuer gaue ouer studying; as if the one had gotten learning by turning ouer his books, and the other lost the same through his owne sluggishnesse. And it fareth as if they ordained prices for two horses, of which the one had his legs sound and nimble, and the other halted down right. If the Vniuersities did admit to the studie of the Sciences, none but such as had a wit capable therof, and were all equall, it should seeme a thing well done to ordaine reward and punishment: for whosoeuer knew most, it would therby appeare that he pained himselfe most, and who knew least, had giuen himselfe more to his ease.

To the second doubt we answer, that as the eies stand in need of light, and cleerenesse, to see figures and colours, so the imagination hath need of light in the brain, to see the fantasies which are in the memory. This cleernesse, the sunne giueth not, nor any lamp or candle, but the vital spirits which are bred in the heart, and dispersed throughout the body. Herewithall it is requisit to know that feare gathereth all the vitall spirits to the heart, and leaueth the braine darcke, and all the other parts of the

body

body cold. Whervpon *Aristotle* maketh this demaund, Whence commeth it, that who so feareth, his voice, his hands, and his nether lip do tremble? whereto he answereth, that through this feare, the naturall heat hieth to the heart, and leaueth all the residue of the body a-cold, and the cold (as is before touched) by *Galens* mind, hindereth all the powers and faculties of the soule, and suffereth not them to woike.

Hence beginneth the answer of this second doubt, and it is, that those who play at Chesse, conceiue feare to loose, because the game standeth vpon termes of reputation and disgrace, and for that Fortune hath no stroke therein, so the vitall spirits assembling to the heart, the imagination is foreslowed by the cold, and the fantasms in the darke, for which two reasons, he who plaieth cannot bring his purpose to effect. But the lookers on, in as much as this no way importeth them, neither stand in fear of loosing through want of skill, do behold more draughts, for that their imagination retaineth his heat, and his figures are enlightened by the light of the vitall spirits. True it is, that much light reaueth also the light of the imagination, and it befalleth what time the player waxeth ashamed and out of countenaunce to see his aduersarie beat him; then through this aggreeuednes, the naturall heat encreaseth, and enlighteneth more than is requisit, of all which he that standeth by is deuoid. From hence issueth an effect very vsual in the world, that what time a man endeuoreth to make the best muster of himselfe, and his learning and sufficiencie most knowne, it prooueth worst with him: with others againe the contrarie betideth, who being brought to their triall, make a great show, and passed out of the lists, appeare of little woorth, and of all this, the reason is very manifest, for he

whose

whose head is filled with much naturall heat, if you appoint him to do an exercise of learning or disputation, within foure and twentie hours after, a part of that excessiue heat which he hath, flieth to the heart, and so the brain remaineth temperat, and in this disposition (as we wil prooue in the chapter ensuing) many points woorth the vtterance, present themselues to a mans remembrance. But he who is very wise and endowed with a great vnderstanding, being brought to triall, by means of feare, cannot retaine the naturall heat in his head, whereon through default of light, he findeth not in his memorie what to deliuer.

If this fell into their consideration, who take vpon them to controll the Generals of armies, blaming their actions, and the order which they set down in the field, they should discerne how great a difference resteth betweene the giuing a looking on the fight out at a window, or the breaking of a launce therein, and the feare to leese an armie whose charge their soueraigne hath committed to their hands.

No lesse dammage doth feare procure the Physition in curing, for his practise (as we haue prooued heretofore) appertaineth to the imagination, which resteth more annoied by cold than any other power, for that his operation consisteth in heat. Whence we see by experience, that Physitions can sooner cure the vulgar sort, than Princes and great personages. A counsellor at law one day asked me (knowing that I handled this matter) what the cause might be, that in the affairs where he was well payd, many cases and points of learning came to his memorie, but with such as yeelded not to his trauell what was due, it seemed that all his knowledge was shrunke out of his braine: whome I answered, that matters

ters of interest appertained to the wrathfull faculty which maketh his residence in the heart, and if the same receiue not contentment, it doth not willingly send forth the vitall spirits, by whose light, the figures which rest in the memory may be discerned. But when that findeth satisfaction, it cheerfully affoordeth naturall heat. Wherthrough the reasonable soule obtaineth sufficient cleerenesse to see whatsoeuer is written in the head. This defect do men of great vnderstanding partake, who are pinching, and relie much on their interest and in such is the propertie of that counsellor best discerned. But who so falleth into due consideration hereof, shall obserue it to be an action of Iustice, that he who laboureth in another mans vineyard be well paied his wages.

The like reason is currant for the phisition, to whom (when they are wel hired) many remedies present them selues: otherwise, the art (aswell in them as the lawyer) slippeth out of their fingers. But here a matter very important is to be noted, namely; that the good imagination of the phisition, discouereth on a sodain what is necessarie to be done. And if he take leisure and farther consideration, a thousand inconueniences come into his fancie, which hold him in suspense, and this-while the occasion of the remedie passeth away. Therfore it is neuer good, to aduise the phisition to consider well what he hath in hand, but that he forthwith execute what first he purposed. For we haue prooued heretofore, that much speculation maketh the naturall heat to auoid out of the head, and again the same may encrease so far forth, as to turmoile the imagination. But the phisition in whom it is slacke, shall not doe amisse to vse long contemplation: for the heat aduancing it selfe vp

to the braine, ſhall come to attaine that point, which to this power is behooffull.

The third doubt in the matters alreadie rehearſed, hath his anſwer very manifeſt: for the difference of the imagination, with which we play at cheſſe, requireth a certaine point of heat, to ſee the draughts, and he that plaieth well faſting, hath then the degree of heat requiſit thereunto. But through the heat of the meat, the ſame exceedeth that point which was neceſſarie, and ſo he plaieth worſe. The contrarie befalleth to ſuch as play wel after meales, for the heat riſing vp togither with the meat and the wine, arriueth to the point, which wanted whiles he was faſting. It is therefore needfull to amend a place in *Plato*, who ſaith, that nature hath with great wiſdome diſioyned the liuer from the braine, to the end the meat with his vapours, ſhould not trouble the contemplation of the reaſonable ſoule. But here if he mean thoſe operations which appertain to the vnderſtanding, he ſpeaketh very well, but it can take no place in anie of the differences of the imagination. Which is ſeen by experience in feaſts and banquets: for when the gueſts are come to mid meale, they begin to tell pleaſant tales, merriments, and ſimilitudes; where at the beginning none had a word to ſay; but at the end of the feaſt, their tongue faileth them, for the heat is paſſed beyond the bound, requiſit for the imagination. Such as need to eat and drinke a little, to the end the imagination may lift vp it ſelfe, are melancholicke by aduſtion: for ſuch haue their brain like hot lime, which taken vp into your hand, is cold and drie in feeling: but if you bath the ſame in anie liquor, you cannot endure the heat which groweth therof.

We muſt alſo correct that law of the Carthagineans, which

which *Plato* alleageth, whereby they forbad their Captains to drinke wine, when they went to their wars, and likewise their gouernours, during the yeare of their office. And albeit *Plato* held the same for a verie iust law, and neuer maketh an end of commending the same; yet it behoooueth to make a distinction: we haue alleaged heretofore, that the worke of iudging appertaineth to discourse, and that this power abhorreth heat, and therfore receiueth much dammage by wine: but to gouern a common-wealth, (which is a distinct matter from taking into your hand a processe, & giuing sentence thervpon) belongeth to the imagination, and that requireth heat. And the gouernor not arriuing to the point, which is requisit, may well drinke a little wine, so to attaine the same. The like may be said touching the generall of an army, whose councell partaketh also with the imagination. And if the naturall heat be by any hot thing to be aduanced, none performeth it so well as wine; but it is requisit, that the same be temperatly taken, for there is no nourishment which so giueth and reaueth a mans wit, as this liquor. Wherefore it behooueth the Generall, to know the maner of his imagination, whether the same be of those which need meat and drinke to supply the heat that wanteth, or to abide fasting: for in this onely, consisteth how to mannage his affaires well or euill.

CHAP. XIIII.

How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a king appertaineth, and what signes he ought to haue, who enioyeth this maner of wit.

When

WHen *Salomon* was choſen king and head of ſo great and numberfull a people, as that of Iſraell; the text ſaith, that for gouerning and ruling them, he craued wiſdom from heauen, and nothing beſides. Which demand ſo much pleaſed God, as in reward of hauing asked ſo well, he made him the wiſeſt king of the world, and not ſo contented, he gaue him great riches and glorie, euermore holding his requeſt in better price. Whence is manifeſtly gathered, that the greateſt wiſdome and knowledge which may poſſibly be in the world, is that foundation, vpon which the office of a king relieth. Which concluſion is ſo certaine and true, as it were but loſt labour to ſpend time in the proofe therof. Only it behoooueth to ſhew to what difference of wit the art of being a king, and ſuch a one as is requiſit for the common wealth, appertaineth: and to vnfold the tokens, whereby the man may be known who is indowed with this wit and abilitie. Wherethrough it is certaine, that as the office of a king exceedeth all the arts in the world; ſo the ſame requireth a perfection of wit in the largeſt meaſure that nature can deuiſe. What the ſame is we haue not as yet defined: for we haue been occupied in diſtributing to the other arts, their differences & maners. But ſince we now haue the ſame in handling, it muſt be vnderſtood that of nine temperatures, which are in mankind, one onely (ſaith *Galen*) maketh a man ſo ſurpaſſing wiſe, as by nature he can be. Wherein the firſt qualities are in ſuch waight and meaſure, that the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie; but are found in ſuch equalitie and conformitie, as if really they were not contraries, nor had any naturall oppoſition. Whence reſulteth an inſtrument

ſtrument ſo appliable to the operations of the reaſonable ſoul, that man commeth to poſſeſſe a perfect memory of things paſſed, and a great imagination to ſee what is to come, and a great vnderſtanding, to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge, and make choice. The other differences of wit (by vs recounted) haue not anie one amongſt them of ſound perfection: for if a man poſſeſſe great vnderſtanding, he cannot (by means of much drineſſe) compriſe the ſciences which appertain to the imagination and the memorie; and if he be of great imagination, by reaſon of much heat, he remaineth vnſufficient for the ſciences of the vnderſtanding and the memorie, and if he enioy a great memorie, we haue tofore expreſſed how vnable thoſe of much memory (through their exceſſiue moiſture) do prooue for all the other ſciences. Only this difference of wit, which we now are a ſearching is that, which anſwereth all the arts in proportion. How much dammage the vnableneſſe of adioyning the reſt, breedeth to any one knowledge, *Plato* noteth, ſaying; That the perfection of ech in particular, dependeth on the notice and knowledge of them all in generall.

No ſort of knowledge is found ſo diſtinctly and ſeuered from another, but that the skill in the one much aideth to the others perfection. But how ſhall we do, if hauing ſought for this difference of wit with great diligence in all Spaine, I can find but one ſuch? Whereby I conceiue, that *Galen* ſaid verie well, That out of Greece, nature not ſo much as in a dream, maketh any man temperat, or with a wit requiſit for the ſciences. And the ſame *Galen* alleageth the reaſon hereof, ſaying; That Greece is the moſt temperat region of the world. Where the heate of the aire exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt

moist the dry. Which temperature, maketh men very wise and able for all the Sciences, as appeareth, considering the great number of famous mē, who thence haue issued, as *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, *Theophrastus*, *Demosthenes*, *Homer*, *Thales Milesius*, *Diogenes Cynicus*, *Solon*, and infinit other wise men mentioned in histories, whose works we find repleniſhed with all sciences. Not as the writers of other prouinces, who if they treat of phisicke, or any other science, it prooues a miracle, for them to alleage any other sort of science in their aid or fauour. All of them are beggerly and without furniture, as wanting a wit capable of all the arts. But which we may most maruell at in Greece is, that whereas the wit of women is found so repugnant vnto learning (as hereafter we will prooue) yet there haue ben so many she Greeks, so specially seen in the sciences, as they haue grown into competencie with the sufficientest men: as namely *Leontia*, a most wise woman, who wrote against *Theophrastus*, the greatest Philosopher of his time, reprooning him for many errors in philosophy. But if we looke into other Prouinces of the world, hardly shall we find sprung vp any one wit that was notable. Which groweth for that they inhabit places distempered, where men become brutish, slow of capacitie, and ill conditioned.

For this cause *Aristotle* moueth a doubt, saying; What meaneth it, that those who inhabit a country, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in countenance and conditions, To which probleme he answereth verie well, saying; that a good temperature, not only maketh a good grace in the body, but also aideth the wit and ability. And as the excesses of heat and cold do hinder nature, that she cannot shape a man in good figure;

So (also for the like reason) the harmonie of the soule is turned topsie turuie, and the wit prooueth slow and dull.

This the Greeks well wist, inasmuch as they termed al the nations of the world Barbarians, considering their slender sufficiencie and little knowledge. Whence we see, that of so many that are borne and studie out of Greece, if they be Philosophers, none of them arriueth to the perfection of *Plato*, and *Aristotle*: if Phisitions, to *Hippocrates* and *Galen*: if orators, to *Demosthenes*: if Poets, to *Homer*: and so in the residue of the sciences parts, the Greeks haue euer held the formost ranke beyond al contradiction. At least the probleme of *Aristotle* is very wel verified in the Greeks: for verily they are the men of most sufficiencie and loftiest capacity in the world: were it not that they liue in disgrace, oppressed by force of armes in bondage, and all hardly intreated, by the comming of the Turks, who banished all learning, and caused the Vniuersitie of Athens, to passe vnto Paris in France, where at this day the same cõtinueth. And (thus through want of manurance) so many gallant wits (as we haue before reported) are vtterly perished. In the other regions out of Greece, though schools and exercise of learning are planted, yet no man hath proued in them of any rare excellency.

The Phisition holded he hath waded very far, if with his wit he can attain to that which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* deliuered, and the naturall Philosopher reckoneth himselfe so full of knowledge, as he can be capable of no more, if he once grow to the vnderstanding of *Aristotle*. But this notwithstanding, it goeth not for an vniuersall rule, that all such as haue Greece for their birth-place, must of force be temperate and wise, and all the residue distem-

distemperat and ignorant: for the same *Galen* recounteth of *Anacharsis*, who was born in Scythia, that he carried the reputation of a rare wit amongst the Grecians, though himselfe a Barbarian. A Philosopher, borne in Athens, falling in contention with him, said vnto him; get thee hence thou Barbarian. Then *Anacharsis* answered, My countrey is to me a shame, and so art thou to thine: for Scythia, being a region so distemperat, and where so many ignorant persons liue, my self am grown to knowledge, and thou being borne in Athens, a place of wit and wisdome, wert neuer other than an Asse. In sort, that we need not vtterly despaire in regard of the temperature: neither thinke it a case of impossibilitie, to meet therewithall out of Greece, and especially in Spain, a region not verie distemperat: for as I haue found one of these differences in Spaine, so it may well be, that there are many others not yet come to knowledge, and which I haue not been able to find out. It shall doe well therefore, to intreat of the tokens, by which a temperat man may be discerned, to the end where such a one is, he may not be hidden.

Many signes haue the Phisitions laid down to discouer this difference of wit, but the most principall, and which affoord best notice, are these following.

The first (saith *Galen*) is to haue his haire abourne, a colour betweene white and red; and that passing from age to age, they euer become more golden. And the reason is very cleere: for the materiall cause whereof the haire consisteth, the Phisitions say, is a grosse vapour, which ariseth from the digestion, that the brain maketh at the time of his nourishment; and looke what colour is of the member, such also is that of his excrements. If the braine in his composition partake much of fleagme,

the haire in growth is white, if much choler, ſaffron coloured: but if theſe two humours reſt equally mingled, the braine becommeth temperat, hot, cold, moiſt, and dry; and the haire abourn, partaking both the extremes. True it is *Hippocrates* ſaith, that this colour in men, who liue vnder the North, as are the Engliſh, Flemmiſh, and Almains, ſpringeth for that their whitneſſe is parched vp with much cold, and not for the reaſon by vs alleaged. Wherfore in this token it behoooueth to be wel aduiſed: otherwiſe we may ſoon ſlip into error.

The ſecond token which a man, who ſhalbe endowed with this difference of wit, muſt haue, is, ſaith *Galen*, to be well ſhaped, of good countenance, of ſeemly grace, and cheerfull: in ſort, that the ſight may take delight to behold him, as a figure of rare perfection. And the reaſon is very plain: for if nature haue much force, and a ſeed well ſeaſoned, ſhe alwaies formeth of things poſſible, the beſt and moſt perfect in his kind: but being purueied of forces, moſtly ſhe placeth her ſtudie in faſhioning the braine, for that amongſt all other parts of the bodie, the ſame is the principal ſeat of the reaſonable ſoul: whence we ſee many men to be great and foule, and yet of an excellent wit.

The quantity of body, which a temperat man ought to haue (ſaith *Galen*) is not reſolutely determined by nature, for he may be long, ſhort, and of mean ſtature, conformable to the quantitie of the temperat ſeed, which it had when it was ſhaped. But as touching that which appertaineth to the wit in temperat perſons, a mean ſtature is better than either a great or little. And if we muſt lean to either of the extreames, it is better to encline to the little than to the great: for the bones and ſuperfluous fleſh (as we haue prooued heeretofore, by the opinion

of

of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) bring great dammage to the wit. Agreeable hereunto, the naturall Philosophers are wont to demand, whence it proceedeth, that men of small stature, are ordinarily more wise, than those of long stature. And for proofe hereof, they cite *Homer*, who saith that *Vlisses* was very wise, and little of bodie; and contrariwise *Aiax* very foolish, and in stature tall. To this question they make verie simple answer, saying, that the reasonable soule gathered into a narrow roome, hath thereby more force to worke comformable to that old saw, Vertue is of more force vnited than dispersed: and contrariwise making abode in a body long and large, it wanteth sufficient vertue to moue and animat the same. But this is not the reason thereof: for we should rather say, that long men haue much moisture in their composition, which extendeth out their flesh, and ableth the same to that increase which the naturall heat doth euer procure. The contrary betideth in little bodies: for through their much drinesse, the flesh cannot take his course, nor the naturall heat enlarge or stretch it out, and therefore they remaine of short stature. And we haue earst proued that amongst the first qualities, none bringeth so great dammage to the operations of the reasonable soule, as much moisture, and that none so farre quickneth the vnderstanding, as drinesse.

The third signe (saith *Galen*) by which a temperat man may be known, is, that he be vertuous and of good conditions: for if he be lewd and vitious, *Plato* affirmeth it groweth for that in man there is some distemperat qualitie, which vrgeth him to offend: and if such a one will practise that which is agreeable to vertue, it behooueth, that first he renounce his owne naturall inclination. But whosoeuer is absolutely temperat, standeth not in need

of any such diligence, for the inferiour powers require nothing at his hands, that is contrary to reason. Therefore *Galen* saith, that to a man who is possessed of this temperature, we need prescribe no diet what he shall eat and drinke: for he neuer exceedeth the quantitie and measure which phisicke would assigne him. And *Galen* contenteth not himselfe to terme them most temperat: but moreouer auoucheth, that it is not necessary to moderat their other passions of the soule: for his anger, his sadnesse, his pleasure, and his mirth, are alwaies measured by reason. Whence it followeth, that they are euermore healthful and neuer diseased, and this is the fourth figure.

But herein *Galen* swarueth from reason: for it is impossible to frame a man, that shalbe perfect in all his powers, as the body is temperat, and that his wrathfull and concupiscentiall power, get not the soueraigntie ouer reason, and incite him to sin. For it is not fitting to suffer any man (how temperat soeuer) to follow alwaies his owne naturall inclination without gainsetting and correcting him by reason. This is easily vnderstood, considering the temperature which the braine ought to haue, to the end the same may be made a conuenient instrument for the reasonable facultie: and that which the heart should hold, to the end the wrathfull power may couet glorie, empire, victorie, and soueraigntie ouer all: and that which the liuer ought to haue for disgesting the meats, and that which ought to rest in the cods, to be able to preserue mankind, and to increase the same. Of the brain, we haue said sundry times tofore, that it should retaine moisture, for memory; drinesse, for discourse; and heat, for the imagination. But for all this, his naturall temperature is cold and moist; and by reason of the

more

more or lesse of these two qualities, somtimes we terme it hot, and somtimes cold; now moist, then drie: but the cold and moist grow to predominat. The liuer, wherein the facultie of concupiscence resideth, hath for his naturall temperature, heat and moisture to predominate; and from this it neuer altereth, so long as a man liueth. And if somtimes we say it is cold, it groweth, for that the same hath not all the degrees of heat requisit to his owne operations. As touching the heart, which is the instrument of the wrathfull facultie, *Galen* affirmeth it of his owne nature to be so hot, as if (while a creature liueth) we put our finger into his hollownesse, it will grow impossible to hold the same there one moment without burning. And albeit somtime we terme it cold; yet we may not conceiue, that the same doth predominate: for this is a case impossible, but that the same consisteth not in such degree of heat, as to his operations is behooffull.

In the cods, where the other part of the concupiscible maketh abode: the like reason taketh place, for the predomination of his naturall temperature, is hot and drie. And if somtimes we say, that a mans cods are cold, we must not absolutly so vnderstand the same: neither to predomination: but that the degree of heat, requisit for the generatiue vertue is wanting. Hereon we plainly inferre, that if a man be well compounded and instrumentalized, it behoueth of force, that he haue excessiue heat in his heart: for otherwise the wrathfull facultie would grow verie remisse; and if the liuer be not exceeding hot, it cannot disgest the meat, nor make bloud for nourishment: and if the cods haue not more heat than cold, a man will proone impotent, and without power of begetting. Wherefore these two members

(being of such force as we haue said) it followeth of necessitie, that the braine take alteration through much heat, which is one of the qualities that most paineth reason; and which is worst, the will being free, inciteth and inclineth it selfe to condiscend to the appetites of the lower portion.

By this reckoning it appeareth, that nature cannot fashion such a man as may be perfect in al his powers, nor produce him enclined to vertue. How repugnant it is vnto the nature of man, that he become inclined to vertue, is easily prooued, considering the composition of the first man, which though the most perfect that euer mankind enioyed, sauing that of Christ our redeemer, and shaped by the hands of so great an artificer: yet if God had not infused into him a supernaturall qualitie, which might keepe down his inferiour part; it was impossible (abiding in the principles of his owne nature) that he should not be enclined to euill. And that God made *Adam* of a perfect power to wrath and concupiscence, is well to be vnderstood, in that he said and commanded him, Encrease and multiply, and to replenish the earth. It is certaine that he gaue them an able power for procreation, & made them not of a cold complexion, inasmuch as he commanded him that he should people the earth with men; which worke cannot be accomplished without abundance of heat. And no lesse heat did he bestow vpon the facultie nutritiue: with which he was to restore his consumed substance, and renew another in lieu thereof. Seeing that he said to the man and the woman, Behold, I haue giuen you euerie heath, that bringeth forth seed vpon the earth, & whatsoeuer trees haue seed of their kind, to the end they may serue you for food: for if God had giuen them a stomacke

macke and liuer, cold and of little heat, for certain they could not haue digeſted their meat, nor preſerue themſelues 900 yeares aliue in the world. He fortified alſo the heart, and gaue the ſame a wrathfull facultie, which might yeeld him apt to be a king and lord, and to command the whole world, and ſaid vnto them, Do you ſubdue the earth, and command ouer the fiſhes of the ſea, and the foules of the aire, and all the beaſts that mooue on the face of the earth. But if he had not giuen them much heat, they had not partaken ſo much viuacitie, nor authoritie of ſoueraigntie, of commandement, of glory, of maieſtie, and of honour.

How much it endamageth a prince, to haue his wrathfull power remiſſe, cannot ſufficiently be expreſſed: for through this only cauſe it befalleth, that he is not feared nor obeied, nor reuerenced by his ſubiects. After hauing fortified the wrathfull and concupiſcible powers, giuing vnto the forementioned members ſo much heat, he paſſed to the facultie reaſonable, and ſhaped for the ſame a braine cold and moiſt, in ſuch degree, and of a ſubſtance ſo delicat, that the ſoule might with the ſame diſcourſe, and philoſophize, and vſe his infuſed knowledge. For we haue alreadie auouched, and heretofore prooued, that God to beſtow a ſupernaturall knowledge vpon men, Firſt ordereth their wit, and maketh them capable, by way of the naturall diſpoſitions deliuered by his hand, that they may receiue the ſame: for which cauſe, the text of the holy ſcripture affirmeth, that he gaue them a heart to conceiue, and repleniſhed them with the diſcipline of vnderſtanding. The wrathful and concupiſcentiall powers, being then ſo mighty through great heat, and the reaſonable ſo weake and remiſſe to reſiſt, God made prouiſion of a ſupernaturall qualitie,

and

and this is tearmed by the Diuines Originall Iuſtice, by which they come to expreſſe the brunts of the inferiour portion, and the part reaſonable remaineth ſuperiour, and enclined to vertue. But when our firſt parents offended, they loſt this qualitie, and the iraſcible and concupiſcible remained in their nature, and ſuperiour to reaſon, in reſpect of the ſtrength of the three members that we ſpake of, and man reſted ready euen from his youth, vnto euill.

Adam was created in the age of youth, which (after the Phyſitions) is the moſt temperat of all the reſidue, and from that age foorth, he was enclined to euilnes, ſauing that little time, whilſt he preſerued himſelfe in grace by originall iuſtice. From this doctrine we gather in good naturall Philoſophie, that if a man be to performe any action of vertue to the gainſaieng of the fleſh, it is impoſſible that he can put the ſame in execution, without outward ayd of grace; for the qualities with which the inferiour power worketh, are of greater efficacie. I ſayd, with gainſaying of the fleſh, becauſe there are many vertues in man, which grow for that he hath his powers of wrath and concupiſcence feeble, as chaſtitie in a cold perſon, but this is rather an impotencie of operation, than a vertue: for which cauſe, had not the catholicke church taught vs, that without the ſpeciall aid of God, we could not haue ouercome our owne nature, Philoſophie naturall would ſo haue learned vs, namely, that grace comforteth our wil. That then which *Galen* would haue ſayd, was, that a temperat man exceedeth in vertue all others who want this good temperature, for the ſame is leſſe prouoked by the inferiour part.

The fifth propertie which thoſe of this temperature poſſeſſe, is to be very long liued, for they are ſtrong to reſiſt

reſiſt the cauſes and occaſions which engender diſeaſes; and this was that which the roiall prophet *Dauid* meant, The daies of our age in themſelues are ſeuentie yeares, but if in the potentates there be eightie or more, it is their paine and ſorrow: as if he ſhould ſay, The number of yeares which men ordinarily do liue, arriue vnto ſeuentie, and if potentates reach vnto eightie, thoſe once paſſed, they are dead on their feet. He tearmeth thoſe men potentates, who are of this temperature, for more than any other they reſiſt the cauſes which abridge the life. *Galen* layeth downe the laſt token, ſayeng, that they are very wiſe, of great memorie for things paſſed, of great imagination to foreſee thoſe to come, and of great vnderſtanding to find out the truth of all matters. They are not malicious, not wily, not cauillers, for theſe ſpring from a temperature that is vitious. Such a wit as this aſſuredly, was not framed by nature to addict it ſelfe vnto the ſtudie of the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philoſophie, Phiſicke, Diuinitie, or the Lawes: for put caſe he might eaſily attaine theſe ſciences, yet none of them can fully repleniſh his capacitie, only the office of a king is in proportion anſwerable therevnto, and in ruling and gouerning ought the ſame ſolely to be imploied. This ſhall eaſilie be ſeene if you run ouer the tokens and properties of a temperat man, which we haue laid downe, by taking into conſideration, how fitly ech of them ſquareth with the roiall ſcepter, and how impertinent they ſhew for the other arts and ſciences.

That a king be faire and gratious, is one of the things which moſt inuiteth his ſubiects to loue him and wiſh him well; For the obiect of loue (ſaith *Plato*) is beauty and a ſeemly proportion: and if a king be hardly fauoured, and badly ſhaped, it is impoſſible that his ſubiects can

can beare him affection, rather they reake it a ſhame, that a man vnperfect and void of the gifts of nature, ſhould haue ſway and commaundement ouer them. To be vertuous and of good conditions, eaſily may we gather how greatly it importeth; for he who ought to order the liues of his ſubiects, and deliuer vnto them rules and lawes to liue conformably to reaſon, it is requiſit that he performe the ſame alſo in his owne perſon: for as the king is, ſuch are the great, the meane, and the inferiour perſons.

Moreouer, by this means he ſhall make his commandements the more authenticall, and with the better title may chaſtiſe ſuch as do not obſerue them. To enioy a perfection in all the powers which gouern man, namely; the generatiue, nutritiue, wrathfull and reaſonable, is more neceſſarie in a king, than any artiſte whatſoeuer. For (as *Plato* deliuereth) in a well ordered common-wealth, there ſhould be appointed certain ſurueiours who might with skill looke into the qualities of ſuch perſons as are to be married, and giue to him a wife anſwerable vnto him in proportion, and to euerie wife a conuenient husband. Through this diligence, the principall end of matrimonie ſhould not become vaine; for we ſee by experience, that a woman who could not conceiue of her firſt husbād, marrying another, ſtraightwaies beareth children; and many men haue no children by their firſt wife, taking another, ſpeedily come to be fathers.

Now this skill (ſaith *Plato*) is principally behooffull in the marriage of kings: for it being a matter of ſuch importance, for the peace and quiet of the kingdome, that the Prince haue lawfull children to ſucceed in the eſtate, it may ſo fall, that the king marrying at all aduentures,

ſhall

ſhall take a barraine woman to wife, with whom he ſhall be combred all daies of his life, without hope of iſſue. And if he deceaſe without heires of his body, ſtraightwaies it muſt be decided by ciuill wars, who ſhall command next after him. But *Hippocrates* ſaith, this art is neceſſarie for men that are diſtemperat, and not for thoſe who partake this perfect temperature by vs deſcribed. Theſe need no ſpecial choice in their wife, nor to ſearch out which may anſwere them in proportion: for whom ſoeuer they marry withal (ſaith *Galen*) forthwith they beget iſſue, but this is vnderſtood, when the wife is ſound, and of the age wherein women by order of nature, may conceiue and bring forth: in ſort, that fruitfulneſſe is more requiſit in a king than in any artiſt whatſoeuer, for the reaſons tofore alleaged.

The nutritiue power (ſaith *Galen*) if the ſame be gluttonous, greedy, and bibbing, it ſpringeth, for that the liuer and ſtomake want the temperature which is requiſit for their operations: and for this cauſe men become riotous and ſhort liued. But if theſe members poſſeſſe their due temperature and compoſition, the ſelfe *Galen* affirmeth, that they couet no greater quantitie of meat and drink than is conuenient for preſeruation of life. Which propertie is of ſo great importance for a king, that God holdeth that land for bleſſed, to whoſe lot ſuch a Prince befalleth. Bleſſed is the land (ſaith he in *Eccleſiaſticus*) whoſe king is noble, and whoſe princes feed in due times, for their refreſhment, and not for riotouſneſſe. Of the wrathful facultie if the ſame be extended or remiſſe, it is a token (ſaith *Galen*) that the heart is ill compoſed, and partaketh not that temperature, which is requiſit for his operations. From which two extreams, a king ought to be farther diſtant, than any other artiſt. For to ioine

wrath-

wrathfulneſſe with much power maketh ſinally for the ſubiects auaile. And as illy fitteth it for a king to haue his wrathfull power remiſſe: for if he ſlightly ſlip ouer bad parts and attempts in his kingdome, he groweth out of awe and reuerence amongſt his ſubiects; whence great dammages and verie difficult to be remedied, doe accuſtomably ariſe in the common-wealth. But the man who is temperat, groweth diſpleaſed vpon good groũd, and can pacifie himſelfe as is requiſit: which propertie is as neceſſarie to be ſetled in a king, as anie of theſe which we haue before remembred. How much it importeth that the faculty reaſonable, the imagination, the memorie, and the vnderſtanding, be of greater perfection in a king than in any other, is eaſily to be prooued: for the other arts and ſciences (as it ſeemeth) may be obtained and put in practiſe by the force of mans wit: but to gouern a kingdome, and to preſerue the ſame in peace and concord, not only requireth, that the king be endowed with a natural wiſdome to execute the ſame: but it is alſo neceſſary, that God particularly aſſiſt him with his vnderſtanding, and aid him in gouerning: whence it was well noted in the ſcripture, The heart of the king is in the hand of God. To liue alſo many yeares, and to enioy continuall health, is a propertie more conuenient for a good king than for any other artiſan. For his induſtry and trauell, breedeth an vniuerſall good to all: and if he faile to hold out in healthfulneſſe, the common-wealth falleth to ruine.

All this doctrine here laid downe by vs, will be euidemly confirmed, if we can find in any hiſtory, that at any time there was any king choſen, in whom anie of thoſe tokens and conditions by vs recited, were not wanting. And truth hath this as peculier to her nature,

that

that she neuer lacketh arguments, whereby to be confirmed.

The diuine scripture recounteth, that God falling in dislike with *Saul*, for that he had spared *Amalecks* life; commanded *Samuel* that he should go to Bethleem, and annoint for king of Israell, one of the eight sons of *Iesse*. Now the holy man, presuming that God had a liking to *Eliab*, for that he was tall of stature; demanded of him, Is this man, here in the presence of my Lord, his Christ? to which question he was answered in this maner, Take not regard to his countenance, nor to the talnesse of his stature, for I haue refused him; I iudge not man by his looke: for man seeth the things outwardly apparent, but the Lord discerneth the heart; As if God should say, Marke not (O *Samuel*) the high stature of *Eliab*, nor that manly countenance which thou beholdest; for I haue tried that in *Saul*. You men iudge by the outward signes, but I cast mine eye vpon the iudgement and wisedome, wherewith a people is to be gouerned.

Samuel mistrusting his owne skill in chusing, passed on farther in the charge which was commanded him; asking still of God, vpon euery one, which of them he should annoint for king: and because God held himselfe contented with none of them, he said vnto *Iesse*, hast thou yet no more sonnes but those who stand before vs? Who answered, saying; That he had yet one more, who kept his beasts, but he was of little growth: him seeming, that therfore he was not sufficient to weeld the royall scepter. But *Samuel* now wisted, that a great stature was no sure token, caused him to be sent for. And it is a point worth the noting, that the holy Scripture, before it expressed how he was annointed king, said in this maner; But he was abourne haired, and of a faire coun-

countenance, and a viſage well ſhaped, ariſe and annoint him, for this is he. In ſort, that *Dauid* had the two firſt tokens, of thoſe which we recounted, abourne haired, handſome ſhaped, and of meane ſtature. To be vertuous and well conditioned, which is the third ſigne eaſily we may conceiue, that he was therwithall endowed, ſeeing that God ſaid, I haue found a man after my heart: for albeit he ſinned ſundry times, yet for all that, he loſt not the name and habite of vertue. Euen as one by habite vitious, though he performe ſome good morrall works, doth not therefore leeſe the name of lewd and vitious. That he led all the courſe of his life in health, it ſhould ſeeme may be prooued; becauſe in his whole hiſtory, mention is made of his ſicknes but once (& this is a naturall diſpoſition, of all ſuch as are long lyued.) Now becauſe his naturall heat was reſolued, and that he could not take heat in his bed; to remedie this, they couched a verie faire lady by his ſide, who might foſter him with heat. And herethrough he liued ſo manie yeares, that the text ſaith, he deceaſſed in a good age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie: as if it ſhould ſay, *Dauid* died in a good old age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie: hauing endured ſo many trauails in the wars, and vndergone great penance for his tranſgreſſions. And this grew, for that he was temperat, and of a good complexion: for he refuſed the occaſions, which accuſtomably breed infirmitie, and ſhortning of mans life. His great wiſdome and knowledge was noted by that ſeruant of *Saul* when he ſaid, My lord, I know a cunning muſition, the ſon of *Ieſſe*, born in *Bethleem*, couragious in fight, wiſe in diſcourſe, and of ſeemly countenance. By which tokens (aboue ſpecified) it is manifeſt, that *Dauid* was a temperat man, and to ſuch is the royall ſcepter belonging,

ging: for his wit is of the best mould that nature could fashion. But there presenteth it selfe a verie great difficultie against this doctrine, namely; seeing God knew all the wits and abilities of Israel, and likewise wist, that temperat men are seized of the wisdom and knowledge requisit to the calling of a king: for what cause in the first election that he made, he sought not out a man of this sort? Nay the text auoucheth, that *Saul* was so tall of stature, as he passed al the residue of Israel, by the head and shoulders. And this signe is not only an euil token of wit in natural Philosophy, but euē God himself (as we haue prooued) reprooued *Samuel*, because (mooued by the high growth of *Eliab*) he thereupon would haue made him king. But this doubt declareth that to be true, which *Galen* said, that out of Greece, we shall not (so much as in a dreame) find out a temperat man, Seeing in a people so large (as that of Israel) God could not find one to chuse for a king: but it behooued him to tarrie, till *Dauid* was grown vp, and the while made choice of *Saul*. For the text saith, that he was the best of Israel: but verely it seemed he had more good nature than wisdome, and that was not sufficient to rule and gouerne. Teach me (saith the *Psalme*) goodnes, dicipline, and knowledge. And this the royall Prophet *Dauid* spake, seeing that it auaileth not for a king to be good and vertuous, vnlesse he ioine wisdome and knowledge therewithall. By this example of king *Dauid*, it seemeth we haue sufficiently approoued our opinion.

But there was also another king borne in Israell, of whom it was said, Where is he that is borne king of the Iewes? And if we can prooue, that he was abourne hairred, towardly, of meane bignesse, vertuous, healthfull, and of great wisdome and knowledge, it will be no way

damageable to this our doctrin. The Euangelists busied not themselues, to report the disposition of Christ our redeemer: for it serued not to the purpose of that which they handled, but is a matter which may easily be vnderstood, supposing that for a man to be temperat, as is requisit, compriseth all the perfection, wherewith naturally he can be endowed. And seeing that the holy spirit compounded and instrumentalized him, it is certaine that as touching the materiall cause, of which he formed him, the distemperature of Nazareth could not resist him, nor make him erre in his worke, as do the other naturall agents: but he performed what him best pleased: for he wanted neither force, knowledge, nor will, to frame a man most perfect, and without any defect. And that so much the rather, for that his comming (as himselfe affirmed) was to endure trauels for mans sake, and to teach him the trueth. And this temperature (as we haue before prooued) is the best naturall instrument that can be found for these two things. Wherethrough I hold that relatiō for true, which *Publius Lentulus*, Viceconsull, wrote from Hierusalem vnto the Roman Senat after this maner.

There hath been seen in our time, a man who yet liueth, of great vertue, called Iesus Christ, who by the Gentiles, is termed the prophet of truth, and his disciples say, that he is the sonne of God. He raiseth the deceased, and healeth the diseased, is a man of meane and proportionable stature, and of very faire countenance, his looke carrieth such a maiesty, as those who behold him, are enforced both to loue and feare him. He hath his haire coloured like a nut full ripe, reaching down to his eares, and from his eares to his shoulders; they are of waxe colour, but more bright: he hath in the middle

of his forehead, a locke, after the maner of *Nazareth*. His forehead is plain, but very pleasing: his face void of spot or wrincklé, accompanied with a moderat colour: his nosthrils and mouth, cannot by any with reason be reprooued: his beard thicke, and resembling his haire; not long, but forked: his countenance verie gratious and graue: his eies gracefull and cleere; and when he rebuketh, he daunteth; and when he admonisheth, he pleaseth: he maketh himselfe to be beloued, and is cheerfull with grauitie: he hath neuer been seen to laugh, but to weep diuers times: his hands and arms are verie faire: in his conuersation he contenteth verie greatly, but is seldom in company: but being in company, is very modest: in his countenance and port, he is the seemliest man that may be imagined. In this relation, are contained three or foure tokens of a temperat person.

The first that he had, his hair and beard of the colour of a nut fully ripe, which to him that considereth it well appeareth to be a browne abourne; which colour, God commanded the heifer should haue, which was to be sacrificed as a figure of Christ: and when he entred into heauen with that triumph and maiestie, which was requisit for such a Prince: some Angels who had not been enformed of his incarnation, said, Who is this that commeth from Edon, with his garments died in Bozra? as if they had said, Who is he that commeth from the red Land, with his garment stained in the same die, in respect of his haire & his red beard, and of the blood with which he was tainted? The same letter also reporteth him to be the fairest man that euer was seene, and this is the second token of a temperat person, and so was it prophesied by the holy scripture as a signe wherby to know him, Of faire shape aboue all the children of men. And

S. Hierom interpreteth it) a red man. That he was faire & wel fashioned, which is the second token, cannot in him be denied: for when God created him, the text saith, God saw all things which he had made, and they were verie good. Then it falleth out certaine, that he issued not from the hands of God, foule and ill shaped: for the works of God are perfect. And so much the more for that the trees (as the text saith) were faire to behold. Then what may we think of *Adam*, whom God created to this principall end, that he might be Lord and president of the world? That he was vertuous, wise, and well conditioned, (which are the third and sixth signes) is gathered out of these words, Let vs make a man after our owne image and likenesse: for by the antient Philosophers, the foundation on which the resemblance that man hath with God is grounded, are vertue & wisdome. Therefore *Plato* auoucheth, that one of the greatest contentments which God receiued in heauen, is to see a vertuous and wise man, praised and magnified vpon earth: for such a one is his liuely purtraiture. And contrariwise, he groweth displeased, when ignorant and vitious persons are held in estimation and honor: which springeth from the vnlikenesse between God and them. That he liued healthfull and a long space (which are the fourth and fifth tokens) is nothing difficult to prooue, inasmuch as his daies were 930 yeares. Wherethrough I may now cõclude, that the man who is a bourn haired, faire, of meane stature, vertuous, healthfull, and long lyned, must necessarily be very wise, and endowed with a wit requisit for the scepter royall.

We haue also (as by the way) disclosed, in what sort great vnderstanding may be vnited with much imagination, and much memory, albeit this may also come to passe;

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CHAP. XV.

In what maner Parents may beget wise children, and of a wit fit for learning.

IT falleth out a matter worthie of maruaile, that nature being such as we all know her, wise, wittie, and of great art, iudgement, and force, and mankind a worke of so speciall regard, yet for one whom she maketh skilful and wise, she produceth infinit depriued of wit. Of which effect my selfe searching the reason and naturall causes, haue found (in my iudgement) that parents apply not themselues to the act of generation with that order and concert which is by nature

 established,

in another place he saith, His eies are fairer than the wine, and his teeth whiter than milke. Which beautie and good disposition of body, imported much to effect that all men should beare him affection, and that there might be nothing in him worthy to be abhorred. For which cause, the letter deliuereth, that all men were enforced to loue him. It reciteth also that he was meane of personage, and that not because the holy Ghost wanted matter to make him greater, if so it had seemed good: but (as we tofore haue prooued by the opinion of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) because when the reasonable soule is burdened with much bones and flesh, the same incurreth great dammage in his wit.

The third signe, namely, to be vertuous and wel conditioned, is likewise expressed in this letter, and the Iews themselues with al their false witnesses, could not proue the contrarie, nor reply when he demanded of them, Which of you can reprooue me of sinne? And *Ioseph* (through the faithfulnes which he owed to his history) affirmed of him that he partaked of another nature aboue man, in respect & wisedome. Only long life could not be verefied of Christ our redeemer, because they put him to death being yong; where as if they had permitted him to finish his naturall course, the same would haue reached to 80 years and vpwards. For he who could abide in a wildernesse 40 daies, and 40 nights without meat or drinke, and not be sicke nor dead therewithall, could better haue defended himselfe from other lighter things, which had power to breed alteration or offence. Howbeit this action was reputed miraculous, and a matter which could not light within the compasse of nature.

These two examples of kings, which we haue alleaged

ged, sufficeth to make vnderstood, that the sceptre royal, is due to men that are temperate; and that such are endowed with the wit and wisdom requisit for that office. But there was also another man, made by the proper hands of God, to the end he should be king and Lord of all things created, & he made him faire, vertuous, sound, of long life, and very wise. And to prooue this, shal not be amisse for our purpose. *Plato* holdeth it for a matter impossible, that God or nature, can make a man temperat in a countrey distemperat: wherethrough he affirmeth that God, to create a man of great wisdom & temperature, sought out a place where the heat of the aire should not exceed the cold, nor the moist the dry. And the diuine scripture, whence he borrowed this sentence, saith not, that God created *Adam* in the earthly paradise, which was that most temperat place whereof he speaketh, but that after he had shaped him, there he placed him. Then our Lord God (saith he) tooke man, and set him in the Paradise of pleasure, to the end he might there worke and take it in charge. For the power of God being infinit, & his knowledge beyond measure, when he had a will to giue him all the naturall perfection that might be in mankinde; we must thinke that neither the peece of earth of which he was framed, nor the distemperature of the soile of Damascus where he was created, could so gainsay him, but that he made him temperat. The opinion of *Plato*, of *Aristotle*, and of *Galen*, take place in the works of nature: and euen she also, can somtimes (euen in distemperat regions) engender a person that shalbe temperat. But that *Adam* had his haire and his beard abourne, which is the first token of a temperat man, manifestly appeareth. For in respect of this so notorious signe, he had that name *Adam*, which is to say (as

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IT falleth out a matter worthie of maruaile, that nature being such as we all know her, wise, wittie, and of great art, iudgement, and force, and mankind a worke of so speciall regard, yet for one whom she maketh skilful and wise, she produceth infinit depriued of wit. Of which effect my selfe searching the reason and naturall causes, haue found (in my iudgement) that parents apply not themselues to the act of generation with that order and concert which is by nature

 established,

eſtabliſhed; neither know the conditions which ought to be obſerued, to the end their children may proue of wiſedome and iudgement. For by the ſame reaſon, for which in any temperat or diſtemperat region, a man ſhould be borne very wittie (hauing alwaies regard to the ſelfe order of cauſes) there will 100000 proue of ſlender capacity: now if by art we may procure a remedie for this, we ſhall haue brought to the commonwealth the greateſt benefit that ſhe can receiue. But the knot of this matter conſiſteth, in that we cannot entreat hereof with tearms ſo ſeemly and modeſt, as to the naturall ſhamefaſtneſſe of man is requiſite: and if for this reaſon I ſhould forbeare to note any part or contemplation that is neceſſarie, for certaine the whole matter would be marred, in ſort that diuers graue Philoſophers hold opinion, how wiſe men ordinarily beget fooliſh children, becauſe in the act of copulation, for honeſties ſake, they abſtaine from certaine diligences which are of importance, that the ſonne may partake of his fathers wiſedome. Some antient Philoſophers haue laboured to ſearch out the naturall reaſon of this naturall ſhame, which the eies conceiue when the inſtruments of generation are ſet before them; and why the eares take offence to heare them named: and they maruell to ſee, that nature hath framed thoſe parts with ſuch diligence and carefulneſſe, and for an end of ſuch importance, as the immortalizing of mankind; and yet the wiſer a man is, the more he groweth in diſlike to behold or heare them ſpoken of. Shame and honeſtie (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is the proper paſſion of the vnderſtanding, and who ſo reſteth not offended at thoſe terms and actions of generation, giueth a ſure token of his wanting that power, as if we ſhould ſay, that he is blockiſh, who putting his hand

hand into the fire, doth not feele the same to burne. By this token, *Cato* the elder discouered, that *Manilius* (a noble man) was depriued of vnderstanding, because it was told him, that the other kissed his wife in presence of his daughter; for which cause he displaced him out of the Senat, and *Manilius* could neuer obtaine at his hands to be restored.

Out of this contemplation, *Aristotle* frameth a probleme, demaunding whence it grew, that men who desire to satisfie their venerous lusts, do yet greatly shame to confesse it, and yet coueting to liue, to eat, or to perform any other such action, they stagger not to acknowledge it? to which probleme he shapeth a very vntoward answer, saying; Perhaps it commeth, because the couetings of diuers things are necessary, and some of them kill if they be not accomplished, but the lust of venerous acts, floweth from excesse, and is token of abundance. But in effect this probleme is false, and the answer none other: for a man not only shameth to manifest the desire he carrieth to companie with a woman, but also to eat, to drinke, and to sleepe, and if a will take him to send foorth anie excrement, he dares not say it or do it, but with cumber & shamefastnesse, and so gets him to some secret place out of sight. Yea, we find men so shamefast, as though they haue a great will to make water, yet cannot do it if any looke vpon them, whereas if we leaue them alone, straight waies the vrine taketh his issue. And these are the appetites to send foorth the superfluous things of the body, which if they were not effected, men should die, and that much sooner than with forbearing meat or drink. And if there be any (saith *Hippocrates*) who speaketh or actuateth this in the presence of another, he is not maister of his sound iudgement. *Galen* affirmeth, that

that the ſeed holdeth the ſemblable proportion with the ſeed veſſels, as the vrine doth with the bladder, for as much vrine annoieth the bladder, ſo much ſeed endammageth the ſeed veſſels. And the opinion which *Ariſtotle* held, in denieng that man and woman incur no infirmitie or death by retaining of ſeed, is contrarie to the iudgement of all Phiſitions, and eſpecially of *Galen*, who ſaith and auoucheth, that many women remaining widowes in their youth, haue therthrough loſt their ſenſe, motion, breathing, and finally their life. And the ſelfe *Ariſtotle* reckoneth vp many diſeaſes wherunto continent perſons are ſubiect in that behalfe. The true anſwer of this probleme cannot be yeelded in naturall Philoſophy, becauſe it is not marſhalled vnder her iuriſdiction; for it behoueth to paſſe to an higher, namely Metaphiſicke, wherein *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that the reaſonable ſoule is the loweſt of all the intelligences, and for that it partaketh of the ſame generall nature with the Angels, it ſhameth to behold it ſelfe placed in a body which hath fellowſhip with brute beaſts: wherethrough the diuine ſcripture noteth it as a myſterie, that the firſt man being naked, was not aſhamed, but ſo ſoone as he ſaw himſelfe tō be ſo, forthwith he got a couering. At which time he knew that through his owne fault, he had loſt immortality, and that his body was become ſubiect to alteration and corruption, and thoſe inſtruments and parts giuen him for that of neceſſity he muſt die, and leaue an other in his roome, and that to preſerue himſelfe in life, that ſmall ſpace which reſted, it behooued him to eat and drinke, and to expell thoſe noiſome and corrupt excrements. And principally he ſhamed, ſeeing that the Angels, with whom he had competence, were immortall and ſtood not in need of eating, drinking, or ſleeping:

An high ſpeculation.

ping, for preseruation of their life: neither had the instruments of generation, but were created all at once, without matter, and without feare of corrupting. Of all these points were the eies and the eares naturally done to ware. Wherethrough, the reasonable soule groweth displeased and ashamed, that these things giuen man to make him mortall and corruptible, are thus brought to his memory. And that this is a well fitting answere we euidently perceiue: for God to content the soule after the vniuersall iudgement, and to bestow vpon him intire glory, will cause that hir body shall partake the properties of an Angell, bestowing thereupon subtlenesse, lightnesse, immortalitie, and brightnesse: for which reason, he shall not stand in need to eat or drink as the brute beasts. And when men shall thus-wise dwell in heauen, they will not shame to behold themselues clothed with flesh, euen as Christ our redeemer, and his mother, nothing shamed thereat. But it will breed an accidentall glory, to see that the vse of those parts, which were wont to offend the hearing and the eies, is now surceased. I therefore making due reckoning of this naturall modestie of the care, haue endeuoured to salue the hard and rough termes of this matter, and to fetch certain, not ill pleasing biasses of speech, and where I cannot throughly performe it, the honest reader shall affoord me pardon. For to reduce to a perfect maner, the art which must be obserued, to the end men may proue of rare capacities, is one of the things most requisit for the common-wealth. Besides that, by the same reason they shall proue vertuous, prompt, sound, and long lyued.

Note here a sign which sheweth the immortalitie of the soule:

I haue thought good to seuer the matter of this chapter, into foure principall parts, that thereby I may make plaine what shalbe deliuered; and that the reader may not

not rest in confusion. The first is, to shew the naturall qualities and temperature which man & woman ought to possesse, to the end they may vse generation. The second, what diligence the parents ought to employ, that their children may be male and not female. The third, how they may become wise and not fooles. The fourth, how they are to be dealt withall after their birth, for preseruation of their wit.

To come then to the first point we haue alreadie aleaged, that *Plato* laieth downe, how in a well ordered common-wealth, there ought to be assigned certain surueiors of marriages, who by art might skill, to looke into the qualities of the persons that are to be married, and to giue ech one the wife which answereth him in proportion, & to euery wife her cõuenient husband. In which matter, *Hippocrates* and *Galen* began to take some pains, and prescribed certain precepts and rules, to know what woman is fruitful, and who can beare no children; and what man is vnable for generation, and who able and likely to beget issue. But touching all this, they vttered verie little, and that not with such distinction as was behooffull, at least for the purpose which I haue in hand. Therefore it falleth out necessarie, to begin the art euen from his principles, and briefly to giue the same his due order and concert, that we so may make plaine and apparant, from what vnion of parents, wise children issue; and from what, fools and do-noughts: To which end it behoooeth first to know a particular point of Philosophy, which although in regard of the practises of the art, it be very manifest and true, yet the vulgar make little reake thereof. And from the notice of this, dependeth all that, which as touching this first point is to be deliuered: and that is, that man (though it seeme otherwise

wise in the composition which we see) is different from a woman in noughtels (saith Galen) than only in hauing his genitall members without his body. For if we make anotomie of a woman, we shall find that she hath within her two stones, two vessels for seed; and her belly of the same frame as a mans member, without that any one part is therin wanting. And this is so very true, that if when nature hath finished to forme a man in all perfection, she would conuert him into a woman, there needeth nought els to be done; saue only to turne his instruments of generations inward. And if she haue shaped a woman, and would make a man of her, by taking forth her belly and her cods, it would quickly be performed. This hath chanced many times in nature, aswell whiles the creature hath been in the mothers womb, as after the same was borne, wherof the histories are full; but some haue held them only for fables, because this is mentioned in the Poets, yet the thing carrieth meere truth: for diuers times nature hath made a female child, and she hath so remained in her mothers belly for the space of one or two months: and afterwards, plentie of heat growing in the genitall members, vpon some occasion they haue issued forth, and she become a male. To whom this transformation hath befallen in the mothers womb, is afterwards plainly discouered, by certaine motions which they retaine, vnfitting for the masculin sex, being altogither womanish, & their voice shrill & sweet. And such persons are enclined to perform womens actions, and fall ordinarily into vncouth offences. Contrariwise, nature hath sundrie times made a male with his genetories outward, and cold growing on, they haue turned inward, and it became female. This is knowen after she is borne, for she retaineth a mannish fashion, aswell

well in her words, as in all her motions and workings. This may seem difficult to be prooued, but considering that which many authenticall historians affirme, it is a matter not hard to be credited. And that women haue been turned into men, after they were borne, the verie vulgar doe not much maruell to heare spoke of: for besides that which sundrie our elders haue laid downe for trueth, It befell in Spain but few yeares since, and that wherof we find experience, is not to be called in question or argument. What then the cause may be, that the genitall members are engendred within or without, and the creature becommeth male or female, will fall out a plain case, if we once know that heat extendeth and enlargeth all things; and cold retaineth and closeth them vp. Wherethrough, it is a conclusion of all Philosophers and Phisitions, that if the seed be cold and moist, a woman is begotten, and not a man; and if the same be hot and dry, a man is begotten and not a woman. Whence we apparently gather, that there is no man, who in respect of a woman, may be termed cold; nor woman hot, in respect of a man.

Aristotle saith, it is necessarie for a woman to be cold and moist, that she may be likewise fruitfull: for if she were not so, it would fal out impossible, that her monthly course should flow, or she haue milke to preserue the child nine months, in her belly, and two yeares after it is borne, but that the same would soone wast and consume.

All Philosophers and Phisitions auouch, that the belly holdeth the same proportion with mans seed, that the earth doth with corne, and with any other graine. And we see, that if the earth want coldnesse and moisture, the husbandmen dareth not sow therein, neither will the

seed prosper. But of soils, those are most fruitfull and fertile in rendering fruit, which partake most of cold and moist, As we see by experience in the regions towards the North, As England, Flanders, and Almaine, whose abundance of all fruits, worketh astonishment in such as know not the reason thereof. And in such countries as these, no married woman was euer childlesse, neither can they there tell, what barrennesse meaneth, but are all fruitfull, and breed children through their abundance of coldnesse and moisture. But though it is true that the woman should be cold and moist for conception, Yet she may abound so much therein, that it may choke the seed; euen as we see excesse of raine spoileth the corne, which cannot ripen in ouermuch coldnesse. Whereon we must conceiue, that these two qualities ought to keepe a certaine measurableneſſe, which when they exceed, or reach not vnto, the fruitfulnesse is spoiled. *Hippocrates* holdeth that woman for fruitfull, whose wombe is tempered in such sort, as the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie. Wherethrough he saith, that those women who haue their belly cold, cannot conceiue, no more than such as are verie moist, or verie cold and dry. But so, for the same reason that a woman and her genitall parts should be temperat, it were impossible that she could conceiue, or be a woman. For if the seed, of which she was first formed, had been temperat, the genitall members would haue issued forth, and she haue been a man. So should a beard grow on her chin, and her floures surcease, and she become as perfect a man, as nature could produce. Likewise the womb in a woman cannot be predominatly hot: For if the seed whereof she was engendred had been of that temperature, she should haue been born a man, and not a woman.

man. This is past all exception, that the qualities which yeeld a woman fruitfull, are cold and moisture: for the nature of man, standeth in need of much nourishment, that he may be able to vse procreation, and continue his kind. Wherethrough we see, that amongst all the females of brute beasts, none haue their monthly courses as a woman. Therefore it was requisite to make her altogither cold and moist, and that in such a degree, as that she might breed much flegmatick bloud, and not be able to wast or consume the same. I said flegmaticke blood, because this is seruiceable to the breeding of milke, by which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* auouch, the creature is releeued, all the time it remaineth in the mothers belly. Now if the same should be temperat, it would produce much bloud, vnfit for the engendring of milke, and would wholly resolue, as it doth in a temperat man, and so nothing be left for nourishing the babe. Therefore I hold it for certain, and verily it is impossible that a woman can be temperat or hot, but they are all cold and moist. And if this be not so, let the Philosopher or Phisition tell me for what cause all women are beardlesse, and haue their sicknesse whiles they are healthfull, & for what cause the seed of which she was formed, being temperat or hot, she was borne a woman, & not a man? Howbeit, though it be true that they are al cold & moist: yet it followeth not, that they are all in one degree of coldnesse and moisture. For some are in the first, some in the second, and some in the third, and in ech of these they may concorde, if a man answere them in proportion of heat, as shall hereafter be expressed. By what tokens we may know these three degrees of coldnesse and moisture in a woman, and likewise weet who is in the first, who is in the second, and who in the third:

there is no Philosopher or Phisition, that as yet hath vnfolded. But considering the effects, which these qualities do worke in women, we may part them, by reason of their being extended, and so we shall easily get notice hereof. The first, by the wit and habilitie of the woman. The second, by her maners and conditions. The third, by her voice big or small. The fourth, by her flesh, much, or little. The fifth, by her colour. The sixt by her haire. The seuenth, by her faireneſſe or foulneſſe. As touching the first, we may know, that though it be true (as tofore we haue prooued) that the wit and abilitie of a woman, followeth the temperature of the brain, and of none other member: yet her womb and cods, are of so great force and vigour, to alter the whole body, that if these be hot and dry, or cold and moist, or of whatsoeuer other temperature, the other partes (saith *Galen*) will be of the same tenour: but the member which most partaketh the alterations of the belly, all Phisitions say, is the brain, though they haue not set down the reason whereon they ground this correspondencie. True it is *Galen* prooueth by experience, that by speying a Sow, she becommeth faire and fat, and her flesh very sauoury: and if she haue her cods, she tasteth little better than dogs flesh. Wherby we conceiue, that the belly and the cods carrie great efficacie, to communicat their temperature to all the other parts of the body; especially to the brain, for that the same is cold & moist like themselues. Between which (through the resemblance) the passage is easie.

Now if we conclude, that cold and moist, are the qualities which worke an impairement in the reasonable part, and that his contraries, namely hot and drie, giue the same perfection and encreasement, we shall find that

the woman who sheweth much wit and sufficiencie, partaketh of cold and moist in the first degree; and if she be very simple, it yeeldeth a signe that she is in the third, the partaking betweene which two extreames, argueth the second degree; for to thinke that a woman can be hot and drie, or endowed with a wit and ability conformable to these two qualities, is a verie great error; because if the seed of which she was formed, had been hot and dry in their domination, she should haue been born a man, and not a woman. But in that it was cold and moist, she was born a woman and not a man. The truth of this doctrine may cleerely be discerned, if you consider the wit of the first woman, who liued in the world: for God hauing fashioned her with his own hands, and that very accomplished, and perfect in her sex, it is a conclusion infallibly true, that she was possessed of much lesse knowledge than *Adam*: which the diuell well weeting, got him to tempt her, and durst not fall into disputation with the man, fearing his great wit and wisdome. Now to say, that *Eue* for her offence, was reft that knowledge which she wanted, cannot be auouched, for as yet she had not offended.

So then this defect of wit in the first woman grew, for that she was by God created cold and moist: which temperature, is necessary to make a woman fruitfull, and apt for childbirth, but enemy to knowledge: and if he had made her temperat like *Adam*, she should haue beene very wise, but nothing fruitful, nor subiect to her monthly courses, saue by some supernaturall meanes. On this nature S. *Paul* grounded himselfe, when he said, Let a woman learne in silence, with all subiection: neither would he allow the woman to teach, or gouerne the man, but to keep silence. But this is true, when a woman

man hath not a ſpirit or greater grace, than her own naturall diſpoſition: but if ſhe obtaine any gift from aboue, ſhe may wel teach and ſpeake, for we know that the people of Iſrael, being oppreſſed and beſieged by the Aſſirians; *Iudith* (a very wiſe woman) ſent for the Priests of the *Gabeits* and *Carmits*, and reprooued them ſaying, How can it be endured, that *Oſias* ſhould ſay, if within fiue daies there come no ſuccour, he will yeeld the people of Iſrael to the Aſſirians? ſee you not, that theſe words rather prouoke God to wrath, than to mercie? how may it be, that men ſhould point out a limited time for the mercy of God, and in their mind aſſigne a day, at which he muſt ſuccour and deliuer them? And in the concluſion of this reproofe, ſhe told them in what ſort they might pleaſe God, and obtaine their demand. And no leſſe, *Elbora* (a woman of no leſſe wiſdome) taught the people of Iſrael, how they ſhould render thanks vnto God, for the great victories which ſhe had attained againſt their enemies. But whilſt a woman abideth in her naturall diſpoſition, all ſorts of learning and wiſdome, carrieth a kind of repugnancie to her wit. And for this cauſe, the Catholicke Church, vpon great reaſon hath forbidden, that no woman do preach, confeſſe, or inſtruct: for their ſex admitteth neither wiſdome nor diſcipline.

It is diſcouered alſo by the maners of a woman, and by her condition, in what degree of cold and moiſt, her temperature conſiſteth: for if with a ſharp wit, ſhe be froward, curſt, and wayward, ſhe is in the firſt degree of cold and moiſt: it being true (as we haue prooued tofore) that an ill condition, euermore accompanieth a good imagination. She who partaketh this degree of cold & moiſt, ſuffereth nothing to eſcape her hands, noteth all things,

findeth fault with all things, and so is insupportable. Such are accustomably of amiable conuersation, and feare not to looke men in the face, nor hold him ill mannered, who maketh loue vnto them. But on the other side, to be a woman of good conditions, and to be agreeued at nothing, to laugh vpon euery small occasiõ, to let things passe as they come, and to sleepe soundly, descrieth the third degree of cold and moist: for much pleasantnesse of conceit, is ordinarily accompanied with little wit. She who partaketh of these two extreams, standeth in the second degree. A voice, hoarse, big, and sharp (saith *Galen*) is a token of much heat and drouth, and we haue also prooued it heretofore, by the opinion of *Aristotle*, wherthrough we may gain this notice, that if a woman haue a voice like a man, she is cold and moist in the first degree, and if very delicat, in the third. And partaking betwixt both the extreams, she shall haue the naturall voice of a woman, and be in the second degree.

How much the voice dependeth on the temperature of the cods, shall shortly hereafter be prooued, where we entreat of the tokens appertaining to a man. Much flesh also in women, is a signe of much cold and moist: for to be fat and big (sayth the Phisitians) groweth in liuing creatures, from this occasion. And contrariwise, to be leane and dry, is a token of little coldnesse & moisture. To be meanly fleshed, that is, neither ouermuch, nor verie little, giueth euidence that a woman holdeth her selfe in the second degree of cold and moist. Their pleasantnesse and curtesies, sheweth the degrees of these two qualities: much moisture maketh their flesh supple, and little, rough and hard. The meane is the commendablest part: The coulour also of the face,

and

and of the other parts of the body, discouereth the extended or remisse degrees, of these two qualities. When the woman is verie white, it boadeth (saith *Galen*) much cold and moist: and contrariwise, she that is swart and browne, is in the first degree therof; of which two extreames, is framed the second degree of white and well coloured.

To haue much haire, and a little shew of a beard, is an euident signe, to know the first degree of cold and moist: for all Phisitions affirme, that the haire and beard are engendred of heat and drinesse: and if they be blacke it greatly purporteth the same. A contrary temperature is betokened, when a woman is without haire. Now she whose complexion consisteth in the second degree of cold and moist, hath some haire; but the same reddish and golden. Foulnesse moreouer, and faireneſse help vs to iudge the degrees of cold and moist in women. It is a miracle to see a woman of the first degree very faire: for the seed whereof she was formed being dry, hindereth that she cannot be fairely countenanced. It behoooueth that clay be seasoned with conuenient moisture, to the end vessels may be well framed, and serue to vse. But when that same is hard & dry, the vessell is foule and vnhandsom.

Aristotle farther auoucheth, that ouermuch cold and moist, maketh women by nature foule: for if the seed be cold and very moist, it can take no good figure, because the same standeth not togither, as we see, that of ouer soft clay, ill shaped vessels are fashioned. In the second degree of cold and moist, women prooue verie faire: for they were formed of a substance well seasoned, and pleasant to nature: which token, of it selfe alone affordeth an euident argument, that the woman is fruit-

full: for it is certain that nature could do it, and we may iudge, that ſhe gaue her a temperature and compoſition, fit for bearing of children. Wherethrough ſhe anſwers in proportion (welneer) to all men, and all men do deſire to haue her.

In man, there is no power which hath tokens or ſignes, to deſcry the goodneſſe, or malice of his obiect. The ſtomacke knoweth the meat by way of taſt, of ſmelling, and of ſight, wherethrough the diuine ſcripture ſaith, That *Eue* fixed her eies on the tree forbidden, and her ſeemed that it was ſweet in taſt. The facultie of generation, holdeth for a token of fruitfulneſſe, a womans beautie; and if ſhe be foule, it abhorreth her, conceiuing by this ſigne, that nature erred, and gaue her not a fit temperature, for bearing of children.

By what ſignes we may know, in what degree of hot and dry, euery man reſteth.

§. 1.

A Man hath not his temperature ſo limited as a woman, for he may be hot & drie (which temperature *Ariſtotle* & *Galen* held, was that which beſt agreed with his ſex) as alſo hot and moiſt and temperat; but cold & moiſt, and cold and drie, they would not admit whilſt a man was ſound and without impairment: for as you ſhall find no woman hot and drie, nor hot and moiſt, or temperat; ſo ſhall you find no man cold and moiſt, nor cold and drie, in compariſon of women, vnleſſe in caſe as I ſhal now expreſſe. A man hot and drie, and hote and moiſt, and temperat, holdeth the ſame degrees in his temperature, as doth a woman in cold and moiſt: and ſo it behoueth to haue certain tokens,

kens, whereby to discerne what man is in what degree, that we may assigne him a wife answerable vnto him in proportion. We must therefore weet, that from the same principles, of which we gathered vnderstanding what woman is hot and drie, and in what degree, from the selfe we must also make vse to vnderstand what man is hote and drie, and in what degree: and because we sayd, that from the wit and manners of a man we coniecture the temperature of his cods, it is requisit that we take notice of a notable point, mentioned by *Galen*, namely, that to make vs vnderstand the great vertue which a mans cods possesse, to giue firmnesse and temperature to all the parts of the body, he affirmeth that they are of more importance than the heart: and he rendereth a reason, saying, that this member is the beginning of life, & nought else, but the cods are the beginning of liuing soundly and without infirmities. How much it endammageth a man to be depriued of those parts (though so smal) there need not many reasons to proue, seeing we see by experience, that forthwith the haire and the beard pill away, and the big and shrill voice becommeth small, and herewithall a man leeseth his forces and naturall heat, and resteth in far woorse and more miserable condition than if he had bene a woman. But the matter most worth the noting is, that if a man before his gelding had much wit and habilitie, so soone as his stones be cut away, he groweth to leese the same, so far foorth as if he had receiued some notable dammage in his very braine. And this is a manifest token, that the cods giue & reaue the temperature from all the other parts of the body, and he that will not yeeld credit hereunto, let him consider (as my selfe haue done oftentimes) that of 1000 such capons who addict themselues to their booke, none at-

taineth to any perfection, and euen in muſicke (which is their ordinarie profeſſion) we manifeſtly ſee how blockiſh they are, which ſpringeth becauſe muſick is a worke of the imagination, & this power requireth much heat, whereas they are cold and moiſt. So it falleth out a matter certaine, that from the wit and habilitie we may gather the temperature of the cods: for which cauſe, the man who ſhoweth himſelfe prompt in the works of the imagination, ſhould be hot and drie in the third degree. And if a man be of no great reach, it tokeneth, that with his heat much moiſture is vnited, which alwaies endammageth the reaſonable part, and this is the more confirmed if he be good of memorie. The ordinarie conditions of men hot and dry in the third degree, are courage, pride, liberalitie, audacitie, and cheerfulneſſe, with a good grace and pleaſantneſſe, and in matter of women ſuch a one hath no bridle nor ho. The hote and moiſt are merry, giuen to laughter, louers of paſtime, faire conditioned, very courteous, ſhamefaſt, and not much addicted to women.

The voice and ſpeech much diſcouereth the temperature of the cods. That which is big and ſomwhat ſharp, giueth token that a man is hot and dry in the third degree: and if the ſame be pleaſant, amiable, and very delicat, it purporteth little heat and much moiſture, as appeareth in the gelded. A man who hath moiſt vnited with heat, will haue the ſame high, but pleaſant & ſhrill. Who ſo is hot and drie in the third degree, is ſlender, hard and rough fleſhed; the ſame compoſed of ſinews and arteries, and his veines big: contrariwiſe, to haue much fleſh, ſmooth and tender, is ſhew of much moiſture: by means wherof, it extendeth and enlargeth out the naturall heat. The colour of the skin, if the ſame be

brown,

brown,burned,blackiſh greene,and like aſhes, yeeldeth ſigne that a man is in the third degree of hot and dry: but if the fleſh appeareth white,and well coloured, it argueth little heat and much moiſture. The haire & beard are a marke alſo not to be ouerſlipped: for theſe two approch very neere to the temperature of the cods. And if the haire be very blacke and big, and ſpecially from the ribs down to the nauell, it deliuereth an infallible token that the cods partake much of hot and dry: and if there grow ſome haire alſo vpon the ſhoulders, the ſame is ſo much the more confirmed. But when the haire and beard are of cheſſe-nut colour,ſoft,delicat, and thin: it inferreth not ſo great plenty of heat and drineſſe in the cods.

Men very hot and dry, are neuer faire, ſaue by miracle,but rather hard fauored,and ill ſhaped: for the heat and drineſſe (as *Ariſtotle* affirmeth of the Ethiopians) wrieth the proportion of the face, and ſo they become diſſigured. Contrariwiſe, to be ſeemly and gratious, prooueth a meaſurable hot and moiſt: for which cauſe, the matter yeelded it ſelfe obedient whereto nature would employ it. Whence it is manifeſt, that much beautie in a man,is no token of much heat. Touching the ſignes of a temperat man, we haue ſufficiently diſcourſed in the chapter foregoing, and therefore it ſhall not be needfull to reply the ſame againe. It ſufficeth only to note that as the Phiſitions place in euery degree of heat, three degrees of extention, ſo alſo in a temperat man, we are to ſet downe the largeneſſe and ampleneſſe of three other. And he who ſtandeth in the third, next to cold and moiſt, ſhalbe reputed cold and moyſt: for when a degree paſſeth the meane, it reſembleth the other, and that this is true, we manifeſtly find: for the

ſignes

ſigns which *Galen* deliuereth vs to know a man cold and moiſt, are the ſelfe ſame of the temperat man, but ſomewhat more remiſſe: ſo he is wiſe, of good conditions, and vertuous, he hath his voice cleare & ſweet, is white skinned, of fleſh good and ſupple, & without haire, and if it haue any, the ſame is little and yellow; ſuch are very well fauoured and faire of countenaunce, but *Galen* affirmeth that their ſeed is moiſt, and vnfit for generation: theſe are no great friends to women, nor women vnto them.

What women ought to marrie with what man, that they may haue children.

§. 2.

TO a woman who beareth not children when ſhe is married, *Hippocrates* commaundeth that two points of diligence be vſed, to know whether it be her defect, or that it grow becauſe the ſeed of her husband is vnable for generation. The firſt is to make her ſuffumigations with incenſe, or *Storax*, with a garment cloſe wrapped about her, which may hang downe on the ground, in ſort that no vapour or fume may iſſue out, and if within a while after ſhe feele the ſauour of the incenſe in her month, it yeeldeth a certaine token, that the barrenneſſe commeth not through her defect, in as much as the ſame found the paſſages of the belly open, wherethrough it pearceth vp to the noſthrils and the mouth.

The ſecond is, to take a garlicke head clean pilled, and put the ſame into the bellie, what time the woman goeth to ſleepe, and if the next day ſhe feele in her mouth the

the sent of the garlicke, she is of her self fruitfull without any default.

But albeit these two proofs perform the effect which *Hippocrates* speaketh of, namely, that the vapour pierce from the inner part vp to the mouth, yet the same argueth not an absolute barrennesse in the husband, nor an intire fruitfulnesse in the wife, but an vnapt correspondence of both, wherethrough she proueth as barren for him, as he for her: which we see to fall out in dayly experience, for the man taking another wife begetteth children, and (which encreaseth the maruell, in such as are not seene in that point of naturall Philosophie) is, that if these two seperat each from other vpon pretence of impotencie, and so he take another wife, and she another husband, it hath bene found, that both haue had children. And this groweth, because there are some men whose generatiue faculty is vnable, and not alterable for one woman, and yet for another is apt and begetteth issue. Euen as we see by experience in the stomacke, that to one kind of meat a man hath a great appetite, and to another (though better) it is as dead. What the correspondence should be, which the man & wife ought to beare each to other, to the end they may bring forth children, is expressed by *Hippocrates* in these words, If the hot answer not the cold, and the drie the moist, with measure and equalitie, there can be no generation: as if he should say, that if there vnite not in the womans wombe two seeds, the one hote, & the other cold, and the one moist and the other drie, extended in equall degree, they cannot beget children. For a worke so maruellous as is the shaping of a man, standeth in need of a temperature, where the hot may not exceed the cold, nor the moist the drie. For if a mans seed be hot, and the womans seed

hot

hot likewise, there will no engendring succeed. This doctrine thus presupposed, Let vs now sit by way of example, a woman cold and moist in the first degree, whose signes we said were, to be wily, ill conditioned, shrill voiced, spare fleshed, and blacke and greene coloured, hairie and euill fauoured, she shall easily conceiue by a man, that is ignorant, of good conditions, who hath a well sounding and sweet voice, much, white, and supple flesh, little haire, and well coloured, and faire of countenance. She may also be giuē for wife to a temperat man, whose seed (following the opinion of *Galen*) we said was most fruitfull and answerable to whatsoeuer woman: Prouided that she be sound and of age conuenient; but yet with all their incidents, it is verie difficult for her to conceiue child: and being conceiued (saith *Hippocrates*) within two months the same miscarieth: for she wanteth bloud, wherwith to maintain her selfand the babe, during the 9 months. Howbeit this will find an easie remedie, if the woman do bath her selfe before she companie with her husband, and the baigne must consist of water fresh and warme: the which (by *Hippocrates*) righteth her temperature to a good sort. For it looseneth and moistneth her flesh, euen as the earth ought to be alike disposed, that the graine may therin fasten it self, and gather root.

Moreouer, it worketh a farther effect: for it encreaseth the appetite to meat; it restraineth resolution, & causeth a greater quantitie of naturall heat: wherthrough plenty of flegmaticke blood is increased: by which the little creature, may those nine months haue sustenance. The tokens of a woman cold & moist in the third degree, are to be dull witted, well conditioned, to haue a very delicat voice, much flesh, and the same soft and white, to want

want haire and downe, and not to be ouer faire. Such a one, ſhould be wedded to a man hot and dry in the third degree: for his ſeed is of ſuch furie and feruency, as it behoueth the ſame to fall into a place very cold and moiſt, that it may take hold and root. This man is of the qualitie of Creſſes, which will not grow ſaue in the water, and if he partaked leſſe hot and dry, his ſowing in ſo cold a belly were nought els, than to caſt graine into a poole.

Hippocrates giueth counſell that a woman of this ſort, ſhould firſt leſſen her ſelfe, and lay aſide her fleſh aud her fat before ſhe marrie, but then ſhe need not to take to husband a man ſo hot and dry: for ſuch a temperature would not ſerue, nor ſhe conceiue. A woman cold and moiſt in the ſecond degree, retaineth a meane in all the tokens which I haue ſpecified, ſaue onely in beauty, which ſhe enioyeth in an high degree. Which yeeldeth an euident ſigne, that ſhe will be fruitfull, and beare children, and prooue gratious and cheerfull. She anſwereth in proportion wel-neer to all men.

Firſt to the hot and dry in the ſecond degree, and next to the temperat, and laſtly to the hot & moiſt. From all theſe vnions and conioynings of men and women, which we haue here laid down, may iſſue wiſe children, but from the firſt are the moſt ordinary. For put caſe that the ſeed of a man encline to cold and moiſt; yet the continuall drineſſe of the mother, and the giuing her ſo little meat, correcteth and amendeth the defect of the father. For that this maner of philoſophizing neuer heretofore came to light, it was not poſſible that all the naturall Philoſophers could ſhape an anſwere to this probleme, which asketh, Whence proceedeth it, that manie fools haue begotten wiſe children? Whereto they anſwer

swer, that sortish persons apply themselues affectionatly to the carnall act, and are not carried away to any other contemplation. But contrarily, men verie wise, euen in the copulation go imagining vpō matters nothing pertinent to that they haue in hand, and therethrough, weaken the seed, and make their children defectiue, aswell in the powers reasonall, as in the naturall. In the other conioynings it is requisit, to take heed that the woman be clensed, and dried by a ripe age, and marry not ouer yong: for hence it commeth, that children prooue simple and of little wit. The seed of yong parents is verie moist: for it is but a whiles since they were borne, and if a man be formed of a matter endowed with excessiue moisture, it followeth of force, that he prooue dull of capacitie.

What diligence ought to be vsed, that children male, and not female may be borne.

§. 3.

THose parents who seeke the comfort of hauing wise children, and such as are towards for learning, must endeuour that they may be borne male: for the female, through the cold and moist of their sex, cānot be endowed with any profound iudgment. Only we see, that they talke with some apparence of knowledge, in slight and easie matters, with termes ordinary, and long studied, but being set to learning, they reach no farther than to some smacke of the Latine tongue, and this only through the help of memorie. For which dulnesse, themselues are not in blame, but that cold and moist, which made them women,

men, and theſe ſelfe qualities (we haue prooued heretofore) gainſay the wit and abilitie. *Salomon* conſidering how great ſcarcitie there was of wiſe men, and that no woman came to the world with a wit apt for knowledge, ſaid in this maner, I found one man amongſt 1000; but I haue not found one woman amongſt the whole rout. As if he ſhould ſay, that of a 1000 men, he had found one wiſe; but throughout the race of women, he could neuer light vpon one that had iudgment. Therfore we are to ſhun this ſex, and to procure that the child be borne male: for in ſuch only reſteth a wit capable of learning. It behooueth therfore firſt to take into conſideration, what inſtruments were ordained by nature in mans body to this effect, and what order of cauſe is to be obſerued, that we may obtaine the end which we ſeeke for. We muſt then vnderſtand, that amongſt many excrements and humours which reſide in a mans bodie: nature (ſaith *Galen*) vſeth only the ſeruice of one, to worke that mankind may be preſerued. This is a certain excremēt, which is termed whey, or wheyiſh blood, whoſe engendring is wrought in the liuer, and in the veins, at ſuch time as the foure humours, blood, fleagme, choler, and melancholy, do take the forme and ſubſtance which they ought to haue.

Of ſuch a licour as this, doth nature ſerue her ſelfe, to reſolue the meat, and to worke, that the ſame may paſſe through the veins and through the ſtrait paſſages, carrying nouriſhment to all the parts of the body. This work being finiſhed, the ſame nature prouideth the veins; whoſe office is nought els, but to draw vnto them this whey, and to ſend it through their paſſages to the bladder, and from thence out of the body: and this to free man from the offence, which an excremēt might breed him.

him. But she, aduising that he had certain qualities conuenient for generation, prouided two veins, which should carry part therof to the cods and vessels of seed, together with some small quantitie of bloud, whereby such seed might be formed, as was requisit for mankind. Wherethrough she planted one veine in the reins on the right side, which endeth in the right cod, and of the same is the right seed vessell framed; and another on the left side, which likewise taketh his issue at the left cod, and of that is shaped the left seed vessell.

The requisit qualities of this excrement, that the same may be a conuenient matter for engendring of seed, are (saith *Galen*) a certaine tartnesse and biting which groweth, for that the same is salt, wherethrough it stirreth vp the seed vessels, & moueth the creature to procure generation, and not to abandon this thought. And therfore persons very lecherous, are by the Latinists termed *Salaces*, that is to say, men who haue much saltnesse in their seed.

Next to this, nature did another thing worthy of great consideration, namely, that to the right side of the reines, and to the right cod, she gaue much heat and drinesse; and to the left side of the reines, & to the left cod, much cold and moisture: wherthrough, the seed which laboureth in the right cod, issueth out hot and drie, and that of the left cod, cold and moist. What nature pretended by this varietie of temperature, aswell in the reins as in the cods, & seed vessels, is very manifest, we knowing by histories very true, that at the beginning of the world, and many yeares after, a woman brought forth two children at a birth, whereof the one was born male, the other female; the end wherof tended, that for euery man, there should be a wife, that mankind might take

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the ſpeedier increaſe. She prouided then, that the right ſide of the reines, ſhould yeeld matter hot and drie to the right cod, and that the ſame with his heat and drineſſe ſhould make the ſeed hot & dry for generation of the male. And the contrary ſhe ordained for the forming of a woman, that the left ſide of the reins, ſhould ſend forth ſeed cold and moiſt to the left cod, and that the ſame with his coldneſſe and moiſture, ſhould make the ſeed cold and moiſt, whence it enſued of force, that a female muſt be engendred. But after that the earth was repleniſhed with people, it ſeemeth that this order and concert of nature was broken off, and this double childbearing ſurceaſed, & which is worſt, for one man that is begotten, 6 or 7 women are born to the world, ordinarily. Whence we comprize, that either nature is grown weary, or ſome error is thwarted in the mids, which beareth her from working as ſhe would. What the ſame is, a litle hereafter we wil expreſſe, when we may lay down the conditions, which are to be obſerued, to the end a male child (without miſſing) may be borne. I ſay then, that if parents will attaine the end of their deſire in this behalfe, they are to obſerue 6 points. One of which is, to eat meats hot and drie. The ſecond, to procure that they make good digeſtion in the ſtomacke. The third, to vſe much exercise. The fourth, not to apply themſelues vnto the act of generation, vntill their ſeed be well ripened and ſeaſoned. The fifth, to companie with the wife foure or fiue daies before her natutall courſe is to runne. The ſixth, to procure, that the ſeed fall in the right ſide of the womb, which being obſerued (as we ſhall preſcribe) it will grow impoſſible, that a female ſhould be engendred. As touching the firſt condition, we muſt weet, that albeit a good ſtomacke do parboile

and alter the meat, and ſpoile the ſame of his former quality, yet it doth neuer vtterly depriue it ſelfe of them: for if we eat lettice (whoſe quality is cold and moiſt) the blood engendred thereof, ſhalbe cold and moiſt, the whey cold and moiſt, and the ſeed cold and moiſt. And if we eat honny (whoſe quality is hot and dry) the bloud which we breed, ſhalbe hot and drie, the whey hot and dry, and the ſeed hot and dry: for it is impoſſible (as *Galen* auoucheth) that the humours ſhould not retaine the ſubſtances and the qualities, which the meat had, before ſuch time as it was eaten. Then it being true, that the male ſex conſiſteth in this, that the ſeed be hot and drie at the time of his forming, for certaine it behoooueth parents to vſe meats hot and drie, that they may engender a male child. I grant well, how in this kind of begetting, there befalleth a great perill: for the ſeed being hot and drie, we haue often heretofore affirmed, it followeth of force, that there be borne a man, malicious, wily, cauilling, and addicted to many vices and euils, and ſuch perſons as theſe (vnleſſe they be ſtraightly curbed) bring great danger to the common wealth. Therefore it were better, that they ſhould not be gotten at all: but for all this there will not want parents, who will ſay, Let me haue a boy, and let him be a theefe and ſpare not, for the iniquity of a man is more allowable, than the wel-doing of a woman. Howbeit this may find an eaſie remedie, by vſing temperat meates, which ſhall partake but meanly of hot and dry, or by way of preparation, ſeaſoning the ſame with ſome ſpice. Such (ſaith *Galen*) are Hennes, Partridges, Turtles, Doues, Thruſhes, Blackbirds, and Goates, which (by *Hippocrates*) muſt be eaten roſted, to heat and drie the ſeed.

The bread with which the ſame is eaten, ſhould be white,

white, of the fineſt meale, ſeaſoned with Salt and Annis ſeed: for the browne is cold and moiſt (as we will prooue hereafter) and verie dammageable to the wit. Let the drinke be VVhite-wine, watered in ſuch proportion, as the ſtomacke may allow thereof: and the water with which it is tempered, ſhould be very freſh and pure.

The ſecond diligence which we ſpake of, is, to eat theſe meates in ſo moderat quantitie, as the ſtomacke may ouercome them: for albeit the meat be hot and drie of his proper nature, yet the ſame becommeth cold and moiſt, if the naturall heat cannot digeſt it: Therefore though the parents eat honny, and drinke VVhite wine, theſe meates, by this meanes will turne to cold ſeed, and a female child be brought forth. For this occaſion, the greater part of great and rich perſonages, are afflicted by hauing more daughters than meaner folke: for they eat and drinke that which their ſtomacke cannot digeſt: and albeit their meat be hot and drie, ſauced with Suger, Spices, and Honny: yet through their great quantitie, then waxe raw, and cannot be digeſted. But the rawneſſe which moſt endammageth generation, is that of Wine: for this licour, in being ſo vaporous and ſubtile, occaſioneth, that the other meates togither therewith paſſe to the ſeed veſſels raw, and that the ſeed falſly prouoketh a man, ere it be digeſted and ſeaſoned.

VVhereon, *Plato* commendeth a law, enacted in the Carthaginean Common-wealth, which forbad the married couple, that they ſhould not taſt of anie Wine that day, when they meant to performe the rightes of the marriage bed, as well ware, that this liquor alwaies bred much hurt and dammage to the

childs bodily health, and might yeeld occasion that he should prooue vitious and of ill conditions. Notwithstanding, if the same be moderatly taken, so good seed is not engendred of any meat (for the end which we seeke after) as of white wine: and especially, to giue wit and ability, which is that wherto we pretend. The 3 diligence which we spake of, was, to vse exercise somwhat more than meanly: for this fretteth and consumeth the excessiue moisture of the seed, and heateth & drieth the same. By this means a man becommeth most fruitful and able for generation: and cõtrariwise to giue our selues to our ease, and not to exercise the body, is one of the things which breedeth most coldnes & moisture in the seed. Therfore rich and dainty persons, are lesse charged with children, than the poore who take pains. Whence *Hippocrates* recounteth, that the principall persons of Scythia were verie effeminat, womanish, delicious, and enclined to do womens seruices; as to sweepe, to rub, & to bake: and by this means were impotent for generation. And if they begot any male child, he prooued either an Eunuch, or an Hermaphrodite. Whereat, they shaming, & greatly agreeued, determined to make sacrifices to their God, and to offer him many gifts, beseeching him not to entreat them after that maner, but to yeeld thẽ some remedy for the defect, seeing it lay in his power so to do. But *Hippocrates* laughed them to scorne, saying, That none effect betideth, which seemes not miraculous and diuine, if after that sort they fall into consideration thereof: for reducing which soeuer of them to his naturall causes, at last we come to end in God, by whose vertue all the agents of the world doe worke. But there are some effectes, which must be imputed to God immediatly, (as are those which come besides the

the order of nature) and others by the way of meanes, reckoning first as a meane, the causes which are ordained to that end. The countrey which the Scythians inhabited (saith *Hippocrates*) is seated vnder the North, a region moist and cold beyond measure, where, through abundance of clouds, it seemes a miracle if you see the sunne. The rich men sit euer on horsebacke, neuer vse any exercise, eat and drink more than their naturall heat can consume; all which things make the seed cold and moist: And for this cause they beget many females: and if anie male were borne, they prooued of the condition which we haue specified. Know you (said *Hippocrates* to them) that the remedie hereof consisteth, not in sacrifising to God, neither in doing ought like that; but it behoueth withall, that you walke on foot, eat little, and drink lesse, and not so wholly betake your selues to your pleasures. And that you may the more plainly discerne it, looke vpon the poore people of this countrie, & your very slaues, who not onely make no sacrifices to your God, neither offer him gifts (as wanting the means) but euen blaspheme his blessed name, and speake iniuriously of him, because he hath placed them in such estate. And yet (though so lewd and sacrilegious) they are very able for procreation, & the most part of their children, proue males, & strong; not cocknies, not Eunuchs, not Hermafrodites, as do those of yours. And the cause is, for that they eat litle, & vse much exercise, neither keep thēselues alwais on horsback, like their masters. By which occasiō, they make their seed hot and dry, & therthrough engender males and not females. This point of Philosophy was not vnderstood by *Pharao*, nor by his councell seeing that he said in this manner, Come, let vs keepe them downe with oppression, that they may not

multiply, nor ioyne with our enemie, if warre be raiſed againſt vs. And the remedie which he vſed, to hinder that the people of Iſraell ſhould not encreaſe ſo faſt, or at leaſt that ſo many male children might not be borne (which he moſt feared) was to keepe them vnder with much toile of body, and to cauſe them for to eat leeks, garlicke, and onions, which remedie tooke but a bad effect, as the holy ſcripture expreſſeth: for the harder he held them oppreſſed, the more did they encreaſe and multiply. Yet he making reckoning, that this was the ſureſt way he could follow, doubled this their affliction of body. Which preuailed ſo little, as if to quench a great fire, he ſhould throw thereinto much oile or greaſe: but if he or any of his counſellors, had been ſeen in this point of naturall Philoſophy, he ſhould haue giuen them barly bread, lettice, melons, cucũbers, & citrons to eat, and haue kept them well fed and well filled with drinke, and not haue ſuffered them to take anie paine. For by this means, their ſeed would haue become cold and moiſt, & therof more women than men bin begotten, and in ſhort time their life haue been abridged. But feeding them with much fleſh boiled with garlicke, with leeks, & with onions, and tasking them to work ſo hard, he cauſed their ſeed to wax hot and drie, by which two qualities, they were the more incited to procreation, and euer bred iſſue male. For confirmation of this veritie, *Ariſtotle* propoundeth a probleme, which ſaith, What is the cauſe, that thoſe who labor much, and ſuch as are ſubiect to the feuer Ectticke, ſuffer many pollutions in their ſleepe? whereto (verely) he wiſt not to ſhape an anſwer: for he telleth many things, but none of them hit the truth. The right reaſon hereof is, that the toile of the body, and the actiue feuer, do heat and dry the ſeed;

and these two qualities, make the same tart & pricking; and for that in sleep all the naturall powers are fortified, this betideth which the probleme speaketh of. How fruitfull and pricking the hot and drie seed is, *Galen* noteth in these words. The same is most fruitfull, and soon inciteth the creature to copulation, and is lecherous and prone to lust. The fourth condition was, not to accompany in the act of generation, vntill the seed were setled, concocted and duly seasoned: for though the three former diligences haue gone before, yet we cannot thereby know whether it haue attained that perfection which it ought to haue. Principally it behoueth, for 7 or 8 daies before, to vse the meats which we haue prescribed, to the end the cods may haue time to consume in their nourishment, the seed which all that time was engendred of the other meats, and that this which we thus go describing may succeed.

The like diligence is to be vsed touching mans seed, that the same may be fruitfull and apt for issue, as the gardeners doe with the seeds which they will preserue: for they attend till they ripen, and clense, and wax drie: for if they plucke them from the stalke, before they are deeply seasoned, and arriued to the point which is requisit, though they lie in the ground a whole yeare, they will not grow at all. For this reason I haue noted, that in places where much carnall copulation is vsed, there is lesse store of children, than where people are more enclined to continencie. And common harlots neuer conceiue, because they stay not till the seed be digested and ripened.

It behoueth therefore to abide for some daies, that the seed may settle, concoct, and ripen, and be duly seasoned: for by this meanes, is hot and drie, and the good

ſubſtance which it had loſt, the better recouered. But how ſhall we know the ſeed to be ſuch, as is requiſit it ſhould be, ſeeing the matter is of ſo great importance? This may eaſily be known, if certaine daies haue paſſed ſince the man companied with his wife, and by his continuall incitement, and great deſire of copulation; all which ſpringeth, for that the ſeed is grown fruitfull and apt for procreation. The fifth condition was, that a man ſhould meddle with his wife in the carnal act, ſix or ſeuen daies before ſhe haue her naturall courſe: for that the child ſtraightwaies ſtandeth in need of much food to nouriſh it. And the reaſon hereof is, that the hot and drie of his temperature, ſpendeth and conſumeth not onely the good blond of the mother, but alſo the excrements. Wherethrough *Hippocrates* ſaid, that the woman conceiued of a male, is well coloured and faire. Which groweth, becauſe the infant, through his much heat, conſumeth all thoſe excrements, which are woont to disfigure the face, leauing the ſame as a waſhed cloth. And for that this is true, it is behoofull, that the infant be ſupplied with blood for his nouriſhment. And this experience manifeſteth, for it is a miracle that a male child ſhould be engendered ſaue vpon the laſt daies of the month. The contrarie befalleth, when a woman goeth with a female: for through the much cold and moiſt of her ſex, ſhe eareth little, and yeeldeth ſtore of excrements, wherethrough the woman conceiued of a girle, is ill fauoured, and full of ſpots, and a thouſand ſluttiſhneſſes ſticke vnto her; and at the time of her deliuerie, ſhe muſt tarrie ſo many more daies to purge her ſelfe, than if ſhe had brought a manchild to the world. On the naturall reaſon whereof, God grounded himſelfe, when he commanded *Moſes*, that the woman, who brought

forth

forth a male, ſhould remain in her bed a weeke, and not enter into the temple vntill 33 daies were expired. And if ſhe were deliuered of a female, ſhe ſhould be vncleane for the ſpace of two weeks, and not enter into the temple, vntill after 66 daies, in ſort, that when the birth is of a female, the time is doubled. Which ſo falleth out, becauſe in the nine moneths (during which the child remained in the mothers wombe) through the much cold and moiſt of her temperature, ſhe doubly encreaſed excrements, and the ſame of very malignant ſubſtance and qualitie, which a male infant would not haue done. Therefore *Hippocrates* holdeth it a matter verie perillous, to ſtop the purgation of a woman, who is deliuered of a wench.

All this is ſpoken to the purpoſe, that we muſt well aduiſe our ſelues of the laſt day of the moneth, to the end the ſeed may find ſufficient nouriſhment, wherwith to relieue it ſelfe. For if the act of procreation be committed ſo ſoone as the purgation is finiſhed, it will not take hold through defect of blood. Whereon it behoueth the parents be done to vnderſtand, that if both ſeeds ioine not togither at one ſelfe time, (namely that of the woman and of the man) *Galen* ſaith there will enſue no conception, although the ſeed of the man be neuer ſo apt for procreation. And hereof we ſhall render the reaſon to another purpoſe. This is very certaine, that all the diligences by vs preſcribed, muſt alſo be performed on the womans behoofe, otherwiſe, her ſeed (euill employed) will mar the conception. Therefore it is requiſit they attend ech to other, ſo as at one ſelfe inſtant, both their ſeedes may ioyne togither.

This, at the firſt cõming, importeth very much, for the right

right cod, and his seed vessell (as *Galen* affirmeth) is first stirred vp, and yeeldeth his seed before the left, and if the generation take not effect at the first comming, it is a great hap hazard, but that at the second a female maibe begotten. The left two seeds are knowen, first by the heat and coldnesse, thorough the quantitie of being much or litle, and finally by the issuing forth speedily or slowly. The seed of the right cod, commeth forth boiling, and so hot, as it burneth the womans belly, is not much in quantitie, and passeth out in hast: Contrariwise, the seed of the left, taketh his way more temprat, is much in quantitie: and for that the same is cold and grosse, spendeth longer space in coming forth. The last consideration was, to procure that both the seeds of the husband & the wife, fall into the right side of the womb: for in that place (saith *Hippocrates*) are males engendred, & females in the left. *Galen* alleageth the reason hereof, saying, that the right side of the womb is verie hot, through the neighbourhood which it holdeth with the liuer, with the right side of the raines, and with the right seed vessell: which members, we haue affirmed and approoued to be verie hot. And seeing all the reason of working, that the issue may become male, consisteth in procuring, that at the time of conception it partake much heat, it falleth out certaine, that it greatly importeth to bestow the seed in this place. Which the woman shall easily accomplish, by resting on her right side, when the act of generation is ended, with her head down and her heels vp: but it behoooueth her to keepe her bed a day or two, for the woinbe doth not straightwaies embrace the seed, but after some houres space.

The signes wherby a woman may know, whether she be with child or no, are manifest and plain to euery ones vnder-

vnderſtanding: for if when ſhe ariſeth vp on her feet, the ſeed fall to the ground, it is certain (ſaith *Galen*) that ſhe hath not cõceiued, albeit herein one point requireth conſideration, that al the ſeed is not fruitful or apt for iſſue: for the one part therof is very wateriſh, whoſe office ſerueth to make thin the principal ſeed, to the end it may fare through the narrow paſſages, and this is that which nature ſendeth forth, and it reſteth, when ſhe hath conceiued, with the part apt for iſſue. It is knowen by that it is like water, and of like quantitie. That a woman riſe vp ſtraightwaies on her feet, ſo ſoon as the act of generation hath paſſed, is a matter verie perillous. Therefore *Ariſtotle* compelleth that ſhe beforehand make euacuation of the excrements, and of her vrine, to the end ſhe may haue no cauſe to riſe. The ſecond token whereby we may know the ſame, is, that the next day following, the woman will feele her belly empty, eſpecially about the nauell. Which groweth, for that the womb, when it deſireth to conceiue, becommeth verie large and ſtretched out: for verely it ſuffereth the like ſwelling vp and ſtiffneſſe, as doth a mans member, and when it fareth thus-wiſe, the ſame occupieth much roome. But at the point when it conceiueth (ſaith *Hippocrates*) ſodainly the ſame draweth togither, and maketh as it were a purſe to draw the ſeed vnto it, and will not ſuffer it to go out, and by this meanes leaueth many emptie places, the which women do declare, ſaying, that they haue no tripes left in their belly, as if they were ſodainly become leane. Moreouer, forthwith they abhorre carnall copulation, and their husbands kindneſſe, for the belly hath now got what it ſought, but the moſt certain token (ſaith *Hippocrates*) is, when their naturall courſe faileth, & their breaſts grow, and when they fall in loathing with meat.

What

What diligence is to be vsed, that children may proue wittie and wise.

§. 4.

IF we doe not first know the cause, whence it proceedeth, that a man of great wit and sufficiencie is begotten, it is impossible that the same may be reduced to art: for through conioyning and ordering his principles and causes, we grow to attaine this end, and by none other meanes. The Astrologers hold, that becauſe the child is borne vnder such an influence of the starres, he commeth to be discreet, wittie, of good or ill maners, fortunat, and of those other conditions and properties, which we see and consider euery day in men. Which being admitted for true, it would follow a matter of impossibilitie, to frame the same to any art: for it should be wholly a case of fortune, and no way placed in mens election. The naturall Philosophers, as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and *Galen*, hold, that a man receiueth the conditions of his soule, at the time of his forming, and not of his birth: for then the starres do superficially alter the child, giuing him heat, coldnesse, moisture, and drouth; but not his substance, wherin the whole life relieth, as doe the foure elements, fire, aire, earth, and water, who not only yeeld to the party composed, heat, cold, moisture, and drinesse, but also the substance which may maintain and preserue the same qualities, during all the course of life. Wherethrough, that which most importeth in the engendring of children, is, to procure that the elements whereof they are compounded, may partake the qualities, which are

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requisite for the wit. For these according to the waight and measure, by which they enter into the composition, must alwaies so indure in the mixture, and not the alterations of heauen. What these elements are, and in what sort they enter into the womans wombe, to forme the creature, *Galen* declareth and affirmeth them to be the same which compound all other natural things: but that the earth commeth lurking in the accustomed meates which we eate, as are flesh, bread, fish, and fruits; the water in the liquors which we drinke, The aire and fire (he saith) are mingled by order of nature, and enter into the body by way of the pulse, and of respiration. Of these foure elements, mingled and digested by our naturall heat, are made the two necessarie principles of the infants generation, to weet the seed, and the monthly course. But that whereof we must make greatest reckoning for the end which we enquire after, are the accustomable meats whereon we feed: for these shut vp the foure elements in themselues, and from these the seed fetcheth more corpulencie and qualitie, than from the water which we drinke, or the fire and aire which we breath in. Whence *Galen* saith that the parents who would beget wise children, should read three bookes which he wrot, of the facilitie of the aliments: for there they should find, with what kinds of meat they may effect the same. And he made no mention of the water, nor of the other elements, as materials, and of like moment. But herein he swarued from reason: for the water altereth the body much more than the aire, & much lesse than the sound meats wheron we feed, And as touching that which concerneth the engendring of the seed, it carrieth as great importance as all the other elemẽts togither. The reason is (as *Galen* himself affirmeth) because

becauſe the cods draw from the veines (for their nouriſhment) the wheyiſh part of the blood, and the greateſt part of this whey, which the veins receiue, partaketh of the water which we drinke. And that the water worketh more alteration in the bodie, than the aire, *Ariſtotle* prooueth, where he demandeth, what the cauſe is, that by changing of waters, we breed ſo great an alteration in our health, wheras if we breath a contrarte aire, we perceiue it not. And to this he anſwereth, that water yeeldeth nouriſhment to the body, and ſo doth not the aire. But he had little reaſon to anſwer after this maner: for the aire alſo (by *Hippocrates* opinion) giueth nouriſhment and ſubſtance, aſwell as the water. Wher-through *Ariſtotle* deuiſed a better anſwer, ſaying; that no place nor country hath his peculiar aire; for that which is now in Flanders, when the North wind bloweth, paſſeth within two or three daies into Affricke, and that in Affricke, by the South is carried into the North; and that which this day is in Hieruſalem, the Eaſt wind driueth into the VVeſt Indies. The which cannot betide in the waters: for they do not all iſſue out of the ſame ſoile, where through euery people hath his particular water cõformable to the Mine of the earth where it ſpringeth, and whence it runneth. And if a man be vſed to drinke one kind of water, in taſting another, he altereth more than by meat or aire. In ſort, that the parents who haue a will to beget verie wiſe children, muſt drinke waters, delicat, freſh, and of good temperature; otherwiſe they ſhall commit error in their procreation. *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that at the time of generation, we muſt take heed of the South-weſt wind: for the ſame is groſſe, and moiſtneth the ſeed, ſo as a female and not a male is begotten. But the weſt wind he highly commendeth, and aduanceth it

with

with names and titles very honourable. He calleth the ſame temperat, fatter of the earth, and ſaith; that it commeth from the Eliſian fields. But albeit it be true that it greatly importeth, to breath an aire very delicat, and of good temperature, and to drinke ſuch waters; yet it ſtandeth much more vpon to vſe fine meats appliable to the temperature of the wit: for of theſe is engẽdred the bloud and the ſeed, and of the ſeed the creature. And if the meat be delicat and of good temperature, ſuch is the blood made; and of ſuch blood, ſuch ſeed; and of ſuch ſeed, ſuch braine. Now, this member being temperat, and compounded of a ſubſtance ſubtile and delicat, *Galen* ſaith, that the wit will be like thereunto: for our reaſonable ſoule, though the ſame be incorruptible, yet goeth alwaies vnited with the diſpoſitions of the brain, which being not ſuch as it is requiſit they ſhould be, for diſcourſing and philoſophizing, a man ſaith and doth 1000 things, which are verie vnfitting. The meats then which the parents are to feed on, that they may engender children of great vnderſtanding (which is the ordinarie wit for Spaine) are, firſt, White bread made of the fineſt meale, and ſeaſoned with ſalt: this is cold and dry, and of parts verie ſubtile and delicat. There is another ſort made (ſaith *Galen*) of reddiſh graine, which though it nouriſh much, and make men big limmed, and of great bodily forces; yet for that the ſame is moiſt and of groſſe parts, it breedeth a loſſe in the vnderſtanding. I ſaid, ſeaſoned with ſalt, becauſe none of all the aliments which a man vſeth, bettereth ſo much the vnderſtanding, as doth this minerall. It is cold, and of more drineſſe than any other thing; and if I remember well the ſentence of *Heraclitus*, he ſaid after this maner, A drie brightneſſe, a wiſeſt minde. Then ſeeing that

ſalt

ſalt is ſo drie, and ſo appropriat to the wit, the ſcripture had good reaſon to terme it by the name of Prudence and Sapience. Partridges and *Francolini* haue a like ſubſtance, and the ſelfe temperature with bread of white meale, and Kid, and Muskadel wine. And if parents vſe theſe meats (as we haue aboue ſpecified) they ſhall breed children of great vnderſtanding. And if they would haue a child of great memorie, let them eight or nine daies before they betake themſelues to the act of generation, eat Trouts, Salmons, Lampreis, and Eeles, by which meat, they ſhall make their ſeed verie moiſt and clammie.

Theſe two qualities (as I haue ſaid before) make the memorie eaſie to receaue, and verie faſt to preſerue the figures a long time. By Pigions, Goats, Garlicke, Onions, Leekes, Rapes, Pepper, Vinegar, White-wine, Honny, and al otherſorts of ſpices, the ſeed is made hot and drie, and of parts very ſubtile and delicat. The child who is engendred of ſuch meat, ſhalbe of great imagination, but not of like vnderſtanding, by means of the much heat, and he ſhall want memorie through his abundance of drineſſe. Theſe are woont to be very preiudiciall to the common wealth: for the heat enclineth them to many vices and euils, and giueth them a wit and mind, to put the ſame in execution: howbeit if we do keepe them vnder, the common-wealth ſhall receiue more ſeruice by theſe mens imagination, than by the vnderſtanding and memorie of the others. Hens, capons, veale, weathers of Spaine, are all meats of moderat ſubſtance; for they are neither delicat nor groſſe. I ſaid weathers of Spain: for *Galen*, without making any diſtinctiō, ſaith, that their fleſh is of a groſſe and noiſom ſubſtance, which ſtraieth from reaſon: for put caſe that in Italie, (where

(where he wrot) it be the worſt of all others; yet in this our countrey, through the goodneſſe of the paſtures, we may reckon the ſame among the meats of moderat ſubſtance. The childrē who are begotten on ſuch food, ſhall haue a reaſonable diſcourſe, a reaſonable memory, and a reaſonable imagination. Wherethrough they will not be verie profoundly ſeen in the Sciences, nor deuiſe ought of new.

Of theſe we haue ſaid heretofore, that they are pleaſant conceited, and apt, in whom may be imprinted all the rules and conſiderations of art, cleere, obſcure, eaſie, and difficult: but doctrine, argument, anſwering, doubting, and diſtinguiſhing, are matters wherewith their braines can in no ſort endure to be cloied. Cowes fleſh, Manzo, bread of red grain, cheeſe, oliues, vineger, and water alone, will breed a groſſe ſeed, and of faultie temperature, the ſonne engendred vpon theſe, ſhall haue ſtrength like a bull: but withall, be furious and of a beaſtly wit. Hence it proceedeth, that amongſt vpland people, it is a miracle to find one quicke of capacitie, or towardly for learning: they are all borne dull and rude; for that they are begotten on meats of groſſe and euill ſubſtance. The contrarie hereof befalleth in Citizens, whoſe children we find to be endowed with more wit and ſufficiencie. But if the parents carrie in verie deed, a will to beget a ſonne, prompt, wiſe, and of good conditions, let them, fix or ſeuen daies before their companying, feed on Goats milke; for this aliment (by the opinion of all Phiſitions) is the beſt, and moſt delicat that any man can vſe, prouided that they be ſound, and that it anſwer them in proportion, but *Galen* ſaith, it behoooueth to eat the ſame with honny, without which it is dangerous, and eaſily corrupteth. The reaſon hereof

is, for that the milke, hath no more but three elements in his compoſition, cheeſe, whey, and butter. The cheeſe anſwereth the earth; the whey, the water; and the butter the aire. The fire, which mingleth the other elements, and preſerueth them being mingled, iſſuing out of the teats, is exhaled, for that it is very ſubtile: but adioyning thereunto a little honny, which is hot and dry, in lieu of fire, the milke wil ſo partake of al the 4 elements. Which being mingled, and concocted by the operation of our naturall heat, make a ſeed verie delicat, and of good temperature. The ſonne thus engendred, ſhall at leaſtwiſe poſſeſſe a great diſcourſe; and not be depriued of memorie and imagination. In that *Ariſtotle* wanted this doctrine, he came ſhort to anſwer a probleme, which himſelfe propounded, demanding what the cauſe is, that the yong ones of brute beaſts, carry with them (for the moſt part) the properties and conditions of their ſires and dammes. And the children of men and women not ſo? And we find this by experience to be true: for of wiſe parents, are borne fooliſh children; and of fooliſh parents, children very wiſe; of vertuous parents, lewd children; and of vitious parents vertuous children; of hard fauoured parents, faire children: and of faire parents, foule children: of white parents, browne children: and of brown parents, white and well coloured children. And amongſt children of one ſelfe father and mother, one proueth ſimple, and another wittie: one foule, and another faire: one of good conditions, and another of bad: one vertuous, and another vitious. Whereas if a mare of a good harrage, be couered with a horſe of the like, the colt which is foaled, reſembleth them aſwell in ſhape and colour, as in their properties. To this probleme, *Ariſtotle* ſhaped a very vntowardly anſwer, ſay-

ing, that a man is caried away with many imaginations, during the carnall act: and hence it proceedeth that the children prooue so diuers. But brute beasts, because in time of procreation they are not so distraughted, neither possesse so forcible an imagination as man doth, make alwaies their yong ones after one selfe sort, and like to themselues. This answer hath euer hitherto gone for currant amongst the vulgar philosophers: and for confirmation hereof, they alleage the history of *Iacob*, which recounteth, that he hauing placed certaine rods, at the watering places of the beasts, the lambes were yeaned party coloured. But little auailes it them to handfast holy matters: for this historie recounteth a miraculous action, which God performed, therein to hide some sacrament. And the answer made by *Aristotle*, sauoreth of great simplicity. And who so wil not yeald me credit, let him (at his day) cause some shepheards to try this experiment, and they shall find it to be no naturall matter. It is also reported in these our partes, that a ladie was deliuered of a sonne, more brown than was due, because a blacke visage, which was pictured, fell into her imagination. Which I hold for a iest: and if perhaps it be true that she brought such a one to the world, I say that the father who begat him, had the like colour to that figure. And because it may be the better known, how from-shapen this philosophy is, which *Aristotle* bringeth in, togither with those that follow him, it is requisit we hold it for a thing certaine, that the worke of generation appertaineth to the vegetatiue soule, and not to the sensitiue, or reasonable: for a horse engendreth without the reasonall, and a plant without the sensitiue. And if we do but marke a tree loden with fruit, we shall find on the same a greater variety, than in the children of any

man: One apple will be green, another red; one little, another great; one round, another ill shaped: one sound, another rotten: one sweet, and another bitter. And if we compare the fruit of this yeare with that of the last, the one will be verie different and contrary to the other: which cannot be attributed to the varietie of the imagination, seeing the plants do want this power. The error of *Aristotle*, is very manifest in his own doctrine: for he saith, that the seed of the man, and not of the women, is that which maketh the generation: and in the carnal act, the man doth nought els, but scatter his seed without forme or figure, as the husbandman soweth his corne in the earth. And as the graine of corne doth not by and by take root, nor formeth a stalke and leaues, vntill some daies been expired: so (saith *Galen*) the creature is not formed all so soon as the mans seed falleth into the womans wombe: but affirmeth that thirtie or fortie daies are requisit, ere the same can be accomplished. And if this be so, what auaileth it that the father go imagining of diuers things in the carnall act, when as the forming beginneth not vntill some daies after? especially, when the forming is not made by the soule of the father or the mother, but by a third thing which is found in the seed it selfe. And the same being only vegetatiue, and no more, is not capable of the imagination, but followeth only the motions of the temperature, and doth nothing els. After my mind, to say that mens children are borne of so diuers figures, through the variable imagination of the parents, is none other, than to auouch, that of grains, some grow big, and some little, because the husband-man (when he sowed them) was distraught into sundry imaginations. Vpon this so vnsound opinion of *Aristotle*, some cutious heads argue, that the children of

the adulterous wife resemble her husband, though they be none of his. And the reason which leadeth them, is manifest: for during the carnall act, the adulterers settle their imagination vpon the husband, with feare least he come and take them napping. And for the same consideration, they conclude that the husbands children resemble the adulterer though they be not his, because the adulterous wife, during the copulation with her husband, alwaies busieth her selfe in contemplation of the figure of her louer. And those who say, that the other woman brought forth a blacke sonne, because she held her imagination fixed on the picture of a blacke man, must also graunt this, which by these queint braines is inferred: for the whole carrieth one selfe reason, and is in my conceit a starcke leasing, and verie mockerie, though it be grounded on the opinion of *Aristotle*. *Hippocrates* answered this probleme better, when he said, that the Scythians are all alike conditioned, and shaped in visage, and rendereth the reason of this resemblance to be, for that they all fed of one selfe meat, and dranke of one selfe water, went apparrelled after one selfe maner, and kept one selfe order in all things. For the same cause, the brute beastes engender yong ones after their particular resemblance, because they alwaies vse the same food, and haue there through an vniforme seede. But contrariwise man, because he eateth diuers meates, euerie day maketh a different seed aswell in substance, as in temperature. The which the naturall Philosophers doe approoue, in answering to a probleme, that saith, What is the cause, that the excrements of brute beastes haue not so vnpleasant a verdure, as those of mankind? And they affirme, that brute beastes vse alwaies the selfe meates, and much exercise therewithall:

but a man eateth so much meate, and of so diuers substance, as he cannot come away with them, and so they grow to corrupt. Mans seed, and that of beasts, hold one selfe reason and consideration, for that they are both of them excrements of a third concoction. As touching the varietie of meats which man vseth, it cannot be denied, but must be graunted, that of euery aliment there is made a different and particular seed. Where it falleth out apparent, that the day, on which a man eateth beefe or bloudings he maketh a grosse seed, & of bad temperature; and therefore, the sonne begotten therof, shalbe disfigured, foolish, blacke, and ill conditioned. And if he eat the carcas of a capon, or of a henne, his seed shall be white, delicat, and of good temperature. VVherthrough the sonne so engendred, shalbe faire, wise, and verie gentle conditioned. From hence I collect, that there is no child born, who partaketh not of the qualities and temperature of that meat, which his parents fed vpon a day before he was begotten. And if any would know of what meat he was formed; let him but consider, with what meat his stomacke hath most familiaritie, (and without all doubt) that it was. Moreouer, the naturall philosophers demand what the cause is, that the children of the wisest men, do ordinarily prooue blockish and void of capacitie? To which probleme they answer verie fondly, saying; that wise men are verie honest and shamefast, and therefore in companying with their wiues, doe abstaine from some diligences, necessarie for effecting that the child prooue of that perfection which is requisite. And they confirme this, by example of such parents, as are foolish and ignorant, who, because they employ all their force and diligence at the time of generation, their children doe all prooue wise and wittie;

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but this answer tokeneth they are slenderly seene in naturall Philosophy. True it is, that for rendering an answere conuenient, it behoooueth first to presuppose and prooue certaine points; one of which purporteth, that the reasonable facultie, is contrarie to the wrathfull and the concupiscible, in sort, that if a man be verie wise, he cannot be verie couragious, of much bodily forces, a great feeder, nor verie able for procreation: for the naturall dispositions, which are requisite, to the end the reasonable soule may performe his operations, carrie a contrarietie to those, which are necessarie for the wrathfull and the concupiscible. *Aristotle* saith, (and it is true) that hardinesse and naturall courage consist in heate: and Prudence and Sapience in cold and drie. VVhence we see by plaine experience, that the valientest persons are void of reason, spare of speech, impatient to be iested withall, and verie soone ashamed; for remedie whereof, they straightwaies set hand on their sword, as not weeting what other answer to make. But men endowed with wit haue many reasons and quicke answers and quippes, with which they entertaine the time, that they may not come to blowes. Of such a manner of wit, *Salust* noteth that *Cicero* was, telling him, that he had much tongue, and feet verie light: wherein he had reason, for so great a wisedome, in matters of armes, could not end but in cowardise. And hence tooke a certaine nipping prouerbe his originall, which saith; He is as valiant as *Cicero*, and as wise as *Hector*. Namely, when we will note a man to be a buzzard, and a cow-babie. No lesse doth the naturall faculty gainsay the vnderstanding, for if a man possesse great bodily forces, he cannot enioy a good wit; and the reason is, for that the force of the arms and

the legges, springeth from having a braine hard and earthly, and though it be true, that by reason of the cold and drie of the earth, he might partake a good vnderstanding, yet in that it hath his composition of a grosse substance, it ruinateth and endammageth the same. For through his coldnesse the courage and hardinesse are quenched: whereth ough, we haue seene some men of great forces to be verie cowardes. The contrarietie which the vegetatiue soule hath with the reasonable, is most manifest of all others, for his operations, namely; to nourish, and engender, are better performed with heat and moisture, than with the contrarie qualities, Which experience cleerely manifesteth, considering how powerfull the same is in the age of childhood, and how weake and remisse in old age. Againe, in boyes estate the reasonable soule cannot vse his operations; whereas in old age, which is vtterly void of heat and moisture, it performeth them with great effect. In sort, that by how much the more a man is enabled for procreation, and for digestion of food, so much he leeseth of his reasonable facultie. To this alludeth that which *Plato* affirmeth, that there is no humour in a man, which so much disturbeth the reasonable faculty, as abundance of seed, only (saith he) the same yeeldeth help to the art of versifieng. Which we behold to be confirmed by daily experience: for when a man beginneth to entreat of amorous matters, so dainly he becommeth a Poet, And if before he were greasie and lousish, forthwith he takes it at heart, to haue a wrinckle in his pompe, or a mote on his cape. And the reason is, because these workes appertaine to the imagination, which encreaseth and lifteth it lofte vp from this point, through the much heat, occasioned in him by this amorous passion. And that loue is an

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hot alteration, sheweth apparently, through the courage and hardinesse, which it planteth in the louer, from whom the same also reaueth all desire of meat, and will not suffer him to sleep. If the common-wealth bare an eie to these tokens, she would banish from publick studies, lusty schollers, and great fighters, inamouted persons, Poets, and those who are verie neat and curious in their apparrell, for they are not furnished with wit or abilitie for any sort of study. Out of this rule, *Aristotle* excepteth the melancholicke by adustion, whose seede (though fruitfull) reaueth not the capacitie. Finally, all the faculties which gouern man, if they be very powerfull, for the reasonable soule in a garboile. Hence it proceeds, that if a man be very wise, he proueth a coward, of small strength of bodie, a spare feeder, and not verie able for procreation. And this is occasioned by the qualities which make him wise, namely; coldnesse and drinesse. And these selfe, weaken the other powers, as appeareth in old men, who (besides their councell and wisdom) are good for nothing els. This doctrine thus presupposed, *Galen* holdeth opinion, that to the end the engendring of whatsoeuer creature may take his perfect effect, two seeds are necessary, one, which must be the agent and former, and another which must serue for nourishment; for a matter so delicat as generation, cannot straightwais ouercome a meat so grosse, as is the blood, vntill the effect be greater. And that the seed is the right aliment of the seed members, *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Galen* doe all accord: for by their opinion, if the blood be not conuerted into seed, it is impossible, that the sinews, the veins, & the arteries can be maintained. Wherthrough *Galen* affirmed, the difference betweene the veines and the cods to be, that the cods doe speedily make much seed,

seed, and the veins a little, and in long space of time: In sort, that nature prouided for the same, an aliment so like, which with light alteration, & without making any excrements, might maintain the other seed. And this could not be effected, if the nourishment therof had bin made of the bloud. The selfe prouision (saith *Galen*) was made by nature, in the engendring of mankind, as in the forming of a chick, and such other birds, as come of egs. In which we see there are two substances, one of the white, and another of the yolke, of one of which, the thicke is made, and by the other maintained all the time whiles the forming endureth. For the same reason are two seeds necessarie in the generation of the man, one, of which the creature may be made, and the other by which it may be maintained whilst the forming endureth. But *Hippocrates* mentioneth one thing worthie of great consideration, namely; that it is not resolued by nature, which of the two seeds shalbe the agent and formour, & which shall serue for aliment. For many times, the seed of the woman is of greater efficacy than that of the man, and when this betideth, she maketh the generation, and that of the husband serueth for aliment. Otherwhiles, that of the husband is more mighty, and that of the wife doth nought els than nourish. This doctrin was not cõsidered by *Aristotle*, who could not vnderstand, whereto the womans seed serued, and therefore vttered a thousand follies; and that the same was but a little water, without vertue or force for generation. Which being granted, it would follow impossible, that a woman should euer couet the conuersation of man; or consent thereunto, but would shun the carnall act, as being her selfe so honest, and the worke so vncleane and filthy; whereby through, in short space mankind would decay,

decay, and the world left depriued of the faireſt creature, that euer nature formed. To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* demandeth, what the cauſe is, that fleſhly copulation ſhould be an action of the greateſt pleaſure, that nature euer ordained for the ſolace of liuing things. To which probleme he anſwereth, that nature hauing ſo deſirouſly procured the perpetuitie of mankind, did therefore place ſo great a delight in his worke, to the end, that they being mooued by ſuch intereſt, might gladly apply themſelues to the act of generation, and if theſe incitements were wanting, no woman or man would condiſcend to the bands of marriage, inaſmuch as the woman ſhould reape none other benefite, than to beare a burden in her belly the ſpace of nine months, with ſo great trauaile and ſorrowes, and at the time of her child-birth, to yndergo the hazard of forgoing her life. So would it be neceſſarie, that the common-wealth ſhould through feare enforce women to marrie, to the end mankind might not come to nothing. But becauſe nature doth her things with pleaſing, ſhe gaue to a woman, all the inſtrumentes neceſſarie for making a ſeed, inciting, and apt for iſſue, whereby ſhe might deſire a man, and take pleaſure in his conuerſation. But if it were of that qualitie which *Ariſtotle* expreſſeth, ſhe would rather flie and abhorre him, than euer loue him. This ſelfe *Galen* prooueth, alleadging an example of the brute beaſtes, wherethrough he ſaith, that if a Sowe be ſpeyed, ſhe neuer deſireth the Boare, nor will conſent that he approch vnto her.

The like we do euidently ſee in a woman, whoſe temperature partaketh more of coldneſſe than is requiſite: for if we tell her that ſhe muſt be married, there

there is no word which soundeth worse in her eare. And the like befalleth to a cold man, for he wanteth the fruitful seed. Moreouer, if a womans seed were of that maner which *Aristotle* mentioneth, it could be no proper aliment: for to attain the last qualities of actuall nutriment, a totall seed is necessarie, whereby it may be nourished. Wherthrough, if the same come not to be concocted & semblable, it cannot performe this point: for womans seed wanteth the instruments and places, as are the stomacke, the liuer, and the eods, where it may be concocted. Therefore nature prouided, that in the engendring of a creature, two seedes should concurre, which being mingled, the mightier should make the forming and the other serue for nourishment. And this is seen euidently so to be: for if a blackamore beget a white woman with child, & a white man a *negro* woman, of both these vnions, will be borne a creature, partaking of either qualitie. Out of this doctrin I gather that to be true, which many authenticall histories affirm, that a dog carnally companying with a woman, made her to conceiue; and the like did a beare with another woman, whom he found alone in the fields. And likewise, an ape had two yong ones by another. We read also of one, who walking for recreation alongst a riuers side, a fish came out of the water, and begat her with child. The matter herein of most difficultie for the vulgar to cõceiue, is, how it may be, that these women should bring forth perfect men, and partakers of the vse of reason, seeing the parents who engendred them, were brute beasts. To this I answer, that the seed of euery of these womẽ, was the agent & former of the creature, as the greater in force, whence it figured the same, with his accidents of mans shape. The seed of the brute beast (as not equall in strength) serued for aliment, & for

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nothing els. And that the ſeede of theſe vnreaſonable beaſts, might yeeld nouriſhment to mans ſeed, is a matter eaſie to be conceiued. For if any of theſe women had eaten a peece of bears fleſh, or of a dog, boiled or roſted, ſhe ſhould haue receiued nouriſhment thereout, though not ſo good as if ſhe had eaten mutton or partridges. The like befalleth to mans ſeed, that his true nouriſhment (in the forming of the creature) is another mans ſeed, but if this be wanting, the ſeed of ſome brute beaſt may ſupply the roome: but a thing which theſe hiſtories ſpecifie, is, that children borne of ſuch copulations giue token in their maners and conditions, that their engendring was not naturall.

Out of the things already rehearſed (though we haue ſomewhat lingered by the way therein) we may now gather the anſwere to that principall probleme, *vz*: that wiſe mens children, are wel-neere alwaies formed of their mothers ſeed: for that of the fathers (for the reaſons alreadie alleaged) is not fruitfull for generation, and in engendrring, ſerueth only for aliment. And the man who is ſhaped of the womans ſeed, cannot be wittie, nor partake abilitie through the much cold and moiſt of that ſex. Whence it becommeth manifeſt, that when the child prooueth diſcreet and prompt, the ſame yeeldeth an infallible token, that he was formed of his fathers ſeed. And if he ſhew blockiſh and vntoward, we inferre, that he was formed of the ſeed of his mother. And hereto did the wiſe-man allude, when he ſaid, The wiſe ſonne reioyceth the father, but a fooliſh child is a griefe to his mother. It may alſo come to paſſe vpõ ſome occaſiõ, that the ſeed of a wiſe man may be the agent & form-giuer, and that of the woman, ſerue for nouriſhment, but the ſon ſo begotten will prooue of

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ſlender capacitie: for put caſe, that cold and dry be two qualities, whereof the vnderſtanding hath need: yet it behooueth, that they hold a certaine quantitie and meaſure, which once exceeded, they doe rather hurt than good. Euen as we ſee men very aged, that by occaſion of ouermuch cold and dry, we find them become children anew, and vtter many ſollies. Let vs then preſuppoſe, that to ſome old man, there yet remaine ten yeares of life, with conuenient cold and dry to diſcourſe, in ſuch ſort, as theſe being expired, he ſhall then grow a babe againe.

If of ſuch a ones ſeed a ſon be engendred, he ſhall till ten yeares age, make ſhew of great ſufficiency: for that til then; he enioyeth the conuenient cold and drouth of his father; but at eleuen yeares old, he will ſodainly quaile away, for that he hath out-paſſed the point, which of theſe two qualities was behooffull. VVhich we ſee confirmed by daily experience in children begotten in old age, who in their childhood are verie aduiſed, and afterwards in mans ſtate, prooue verie dullards, & ſhort of life. And this groweth, becauſe they were made of a ſeed cold and dry, which had alreadie out-run the one half of his race. And if the father be wiſe in the works of the imagination, and by means of his much heat & drineſſe, take to wife a woman cold and moiſt in the third degree, the ſonne born of ſuch an accouplement, ſhalbe moſt vntoward, if he be formed of his fathers ſeed, for that he made abode in a belly ſo cold and moiſt, & was maintained by a blood ſo diſtemperat, the contrary betideth, when the father is vntoward, whoſe ſeed hath ordinarily heat and exceſſiue moiſture. The ſonne ſo engendred, ſhalbe dull til 15 yeares of age, for that he drew part of his fathers ſuperfluous moiſture. But the courſe

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of that age once ſpent, it giueth firmneſſe, in aſmuch as the fooliſh mans ſeed, is more temperat and leſſe moiſt. It aideth likewiſe the wit, to continue nine moneths ſpace in a belly of ſo little coldneſſe and moiſture, as is that of a woman cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, where it endured hunger and want. All this ordinarily befalleth, for the reaſons by vs ſpecified: but there is found a certaine ſort of men, whoſe genitories are endowed with ſuch force and vigour, as they vtterly ſpoile the aliments of their good qualities, and conuert them into their euill and groſſe ſubſtance. Therefore all the children whom they beget, (though they haue eaten delicat meats) ſhall prooue rude and dullards. Others contrariwiſe, vſing groſſe meats, and of euill temperature, are ſo mightie in ouercomming them, that though they eat or porcke, yet they make children of very delicat wit. Whence it prooueth certain, that there are linages of fooliſh men, & races of wiſe men: and others, who of ordinarie are borne blunt and void of iudgement.

Some doubts are encountred, by thoſe who ſeeke to pearce into the bottom of this matter, whoſe anſwer (in the doctrin forepaſſed) is verie eaſie. The firſt is, whence it ſpringeth, that baſtard children accuſtomably reſemble their fathers, and of a 100 lawfull, 90 beare the figure and conditions of the mother. The ſecond, why baſtard children prooue ordinarily deliuer, couragious, and very aduiſed. The third, what the cauſe is, that if a common ſtrumpet conceiue, ſhe neuer looſeth her burden, though ſhe take venomous drenches to deſtroy the ſame, or be let much blood, whereas if a married woman be with child by her husband, vpon euery light occaſion the ſame miſcarrieth. To the firſt, *Plato* anſwereth, ſaying;

saying, that no man is nought of his owne proper and agreeable will, vnlesse he be first incited by the vitiousnesse of his temperature. And he giues vs an example in lecherous men; who, for that they are stored with plentifull and fruitfull seed, suffer great illusions, and many combers; and therefore (molested by that passion) to driue the same from them, doe marrie wiues. Of such *Galen* saith, that they haue the instruments of generation very hot and dry: and for this cause breed seed verie pricking & apt for procreation. A man then, who goeth seeking a woman not his owne, is repleniſhed with this fruitfull, digested, and well seasoned seed, Whence it followeth of force, that he make the generation: for where both are equall, the mans seed carrieth the greatest efficacie; and if the son be shaped of the seed of such a father, it ensueth of necessitie that he resemble him. The contrarie betideth in lawfull children; who, for that married men haue their wiues euer couched by their sides, neuer take regard to ripen the seed, or to make it apt for procreation, but rather (vpon euery light enticement) yeeld the same from them, vsing great violence and stirring; whereas women, abiding quiet, during the carnall act, their seed vessels yeeld not their seed, saue when it is well concoct and seasoned. Therfore married women do alwaies make the engendring, and their husbands seed serueth for aliment. But somtimes it comes to passe, that both the seeds are matched in equall perfection, and combat in such sort, as both the one and the other take effect in the forming, and so is a child shaped, who resembleth neither father nor mother. Another time it seemeth that they agree vpon the matter, & part the likenesse between them: the seed of the father maketh the nosthrils and the eies; and that of the mother, the

the mouth and the forehead. And which carrieth most maruell, it hath so fallen out, that the sonne hath taken one eare of his father, and another of his mother, and so the like in his eies. But if the fathers seed do altogither preuaile, the childe retaineth his nature and his conditions: and when the seed of the mother swaieth moist, the like reason taketh effect. Therefore, the father who coueteth, that his child may be made of his owne seed, ought to withdraw himselfe for some daies from his wife, and stay till all his seed be concocted and ripened; and then it will fall out certain that the forming shall proceed from him, and the wifes seed shall serue for nourishment. The second doubt (by meanes of that we haue said already) beareth little difficultie: for bastard children are ordinarily made of seed hote and dry: and from this temperature (as we haue oftentimes prooued heretofore) spring courage, brauerie, and a good imagination, whereto this wisdome of the world appertaineth. And because the seed is digested and well seasoned, nature effecteth what she likes best, and pourtraieth those children as with a pensill. To the third doubt may be answered, that the conceiuing of lewd women, is most commonly wrought by the mans seed: and because the same is drie, and verie apt for issue, it fasteneth it selfe in the woman with verie strong rootes; but the childe breeding of married women, being wrought by their own seed, occasioneth, that the creature easily vnlooseth, because the same was moist and watry, or as *Hippocrates* saith, full of mustinesse.

What diligences are to be vsed, for preseruing the childrens wit after they are formed.

§. 5.

THe matter whereof man is compounded, prooueth a thing so alterable, and so subiect to corruption, that at the instant where he beginneth to be shaped; he likewise beginneth to be vntwined, and to alter, and therein can find no remedy. For it was said, so soon as we are born, we faile to be. Wherthrough nature prouided, that in mans body, there should be 4 natural faculties, attractiue, retētiue, concoctiue, & expulsiue. The which concocting & altering the aliments which we eate, returne to repaire the substance that was lost, ech succeeding in his place. By this we vnderstand, that it little auaileth to haue engendred a child of delicat seed, if we make no reckoning of the meates, which afterwards we feed vpon. For the creation being finished, there remaineth not for the creature, any part of the substance whereof it was first composed. True it is, that the first seed, if the same be well concocted and seasoned, possesseth such force, that digesting & altering the meats, it maketh them (though they be bad and grosse) to turne to his good temperature and substance, but we may so farforth vse contrary meats, as the creature shall loose those good qualities, which it receiued from the seed wherof it was made: therefore *Plato* said, that one of the things which most brought mans wit, and his manners to ruine, was his euill bringing vp in diet. For which cause he counselled that we should giue vnto children, meats and drinks, delicat, and of good temperature, to the end, that when they grow big, they may know how to abandon the euil, & to embrace the good. The reason hereof is very cleere. For if at the beginning the

the braine was made of delicat seed, and that this member goeth euerie day impairing and consuming, and must be repaired with the meats which we eat, it is certaine, if these being grosse and of euill temperature, that vsing them many daies togither, the braine will become of the same nature. Therefore it sufficeth not, that the child be borne of good seed, but also it behoooueth that the meat which he eateth, after he is formed and borne, bee endowed with the same qualities. What these be, it carrieth no great difficultie to manifest, if you presuppose, that the Greekes were the most discreet men of the world, and that, enquiring after aliments and food, to make their children witty and wise, they found the best and most appropriat. For if the subtile and delicate wit, consist in causing that the braine be compounded of partes subtile, and of good temperature, that meate which aboue all others partaketh these two qualities, shalbe the same which it behoooueth vs to vse, for obteining our end. *Galen*, and all the Greeke Phisitions, say that Goats milke boiled with honny, is the best meat which any man can eat: for besidees that it hath a moderate substance, therein the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie. Therefore we said (some few leaues past) that the parentes, whose will earnestly leadeth them, to haue a childe, wise, prompt, and of good conditions, must eat much Goats milke boiled with honny, 7 or 8 daies before the copulation. But albeit this aliment is so good (as *Galen* speaketh of) yet it falleth out a matter of importance for the wit, that the meate consist of moderate substance, and of subtile partes. For how much the finer the mater becommeth in the nourishment of the braine, so much the more is the wit sharpened. For which cause, the Greekes drew

out of the milke, cheese and whey (which are the two grosse aliments of his composition) and left the butter, which in nature resembleth the aire. This they gaue in food to their children, mingled with honny, with intention to make them witty and wise. And that this is the truth, is plainly seen by that which *Homer* recounteth. Besides this meat, children did eat cracknels, of white bread, of very delicat water, with honny and a little salt: but in steed of vinegar (for that the same is very noisome and dammageable to the vnderstanding) they shall adde thereunto, butter of Goats-milke, whose temperature & substance, is appropriat for the wit. But in this regiment grows an inconuenience verie great, namely; that children vsing so delicat meats, shall not possesse sufficient strength to resist the iniuries of the aire: neither can defend themselues from other occasions, which are woont to breed maladies. So by making thē become wise, they will fall out to be vnhealthful, and liue a small time. This difficulty demandeth, in what sort children may be brought vp, witty and wise, and yet the matter so handled, as it may no way gainsay their healthfulnes. Which shall easily be effected, if the parentes dare to put in practise, some rules and precepts which I wil prescribe. And because deintie people are deceiued in bringing vp their childrē, and they treat stil of this matter: I wil first assigne them the cause why their children, though they haue Schoolemaisters and tutors, and themselues take such pains at their booke, yet they come away so meanly with the sciences, as also in what sort they may remedy this, without that they abridge their life, or hazard their health. Eight things (saith *Hippocrates*) make mans flesh moist & fat. The 1 to be merry, and to liue at hearts ease; the 2 to sleepe much: the 3 to lie in a soft bed: the 4 to

fare well: the fifth, to be well apparelled and furnished: the sixth, to ride alwaies on horsebacke: the seuenth, to haue our will: the eighth to be occupied in plaies and pastimes, and in things which yeeld contentment and pleasure. All which is a veritie so manifest, as if *Hippocrates* had not affirmed it, none durst denie the same. Only we may doubt, whether delicious people doe alwaies obserue this maner of life; but if it be true that they do so, we may well conclude, that their seed is very moist, and that the children which they beget, will of necessitie ouer-abound in superfluous moisture, which it behoooueth first to be consumed: for this qualitie sendeth to ruine the operations of the reasonable soule: And moreouer the Phisitions say, that it maketh them to liue a short space and vnhealthfull. By this it should seeme, that a good wit, and a sound bodily health require one selfe qualitie, Namely drouth; wherethrough, the precepts and rules which we are to lay downe for making children wise, will serue likewise to yeeld them much health, and long life. It behooueth them, (so soone as a childe is borne of delicious parents) inasmuch as their constitution consisteth of more cold and moist than is conuenient for childhood, to wash him with salt hote water; which (by the opinion of all phisitions) soketh vp and drieth the flesh, & giueth soundnesse to the sinews, and maketh the child strong and manly, and (by consuming the ouermuch moisture of his braine) enableth him with wit, and freeth him from many deadly infirmities. Contrariwise, the bath being of water fresh and hot, in that the same moisteneth the flesh (saith *Hippocrates*) it breedeth fiue annoiances; Namely, effeminating of the flesh, weakenesse of sinews, dulnesse of spirits, fluxes of blood, and baseneſſe of stomacke. But if the

child issue out of his mothers belly with excessiue drinesse, it is requisit to washe the same with hote fresh water. Therfore *Hippocrates* said, children are to be washed a long time with hote water, to the end they may receiue the lesse annoiance by the crampe, and that they may grow and be well coloured: but (for certaine) this must be vnderstood of those who come forth drie out of their mothers belly, in whom it behoueth to amend their euill temperature, by applying vnto them contrarie qualities. The Almains (saith *Galen*) haue a custome, to wash their children in a riuer, so soon as they are born, them seeming, that as the iron which commeth burning hot out of the forge, is made the stronger, if it be dipped in cold water: so when the hot child is taken out of the mothers wombe, it yeeldeth him of greater force and vigour, if he be washed in fresh water. This thing is condemned by *Galen* for a beastly practise, and that with great reason: for put case, that by this way, the skinne is hardened and closed, and not easie to be altered by the iniuries of the aire, yet will it rest offended by the excrements which are engendred in the body, for that the same is not of force, nor open so as they may be exhaled and passe forth. But the best and safest remedie is, to wash the children, who haue superfluous moisture, with hot salt water: for their excessiue moisture consuming, they are the neerer to health, and the way through the skinne, being stopped in them, they cannot receiue annoiance by any occasion. Neither are the inward excrements therefore so shut vp, that there are not waies left open for them, where they may come out. And nature is so forcible, that if they haue taken from her a common way, she will seeke out another to serue her turne. And when all others faile, she can skill to make new

waies,

waies, wherethrough to ſend out what doth her dammage. Wherefore of two extreames, it is more auaileable for health, to haue a skinne hard and ſomewhat cloſe, than thinne and open.

The ſecond thing requiſit to be performed when the child ſhalbe born, is, that we make him acquainted with the winds, and with change of aire, & not keep him ſtill locked vp in a chamber: for elſe it will become weake, womaniſh, peeuiſh, of feeble ſtrength, and within three or foure daies, giue vp the ghoſt. Nothing (ſaith *Hippocrates*) ſo much weakeneth the fleſh, as to abide ſtill in warme places, and to keepe our ſelues from heate and cold. Neither is there a better remedie for healthfull liuing, than to accuſtome our body to al winds, hot, cold, moiſt, and dry. Wherethrough *Ariſtotle* enquireth, what the cauſe is, that ſuch as liue in the Gallies are more healthy, & better colored, than thoſe who inhabit a plaſhy ſoil. And this difficulty groweth greater, conſidering the hard life which they lead, ſleeping in their clothes, in the open aire, againſt the ſun, in the cold, & the water, & faring withall ſo courſly. The like may be demanded, as touching ſhepheards, who of all other men enioy the ſoundeſt health, & it ſpringeth, becauſe they haue made a league with al the ſeueral qualities of the aire, and their nature diſmaieth at nothing. Cõtrariwiſe, we plainly ſee, that if a man giue himſelfe to liue deliciouſly, and to beware that the ſun, the cold, the euening, nor the wind offend him, within 3 daies he ſhalbe diſpatched with a poſt letter to another world. Therfore it may well be ſaid, he that loueth his life in this world, ſhall leeſe it: for there is no man that can preſerue himſelf from the alteration of the aire; therfore it is better to accuſtom himſelf to euery thing, to the end a mã may liue careles, & not in ſuſpẽce.

The errour of the vulgar consisteth, in thinking that the babe is borne so tender and delicat, as he cannot endure to issue forth of the mothers wombe (where it was so warme) into a region of the aire so cold, without receiuing much dammage. And verely they are deceiued: for those of Almaine (a region so cold) vsed to dip their children so hote in the riuer: and though this were a beastly act, yet the same did them no hurt, nor deaths harme.

3 The third point conuenient to be accomplished, is, to seeke out a yoong nurse of temperature hot & drie: or (after our doctrine) cold and moist in the first degree; enured to hardnesse & want, to lie on the bare ground, to eat little, and to go poorly clad, in wet, drouth and heat; such a one will yeeld a firme milke, as acquainted with the alterations of the aire; and the childe being brought vp by her, for some good space, will grow to possesse a great firmnesse. And if she be discreet and aduised, the same will also be of much auaile for his wit: for the milke of such a one, is verie cleane, hot, and drie: with which two qualities, the much cold and moist will be corrected, which the infant brought from his mothers wombe. How greatly it importeth for the strength of the creature, that it sucke a milke well exercised, is apparently proued in horses, who being foaled by mares, toiled in plowing and harrowing, proue great coursers, and will abide much hardnesse. And if the dammes run vp and down idlely in the pastures after the first cariere, they are not able to stand on their feet. The order then which should be held with the nurse, is, to take her into house, some foure or fiue months before the childbirth, and to giue her the same meats to eat, wheron the mother feedeth, that she may haue time to consume the blood

blood and bad humours, which she had gathered by harmfull meats, that she vsed tofore, and to the end the child (so soon as it is born) may sucke the like milke vnto that, which relieued it in the mothers bellie, or made at least of the same meats.

The fourth is, not to accustome the child to sleepe in a soft bed, nor to keepe him ouerwarme apparrelled: or giue him too much meat. For these three things (saith *Hippocrates*) scarsen and dry vp the flesh, and their contraries, fatten and enlarge the same. And in so doing, the child shall grow of great wit, and of long life, by reason of this drinesse: and by the contraries, he will prooue faire, fat, ful of bloud, & blockish, which habit, *Hippocrates* called Wrastler-like, and holdeth it for verie perillous. With this selfe receit and order of life, was the wisest man brought vp, that euer the world had; To weet our sauiour Christ, in that he was man, sauing (for that he was born out of Nazareth) perhaps his mother had no salt water at hand, wherewith she might wash him: but this was a custome of the Iews, and of all Asia besides, brought in by some skilfull Phisitions, for the good of infants, wherethrough the Prophet saith, And when thou wert borne, at thy birth day thy nauill string was not cut off: neither wert thou for thy healths sake washed in water, nor seasoned with salt, nor wrapped in swathling clothes. But as touching the other things, so soone as he was borne, he began to hold friendship with the cold, and the other alterations of the aire. His first bed was the earth, his apparell course, as if he would obserue *Hippocrates* receit. A few daies after they went with him into Ægypt, a place very hot, where he remained all the time that *Herod* liued. His mother partaking the like humours, it is certaine, that she must yeeld him a

milke

milke well exercised, and acquainted with the alterations of the aire. The meate which they gaue him, was the same which the Greeks deuised, to endow their childrē with wit and wisdom. This (I haue said heretofore) was the butterish part of the milke eaten with honny. Wherfore *Esay* saith, He shall eat butter & honny, that he may know to eschew euill, and chuse the good. By which wordes is seen, how the Prophet gaue vs to vnderstand, that albeit he was verie God, yet he ought also to be a perfect man, and to attaine naturall wisedome, he must apply the semblable diligences, as doe the other sons of men. Howbeit this seemeth difficult to be conceiued, and may be also held a folly, to thinke that because Christ our redeemer did eate butter and honny being a childe, he should therefore know how to eschue euill, and make choice of good, when he was elder, God being (as he is) of infinite wisedome, and hauing giuen him (as he was man) all the science infused, which he could receiue after his naturall capacitie. Therefore it is certaine that he knew full as much in his mothers wombe, as when he was thirtie three yeares old, without eating either butter or honny, or borrowing the helpe of anie other naturall remedies requisite for humaine wisdom: But for all this, it is of great importance that the Prophet assigned him that selfe meat, which the Troians and Greeks accustomably gaue their children, to make them witty and wise, & that he said, To the end he may know to shun euill and chuse the good. For vnderstanding, that by means of these aliments, Christ our sauiour, got (as he was man) more acquisit knowledge, than he should haue possessed if he had vsed other contrarie meats; it behoueth vs to expound this particle, (to the end) that we may know what he meant, when

he

he spake in those termes. We must therefore presuppose, that in Christ our redeemer were two natures, as the verity trueth is, and the faith so teacheth vs, one, diuine, as he was God; and another humane, compounded of a reasonable soule, and of an elimentall bodie, so disposed and instrumentalized, as the other children of men. As concerning his first nature, it behoueth not to entreat of the wisdome of our sauiour Christ: for it was infinit without encrease or diminishment, and without dependance vpon ought else, saue onely in that he was God, and so he was as wise in his mothers wombe, as when he was 33 yeares of age, and so from euerlasting. But in that which appertaineth to his second nature, we are to weet, that the soule of Christ, euen from the instant when God created it, was blessed, and glorious, euen as now it is; and seeing it enioyed God and his wisdome, it is certaine that in him was none ignorance: but he had so much science infused, as his naturall capacity would beare: but withall, it is alike certaine, that as the glorie did not communicat it selfe vnto all the partes of the bodie, in respect of the redemption of mankinde; no more did the wisedome infused, communicate it selfe. For the braine was not disposed, not instrumentalized, with the qualities & substance, which are necessary, to the end the soule may with such an instrument, discourse and philosophize: for if you call to mind that which in the beginning of this worke we deliuered, the graces *gratis* giuen, which God bestoweth vpon men, doe ordinarily require, that the instrument with which they are to be exercised, and the subiect whereinto it is to be receiued, doe partake the naturall qualities, requisite for euerie such gift. And the reason is, because that the reasonable soule, is an

act

act of the body, and worketh not without the seruice of his bodily instrumentes. The braine of our redeemer Christ, whilst he was a babe, and lately born, had much moisture: for in that age it was behoofful so to be, and a matter naturall; and therefore in that it was of such qualitie, his reasonable soule (naturally) could not discourse nor philosophize with such an instrumēt. Wherethrough, the science infused, passed not to the bodily memorie, nor to the imagination, nor the vnderstanding, because these three are instrumentall powers (as before we haue proued) & enioyed not that perfection, which they were to haue, but whilst the brain went drying, by meanes of time and age: the reasonable soule went also manifesting euery day more and more, the infused wisdome which it had, and communicated the same to the bodily powers. Now, besides this supernaturall knowledge, he had also another, which is gathered of things that they heard whilest they were children, of that which they saw, of that which they smelled, of that which they tasted, and of that which they touched: and this (for certaine) our sauiour Christ attained as other men do. And euen as for discerning things perfectly, he stood in need of good eies, and for hearing of sounds, good eares: so also he stood in need of a good braine, to iudge the good and the euill. Whence it is manifest, that by eating those delicat meates, his head was daily better instrumentalized, & attained more wisdom. In sort, that if God had taken frō him his science infused, thrise in the course of his life (by seeing that which he had purchased) we shall find, that at ten yeares he knew more than at fiue, at twentie, more than at ten, and at thirtie three, more than at twenty. And that this doctrin is true and catholicke, the letter of the Euangelicke text

prooueth, saying; and Iesus encreased in wisedome and age, and grace, with God, & with men. Of many catholicke senses which the holy scripture may receiue, I hold that euer better which taketh the letter, than that which reaueth the termes and wordes of their naturall signification. What the qualities are which the brain ought to haue, and what the substance, we haue already reported, by the opinion of *Heraclitus*, That drinesse maketh the wisest soule. And by *Galens* mind we proued, That when the braine is compounded of a substance very delicat, it maketh the wit to be subtile. Christ our redeemer, went purchasing more drinesse by his age: for from the day that we are borne, vntil that of our death, we daily grow to a more drinesse, and leesing of flesh, & a greater knowledge. The subtile and delicat parts of his braine, went correcting themselues whilst he fed vpon meats, which the Prophet speaketh of. For if euery moment he had need of nourishment, and restoring the substance which wasted away, and this must be performed with meates, and in none other sort, it is certaine, that if he had alwaies fed on cowes beefe, or porcke, in few daies he should haue bred himselfe a braine grosse and of euill temperature: with which his reasonable soule could not haue shunned euill, or chosen good, saue by miracle, and employing his diuinitie. But God leading him by naturall means, caused him to vse those so delicat meats, by which the braine being maintained, the same might be made an instrument, so well supplied, as (euen without vsing the diuine or infused knowledge) he might naturally haue eschued euill, and chosen good, as do the other children of men.

FINIS.

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§. 4. *What diligence is to be vsed, that children may proue wittie and wise.* 300

§. 5. *What diligences are to be vsed, for preserving the childrens wit after they are formed.* 322

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